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AN HISTORICAL
AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
OF EUROPE

AN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE

BY

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WITH 162 MAPS IN THE TEXT



GEORGE G. HARRAP & CO. LTD.
LONDON SYDNEY TORONTO BOMBAY

First published 1947
by GEORGE G. HARRAP & Co. LTD.
18a High Holborn, London, W.C.1
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COMPOSED IN BASKERVILLE TYPE AND PRINTED BY THE PITMAN PRESS, BATH
Made in Great Britain

PREFACE

THIS book was originally written with the restricted purpose of serving as a text-book for sixth forms and for those preparing for the Higher School Certificate examination. It was at the publisher's suggestion that it was extended somewhat, in the hope that it would appeal to a rather wider public. The more advanced stages of geographical study borrow heavily from the works of other subjects. The barrier between Geography on the one hand and History and Economics on the other is narrow, if, in fact, it exists at all. The raw material is common to all three, and if the technique of handling it differs is it not possible that the professed geographer would do well to study and use the techniques of both historian and economist? If he did so more frequently he might be nearer to substituting the whole truth for the half-truths that often masquerade as Geography.

No attempt is made to define historical geography. The book contains much history that would be of use to geographers and perhaps some geography that historians would do well to know. Its purpose is, quite simply, to trace the influence of essentially geographical factors—the surface topography of the earth—on, first, the course of European History and then on the intricacies of world politics. This does not represent the whole content of historical geography, as the writer conceives it. It is merely that part of it which, in his experience, has the greatest value both to the student of immature years and to the hypothetical man in the street.

Political Geography should be up to date, but, under present conditions, there is necessarily a considerable time-lag between the preparation of a manuscript and its publication. The literature dealing with the contemporary scene is bewildering in its variety. Most profit will probably be obtained in a minimum of time from a study of *The World Today*, *The Economist*, *Foreign Affairs*, *The Nineteenth Century*, and the *Spectator*, though no list of periodicals can be exclusive.

Maps have been based on Droysen's *Historischer Handatlas* and Sprüner-Menke's *Handatlas für die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit*, except where other sources have been quoted. Book lists have been kept very short, and contain only the more obvious and easily accessible literature.

I am indebted for much help, advice, and encouragement to Mrs H. G. Steers, M.A., and Miss J. B. Mitchell, M.A., both of the Department of Geography, Cambridge. Following the advice of an old teacher to 'try it on the dog,' I have subjected many students to varying doses of manuscript and have observed the degrees of mental indigestion with which they have reacted. For all their help I am particularly grateful. Lastly, my thanks are due to my old friends, Noreen and Christopher Vivian, for the care with which they have read the proofs and the insistence with which they have pressed their criticism of fact and style, and to my wife for the hours of labour which she has expended on the maps.

N. J. G. POUNDS

FITZWILLIAM HOUSE
CAMBRIDGE
June 1947

CONTENTS

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|--|------------------|
| <p>I. THE PHYSICAL BACKGROUND</p> <p>Relief, p. 11. The Scandinavian Shield, p. 11. Central European Highlands, p. 12. The Great Plain of Europe, p. 13. The Alps, p. 15. The Mediterranean, p. 17. Climate, p. 18.</p> | <p>11</p> |
| <p>PART I</p> <p>ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL TIMES</p> | |
| <p>II. THE EARLY CIVILIZATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST</p> <p>Neolithic Times, p. 24. Origin of Urban Civilization, p. 27. The Fertile Crescent, p. 28. Egypt, p. 31. The Tigris-Euphrates Valley, p. 32. The Spread of Culture, p. 34. India and China, p. 36. The Iron Age, p. 36.</p> | <p>23</p> |
| <p>III. THE WORLD OF GREECE AND ROME</p> <p>The Phœnicians, p. 39. The Ægean Sea, p. 42. Achæans, Dorians, and Ionians, p. 44. The City-state, p. 45. Greek Colonies, p. 49. Thebes, Thessaly, and Macedonia, p. 50. Rome, p. 53.</p> | <p>39</p> |
| <p>IV. THE DISRUPTION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE</p> <p>The Roman Empire, p. 58. Frontiers of the Roman Empire, p. 58. Provinces of the Roman Empire, p. 62. The Barbarian Invasions, p. 65. France, p. 70. The Byzantine Empire, p. 72. The Rise of Islam, p. 73. The Carolingian Empire, p. 75.</p> | <p>58</p> |
| <p>V. THE SEA EMPIRES OF NORTHERN EUROPE</p> <p>Anglo-Saxon Peoples, p. 81. The Vikings, p. 85. The Norsemen, p. 87. The Swedes, p. 88.</p> | <p>79</p> |
| <p>VI. STATE-BUILDING IN WESTERN EUROPE</p> <p>The French State, p. 92. The Spanish Peninsula, p. 96. The Italian Peninsula, p. 100. The Crusades, p. 101. Trade in Medieval Europe, p. 104. Trade and the Italian Cities, p. 104. The Commerce of Northern Europe, p. 105. Towns of the Middle Ages, p. 106.</p> | <p>90</p> |

A POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE

| CHAPTER | | PAGE |
|---------|----------------------------|------|
| VII. | CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE | 109 |

Medieval Germany, p. 109. German Borders in the East, p. 114. The Economic Development of Medieval Germany, p. 118. Burgundy, p. 120. Slavonic Lands, p. 124. South-eastern Europe, p. 126.

PART II MODERN TIMES

| | | |
|-------|--|-----|
| VIII. | THE GREAT DISCOVERIES | 131 |
| | Portuguese Voyagers, p. 134. The New World, p. 135. | |
| IX. | THE TURKISH EMPIRE | 140 |
| X. | THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE | 146 |
| | Race in Europe, p. 146. Language in Europe, p. 151. Territorial Problems, p. 157. | |
| XI. | THE RUSSIAN STATE | 162 |
| | The Kingdom of Kiev, p. 164. Great Russia, p. 166. Russian Expansion, p. 168. Economic Development, p. 175. | |
| XII. | FRANCE AND HER EASTERN FRONTIERS | 177 |
| | The Natural Frontier, p. 177. The French Revolution and Napoleon, p. 180. Agriculture, p. 183. Towns, Industry, and Trade, p. 185. | |
| XIII. | GERMANY AND THE BALTIC | 189 |
| | Germany, p. 189. The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia, p. 190. The Rest of Germany, p. 192. Sweden and the Baltic, p. 193. Germany in the Nineteenth Century, p. 196. The Zollverein, p. 196. The Unification of Germany, p. 198. | |
| XIV. | THE NINETEENTH CENTURY | 200 |
| | Railways and Canals, p. 200. Coal and Iron, p. 203. Manufacturing Industries, p. 206. Agriculture, p. 208. Population, p. 211. | |

PART III THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

| | | |
|-----|--|-----|
| XV. | TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS OF THE WESTERN POWERS | 215 |
| | The Spanish Peninsula, p. 215. Portugal, p. 226. France, p. 227. Belgium, p. 234. The Netherlands, p. 237. | |

CONTENTS

9.

| CHAPTER | | PAGE |
|---------|---|------|
| XVI. | THE MEDITERRANEAN | 242 |
| | Mediterranean Colonization, p. 244. The Western Basin, p. 249. Italy, p. 251. The Central Mediterranean, p. 257. The Eastern Mediterranean, p. 261. Turkey, p. 269. | |
| XVII. | GERMANY IN THE MODERN WORLD | 272 |
| | The First World War, p. 274. The Treaty of Versailles, p. 277. Territorial Acquisitions, p. 279. Germans in Europe, p. 281. National Self-sufficiency, p. 284. The Second World War, p. 290. Post-war Germany, p. 292. | |
| XVIII. | THE NORTHERN SLAVS | 297 |
| | Poland, p. 297. Czechoslovakia, p. 307. | |
| XIX. | THE DANUBIAN STATES | 314 |
| | The Reconquest of South-eastern Europe, p. 314. Austria, p. 318. Hungary, p. 321. Roumania, p. 327. | |
| XX. | THE BALKANS | 333 |
| | The Balkan Wars, p. 334. Yugoslavia, p. 337. Bulgaria, p. 345. Greece, p. 348. The Straits, p. 351. Peasant Europe, p. 353. | |
| XXI. | SOVIET RUSSIA | 357 |
| | The Russian Revolution, p. 357. Tsarist Russia, p. 363. The Economic Revolution, p. 365. Political Divisions, p. 369. Russia's Frontiers in the West, p. 370. The Black Sea, p. 373. The Heart of Asia, p. 374. The Soviet Far East, p. 376. | |
| | PART IV | |
| | EXTRA-EUROPEAN RELATIONS | |
| XXII. | NINETEENTH-CENTURY IMPERIALISM | 378 |
| | The Eighteenth Century, p. 382. The South American Colonies, p. 383. Motives of Nineteenth-century Imperialism, p. 384. The French Empire, p. 387. The British Empire, p. 388. The German Empire, p. 389. The Italian Empire, p. 391. The Belgian Empire, p. 391. | |
| XXIII. | TWENTIETH-CENTURY IMPERIALISM | 393 |
| | The Value of Colonies, p. 397. Colour and Labour, p. 399. Mandates and Trusteeship, p. 401. Colonial Policies of the Imperial Powers, p. 403. | |

| CHAPTER | | PAGE |
|------------|--|------|
| XXIV. | TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS OF THE IMPERIAL POWERS | 407 |
| | Africa, p. 408. Asia, p. 426. North and South America, p. 451. | |
| XXV. | THE ATLANTIC | 456 |
| | Special Interests of Great Britain, p. 460. Special Interests of the United States, p. 463. The Political Geography of Canada and Newfoundland, p. 466. The United States of America, p. 470. Latin America, p. 477. Pan-America, p. 483. | |
| XXVI. | THE PACIFIC | 486 |
| | Australia, p. 488. China and Japan, p. 492. Russia and Japan in Manchuria, p. 498. Japan in the Modern World, p. 500. United States in the Pacific, p. 505. British Interests in the Pacific, p. 509. | |
| CONCLUSION | | 511 |
| | Geopolitics, p. 513. Geographical Determinism, p. 517. Con- ception of the State, p. 518. | |
| INDEX | | 523 |

• CHAPTER ONE

• THE PHYSICAL BACKGROUND

THE land on which the drama of European history has been played out is a peninsula, broadly based in the east on the land mass of Asia, and on the south bounded by the continent of Africa. Its shores, from the White Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south, are irregular. On the north they are indented by the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, and the Bay of Biscay; on the south by the Black Sea and Ægean, the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas. The importance of these arms of the sea, reaching so deeply into the land, lies in the amelioration of the climate that results. The Mediterranean, longest and, in its historical influence, most important of these land-locked seas, sets a limit to the desert of Africa and produces the conditions in which the earliest European civilizations grew up. To the west of the European peninsula, the North Atlantic Ocean, narrowest of the oceans of the world, at first limited the sea-faring activities of the peoples of Western Europe, and then contributed to the close intercourse between its two shores, which now gives a degree of unity to the whole North Atlantic basin.

Europe has a greater variety of relief and climate than any comparable area in the Old World. It consists essentially of a series of belts which extend westward from Asia, narrowing as they approach the Atlantic, until they converge in France. The variety of relief and resource which results in this country is an important factor in her early civilization and economic stability.

RELIEF

The Scandinavian Shield. To the north is the core of Europe, the mass of hard, pre-Cambrian rock which forms much of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and North-western Russia, and which tapers south-westward through the Highlands of Scotland to end in Northern Ireland. This Fenno-Scandian area was folded, uplifted, and peneplained before Palæozoic times. It has since been involved in earth-movements and

exposed to denudation. Within the last million years it has been depressed under the weight of the ice sheet which covered Northern Europe. Its soil has been scraped away



FIG. 1. THE MAJOR PHYSIOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF EUROPE

Unshaded area is covered with rocks of Secondary or later date, generally unfolded and of gentle relief.

by the passage of the ice, and its contours smoothed and rounded.

Central European Highlands. All later rocks which make up the continent of Europe have been laid down upon the flanks of this denuded massif. Rocks of Palæozoic age stretch south and east, under Germany and Russia. They are hard and resistant,

often forming hill masses. They have much mineral wealth, and contain almost all the black coal deposits of the continent. In Great Britain Palæozoic rocks compose Central and Southern Scotland, the Pennines and Lake District, Wales, and much of Ireland. Isolated outcrops show through the English plain, islanded by softer and younger rocks, in the hilly country of Birmingham, Charnwood, the coalfield area of Bristol, and the Mendip Hills. These masses are Palæozoic islands in a sea of soft and but slightly folded Mesozoic deposits.

Similar and larger 'islands' break the monotony of the European Plain—Brittany, Cotentin, Maine, Poitou, comprising together the Armorican massif; the Central Massif of France, the Vosges and Black Forest, the Ardennes and Rhineland plateau, the Highlands of Central Germany, Bohemia, the hills of Southern Poland, the Donetz region of Russia. These hills were folded in the course of the Armorican earth-movements, which occurred near the end of Palæozoic time. The coal measures, among the latest of Palæozoic strata, remained on the flanks of these mountains, but were in general worn away from their summits. That is the reason why the areas of industrial development in Europe follow closely the margins of these highlands, while in the heart of the hills considerable deposits of metal have formed, particularly of lead, zinc, copper, and tin.

The Great Plain of Europe. Between the Fenno-Scandian Highlands and this Central European hilly belt is the Great Plain of Europe. This low, undulating area tapers westward from the borders of Asia, embracing most of European Russia, almost all of Poland, North Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands. The plain narrows in Belgium, between the Ardennes and the sea, widens again into the Paris basin, and is continued across the Channel in South-eastern England. It is built up of thin and only slightly folded beds of limestone, chalk, and clay, so familiar in the 'scarp and vale' of England. A similar pattern is formed in France, but in the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, and Russia, these structural features have been in large measure obscured by the drift laid down during and after the last Ice Age. These quaternary deposits consist of layers of boulder-clay, upon whose uneven surface lakes have formed, as, for example, in the Spreewald country near Berlin and in

East Prussia. The heavy soil, the frequent lakes and marshy hollows, and the forests have interrupted movement and impeded settlement. The boulder-clay plains are in general sparsely populated areas, where ancient practices, dialects, and even languages have survived.

The maximum extension of the ice sheet and stages in its retreat are marked by parallel lines of terminal moraines, which lie from south-east to north-west across the plain of North Germany, and are continued towards the east across Poland and into Russia. They consist of gravel and sand, and form poor heathland. They have deflected the rivers, and made them flow between the parallel ridges towards the north-west. It is a factor of no slight importance in the history of Germany that the centre and even the east of the country is drained towards the North Sea, and not to the Baltic.

Much of the plain in the Low Countries, Germany, and Poland thus consists of the infertile gravels of the moraines and their outwash fans, and of heavy clay; but to the south, between the drift-covered plain and the hill country of Central Europe is a belt of more open and fertile country, covered by a wind-blown deposit of fine, dust-like loess. This soil is naturally dry, porous, and fertile. It was never thickly wooded. Easily cleared and cultivated, it was one of the first areas to be settled. The 'limon' of Northern France and 'brick-earth' of Southern England, consisting for the most part of loess re-sorted by rain, form *les terres de culture facile*, on which an improved agriculture was first practised in North-western Europe. The loess-covered areas have formed tracts of open country, along which movement, either of invasion or settlement, has been easy. They have guided the German expansion towards the East, and their natural productivity, allied with the close proximity of coal has made them the most densely populated region of Europe.

The Central European highland zone is surrounded by lowlands, sometimes loess or drift-covered, of Mesozoic strata. The highlands are broken up by faulting and deeply eroded. Though generally infertile and sparsely peopled, and often wooded, they have not constituted a serious barrier to movement. They give added importance to the ways round and through them: the Gap of Lauraguais, the Côte d'Or and

Rhône Trough, the Rhine Rift Valley, Moravian Gap, and others. The largest area of lowland south of their highland belt is the plain of South Germany. But everywhere the level Mesozoic strata merge southward into the Alps, which form the fourth of the east-west zones of which Europe is composed. The strata become thicker in this direction. Gentle flexures give place to the regular folding which characterizes the Jura, and this in turn to the overfolding of the Alpine system.

The Alps. The Alps are 'young' mountains. Throughout their length the system is high and is generally, as in the Pyrenees, the French and Swiss Alps, and the Dinaric chain, difficult to cross. On the other hand, it harbours distinct cultural groups in its innermost recesses. Small language groups survive, and the belt has always been characterized by small political units—Andorra, Lichtenstein, the Swiss Cantons. At the same time, the remoteness of many of the Alpine valleys has encouraged in-breeding and consequent impoverishment of the human stock.

The Alpine system may be said to begin in the west of the ranges of Northern and Southern Spain and of the Atlas Mountains and to continue eastward through the Apennines, the French and Swiss Alps. Here the range divides. Spurs of the northern branch cross the Danube at Bratislava and Budapest and unite again to form the Carpathian range, and its continuations, the Transylvanian Alps, Balkan Mountains, and the Yalta hills of the Crimea. The more southerly widens in Yugoslavia to form the Dinaric system, which sends long fingers of mountains through Greece, encloses the Ægean, and extends into Asia Minor.

Masses of the old Hercynian Europe were caught up in the Alpine folding. Some are still submerged beneath the Mesozoic sea. Others show through as horst-like masses—the Meseta of Spain, the Rhodope of Bulgaria and the Pelagonian and Cycladean massifs of Greece.

The Alpine system closely encircles the western basin of the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and Ægean, and forms the northern shore of the eastern Mediterranean. Where the mountains run down to the sea, the coast is generally irregular, in contrast with the markedly 'un-Mediterranean' shores of Libya and Egypt, where the African tableland ends in a

straight coast. Deep bays and island arcs, particularly those of the Ægean, have been since classical times a school of seamanship.

The gaps through the ranges of the Alps have acquired an importance very much greater than those through the Central Highlands. The Pyrenees have always been a barrier to communications, movement between the lands to the north and south having taken place around the ends of the range. This, however, has not prevented a degree of unity in the Pyrenean region. The Basque country and its successor, the state of Navarre, lay across the western part of the range. To the east there still remains a cultural and linguistic tie between Mediterranean France and the neighbouring parts of Catalan Spain.

In the south of Spain the Betic Cordillera is a barrier between Andalusia and the Mediterranean coast.

The French, Italian, and Swiss Alps are crossed by a number of high passes, very many of them quite impassable in winter. The traffic of the Roman Empire used a certain number of these, and roads were made through them. A large number of passes of lesser importance came to be used during the Middle Ages, after the bridges and roads of Roman construction had fallen to ruin. They served for traders and pilgrims during the Middle Ages, but armies and the tribes which moved across Europe during the closing years of the Roman Empire more often sought easier routes. Most important of these were the route-ways which converge on the Rhône mouth—the Carcassonne Gap, from Gascony, and the Rhône corridor, which opened either across the Langres Plateau into the Paris basin or through the Belfort Gap into the upper Rhine valley. The Brenner route, between the Inn valley and the Adige, was a common route for the German invaders of Italy. Opposite the head of the Adriatic, the low plains of Hungary and the middle Danube come quite close to the Mediterranean ports of Fiume and Trieste. Between is a low, dissected limestone plateau, easily crossed in spite of its roughness. This was the route *par excellence* of the invaders of Italy.

To the south-east the Karst plateau lies between the headwaters of the Save and Danube tributaries and the sea. This rugged plateau cuts its hinterland off from the coast, and separates Yugoslavia from what would seem its natural outlets.

In Northern Albania the Drin valley provides a route through the Dinaric chain, to link up with the Vardar-Morava and Ibar valleys which together form a series of routes between the Danube and the Aegean.

The northern branch of the Alpine chain can be crossed with ease. The Danube has cut a broad valley through it into the Plain of Hungary to the east. The towns of Budapest, Bratislava, and Vienna guard this passageway. To the north of Vienna, the Moravian Gap, between the Palaeozoic massif of Bohemia and the Carpathians, puts the North German Plain in easy reach of the middle Danube valley. The Carpathians narrow around the headwaters of the Tisza, and here can be crossed by armies. Many of the invaders of the Hungarian Plain and of Italy came by this route.

The open, loess-covered plains of Bessarabia and Moldavia lead southward from the Ukraine towards the Danube. Beyond the chalk tableland of Dobrudja, around the last spurs of the Balkan mountains and the low Istrandja range, is again a branch of the Mediterranean Sea.

The Mediterranean. Europe ends against the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Peoples and trade, gathered by the rivers of Russia, have been delivered to the Black Sea and thus to the Mediterranean. Scandinavian traders of the early Middle Ages crossed the isthmus which separates the Baltic from the Black Sea and established themselves in Constantinople. The Black Sea has always provided a link between the Mediterranean and the Steppe and forest-lands of Northern Europe.

On the south the lands of the Mediterranean are shut in by the deserts of North Africa. The role of the deserts has always been a protective one, cutting Europe off from invaders on this side, and they remain until the present one of the most formidable barriers to communications to be found on the earth. Movement has, however, always been possible along the coast, between the desert and the sea. The Arab invaders of the seventh century came by this route. The Vandals followed it in the opposite direction. More recently the campaigns of 1940-43 have swayed backward and forward along this narrow coastal strip.

The Middle East, between the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, is not part of Europe, but has greatly

influenced the course of European history. The plateaux and mountains of Anatolia and Armenia send a hill range southward through Syria and the Lebanon to die away in the deserts of southern Judæa. These hills separate the drainage basin of the Tigris-Euphrates from that of the Mediterranean. They are easily crossed, particularly east of Antioch. Here a




FIG. 2. THE CLIMATIC DIVISIONS OF EUROPE

After L. D. Stamp

small rainfall relieves the aridity and makes the whole region a passageway between the rich alluvial lands of Mesopotamia and Egypt.

CLIMATE

The climate of Europe is as varied as its relief. The whole continent lies, for a period of the year at least, in the path of the westerlies. No place, except in Russia, is more than 500 miles from the sea, and moist winds can reach the heart of the land. At the same time, temperatures are moderated by the nearness of the ocean.

In summer the high-pressure area, which develops over the Sahara, forces the cyclones of the belt of the westerlies to take a more northerly course. High pressure and hot, dry conditions extend over the Mediterranean. In winter the high-pressure area of Central Asia extends into Northern and Eastern Europe, and depression tracks again move across the Mediterranean. This region, with its summer drought and winter rain, has the most distinctive climate in Europe, which is reflected in the pattern of its political and economic development.

The rest of Europe is characterized by a well-distributed rainfall. Such climatic differences as it has are differences only of degree. There is no season of regular drought. In the Mediterranean, however, there is, and during the season of the year when the needs of man, animals, and plants are greatest, little or no rain falls. Evergreen forests and dry heath, the garrigue and maquis, characterize the Mediterranean areas of summer drought. Rural economy is more specialized and less adaptable than in other parts of Europe. Fruit-growing assumes an importance unknown elsewhere, and fodder crops and animal-raising are of small importance. There are no large rivers in areas of exclusively Mediterranean climate, and streams are torrents in winter, dying away in summer to little more than a series of pools. The typical Mediterranean town lies on a hill or bluff, instead of on the banks of a river, as in North-western Europe. Mediterranean peoples have shown little aptitude for settlement outside the area of Mediterranean climate, the climate of the olive, as it has been called. Neither Romans nor Arabs really established themselves in areas where their native economy was not possible.

The climate of the rest of Europe shows a gradual transition from West to East. Rainfall diminishes, and the range of temperature increases. Summer temperature becomes rather higher, and winter considerably lower. The predominant crops slowly change from wheat and barley in the West to rye in the East, but there is no fundamental change in the character of agriculture until the grasslands of Southern Russia are reached. For this reason European peoples, particularly Germans and Russians, have been able to expand eastward without having to adapt their ways of life to radically different types of environment. It is true that agriculture becomes more

difficult to the east and also to the north. The diminishing rainfall is accompanied by increasing unreliability, which may make agriculture uneconomic in extreme areas, particularly in




FIG. 3. CROP RELIABILITY

The average variation is expressed as percentage departure from the normal of the years 1927-33.

After S. van Valkenburg

the Steppes and in Scandinavia. Life becomes harder to the north and the east, and the variety of crops that can be grown is more restricted.

North-western Europe, consisting of Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries, Western France and North-western Spain, is characterized by a well-distributed rainfall, mild winters, and cool summers. The sea is never frozen, and ice rarely impedes

river navigation. Temperate fruits, fodder crops, and the cultivated grasses can be grown, though there are, of course, limited areas of poor soil or high altitude where these conditions do not obtain. The high rainfall promotes the growth of grass, and dairy-farming is relatively important.

In Central Europe winters are colder and outdoor activity is restricted for several weeks each year. Summers are hotter, and encourage the growth of such crops as maize. To the north-east, the winter becomes increasingly severe, until the Cold Temperate region is reached. Here fruit-trees do not grow, and only the most hardy crops can be cultivated. The growth of grass is sufficient for animal husbandry, and dairying is locally important. Seas and rivers are frozen for a period, in some cases, of four or five months each year. Although the Baltic Sea does not freeze, all its bays and coves are impeded by ice in winter. Ice also increases in winter to the east of the North Cape. Petsamo and Murmansk are normally accessible in the coldest month, but the White Sea is frozen over for several months of the year. The importance of the winter freeze in North-western Europe can be seen in Russia's search for a warm-water port.

✓ The Central European climate passes eastward into the continental climate of the Russian grasslands. Summers are hot; winters, very cold. Rainfall is small and often insufficient for cultivated plants. This environment is associated with the economy of the pastoral nomads, who in the past have occupied the whole of the Steppe. Recently the nomad has given place to the agriculturist in the more cultivable areas of the Steppes.

Within historical times Europe has been invaded by two widely differing groups, the Steppe nomads from the east and people from Africa, of whom the Moors of Spain have been the most significant. In each case these peoples are associated with a particular environment and a specific type of economy, the invaders from the east with the grasslands, those from the south with the area of Mediterranean climate. In neither case were they sufficiently adaptable to make permanent homes in North-western Europe. The movement of peoples which accompanied the break-up of the Roman Empire was within this part of Europe. These peoples invaded the southern peninsulas, but, with certain exceptions, settled the least

Mediterranean parts of them, the Plain of Lombardy, the Spanish Meseta, and the Balkans.

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A good physical atlas should be used in reading the following chapters. An historical atlas, such as F. W. Putzger's *Historisches Schul-Atlas* (Bailey), or Ramsay Muir's *Historical Atlas for Students* (Philip) should also be referred to.

PART I ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL TIMES

CHAPTER TWO THE EARLY CIVILIZATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

THE human species first appeared in Europe during the storm and stress of the Ice Age. The oldest artifacts, ill-shaped flints, may have been fashioned well over a quarter of a million years ago, but it is doubtful whether their makers belong to the family of *homo sapiens*. The earliest anatomical remains are of parallel species, which have since become extinct. It was not until the later part of the Old Stone Age that types recognizably ancestral to present-day man first appeared. Considerable doubt exists about the authenticity of the earliest articles, the eoliths, which have been claimed as of human manufacture. At best, however, they suggest only a sparse population of very primitive collectors, with probably no social organization and at the mercy of a harsh and changing environment. It was, nevertheless, in all probability the changes in environment, in climate and vegetation, that stirred these humble folk along the path of material progress. They made tools of flint of increasing refinement, which locally reached a high order. By learning to clothe themselves with the skins of the beasts they had killed, and by making fires to warm themselves, they adapted themselves to new sets of circumstances and acquired a survival value higher than that of the animals. During the last advances of the Ice Age they hunted the mammoth on the cold plains of Europe. Conditions of the chase compelled a degree of collaboration, and, to judge from the evidence of their kitchen-middens, large drives of these great beasts were organized. Not only weapons, but tools were developed, scrapers for preparing skins and hides, fish-hooks and needles made of bone, delicately fashioned flint knives and arrow-heads. The material culture of later Old Stone Age man attained a high order, within the limits of a hunting and collecting society.

For the essential feature of Palæolithic man was not so much his use of weapons and tools made from cores and flakes of flint as his dependence upon a hunting and collecting economy. This restricted population, kept it mobile and prevented the accumulation of chattels and progress in such arts as pottery.




FIG. 4. THE SPREAD OF NEOLITHIC CIVILIZATION ACROSS EUROPE
AND THE MOVEMENTS OF NEOLITHIC PEOPLES

The figures indicate dates B.C.

After C. S. Coon

NEOLITHIC TIMES

The significance of the Neolithic revolution lies in the introduction of cultivation and of the domestication of animals. It was accompanied by the practice of polishing or grinding stone weapons and instruments. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine how these discoveries could have been made, nor can it be said which came first. It has been customary to consider pastoralism to be older than cultivation, and it may have been so in regions rich in animals which lend themselves

to domestication. But human society as a whole has not progressed in turn from a collecting to a pastoral society and from a pastoral to an agricultural. The two latter practices may have appeared almost simultaneously in some parts, and in the Middle East, where, probably, the cultivated grains originated, agriculture may have preceded pastoralism.




FIG. 5. THE SPREAD OF BRONZE AGE CULTURE

The figures indicate dates B.C.

After G. S. Coon

Agriculture, the deliberate planting of crops in order to reap a harvest, probably originated in Egypt, Palestine, or the region stretching northward towards the Caucasus. These lands were wetter in the early Neolithic period than at present; the climatic belts had not yet moved northward in the wake of the retreating ice sheets as far as they have since done. It is possible that the earliest seeds may have been cast on the veneer of rich mud left by the subsiding flood waters of the Nile or of some other river. They were probably the seeds of the wild grasses, *emmer* and *einkorn*, ancestral to our present-day

wheat. Pottery made rapid advances, perhaps as an adjunct of cultivation. It has been suggested that vessels would be required in which to preserve the harvested grain, free from the ravages of vermin, and at this date only baked clay could serve this purpose.

Although man's material equipment was increasing very rapidly in comparison with the slow progress of the Palæolithic period, he by no means possessed yet a settled habitat. It is not uncommon for primitive peoples at the present day to snatch intermittent harvests from hastily cultivated corn-patches in the course of their wanderings. Perhaps the rapid exhaustion of fertility, then as now, compelled frequent movement. The food-cultivating, animal-rearing economy of Neolithic times originated in the Middle East and spread slowly westward. It had evolved in the riverine lands of the Middle East by about 4000 B.C. It spread first to Crete, then to Asia Minor, and the Greek Islands and mainland. It was carried by invaders along the North African coast, into Spain, across to the islands of Sicily and Sardinia, and northward to France and Great Britain. Other peoples followed the Danube valley from the Black Sea into Central Europe.

The European bearers of Neolithic culture seem to have been a fairly homogeneous racial stock, with nothing more than local variations. The pre-existing Palæolithic people were certainly few in number; they may have been exterminated in certain areas, or have been absorbed into the new Neolithic stock, or, perhaps more likely, they may have been driven into regions of refuge, mountain forest or marsh, where, protected by natural obstacles, they continued their poor existence, and by interbreeding possibly accentuated those racial characteristics which are especially Palæolithic. While no attempt is being made to describe the cultures which evolved in Europe at this time, a word or two is perhaps needed on the influence of the Neolithic invasions on our own islands. These were populated by peoples arriving by two distinct routes. With the retreat of the ice sheet and the gradual improvement of the climate, peoples crossed the English Channel and the southern part of the North Sea, fanning out from South-eastern Britain. They settled in areas naturally cleared, the chalk downland and forest-free areas of brick-earth, which lay at the foot of the hill

ridges. Rather later a people of Mediterranean race and, in the main, Iberian origin, moved northward by sea from the Spanish coast to Western France and on to Cornwall, Wales, and Ireland. From their practice of building great stone monuments, they have come to be called the Megalithic people. For a time they maintained a close contact between the western peninsulas of this country, which, with Ireland and at least Western Scotland, formed a single cultural province. The unity of this area was later broken down, but its revival during the Dark Ages is an interesting comment on the permanence of the geographical factors. Broadly speaking, it may be said that this western unity asserted itself when conditions were disturbed in Lowland Britain and the narrow seas.

Origin of Urban Civilization.—The development of an agricultural economy in the riverine lands of the Middle East, perhaps as early as 5000 B.C., led to what Professor V. G. Childe has called the "urban revolution." The richest agricultural land was that which was periodically inundated and for most of the year a wilderness of swamp vegetation and shifting channels. The achievement of man at the end of the Neolithic period and at the beginning of the age of metal was to discipline this wilderness. There can be no doubt that the writer of the earlier chapters of Genesis had in mind the reclamation of such riverine tracts, "without form and void," when he described the Creation and the way in which the waters were gathered together and dry land appeared. Such a reclamation work, however, called for an organizing capacity of no mean order. The reclaimed, irrigable fields represented what we should call a capital investment; man no longer wandered, but remained to cultivate these fields. Villages became permanent and grew into towns. Man's worldly possessions increased in size and number. Pottery became a craft; mud bricks were made and houses and temples built. The population expanded yet more rapidly. Specialized crafts increased in number and importance, and agriculture became only one, albeit the most important, of many professions. Chief among the new crafts were mining and the smelting and preparation of metals.

The mountains of the Sinai peninsula, of Armenia, Iran, and the Caucasus yielded the ores of copper, lead, zinc, and tin, but their utilization implied a developed trade. It meant

also that the production of foodstuffs was becoming so efficient that men could be spared from cultivation to take part in these pursuits. There is abundant evidence, in fact, that wealth was accumulating rapidly in these early homes of civilization. Their towns grew, crumbled to pieces, and were rebuilt, each town covering the ruins of many earlier, until they came to stand up above the plain on artificial mounds, or *tells*. Their trade-routes reached out to India, Abyssinia, through Asia Minor to the Ægean, and northward to the Caucasus. The movement of traders carried the new stages in human culture outward. The life in the cities of the plain attracted the still nomadic peoples to enter and settle. This was the civilization of the age of Abraham.

THE FERTILE CRESCENT

The Alpine ranges of Europe are continued eastward in those mountain ranges which bound the plateau of Anatolia on the north and south, that is, the Pontic and Taurus. These meet in the tangle of mountains which forms Armenia, and from this region diverge eastward other mountain arcs—the Elburz and its continuation, the Hindu Kush, and the Zagros mountains, which enclose the high plains of Iran. Southward from the Armenian region there stretches a lower and less imposing range, the Amanus. This has several passes, and it is crossed by the Orontes river, south of which it increases in height and becomes the Lebanon range. To the east of the Amanus mountains is the Euphrates, which rises in Armenia and reaches to within a hundred miles of the Mediterranean, before turning southward to unite with the Tigris and enter the Persian Gulf.

The westerly winds in winter bring a small rainfall to the mountains of Syria. Some passes on to the Tigris-Euphrates valley, so that a belt of rough grazing-land lies between the Lebanon, Amanus and Zagros mountains, and the desert of Northern Arabia. It must have been grazed by the Neolithic pastoralists, and where mountain torrents opened on to the plains, dropping their silt in a series of broad fans along the mountain foot, man must have cast his seeds in the wet mud and waited for his crop to ripen in the summer heat. This

belt of poor grassland was also a route-way between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. It continued southward through Palestine to the Nile Valley. This was the Fertile Crescent, the scene of those economic revolutions to which we owe our cultural progress. Certain characteristics of this region were of outstanding importance in the progress of the human species. The small rainfall relieved it from complete sterility.




FIG. 6. THE RELIEF AND DRAINAGE OF THE FERTILE CRESCENT

It received a degree of protection from invaders by the encircling areas of desert and mountain.

Ancient Egypt, the Nile delta and valley as far up-stream as Aswan, was the most perfectly insulated, with deserts to east and west, and the sea to the north. Above Aswan the river Nile is deeply incised in the desert floor. Its valley does not provide a route-way, and the cataracts, formed where the river flows across bars of resistant rock, prevent navigation. Traders penetrated southward into Abyssinia, from which some of the minerals in use in Egypt were obtained, but Egypt had no fear of invasion from this quarter. Invaders from the semi-desert of Northern Arabia threatened the settled dwellers in the great river valleys in ancient times, and have continued

to do so almost to the present. But this danger has rarely been serious. The Tigris-Euphrates valley has been exposed to the inroads of peoples from the plateaux north of the Zagros mountains. These have come in small groups as settlers, or in greater numbers as conquerors. The degree of security from attack in Mesopotamia has always been less than in Egypt.

A further characteristic of this Middle Eastern area is the great rivers, the Tigris, Euphrates, and Nile. All three rise outside the region, in areas having a much higher rainfall; all flow through and irrigate desert and semi-desert country, and all have seasonal floods whose incidence has determined the modes of irrigation and the farming calendar in their valleys.

The Nile derives a steady flow from the equatorial lakes, but upon this is imposed a seasonal flood derived from the monsoon rains in Abyssinia. The flood waters travel slowly northward, reaching Lower Egypt in the early autumn. The quiet stretches of the river above the cataracts serve as filters; no stone or gravel waste is spread over the fields of Egypt. Instead, the water fills the embanked fields and is allowed to drain away, leaving its contribution of fine silt. This is 'basin irrigation.' The floods occur at the beginning of the cool season. The moistened lands dry out slowly through the winter, when, nevertheless, the heat is sufficient for growth. Summer cultivation was possible in this rainless climate only with the aid of water raised laboriously from the river, and does not appear to have been practised in these very early times. In Mesopotamia, however, the floods are caused by the winter rains and the spring melting of the snows in the mountains of Armenia. They occur in early summer, and are followed by a period of intense heat. The soil thus dries out quickly, and some form of perennial irrigation is necessary.

The Euphrates valley is of little value above its plain tract either for cultivation or as a route. It flows across a region of semi-desert and was, in this section of its course, never a scene of early civilization. The Tigris, on the other hand, serves as a route-way almost from the point where it leaves the mountains. Although the earliest settlements grew up in its lower, deltaic course, they spread up-stream at an early date. The Tigris forms part of the route round the Fertile Crescent; the

Euphrates does not. The Tigris, furthermore, receives a number of tributaries from the Zagros mountains, adding to its water-supply and contributing to the area of cultivable land. At about the latitude of Baghdad, the two rivers approach within some twenty miles of one another, and even intermingle their waters through channels partly natural, partly artificial. Between this point and the sea, where the level plain is composed almost wholly of alluvium and detritus, there grew up the cities of Babylonia. At this time the two rivers entered the Persian Gulf by separate mouths. Now, owing to the advance of the delta, the two rivers unite some seventy miles from the sea, and the port of Eridu is over a hundred miles inland.

Egypt.—The valley of the Lower Nile offered peculiar advantages for the growth of early societies. The natural protection afforded by the deserts and the ease of agriculture give Egyptian prehistory a continuity that is not found elsewhere. It appears, however, that the animals first domesticated and the grasses first cultivated occurred naturally further north, and the earliest stages in the Neolithic and later cultural revolutions may have been accomplished in Mesopotamia rather than in Egypt.

The predynastic Egyptians, earlier than about 3500 B.C., lived mainly by hunting, collecting, and fishing, but it seems that agriculture was beginning to spread. During the preceding thousand years, the final advance and retreat of the glaciers was followed by a small uplift of the land. The marshes of Lower Egypt thus drained themselves, exposing large areas of good agricultural land. At the same time, the slow desiccation of the present desert regions to east and west impelled nomadic peoples to take refuge in the Nile valley. We may presume that many independent communities were gradually merged into larger political units. The first dynasty was established about 3400 B.C. at Abydos, in Upper Egypt. It slowly extended its power down-stream to the delta, forming a united kingdom which survived with little interruption throughout ancient times.

The Egyptians passed to the age of metals, mined the copper, of Sinai and continuously improved their techniques. The seasonal floods demanded something more than a merely local

collaboration in controlling and apportioning the waters. Flood warning was needed, and led perhaps to the formulation of a calendar. The obliteration of boundary marks by the flood waters required some sort of surveying to restore them afterwards. The surplus wealth which the rich land afforded was spent in building those monuments which have made the civilization of Ancient Egypt an object of wonder ever since. But the deserts did not give Egypt complete immunity from invaders. These brought new animals and new crops, including wheat. The eastern desert of Sinai could be crossed without very great difficulty, and the drying up of water-holes in the desert of Northern Arabia must have driven many to find refuge here, where a lack of water was unknown.

The Seventh and Eighth Dynasties (2475 B.C. onward) appear to have been provided by Palestinian tribes. An Egyptian papyrus, complimentary to the Biblical narrative, describes how these Palestinian peoples "tried to come down to Egypt to beg for water after their wont, and to give drink to their flocks." The Hyksos, or "Shepherd Kings" of Egypt, were a dynasty (about 2500—1700 B.C.) drawn from the semi-desert lands to the east. The Egyptians traded at an early date with the Red Sea lands. Under the Twelfth Dynasty a canal is said to have been cut between the head of the Gulf of Suez and the Nile valley, and the route from Thebes to the Red Sea was in regular use. Northward sailors from the delta traded with Syrian towns, particularly Byblus, the emporium of the Lebanon cedar-trade; they probably also imported olive-oil and other peculiarly Mediterranean vegetable products.

The Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Mesopotamia appears to have been populated towards the end of its Neolithic period by invaders both from the poor grasslands to the south and from the mountains and plateaux to the north. The group of cities near the head of the Gulf, chief among which were Ur and Eridu, were founded by the Sumerians, a bronze-using people who possibly arrived from the east. Up-stream was Akkad, a group of cities founded by Akkadian settlers from the south, perhaps mainly Semitic. The city states of the lower Tigris-Euphrates valley were welded into a single state by the first of the world's conquerors, Sargon of Akkad, whose authority

reached from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. Such a union was justified by the necessity, as in Egypt, for some measure of joint control over the rivers and irrigation systems, and also by the continual threat of attack from desert nomads to the south and from Elamites, Hittites, and other peoples to




FIG. 7. TOWNS OF THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES VALLEY

After H. Peake and H. J. Fleure

the north. The Sumero-Akkadian rule was, in fact, terminated by a fresh invasion of the northern steppe people, who established in 2169 B.C. the first Babylonian dynasty. The city of Babylon had been one of many Akkadian towns of the plain. It lay originally to the west of the Euphrates and, probably for this reason, had been of small importance. Now, however, the course of the Euphrates changed, deserting Agade, Kish, and Nippur, to flow past the walls of Babylon.

Mesopotamia was no less dependent on trade than Egypt.

The raw materials of its growing industries, copper ore, precious and semi-precious stones, marble and other stones for building, timber, and even certain foodstuffs, had to be imported. They came from the hills of Armenia, from Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor. The trade-route ran up the Tigris valley and, in the vicinity of the present town of Mosul, struck westward along the mountain foot towards the gaps in the Amanus mountains. The town of Assur grew up here, where the land route left the river; Nimrud and Nineveh, were later established further up-stream. Westward along the Fertile Crescent lay the trading towns of Nisibin, Carchemish, and Harran. Thus was founded by about 2000 B.C. the first Assyrian state, at once a commercial dependency of Babylonia and a 'march' state, protecting the exposed north-western frontier of the latter. The first Babylonian dynasty was terminated in 1870 B.C. by fresh invasions from the North, this time by the Hittite people, who had established an empire in Asia Minor, with its capital at Boghaz Keui, in the valley of the Halys river. Babylon recovered its political power, and, guided by the extent of the "Fertile Crescent," conquered westward into Palestine. Then Babylon was overthrown by the Assyrians, who, on their exposed northern frontier had cultivated the arts of war, whereas the Babylonians had for centuries been engrossed in problems of irrigation and cultivation. Another invasion of Mesopotamia about 540 B.C. subjected the area to the Medes and Persians. These people, with whom the tribes north of the Zagros mountains for the first time achieved political unity, conquered the whole Fertile Crescent, and, unlike other conquerors of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, were not stopped by the Taurus mountains (Fig. 6). Instead they ascended through the Cilician passes on to the plateau, overthrew the Hittite state, advanced to the Sea of Marmora and crossed into Europe. Thus political conquest was reaching outward from the valleys of Mesopotamia, as the spread of culture had done.

THE SPREAD OF CULTURE

- * Traders, we have seen, slowly carried the new arts of agriculture and metal working outward from their first homes in

the Middle East. Soon after 4000 B.C. agricultural villages dotted the plateau of Anatolia. The Neolithic revolution spread north-eastward to Turkestan, where was the settlement of Anau. The first Hissarlik (Troy) was in existence long before 3000 B.C. Crete acquired these arts even earlier, perhaps direct from Egypt. They spread to the Cyclades, where a generous climate and an abundance of certain metals encouraged their growth. Population increased and spread over to the mainland of Greece. Traders brought Neolithic culture and later the working of metals to Thessaly and the Black Sea. Cultivation spread northward from the Aegean, probably following the Vardar-Morava corridor or the Maritza valley, to the Danube. The peasants advanced up the Danube valley into Germany, taking with them the practices of cultivating the soil, domesticating animals and making pottery. They did not use metals, until the art of smelting copper had been invented, between 2500 and 3000 B.C., in the Middle East. Soon after 2000 B.C. the use of copper had spread to the basin of the middle Danube, and this region, with its resources in tin and copper, became a centre of dispersion of Bronze Age culture.

It is sometimes difficult to distinguish a movement of culture, carried by traders and communicated from one people to the next, from a movement of people bearing a certain culture. Undoubtedly both occurred in Central Europe. There was an actual movement of peasants westward up the Danube into North-western Europe. To some extent they were driven by fresh invaders from the steppe-lands of southern Russia. Nevertheless, the progress of new techniques overtook the peasants. They learned the art of smelting copper and eventually also that of adding tin and making the much harder bronze. The mountains of Bohemia and of Central Europe, important until modern times for their minerals, became a centre of Bronze Age culture, from which there was an export of the valued metals. The trade was for a time controlled by merchants from Hissarlik, who kept the secrets of the industry as long as they were able. The use of metals spread further west and was carried to the British Isles, perhaps by seafaring peoples from the Spanish peninsula. There Cornwall became a centre of bronze production. The crafts spread slowly northward into the forests, in the wake of the retreating ice-sheets,

reaching Scotland, Scandinavia, and northern Russia only at a relatively late date.

India and China. These countries offered conditions not unlike those which prevailed in the Middle Eastern centres of civilization. Large rivers had furnished areas of fertile silt, and annual floods watered the land. Agriculture was easy under such conditions. Although it began later in the Indus and Yang-tze valleys than in Mesopotamia, it cannot be said with certainty that the peasants here derived their knowledge from the Middle East. The same path of progress followed, and as traders put out their tentacles from the Indus valley and also from the Tigris in search of the material requirements of civilization, it is not surprising that they met, that there were borrowings, and that, in spite of many differences, both India and China have much in common with the Tigris-Euphrates valley. Two great cities grew up in the Bronze Age in the Indus valley, Mohenjo-daro and Harappa. Both were large, well-planned, and built of bricks made from the river-mud. Timber, ores of copper and tin, the precious and semi-precious metals and stones were obtained from the mountains to the north and west and from the ranges of the Deccan to the east. This Indian civilization perished and appears, unlike that of the Middle East, to have contributed comparatively little to later civilizations in India. There is, for example, no apparent continuity in urban institutions from the time of Mohenjo-daro to later urban societies.

A similar revolution occurred rather later in the Yang-tze valley. Here a Neolithic civilization, with cultivated crops and domesticated animals, gave rise about 1400 B.C. to an urban culture. The Shan dynasty was founded with its capital in An-yang. The scene of early Chinese civilization resembled that of Indian and Mesopotamian. The incentive to cultivation was here provided by the fertile and naturally forest-free grasslands of the loess plateau.

THE IRON AGE

After about 1000 B.C., iron came to be used on an increasing scale, first, it would appear, in the region of the Caucasus and Anatolia. The craft travelled outward, making its way, faster

than the craft of copper-smelting and bronze manufacture had done, westward into Europe. The discovery of iron was an event of greater importance than that of copper and bronze. Iron-ore is more widespread. Tools made from it are stronger. Their cutting power is greater. With iron tools, man could, with greater ease, extend his arable land by cutting down trees. The spread of Iron Age culture was marked by the construction of vast entrenched hilltop camps, often fortified further by a palisade of timber. With iron swords, war became a more destructive business. A people with iron weapons was often able to extend its power widely over others not so equipped. It was not until the Iron Age that man began seriously to modify the natural landscape and to produce the 'humanized' or 'cultural' landscape which it is the work of geographers to study.

The spread of an iron culture through Europe appears to have been closely associated with the spread of the Indo-European group of languages. These had appeared in Anatolia as early as 1900 B.C., and five hundred years later the Aryans were crossing into India. The plateau of Iran was in the following centuries settled and unified by Indo-European speaking peoples. After 1000 B.C. the Hallstatt people of Central Europe were not only the earliest bearers of an iron culture in this region, but also the speakers of an Indo-European tongue. Both aspects of their culture spread rapidly, reaching Britain soon after 600 B.C. and spreading slowly northward to reach Scotland by 250 B.C. In the Ægean, iron supplanted bronze during the Homeric period. It facilitated agriculture, mining, quarrying, and building. Sculpture became possible, and the finer flowerings of classical civilization sprang from it. The introduction of iron was the prelude to historical times.

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CHAPTER THREE
THE WORLD OF GREECE AND ROME
THE PHœNICIANS

THE trade-routes westward from the Tigris crossed the passes of the Amanus range and reached the Mediterranean coast, from which they went either north-westward to Anatolia or southward to Egypt. Syria became, as in some measure it has since remained, a focus of routes. Movement southward to Egypt was easier by water than by land, especially for bulky goods. Sea-borne commerce increased in volume during the second millenium B.C., extending to Cyprus, Crete, and the isles of the Ægean. The sea traders of the Syrian and Palestinian coasts were the Phœnicians, a people, apparently, of Semitic origin, who had settled on the margin of the sea and had exchanged their pastoral or agricultural economy for one based on industry and trade. The location of their cities is a result of a compromise between the natural alignment of routes and the threat constantly offered to trading societies by predatory mountain tribes. The natural focus of land, and sea-routes in the Middle East lay where the Orontes gap, between the Ansariyeh mountains and the Amanus range, leads down to the sea. The dangers of attack by the Hittites led to the growth of towns farther to the south. The chief of these were Arvad, Tripoli, Byblus (Gebel), Sidon, and Tyre. Arvad, the most northerly, lay dangerously near the gap of the river Eleutherus, the "entrance to Hamath." For this reason, it was founded on a small island and elaborately fortified. Tyre was similarly built upon a small island, which was later joined to the mainland by a causeway.

The Phœnicians developed the art of navigation and were probably the first sailors to leave the coastwise routes and to sail out into the Mediterranean, to Cyprus, Crete, and beyond. During the Homeric period they figured as the chief carriers, living by trade and industry, and importing foodstuffs into their closely built factory-cities. Approximately contemporary with the Homeric poems was the narrative of the building of




FIG. 8. PHOENICIAN CITIES OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Solomon's Temple, in which Hiram, King of Tyre, undertook to fulfil Solomon's orders

concerning timber of cedar, and concerning timber of fir. My servants shall bring them down from Lebanon unto the sea: and I will convey them by sea in floats unto the place that thou shalt appoint me, and will cause them to be discharged there, and thou shalt receive them: and thou shalt accomplish my desire, in giving food for my household. . . . And Solomon gave Hiram twenty thousand measures of wheat for food to his household, and twenty measures of pure oil. . . .¹




FIG. 9. PHOENICIAN SETTLEMENTS OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

A fuller picture of the ramifications of Phoenician trade is given in Ezekiel's lamentations over Nebuchadnezzar's destruction of Tyre. The city is described as "a merchant of the people for many isles":

Thy borders are in the midst of the seas. . . . They have made all thy ship boards of fir trees of Senir [Hermon]: they have taken cedars from Lebanon to make masts for thee. Of the oaks of Bashan have they made thine oars; the company of the Ashurites have made thy benches of ivory, brought out of the isles of Chittim [Cyprus]. Fine linen with brodered work from Egypt was that which thou spreadest forth to be thy sail; blue and purple from the isles of Elishah [? Southern Italy] was that which covered thee. The inhabitants of Zidon and Arvad were thy mariners.²

¹ I Kings v, 8-11.

² Ezekiel xxvii, 4-8. See also comment in H. Michell's *The Economics of Ancient Greece*, pp. 299-301.

From Tarshish (Southern Spain) came silver, iron, tin, and lead; from Javan (Greece) "the persons of men and vessels of brass"; horses and mules from Togarmah (Armenia); emeralds, dye, embroideries, and linen from Syria; wheat, honey, oil from Judah; wine and wool from Damascus; sheep and goats and spices from Arabia. The Phœnicians sailed into the Atlantic; Hanno reached West Africa, and there is a persistent legend that they came to Cornwall for tin.

Phœnician colonies were established partly to facilitate trade, partly as an outlet for population, which had no opportunity to expand on the coast of Syria. Carthage was probably founded in the ninth century B.C., and many other towns sprang up, founded either from Carthage or from Phœnicea, westward along the African coast from Leptis to Gades. South-eastern Spain, the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Sicily, and, nearer home, Cyprus were the scenes of Phœnician colonizing enterprise (Fig. 9).

THE ÆGEAN SEA

The Ægean, in which specifically European civilization first developed, is an island-studded tract of water, less than four hundred miles from north to south, and at most little more than two hundred from east to west. It is enclosed by the partially submerged mountain ranges of the Alpine system. The mountains of Western Greece are continued in those of the Peloponnesus, and from Cape Malea an arc stretches through Cythera, Crete, Scarpanto, and Rhodes to the coast of Asia Minor. The more northerly ranges of the Balkans are separated from the Pontic mountains only by the low land about the Sea of Marmora and the "Narrows." Between them Eubœa, Attica, and Argolis are all continued in island chains which make up the Cyclades and Southern Sporades. The Northern Ægean has fewer islands, and, on the whole, was less important in early history than the southern. The Ægean islands resemble the mainland of Greece in being rugged and mountainous. Limestone rock is common where it is not predominant, and vegetation is usually sparse. Cultivable land occurs only in small and infrequent patches. The small area of agricultural land, both on the islands

and on the mainland, has invited, since the early days of agriculture, a concentration upon those specialized and relatively valuable crops for which the climate is peculiarly suited. The grape, and the olive become the mainstay of classical Greek economy.

The plains of Greece were larger than those of the islands, though still, except in the North, very small. They are cut off from one another by bare mountain ranges, the naked ribs of the country from which the flesh, in the form of soil, has long since been washed away to the plains. Forest has probably always been small in extent, consisting more often of tough, drought-resisting bushes than of high trees. Destruction of woodland has been followed by the swift erosion of what little soil there was. In this respect Greece is poorer now than in classical times.

The climate of Greece, with the long, hot, dry summer of Mediterranean lands and a short, cool, or even cold winter, when most of the rain falls, set limits to the crops that could be grown, but favoured the growth of wheat, olives, and grapes. The long summer could be given up to outdoor pursuits, meetings and discussions, dramatic entertainments, and even military campaigns. Greek architecture was designed to be viewed from outside; Greek art was open-air art. The culture and institutions developed in the city states of Greece could only flourish where this type of climate prevailed. Greek colonies are confined to those regions of the Mediterranean which have a summer drought (Fig. 13).

The sea was the most important element in Greek civilization. Within the Cyclades no island was, in fair weather, out of sight of another, and navigation was possible between them without instruments. But the narrow channels between one island and the next offered difficulties to the early pilot. Winds are strong and often treacherous, and navigation in winter was rarely possible. Seamanship was a craft not easily acquired, and those Athenians who could handle fleets at most times of the year were very competent sailors indeed. But there are no appreciable tides. Jetties can be built more easily, and the loading and unloading of ships is a simpler business than in the Atlantic. The rivers of Greece are torrents rather than regular streams. Most are short; all are

unnavigable. In summer they are merely 'boulder-strewn gullies; in winter they become raging torrents. Few yielded drinking-water, for which the Greeks depended rather on springs. But the brown rivers carried large quantities of




FIG. 10. THE EARLY INVADERS OF THE GREEK PENINSULA AND ISLANDS

silt to the sea, depositing it at their mouths and increasing the area of cultivable land.

ACHÆANS, DORIANS, AND IONIANS

The Minoan civilizations of Crete range back to the fourth millenium B.C. The successive revolutions in human culture were, outside the Middle Eastern region, as defined in the previous chapter, first experienced in Crete. The city of Knossos appears to have enjoyed a degree of supremacy over

the Cyclades and the neighbouring mainland of Greece until about 1400 B.C., when this was destroyed. A new people appeared, the Achæans, who invaded Greece from the north—perhaps from the Danube valley—and brought with them the Greek language. It was they who, absorbing earlier peoples, created a state in the plain of Argolis, with its chief towns in Mycenæ and Tiryns, and then advanced to the conquest of Crete. In the twelfth century bands of Achæans crossed the sea and attacked and destroyed the city of Troy, on the Asiatic shore, near the southern entrance to the Dardanelles. This event, which is the subject of two of the greatest of epic poems, may have been prompted by Troy's control of the route between the Black Sea and the Ægean. The Troy of the Homeric poems was the sixth city to occupy this site. Its predecessors had been bases from which the knowledge of and trade in metals spread north-westward to the Danube. The capture of Troy was followed by considerable migrations from the mainland of Greece to the north-western corner of Asia Minor, which came to be known as *Æolis*.

In the eleventh century fresh invaders from the north-west, known this time as the Dorians, swept through Greece, and crossed the Gulf of Corinth into the Peloponnese. From here they sailed to the Cyclades, and, passing from one island to another, eventually settled in Rhodes and on the coast of South-western Asia Minor. Groups of Dorians sailed down the west coast of Greece to Crete. The Dorian invaders drove refugees from North-eastern Peloponnese and Attica across to the northern islands of the Cyclades, from which they sailed to Chios, Samos, and the central part of the Asia Minor coast. These were the Ionians, who gave their name to the region in which they settled.

The City-state. The city-state was the characteristic unit of political organization in classical Greece, though far from peculiar to Greece. City-states had grown up in Sumeria, and the Phœnician towns and colonies were city-states. The institution derives partly from the geographical environment, the small and isolated coastal plains; partly from the evolution of social institutions, the fusion of separate village settlements into regional units, each centring for defence and commerce in a single town. In Greece this process was known as

'synœcism.' The legendary Theseus is credited with the amalgamation of the villages of the Attic plain to form Athens. The unified state could more easily resist the attacks of robbers and pirates. The *polis*, or town, was originally a fortress, like the Acropolis at Athens and the Larissa at Thebes, to which the population could in the last resort withdraw. Most of




FIG. 11. ATTICA IN THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.

After A. Zimmern

these towns were situated a short distance from the sea as a protection against sea-borne raiders. In later and perhaps more settled times a small port grew up on the coast. This relationship is typified in Athens and the Piræus, but is general throughout the Ægean. Almost every island has its *polis*, disguised as well as may be from the sea, and its *skala*, or landing-stage and cluster of houses. It is impossible to list the city-states of Greece. It must suffice to describe the geography, physical and economic, of the most famous of them.

Attica is a triangular peninsula about fifty miles in length

from its base in the Parnes-Cithæron range to its south-eastern tip, Cape Sunium. At most the peninsula is only some thirty miles wide. The hill ranges already named separated Attica from the plain of Bœotia, in which Thebes was the chief city.




FIG. 12. THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE (*shown black*) AT THE TIME OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

To the west the Cerata range separated Attica from its neighbour, Megara. Attica is itself divided into three small plains by hill ridges, which, with several gaps and easy crossings, reach southward from Parnes, the plains of Eleusis, Athens, and Mesogæa. These are separated by the Ægaleos and the Pentelicus-Hymettus ranges. To the north-east of Pentelicus is the small plain of Marathon. The southern extremity of

Attica is occupied by the hill mass of Laurium, famous for its marble and its silver.

Attica was one of the least productive of these political units of Greece. The cities of Ionia, facing the westerly, rain-bearing winds, with larger areas of productive soil, were more suited to the early development of political units. Grain-producing land was short in Attica. Sparta solved a not dissimilar problem by the conquest of the fertile plain of Messenia; other towns sent their surplus population to make new homes beyond the sea. Athens alone developed industries and imported foodstuffs.

Forest clothed the northern mountains and parts of the eastern. Elsewhere the hills were covered with poor grass and scrub, providing only grazing for goats. The plain of Eleusis was the chief corn-producing area in Attica, a fact which explains the importance attached to the fertility rites there practised under the name of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Vines and olives covered the lower slopes of the hills.

The population of Attica probably never exceeded 300,000. In the year 338 it imported about 1,200,000 bushels of grain, the domestic crop has been estimated at about three-quarters this total.¹ Timber was also imported, together with many articles of a luxury nature. Athens exported in return olive-oil and wine, marble, silver from the Laurium mines, pottery, and a few other manufactured goods. It would probably be a mistake to compare Athens too closely with medieval Venice or Genoa, and the volume of her manufacturing industries and export trade should not be exaggerated. After the repulse of the Persian invaders at the beginning of the fifth century Athens dominated the Ægean Sea, the Straits, and the Black Sea. This not only insured the steady movement of grain to Athens; it permitted the formation of the Athenian Empire, really a federation of towns and states around the Ægean, with its headquarters at Dhiros. The tightening grip of Athens on the trade-routes of her rivals was resisted by the latter, and led eventually to the Peloponnesian War, in which the sea-state of Athens was matched against the land-state of Sparta. It was only when the latter, taking to the sea, had defeated the Athenians in the naval battle of Ægospotami (405 B.C.)

¹ See H. Michell, *The Economics of Ancient Greece*, pp. 20-21.

and cut off her supplies of corn from the Black Sea, that Athens was brought to her knees and her empire broken up.

Greek Colonies. The city-state, we have seen, was small, and its agricultural resources were limited. If the population increased beyond a certain point it had to emigrate. This was the motive of Greek colonization. Few of the Ægean cities did not found colonies; Athens is an example of one which solved its problems by more developed trade and industry and by developing an empire. The colonies tapped new resources and often increased the trade of the mother city, but they were




FIG. 13. GREEK SETTLEMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

primarily agricultural. Not all attained to the luxury and ease of Sybaris; most were small, and living was by no means easy for them. Once founded, the colony became an independent political unit, bound to its parent city only by sentimental ties. It was free to make what alliances it chose and to develop whatever trade it was able.

The first period of Greek colonization followed the Dorian invasions, and led to the settlement by Ionians and Achæans of the Greek Islands and the shores of Asia Minor. The later, more well-known, and more spectacular period of colonization lasted from about 750 to 550 B.C. The following are the chief areas of colonization.

(i) The northern shores of the Ægean. Here, particularly in Chalcidice, a number of colonies were set up by emigrants

from Chalcis in Eubœa. They were important in Greek economy for the reserves of timber and metals to which they had access.

(ii) The Propontis and the Black Sea colonies were largely founded by the Æolian and Ionian cities. They stretched as far away as the mouth of the Tanais (Don). Their chief importance was as grain-producers.

(iii) Southern Italy and Sicily closely resembled the Greek homeland, and the coasts were thickly dotted with colonies. Very few lay north of Naples, and there were few also on the drier coast of Calabria and Apulia. A few colonies lay on the Dalmatian coast.

(iv) The western basin of the Mediterranean was very largely the preserve of the Carthaginians, but a number of colonies were established east and west of the Rhône delta. Of these the Phocæan colony of Massilia (Marseilles) was most important.

Comment has already been made on the geographical distribution of Greek colonies. Except in the Black Sea they are confined to the areas having a pronounced summer drought. Few are found outside the climate of the olive. All are on or very close to the coast. The colonists came by sea, and, though considerations of trade were not foremost in most colonies, none was wholly self-sufficing. The sea was everywhere present in Greek thought and life; as Pericles asked, "how can mere farmers, with no knowledge of the sea, achieve anything worthy of note?" Not only trade, but also ideas were sea-borne.

Thebes, Thessaly, and Macedonia. The plain of Bœotia is larger and more productive than that of Attica. Its unification and development were achieved later. Thebes attained a short-lived prosperity, and with it the leadership of a confederacy in central Greece. To the north, in the Thessalian plain, there were still village communities and small towns torn by feuds. In the first half of the fourth century these were united by Jason of Pheræ, and but for the latter's death, in the full tide of conquest, the hegemony of Greece might have passed from Thebes to Thessaly. Problems of unification and development in the Macedonian plain were greater. The valley routes northward to the Danube exposed the region to invasion and attack. The climate was more harsh than in

Attica, and life was harder. Pastoral pursuits predominated, and settlements consisted of small groups of huts, of possibly still semi-nomadic herdsmen. Potentially Macedonia was the richest of the plain regions of Ancient Greece, but social and economic progress was delayed, and the rise of Macedonia followed that of Thebes and Thessaly. About the middle of the century Macedonia power was extended to the adjacent Thessalian plain and to the rocky peninsulas of Chalcidice.



FIG. 14. THE EMPIRE OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT AT ITS MAXIMUM EXTENT
Greece was tributary.

But Macedonia was essentially a land-state, spreading eastward through Thrace to the Propontis (Marmora) and westward into Epirus. It was only when this territorial base had been established and its resources and man-power made available that Macedonia turned to the conquest of Greece.

The conquests of Alexander the Great had been foreshadowed by the campaign of Xenophon and by Greek invasions of Asia Minor and Egypt. Alexander's conquests can be grouped under three chronological divisions.

(i) The conquest of the essentially Greek lands of the Ægean and Asia Minor.

(ii) The invasion of Syria, Egypt, and the Tigris-Euphrates lands. The early attention which Alexander gave to the Phœnician cities, notably his siege of Tyre, is evidence of his dependence upon sea-routes and his desire to use the eastern Mediterranean as fully as possible.

(iii) The conquest of the Iranian plateau, the crossing of the Hindu Kush to the Oxus river, and the mountains of Afghanistan to the Indus.

The third stage in Alexander's conquests followed logically from the second. The Persian Empire (Fig. 15) had, at its greatest extent, covered almost the same area as his own, and the defeat of the Persian armies in the Tigris valley led on to the occupation of Persepolis, the Persian capital, to the conquest of the high, Iranian plateau, and to the search for a defensible frontier on the north and east. Sheer lust of conquest




FIG. 15. CITIES FOUNDED BY ALEXANDER THE GREAT

added its contribution, but the empire of Alexander was clearly defined by geographical barriers on most sides; the desert on the south, the steppe-lands to the north. Cities were founded, particularly in Iran, and Greek civilization was spread eastward by soldiers and settlers. A thin veneer of Hellenism covered the whole Middle East.

Alexander's empire had no elements of stability; nothing common to the whole except the person of its ruler, and on his death (323 B.C.) it broke up into fragments, which in their broad outlines resemble the political divisions of a thousand years earlier.

(i) The Ptolemaic kingdom of Egypt.

(ii) The Kingdom of the Seleucids, corresponding with the Fertile Crescent.

(iii) Parthia, corresponding with Persia, and Bactria, its eastward extension in the semi-desert lands of the Indian border.

(iv) Asia Minor and Greece broke up into a maze of cities and states, of which the chief was Macedonia itself.

ROME

The Apennines stretch through Italy from Liguria to Apulia in a gentle curve. Within the arc which they form is a belt of lower country, hilly in the north; flatter and marshy in the valley of the Tiber and to the south of it, and again hilly, with still continuing volcanic action, in the south. It faced the westerly winds, received a rainfall adequate for agriculture and possessed greater areas of cultivable land than any part of Greece except Macedonia. The Latin peoples of Italy were invaders from the north who crossed the Alps after 2000 B.C. They settled the plains and mountain valleys as agricultural and pastoral people, conversant with the use of bronze and, after 1000 B.C., of iron. The size of political units was controlled by the topography. In the more hilly or mountainous districts isolated communities, with a strongly marked clan system, were united into tribes only on rare occasions. They were poor, and, partly for this reason, raided the richer lands of the plain. On these plain-lands agriculture was more productive, and there was a surplus of foodstuffs great enough to maintain specialized craftsmen. Trade became increasingly important, and both the need for markets and the desirability of a walled enclosure for protection against predatory mountain people led to the growth of towns. A process similar to the 'synœcism' of the Greek plains operated. In this way Rome grew up on the south bank of the Tiber, controlling an important ford, perhaps as early as 753 B.C., the traditional date of the foundation of the city.

To the north of the river, in the hill country between the Tiber and the Arno, were the Etruscans, a people of whose origin very little is known. For a time they appear to have dominated Rome, but the function of the city, as described in the legend of Horatius, was to hold the crossing of the Tiber and protect the approaches to Latium. Rome thus established




FIG. 16. THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
 Britain was occupied in A.D. 43. Areas stippled were abandoned before the 'Fall' of the Empire.

her predominance in the plain. Gradually the barbaric tribes of the surrounding hills were dominated, the Æqui, Hernici, Volsci, Sabines; the Etruscans, were defeated, their town of Veii taken, and a more formidable enemy, the Samnites of the southern Apennines, overcome. The conquests were assured by the planting of colonies of Latin farm-settlers, and the goodwill of the conquered people assured by the extension to them of the benefits of Roman citizenship.

The defeat of the Samnites brought the Romans up against the cities of Magna Græcia. These occupied the narrow coastal belt of southern Italy, cut off from expansion inland by the Apennine ranges and the rugged, repellant massif of Sila and Aspromonte. They called to their aid the forces of Epirus, led by Pyrrhus, who campaigned vigorously in southern Italy and Sicily; a comment on the way in which the narrow seas between Greece, Italy, and Sicily served to unite these territories. Roman control of the southern half of the Italian peninsula was complete and contact made with the Carthaginians in Sicily.

The next phase in the expansion of the Roman Empire centres in the war with Carthage, the great Phœnician trading and colonial power of the western Mediterranean. It was a struggle between a land and a sea Power, and it was not until the Romans had made themselves as proficient at sea as the Carthaginians that they began to make headway. In the first Punic War (264–241 B.C.) they conquered Sicily and added shortly afterwards Sardinia and Sicily, Corcyra, one of the Ionian group, and a strip of the coast opposite Calabria. The addition of these overseas territories is a clear indication of Rome's increasing importance as a maritime Power. The second Punic War (218–202 B.C.) was preceded by an extension of Carthaginian power in Spain, and was marked by an attempt to circumvent the tightening Roman control of the sea by invading northern Italy by land from Spain. The Roman victory was followed by the addition of Northern Italy (Cisalpine Gaul) and at least Mediterranean Spain. Thus was Rome slowly encircling the western basin of the Mediterranean, making it a Roman lake.

The source of Rome's military strength had hitherto lain in its independent peasantry. The fighting in Italy had

devastated and depopulated the countryside. Derelict farms could be purchased cheaply and were acquired by wealthy senators, and worked with slave labour. Subsistence farming was abandoned. Grain could now be imported cheaply from Sicily and later from North Africa. The more hilly country was devoted to sheep-rearing, and the vine and olive-trees were planted on the lower ground. Dispossessed rural population crowded the towns, where industry was not developed enough to absorb them, or migrated to one of the newly acquired provinces, while *latifundia*, or large estates, were formed in Italy.

Even before the conclusion of the struggle with Carthage the Romans had interested themselves in the affairs of Greece. A certain geographical logic had led them on from the Samnite hills to the Greek coast, to Sicily, to Epirus, and to Spain. It was, indeed, difficult to stop, though many in Italy would willingly have done so, after the defeat of Carthage. But the dissensions and ambitions of the petty statelets of Greece and Asia Minor were a constant threat to Roman interests and a standing invitation to Roman interference.

The unity of the Mediterranean, which had, with developing trade, become more and more real in the third century B.C., made political unity seem advantageous and not impracticable. It is impossible even to list the wars, campaigns, and annexations which brought the authority of Rome to places as remote as Armenia, Egypt, and Jerusalem. Macedonia and Greece were conquered, followed by at least the coast of Thrace and the western provinces of Asia (Fig. 16). The interior of Asia Minor remained tributary to Rome, whose chief interest lay in securing the coasts and with them a complete command of the sea. Associated with this was the eradication of piracy, hitherto a severe menace to trade, by Pompey. Carthage had been annexed after the short third Punic War (149-146 B.C.), and the mountainous country of Numidia, consisting of the eastern portion of the Atlas ranges, was overrun, though not annexed until sixty years later. Roman power was extended throughout Spain, though the northern and north-western mountains maintained a wild independence into the Christian era. Mediterranean Gaul—Gallia Narbonensis—formed a highway from Northern Italy to Spain, and had been occupied

in 121 B.C. The invasion of the Celtic tribes, the Teutones, and Cimbri, who were defeated at Aix, in Provence (102 B.C.), and the collaboration between the Gauls within the Empire and those without showed how difficult it was to defend Transalpine Gaul without extending the Empire to the rest of Gaul. This was the achievement of Cæsar. His punitive expedition against Britain foreshadowed the invasion of these islands in A.D. 43. Under the Emperor Augustus the frontier was advanced to the Danube, lacunæ were filled in; Palestine and Egypt were made provinces of the Empire. The periphery of the Mediterranean was in the possession of Rome.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE DISRUPTION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

THE ROMAN EMPIRE

THE empire, which was virtually completed by Claudius's conquest of Britain soon after A.D. 43, consisted essentially of the basin of the Mediterranean Sea. It included lands beyond only when it was necessary to round off a territory, as in the Iberian peninsula and Gaul, or to secure a strategic frontier, as in Britain and Dacia or along the Rhine and Danube. The Romans themselves did not settle gladly beyond the climate of the olive, or, at most, the vine. Their empire was, like that of Athens, a sea-empire, held together by its marine communications. In spite of the excellence of the road system, travel was easiest by sea. Rome came to be fed on sea-borne grain, and despatched its armies and its ambassadors from its ports of Ostia and Brundisium (Brindisi).

Frontiers of the Roman Empire. The southern frontier of the Roman Empire was the Sahara Desert, the natural frontier *par excellence*, along which the smallest military forces only need be kept. On the west was the sea. The northern frontier in Britain was eventually stabilized along a line between the Tyne and Solway Firth. On the Continent the Rhine, almost up to Lake Constance, and the Danube, from near its source to the sea, formed the northern limits of the Empire. The frontier in the east was less well defined. Here the land-forms tend to lie in an east to west direction, first the steppe-lands about the Black and Caspian Seas, then the Caucasus and the Armenian mountains, continued westward as the Pontic and Taurus ranges. South of the mountains lay the poor pasture-land of the Fertile Crescent, linking the Mediterranean coast of Syria with the Tigris-Euphrates valley and the head of the Persian Gulf. South of this lay the deserts of Arabia and North Africa. The Romans were never able effectively to divide the "Fertile Crescent." Natural lines of communication drew them ever eastward, and the military frontier moved to and

fro with the varying strengths of the Roman forces and of the Parthians to the east.

The northern frontier was strategically the weakest. Except in certain areas, as in Noricum, it was not easily defended. In Britain the northern frontier was advanced to the Forth-Clyde line, where an earthen wall, known as the Wall of




FIG. 17. PROVINCES OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

Dacia and the Agri Decumates are not shown.

Antonine, was built. But this lay far in advance of the supply-bases in Northern Britain, and was abandoned about A.D. 180, probably after a severe military set-back, and the Romans withdrew to the line of Hadrian's Wall.

The Romans proposed at first to advance their frontier in Europe to the Elbe, but after the defeat at Teutoberg in A.D. 9 it was established along the Rhine-Danube line. In its lower

course, the marshes of the Rhine mouth afforded some protection. South of these lay a belt of open country along the northern foothills of the Central European mountain mass. Here, on the western bank of the Rhine, was placed the




FIG. 18. THE AGRI DECUMATES AND THE FORTIFICATIONS GUARDING THE APPROACHES TO THE UPPER RHINELAND

After Cambridge Ancient History

legionary fortress of Colonia Agrippina (Köln). To the south the Rhine gorge was a more effective barrier, though here Confluentes (Coblenz) was established where the Lahn valley comes down from the hills to the east. Augusta Treverorum (Trier) was a route and strategic centre behind this section of the frontier.

The rift valley, from Moguntiacum (Mainz) to Augusta

Rauricorum (Augst) gave the Romans greater cause for anxiety. Unlike regions surrounding it, it was, as it still is, an area of fertile soil and milder climate, where the vine grows well, if not profusely. Furthermore, a group of valleys—the Fulda, Saale, Main, Neckar—provide routes from Inner Germany. This area was a pole of attraction to the German tribes, and its attractions were not unobserved by the Romans. The Rhine-Danube line gave a dangerous re-entrant between Moguntiacum and Regina (Regensburg). In consequence, the intervening territory was absorbed into the empire during the second half of the first century as the *Agri Decumates*. It was eventually enclosed by a wall from the Danube, near Regina, to the Rhine, near *Confluentes*.

Along the upper Danube the provinces of *Rhætia* and *Noricum* fronted the river between Lake Constance and *Vindobona* (Vienna). The former had little natural protection, but was sheltered from attack by the *Agri Decumates*, with its own artificial protection. *Noricum*, however, was well defended by its own relief. The river here flows in a deep valley, and beyond it to the north are the forested uplands of Bohemia, which tended to divert invading peoples either to the east or the west of them.

From the point, above Vienna, where it escapes from the hills, to the Iron Gates, where it breaches the Transylvanian mountains, the Danube flows slowly across the wide plain of Hungary. Low hill ridges reach out from the Alps of *Noricum* to the Tatra Mountains, crossing the river at Bratislava and Budapest. This plain could be entered on the north and east by the Moravian Gap, followed by the ancient Amber Route, by many passes about the headstreams of the Tisza, and by passes through the Transylvanian mountains. On the south-west the plain approaches within fifty miles of the head of the Adriatic, from which it is separated by hills rather than mountains. Within the bend of the river was the province of *Pannonia*, the most exposed and dangerous along the whole northern frontier. In the north, opposite the junction of the river March with the Danube, was the fortress town of *Carnuntum*. This was linked by road with *Aquileia*, and between lay a succession of fortress towns, *Emona*, *Poetovio*, *Savaria*, *Scarbantia*, and others. The province of *Mœsia*, by

contrast, was rugged and mountainous, with, however, productive wheatlands along the Danube below the Iron Gates.

In front of the Mœsian frontier somewhat resembling Bohemia in its position, lay Transylvania, enclosed by the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps, with the Bihor mountains on the west. It is a plateau of genial climate and high productivity, where the Dacians had built up a state, with its capital in Sarmizegethusa, of no mean strength. During the first century, the Dacians were a threat to the Empire. A conquest of Dacia would not only relieve this, but would also provide a bastion in front of the exposed Pannonian frontier. The agricultural and particularly the mineral wealth of Dacia constituted a further attraction, and in A.D. 101 the Emperor Trajan began the conquest of Dacia. Four seasons of hard campaigning were necessary to effect this. Roman settlers were then brought in, and the mines of gold, iron, and salt opened. So thoroughly was the province Romanized, it is claimed by the present Roumanian people, that a language resembling the Roman has survived till to-day in modern Roumanian.

The conquest of Dacia permitted a small advance to be made in the Dobrudja. The frontier was advanced from the earthen wall that ran inland from Tomi (Constantia) to the delta itself. Subsequently two further artificial barriers were built eastward from the river Pyretus (Pruth), north of the Danube mouth.

Provinces of the Roman Empire. South-east Europe was divided into the provinces of Thracia and Macedonia. Both were poor and sparsely populated. Farming and cattle-rearing were the chief occupations, and mining was carried on in the mountains. They were crossed by the Via Egnatia, the highway from Dyrrachium (Durazzo) in Illyricum, through Thessalonica, to Byzantium. Roads northward to the Danube frontier followed the Axios (Vardar) and Hebrus (Maritza). To the south, the peninsula of Greece formed the province of Achæa. This had lost much of its former prosperity. Its population was probably smaller, and agriculture and horse-breeding were the basis of what prosperity there was in many parts. Athens, Corinth, Sparta remained the chief towns, but Patræ was of more recent origin, with its factories which manufactured the local cotton, flax, and hemp of Elis.

It cannot be said that the great resources of Asia Minor were realized—certainly not exploited—until the Romans conquered the area and brought peace to it. The area came to be organized in the provinces of Bithynia and Pontus along the north; Asia, including the Ægean coast and adjacent islands in the west, and stretching up to the high plateau of the interior; Lycia and Pamphylia and Cilicia in the south, and Galatia and Cappadocia occupying the remainder of the arid plateau. These divisions bear a marked similarity to those adopted by regional geographers. Economic progress was most marked in the western and north-western provinces. Here new towns sprang up and the old-established attained a new importance. The southern shore of the Propontis (Sea of Marmora) became relatively highly urbanized. The hinterland was productive of grain and fruit, and the hills yielded timber, marble, and metals. Lycia and Pamphylia, in the south, was rather remote, and its climate too dry for intensive agriculture or dense population. Cilicia was similarly placed, and its towns tended to be subsidiary to the better-sited towns of Syria, across the Gulf of Alexandretta. In the interior, settlement and agriculture diminished in importance eastward until the arid steppe-lands of Cappadocia were reached.

The physical geography of Syria has already been described (Chapter II). In this ancient home of civilization a vigorous trade was developed and maintained. Corn and wine were exported from its port, Seleucia. Wool and meat were obtained from the poor grazing lands on the desert margin. Silk and other luxuries reached Syria from regions further east, and local artisans were famous for their metal-work, glass-making, and weaving. Syria and Palestine were more productive than now, and the population of the province has been estimated as ten millions in the second century. Caravan routes stretched southward, through Petra, to the head of the Red Sea, and eastward, through the now ruinous desert city of Palmyra, to the cities of Mesopotamia.

Egypt rivalled Syria in its prosperity and trade, and greatly exceeded it in the density of its population. It provided an alternative route to the Indian Ocean, by way of the Nile from Alexandria or Pelusium up to Thebes and then across to the Red Sea.

A narrow belt of steppe-land links Egypt with the Atlas lands to the west, stretched out between the sea and the desert. The province of Africa lay westward from Cyrenaica, along the shores of the Syrtes, and Mauretania occupied most of the Atlas lands. The primary occupation of these African provinces was agriculture; industry gained no footing. Instead grain, wine, and olive-oil were exported in large quantities, and large irrigation works were undertaken. In spite of its predominantly agricultural character, numerous small towns sprang up, linked by roads which ran inland from the ports, and served as centres for the Romanization of the Berber tribes.

Spain, one of the earliest territories outside Italy to be conquered, played a very important part in the economy of the empire. It was valued most for its metals; gold was washed from the river gravels of Galicia and elsewhere; silver was mined, sometimes associated with lead. The rich deposits of tin, copper, lead, and mercury were exploited in the Sierra Morena range. Iron was worked in various places, and gave rise to a local metallurgical industry. The agricultural output was second only to the mineral. Wheat, fruit, and vegetables were grown and exported in large quantities to Italy. Although the Romans conquered the whole Iberian peninsula and organized it into the three provinces of Tarraconensis, Bætica, and Lusitania, the impress of Roman civilization was nowhere deep. Many towns were established, but few became important. The influence of Roman civilization was scarcely felt outside the towns. The Romans were never able to break down completely the regionalism of the peninsula, and this has remained until the present one of the most marked characteristics of Spain.

Southern Gaul had for many centuries been open to Greek settlement; it was highly urbanized and had formed a land route between Italy and Spain. It was organized as the province of Narbonensis and tended for much of the Middle Ages to be distinct from the rest of France. The rest of Gaul was divided into the three provinces of Aquitania, Lugdunensis and Belgica. Gaul was a rich, agricultural country, able to support a dense population and export a surplus of grain and fruit to Italy. Mining was of small importance, and the chief

industry was the manufacture of pottery. A system of roads radiated from Lugdunum (Lyons), and the rivers were much used for transport. Gaul served to provide soldiers and provisions for the Roman army of the Rhine, and from its port of Gesoriacum (Boulogne) it maintained communications with Britain.

In Britain the Romans conquered and occupied the "Lowland zone," built cities, opened up mines, and developed trade. But Romanization was confined to the towns. The countryside remained very largely Celtic in speech and almost unaffected by Roman agricultural practice. Mining was important, particularly for silver-lead, in the Mendips, Shropshire, and the Pennines. Grain and minerals were exported; wine and luxury-goods were imported. An elaborate road system linked Londinium and the South-east with the frontiers against the Welsh and Picts. Little attempt was made to conquer the "Highland fringe" and unless the Celtic peoples troubled the peace of the plain, they were left almost entirely alone.

THE BARBARIAN INVASIONS

The Roman Empire had attained its maximum extent with the conquest of Dacia just after A.D. 100, and the period of the Antonines which followed may in many ways be regarded as its culmination. Dangers on the northern frontier had already become a major preoccupation of the emperors. Marcus Aurelius spent the greater part of his reign fighting against invaders from the north. These peoples were primarily responsible for what is called the 'fall' of the Roman Empire. Defence of the frontier was a continual drain on the imperial resources. Armies on the Danube, the Rhine, and in Britain bred strong soldiers with pretensions to the imperial crown. At the same time citizens of the Empire tended to evade military service, and the legions were recruited from provincials, such as Illyrians, and even from the barbarians themselves. It is beyond the scope of historical geography to consider the moral factors which contributed to the decline of the Empire. They were probably very important, but W. S. Jones has added a further consideration—the spread of disease, particularly of malaria, which diminished the powers of resistance, physical

and spiritual, of the Roman people.¹ He has argued that a change in rural economy, the increase of pastoralism, and destruction of forest and scrubland led to strong soil erosion, to the silting of rivers and creation of swamps, and hence to the spread of the mosquito.

The peoples who threatened the Empire at this time were entirely German. There had been, through a long period of prehistory, a westward movement of peoples across Central Europe. This was checked by Roman defences. The western tribes appear to have been forced to change from a mainly pastoral economy to the more intensive cultivation of the land. Pressure of population was a strong motive for their invasion of the Empire. The attraction of better soil and climate and higher standards was probably also important, and, at the same time, they were probably driven on from the east by other peoples. During the period of the Empire the German tribes appear to have organized themselves into a small number of powerful units. Of these the Franks, Alamanni, Saxons, and Thuringians occupied the West German lands. To the north and east were other Germanic peoples, the Burgundians, who may have taken their origin and their name from the Danish island of Bornholm, the Vandals, the Gepids, and, strongest of them all, the Goths, who first came from Gothland, the island off the Swedish coast. About the beginning of the third century the Goths migrated from the plain of East Germany to the Black Sea region, where they overran Greek cities of the Euxine and soon after attacked the Empire along the Danube frontier in Mœsia. Though defeated on the sea, they compelled the abandonment of Dacia in 270.

The danger of the times made necessary some drastic remedy. Under the Emperor Diocletian (284-305), the army was reorganized and made more mobile and better fitted to oppose the barbarians. At the same time the political structure of the Empire was revolutionized. Henceforward, it was ruled from two capitals, Rome and Byzantium, by joint Emperors. It was convenient for this purpose to adopt a line of division between the Latin West and Greek East, and a boundary was drawn from the Danube near Sirmium, through

¹ W. H. S. Jones, *Malaria, a Neglected Factor in the History of Greece and Rome* (Cambridge University Press, 1907).

the wild and forested hills of Serbia and Bosnia to the Adriatic near Kotor, and thence southward to the Great Syrtis. Such a line passed through the least populous parts of the Empire and, in general, was admirably drawn. It tended, however, to give a divided command along the Lower Danube, where




FIG. 19. THE ROUTES FOLLOWED BY THE BARBARIAN INVADERS OF EUROPE

unity of purpose was essential. Each division of the Empire was itself divided into two præfectures, the western into Gaul (which included Britain and Spain) and Italy; the eastern into Illyricum and the Orient. Each præfecture was divided into dioceses, and a hierarchy of political authority built up.

Some thirty years after the abdication of Diocletian, Constantine the Great founded the city of Constantinople on the site of Byzantium. This fortress city, strongly built on the eastern shore of the Bosphorus, was destined to remain unconquered for over 1100 years. Its fortifications became a

model for those of Western Europe. Constantinople was able to maintain among the islands of the Ægean and along the coasts of the Euxine a sea-borne trade and higher civilization, a faint reflection of those of the Roman Empire, which had long since fallen.

The Gothic people settled in the great belt of territory between the Theiss river and the Dnieper, and here they divided into the two groups, the Visigoths and Ostrogoths. They had maintained for a considerable time a steady pressure against the Empire, and small groups of them had actually settled in Mœsia. About 375 the eastern Goths were attacked by the Huns, pastoral nomads from beyond the Russian steppes. They appealed to the Emperor for permission to cross the Danube and live under the protection of Rome. This was granted, but the problems of settling some 80,000 Germans in Illyricum was too great. There was friction, and a war followed in which the Goths decisively defeated the imperial forces at Hadrianople in 378. They were later pacified and settled in Lower Mœsia. The Ostrogoths were now completely divorced from the Visigoths. A few years later they too crossed the Danube and moved south-eastward into Thrace and approached Constantinople. They were induced to withdraw and passed westward along the coastal plain of Thrace and Macedonia and so into Thessaly, and the Peloponnesus. From this point the Visigoths appear to have moved northward again, through the Vardar valley to the Danube valley, where they probed the defences of the Empire until the time seemed opportune for them to invade Italy by way of the low Karst plateau behind Trieste. The Emperor transferred his seat from Milan, well placed to direct the defence of Northern Italy, to Ravenna, a city of refuge, protected by marshes, with a way of escape open by sea. The Goths advanced into Southern Italy, sacking Rome on their way; returned to the North, passed by the coastal route into Gaul, and, after a brief excursion into Spain, settled in Aquitaine.

In the meantime the Rhine frontier had been breached. The pressure of the Huns drove the Vandals and their kindred people, the Alans and the Sueves, into Western Germany. They crossed the Rhine in 406, moved slowly across Gaul and

entered Spain in 409. Some twenty years later, the Vandals crossed into North Africa, leaving the Sueves and Alans in the north-western and south-western parts of the peninsula respectively. In the wake of the Vandals came the Burgundians, who, passing through the territory of the Alamanni, settled the upper Rhineland and made their capital at Worms.

The attacks by the Huns had been an important factor in the Gothic invasions of the Empire. They were of Asiatic origin, short, yellow-skinned, with black hair; a pastoral people to whom agriculture was almost unknown, who had for generations migrated seasonally with their animals. Their eruption into Europe has been variously explained. It may have been due to over-population, together, perhaps, with a reduced water-supply for their stock. Purely political factors may have influenced their movement. They had moved westward, through the Ural-Caspian Plain into the steppe-lands of Ukraine, and thence, about the year 400, across the Carpathians into the plain of Hungary. Here they remained, in an environment that proved congenial, for a generation, before a new leader urged them to move again. For a while they hung upon the borders of Italy; then moved up the Danube valley, crossed the upper Rhine, and invaded Gaul. They were turned back near Troyes by what was left of Roman power, backed by the Visigoths, and withdrew across Germany to Hungary. The Huns made one more raid into Italy before they were attacked by East German tribes and driven back towards the plains of Asia. The threat which they presented to Western civilization has probably been exaggerated. Their economy, which they showed no desire to modify, was essentially that of pastoral nomads, and the most westerly territory which they could occupy without sacrificing their way of life was the Hungarian Plain. But, if such grasslands had extended further to the west and provided a basis for the depredations of the Huns little of Roman civilization might have survived.

The Ostrogoths had for two or more generations been subject to the Huns. The destruction of the latter now allowed them to move southward. They settled along the northern coast of the Ægean, until, tempted by the luxuries of Italy and urged on by promises of the Eastern Emperor, they moved north-eastward to the head of the Adriatic and came down

into Italy, as so many invaders had done before, by way of the Julian Alps. By 490 the Ostrogoths were masters of Italy.

FRANCE

We first hear of the Franks in the lower and middle Rhineland. The most northerly tribe, the Salians, inhabited the Meuse-Rhine delta. With the weakening of Roman power in Northern Gaul, the Salians entered the Empire, moving westward between the marshes of the Flanders coast and the Carbonnière Forest to the south, making Tournai the capital of their state. The Ripuarian Franks crossed the Rhine and occupied Cologne, while the Chatti, the third Frankish tribe, moved from their homes in the highlands of Hesse, into the Rheingau. The Burgundians, who had previously occupied this area of the Rhineland, were driven south-westward between the Vosges and the Jura by the Huns and re-established their state in the Rhône-Saône valley. The Alamanni moved into the Rhine valley south of the Chatti.

We thus see the territory of Eastern Gaul being slowly encroached upon by West German tribes, the Franks, Alamanni, and Burgundians. In the south was the Visigothic kingdom of Toulouse in process of being assimilated to the civilization of Rome. To the north lay all that was left of the diminishing Roman province of Gaul, which had borne the brunt of the Hun invasion. Towards the end of the fifth century this was represented by the kingdom of Syagrius, who held his court at Soissons. Brittany enjoyed a quasi-independence, closely linked with the Celtic lands to the north of it.

This political geography of France, as we may begin to call the country, was speedily changed by the advance of the Salian Franks, into the Paris basin. The Alamanni were defeated and driven back to the Rhine; the Roman state of Soissons was absorbed and, with Burgundian help, the Visigothic kingdom overthrown and driven into Spain. The Franks thus established a political unit closely resembling Gaul in its extent. It was, however, established by invaders from the north-east, not the south-east, who established themselves among a people of higher cultural standards. The Romans had made Lyons the focus of their road system. The nucleus

of the Frankish state lay in the Paris basin, the nearest suitable basis for a great state to their place of origin in the lower Rhineland. The eastern frontier followed approximately the Alps, but never coincided with the Rhine. The whole of the lower Rhineland was included, but little of the upper, which was inhabited by the Alamanni. In the south the coast of Provence, the province known as Septimania, became part of Visigothic Spain. This narrow strip of land from Roussillon to the Maritime Alps was the most Romanized part of Gaul.




FIG. 20. PARTITIONS OF FRANCE UNDER THE MEROVINGIANS

The map shows the importance of the Paris Basin, which is in each case divided between the four states.

Only the eastern Pyrenees cut it off from the similar regions of North-eastern Spain, and this barrier was more apparent than real. On the other hand, Mediterranean France differed markedly in climate and culture from the regions of Frankish settlement.

The next two centuries were filled with the struggles between the branches of the Merovingian house for power in France. Politics were complicated by the Frankish law of equal division between heirs, and territories continually split up again the Frankish lands whenever a union seemed imminent. But through all the kaleidoscopic changes in the political pattern of France, one factor remains clear, the importance of the Paris basin. The divisions into which the country was cut

were as often as possible wedge-shaped, with one corner in the vicinity of Paris. The capitals of the petty Frankish states were such towns as Soissons, Reims, Orleans, or Paris.

THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE

Compared with the West, the Eastern Empire had suffered little from the invaders. The Gothic peoples had in turn



FIG. 21. THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE, ABOUT A.D. 560

crossed the lower Danube and invaded Thrace, but had not attacked Constantinople. The fact was that this town was impregnable except to an amphibious attack, and Byzantium, backed by the resources of Asia Minor and Syria, could confidently face a land attack by the Goths. The Byzantine Empire early in the sixth century differed little from the Eastern Empire as demarcated by Diocletian.

Then came the attempt by Justinian to recreate the Roman Empire of the inland sea. The interest of this undertaking lies chiefly in the example it affords of a conflict between a naval and a military Power. Sea-borne trade had continued, reduced but not interrupted, in the Eastern Mediterranean. Sea-power allowed Justinian to conquer almost the whole of the North African coast, much of Southern Spain, together

with the islands of the central and western parts of the sea. Armies advanced north-westward up the Illyrian coast and entered North-eastern Italy, as Goths and Huns had done before. Southern Italy, Apulia and Calabria, were occupied, and footholds were gained on the coast at Naples and Rome. But that was the extent of Justinian's conquests. The Visigothic and Frankish kingdoms were untouched. The invasion of Northern Italy made little progress, and the mountain core of Italy was unsubdued. Spain and Northern Italy were anchored too securely to the continental mass of Europe to be easily detached by the sea-power of the Byzantine Empire.

Justinian's Empire was short-lived. The Lombards, the last of the Germanic tribes to enter the lands of the Roman Empire during the period of the *Völkerwanderung*, invaded Italy from the Danubian lands to the north-east and occupied the plain which bears their name, attaching it even more securely to Germany. The other fragments of the Byzantine Empire were slowly melting away, when the rise of Islam destroyed once and for all Byzantine sea-power.

THE RISE OF ISLAM

It was the rise of Islam and the Moslem conquest of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean that destroyed the Roman hegemony of the inland sea and put an end to its commerce, which had survived, though in an attenuated form, the invasions of Vandals and Goths. Mohammed succeeded in uniting the Arab tribes of Arabia and in giving them a new faith, for which they showed a fanatical crusading zeal. Islam is one of the great militant faiths; it thrives only when it conquers. Migration from the over-populated and perhaps diminishing oases and water-holes of the desert was no new thing. It is described in Genesis. But never before had the emigrants been urged on by such a driving-force as Islam. The conquest of Syria and Mesopotamia began in 633. Neither the Eastern Empire nor Persia could offer more than slight resistance. The Arabs, plainsmen themselves, easily overran the lowlands of the Tigris-Euphrates, but were halted before the Taurus Mountains, which for several centuries were to protect the Eastern Empire. About 640 the Moslem forces

occupied Egypt, as the desert people had done on more than one occasion in the past. They then followed the southern coast of the Mediterranean, following the narrow strip of poor grassland. The Atlas country was conquered by the end of the century, and the Berber tribesmen became among the most fanatical followers of the prophet. Both Carthaginians and Romans had been able only to plant colonies along the




FIG. 22. AREAS OVERRUN BY THE MOSLEMS

coast of North Africa, from which they dominated the tribesmen of the mountains. The Arabs assimilated the Berbers and were thus enabled to sweep northward into Spain and France.

Like the Phœnicians before them, the Arabs took to the sea, and in some fifty years built up a formidable sea-power, thus demonstrating how the will to conquer can overcome the difficulties created by an ignorance of the sea and its ways. Byzantine trade was driven from the Mediterranean, and survived only in the Ægean and Black Seas. Piratical raids prepared the way for an invasion of Spain in 710. Within three years all except the mountainous north-west of the Iberian Peninsula was subdued, and in 721 the Arabs were probing beyond the Pyrenees. In 732 they were held at Tours, defeated, and driven back to the Spanish border. A few years earlier a great assault on Constantinople had failed.

These events were the high-water mark of Arab conquest. They had conquered with considerable ease the poor grasslands of North Africa, the Middle East, and Spain, but, like those of the Huns, their conquests were conditioned by the existence of a geographical environment to which their economy was suited. They could cultivate Southern Spain as no other people has been able to do, but their triumphs were only fleeting in the mountains to the north, in France, and on the harsh uplands of Anatolia.

The Arab state began to decline when it had ceased to conquer, but it had, within the space of a century, gained control of two-thirds of the Mediterranean littoral and driven all other shipping from its waters. The trade, and with it the civilization, of Rome had finished. The towns, which flourished in virtue of their trade, began to decline, fell to ruin, and became enlarged agricultural villages. As Henri Pirenne has pointed out,¹ the barbarian invaders were not, in general, opposed to town life. Trade continued, and Gregory of Tours has described the busy traffic at the port of Marseilles under the Franks. The Arab conquests made the Mediterranean, for the most part, a Moslem lake. Henceforward it was a barrier between Christian and Arab, an obstacle to European trade. "The world order which had survived the Germanic invasions was not able to survive the invasions of Islam. A closed domestic economy replaced the trading economy of the Roman Empire. The twilight of the Middle Ages had begun."

THE CAROLINGIAN EMPIRE

"Without Islam, the Frankish Empire would probably never have existed, and Charlemagne, without Mahomet, would be inconceivable."² The Frankish kingdom had been united under the rule of the Carolingian dynasty in the latter part of the eighth century. The pressure of invaders was relaxed, and attacks by the Danes had not yet begun. For a brief period the greater part of Christendom was united under a single ruler. The idea of the Christian empire was not new. The later Roman Empire had provided an example, and to Christians during the period of the invasions the peace of the old

¹ H. Pirenne, *Medieval Cities*.

² *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Empire was something to look back upon with regret and to recreate if possible.

The Franks, originating in the Rhineland, looked farther




FIG. 23. THE CAROLINGIAN EMPIRE, *c.* 810

The stippled areas are the Breton and Spanish Marches.

east for a frontier. No natural feature separated them from the pagan Saxons, who occupied the forest, marsh, and heath of North-west Germany. To the south were the Bavarians, already tributary to the Carolingian Empire. Germany east of the Elbe and the mountains of Bohemia had been occupied by Slavonic people. After a series of difficult campaigns Charlemagne conquered the Saxon tribes and advanced his

frontier beyond the Elbe. Bohemia was subdued, together with the section of the Danube valley corresponding with the modern Austria. The French Alps were crossed, the kingdom of Lombardy defeated, and Northern and Central Italy added to his Empire. These conquests brought with them the obligation, in which the later Roman Empire had failed disastrously, to protect North-eastern Italy from invasion by peoples from the middle Danube basin. Duchies were set up in the Danube valley, in Carinthia and Friuli, to serve as marches and take the first shock of any attack.

A slight advance was made in the Mediterranean, but the land-based empire of Charlemagne failed to absorb Southern Italy, and the political pattern made familiar by the conquests of Justinian was revived. This dualism in Italy, a continental north and a maritime and almost insular south, has survived into the nineteenth century, and, one might add in view of the progress of Allied campaigns in 1944-45, the twentieth. A broad belt of country south of the Pyrenees was occupied and constituted as the Spanish March, thus beginning the reconquest of that country from the Moors. At sea some slight progress was made; Corsica was occupied, and even the Balearic Islands for a short time.

But the outstanding characteristic of Charlemagne's Empire was that, unlike the Roman, it was a continental empire, for which the sea was a means of protection rather than an avenue of trade. It extended farther into Germany, as was to be expected, than the Roman, and thus came to include two major language groups, the Romance of France and Italy, and the Germanic. No attempt was made to assimilate the latter to the former. Instead each developed in its own direction, and within a few years of Charlemagne's death the origins of modern French and German are faintly apparent in one of the documents by which the Empire was partitioned. Thus early did the germs appear of modern nationalism. Lastly, as has already been pointed out, the economy of the Carolingian Empire was predominantly an agricultural one; roads were little used; trade declined, and the village settlements were self-sufficing and self-contained. It was "an economy of no markets."¹

¹ Fierenne, p. 46.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE SEA EMPIRES OF NORTHERN EUROPE

THE division of the British Isles into a Highland and a Lowland zone has become one of the commonplaces of physical and human geography. It indicates a contrast not only in structure and relief, but also in history, society, and institutions. The community of culture which characterized the Highland zone in the Bronze Age and later has already been mentioned. Broadly it may be said that this community asserted itself whenever Lowland Britain was disturbed by way of invasion. It was not apparent under the Roman Empire, when Brittany, Cornwall, Wales, and Scotland were each more closely linked with the English plain than with one another. With the departure of the legions and the invasions of the Anglo-Saxons a more intimate connexion developed again between these lands. Although no common political organization was set up, the Irish Sea and the mouths of the Bristol and English Channels were the centre of a sort of maritime empire, whose strongest characteristic was its Celtic religion and culture.

This unity of Celtic Britain is best seen in the voyages of its saints. That of St Columba from Ireland to Scotland is only the best known. There was actually a vigorous intercourse between these Celtic lands. The lives of the Celtic saints, though digested and edited in later medieval times, are full of echoes of this period. Irish saints crossed to Wales or Cornwall and passed on to Brittany. Church dedications in the latter country are very largely Welsh or Irish saints. Many of these, such as St David, St Petroc, and St Briec, may be described as pan-Celtic saints. The legend of Tristan and Iseult takes us to Ireland, Wales, Cornwall, and Brittany, and probably assumed its present shape in Cornwall.

A sort of pan-Celtic union continued to exist, though diminishing in importance, into the eleventh century, but it could no longer exist in anything like its old form after the Anglo-Saxon peoples and, after them, the Normans had conquered the English plain. A strong Power, based in South-eastern




FIG. 24. TRAVELS OF THE CELTIC SAINTS IN THE FIFTH AND SIXTH CENTURIES
After E. G. Bowen

England, was able gradually to attach the Celtic-speaking lands, both politically and economically, to itself.

Anglo-Saxon Peoples. The invasion of Britain by the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes was approximately contemporary with that of Gaul by the Franks and was part of the same westward movement of Germanic peoples. It has been suggested that a rise of sea-level in their already marshy and low-lying land precipitated their movement. The Saxons appear to have come from the low coastal plain of North-west Germany. The Angles are connected by their own traditions with Schleswig, and the Jutes are commonly supposed to have come from Denmark. The evidence appears to suggest that the invaders came in isolated bands, landed on the coasts of South-western Britain and advanced up the river valleys. Certain fertile and naturally cleared areas were settled first, the dip-slopes of the chalk in Kent, Sussex, and Hants, the gravel and loam plateau of East Anglia, and certain areas in Lincolnshire and Yorkshire. Movement inland was conditioned by avenues of open country. The Thames Valley, the narrow strip of chalk downland, threaded by the Icknield Way, between the Fenland and the forested boulder-clay of Essex and Suffolk, and the open plateau north of Southampton Water were ways into Wessex.

The initial invasion met with little opposition. Later Celtic forces rallied under Ambrosius and the almost mythical Arthur and held the Saxons on some ill-defined battlefield, but years later occupied Chester. The Celtic Highland Fringe was being split up into its natural compartments, each of which carried on in isolation the unco-ordinated struggle. Nor were the invaders themselves united in their struggle against the Celts. They became organized in a large number of tribal kingdoms, the Heptarchy, each with a nucleus in a fertile, easily cultivated area. Larger political units became possible as each encroached on its encircling barrier of less valuable land. In England, France and Germany there was a vigorous attack on the primeval woodland, in which the religious orders played a not inconspicuous part. In the words of one of the *Vitæ*:

All gird themselves to work, they cut down trees, root up bushes, tear up brambles and tangled thorns, and soon convert a dense wood into an open clearing. . . . Some cut down timber and trimmed it with axes, others planed planks for the




FIG. 25. THE PLACE-NAMES OF THE BRITISH ISLES

This map, based on that of I. Taylor in *Words and Places*, is approximately correct. Detail has been modified by later research.

walls of the houses, many prepared the ceilings and roofs, some turned up the sods with hoes. Then the soil was worked carefully with light hoes, and being ploughed with very small furrows, its various produce was placed in due time on the threshing floors.¹




FIG. 26. MIGRATIONS OF THE SCANDINAVIAN PEOPLES DURING THE DARK AGES

After G. M. Trevelyan

Political power lay, until the middle of the seventh century, in Northern England. It moved slowly southward to Mercia and then to Wessex, never to return, as Professor Trevelyan has pointed out, until the nineteenth century. The reason is probably to be found in the character of the natural resources.

¹ G. H. Doble, *St Brioc* ("Cornish Saints" series, S. Lee, 1928).

The agricultural potentialities of the North were smaller than those of the Midlands and South, but until the latter regions




FIG. 27. ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND
After G. M. Trevelyan

were more fully exploited it was always possible for the rude warriors of Northumbria to gain a temporary supremacy. The slow development of the South ultimately gained for it a lead which was lost only when the Industrial Revolution put a premium on coal rather than cornfields.

In the eighth century the boundaries of Mercia were advanced to the margin of the Welsh Mountains, and Offa's Dyke, a defensive work, was dug from the Denbighshire coast, near the Point of Air, southward to the lower Wye. In the South-west, after being halted for a time behind the Somerset marshes, the Saxons advanced into Devon and subjugated, though they did not actually settle, West Wales. The Pennines and the marshes about the Mersey protected the Welsh area of Strathclyde until the end of the eleventh century.

The Vikings. The Anglo-Saxon invasions of Britain were followed, after an interval of three centuries, by the attacks of the Vikings from Norway and Denmark. The reasons for their migrations are even less apparent than those of earlier movements. It has been suggested that over-population, induced by polygamy among the upper classes, was a leading cause. Dynastic factors may have contributed. Small bands of raiders first appeared off the English coast before 800. Small raiding parties were succeeded by permanent settlers. All the coasts of the British Isles were exposed to them. In the ninth century their raids on the Low Countries and the coast of France grew stronger. They reached the Bay of Biscay, ravaged the coasts of Spain and North Africa, and spread fear in the Mediterranean.

Their movements tended to follow three main lines of advance. Emigrants from Denmark followed an inner line to the East Coast of England, the English Channel, and Northern France. From Norway they followed an outer line to the Shetlands, Orkneys, Western Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. An eastern line, which will be considered more fully later, was from Sweden across the isthmus of Europe to the Black Sea. The first two met in what we now call the Western Approaches, and the British Isles were encircled by the routes of the Vikings.

In the second half of the ninth century England east of the Pennines, together with much of the Midlands, was settled by Vikings chiefly from Denmark, Southern Norway, and perhaps South-eastern Sweden. The Viking settlement was no passing episode. Place-names in Lincolnshire and parts of Yorkshire and the counties to the west and south have been very strongly influenced by them. The centre of Danish power in this country lay in the "Five Boroughs"—Lincoln, Stamford,

Leicester, Nottingham, and Derby—fortresses and places of refuge rather than towns in the accepted sense. The boundary of the Danelaw ran from the hills of Derbyshire south to Watling Street, which it followed to a point near London. Raids were made by the Danes beyond this line, and Alfred secured the river Lea as his frontier north and east of London.




FIG. 28. THE DANISH EMPIRE OF KING KNUT

After H. C. Darby

The significance of the boundary of the Danelaw is that it approximately follows the watershed between the Wash and Humber rivers and those flowing to the west.

The successors of King Alfred recovered most of the Danelaw, largely by a process of building fortified towns, or burhs, many of which became the capitals of the Midland shires. England was very largely unified under Edgar (959-975). About the same time Norway and Denmark were each moulded

into a fairly compact state. At the end of the tenth century Danish attacks were renewed. Svein, the King of Denmark, took part in a fresh conquest of England, and his son, Knut, became king of both England and Denmark. The kingdom of Knut was another of the many examples which the Middle Ages can show of a sea state. It embraced the margins of the North Sea, and was held together by the easy sea-routes between the Danish islands and Eastern England. Knut's empire broke up, but the idea of a North Sea state did not die easily, and its revival was perhaps only prevented by the rise of another, that of the Normans, based on the English Channel.

Viking raids on the coast of France began early in the ninth century, diminished, and increased again to a climax late in the century, when Paris was besieged and Normandy settled. No permanent settlements were made elsewhere in France and Spain. Viking raids reached as far as Pisa and the Bay of Spezia. In the next century Vikings from Normandy sailed round the Spanish peninsula and settled Southern Italy and Sicily.

The virility of the Vikings was matched only by their adaptability. In Normandy they took on a French culture; in England they contributed one more strain to an already mixed population, apparent enough in the greater number of freemen who characterized the Danelaw counties at the time of Domesday. In Southern Italy they gave a new vigour to the Greek-Arab civilization of that region, leading to the fine flowering of art and culture in the following centuries.

The Norsemen. Emigrants from the fjords of Norway tended to make for the Shetland and Orkney Islands, and from here sailed down the west coast of Scotland more often than the east. Place-names testify to their settlements round the Irish Sea, where they made the Isle of Man a centre of their activities. North-westward they sailed to the Faroe Islands and Iceland. In 982, Eric the Red reached Greenland, where a Norse settlement continued to exist for several centuries. About the year 1000 Leif reached the shores of the New World, five hundred years before Cabot. Norsemen sailed far into the Arctic Ocean; they rounded the North Cape and explored the White Sea. The distribution of Norse place-names round the Irish Sea resembles the distribution of Celtic saints.

There was a possibility, early in the eleventh century, that the Danes and Vikings might establish a North Atlantic maritime empire. The possibility was not realized. Instead England, which must have been near its centre, was drawn within the orbit of France. The remote islands in the grey northern seas were isolated and forgotten. Greenland had to be re-discovered in modern times, while Iceland faded from the history of the Middle Ages.

The Swedes. The third line of migration from Scandinavia was across the Baltic. By about 800, Viking groups had established themselves near Lake Ladoga, and within some forty years advanced parties had made their way up the Dwina and other rivers, crossed the watershed, and sailed down the Dnieper to the Black Sea and Constantinople. The Rus, as they were called, gained a political supremacy over the Russian plain, which they ruled from their capital, Kiev, the mother of all the towns of Russia.

At a time when trade in the Mediterranean and in Western Europe had come to a standstill contact between Northern Europe and the Middle East was maintained by the Swedes of Russia. Luxury goods from the Byzantine Empire and Middle Eastern countries crossed the "isthmus of Europe" to the Baltic and the markets of Uppsala and Visby. Hoards of Arab coins have been found in Southern Sweden, having almost certainly come by this route.

This Swedish Empire of the Baltic gradually declined. Its trade-route across the Steppe was interrupted by the Tartars. Its land base in Scandinavia was insufficient to support an imperial and colonizing movement of such magnitude, and gradually the trade of the Baltic fell into the hands of German peoples. A similar Swedish *imperium* was revived by the house of Vasa in the seventeenth century to be destroyed by the Russian state at the beginning of the eighteenth. It would seem that a 'greater' Sweden can exist only when Germany and Russia are weak and divided. In the ninth century there was no Russian state, and the lands south of the Baltic Sea were occupied by barbarous Slavonic tribes (see Chapter XI). In the seventeenth both were a prey to civil war. But the resources of each were such that a Swedish sea state could not exist when they were fully developed.

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CHAPTER SIX

STATE-BUILDING IN WESTERN EUROPE

THE large and unwieldy empire of Charlemagne was ruled by Louis, son of the great Charles, but before his death was partitioned between two of his sons. The Partition of Worms, drawn up in 838, divided the Empire into a Western and an Eastern Kingdom, of which the latter was considered the more eligible. The boundary followed the Meuse, crossed the Moselle, and then followed the Jura and the Alps to the Mediterranean. Five years later the first partition, which was never implemented, was followed by that of Verdun. The Empire was divided between the three sons of the late emperor, and a Middle Kingdom was created for Lothair, the eldest. Its boundaries were arbitrary. The eastern border followed the Rhine, but curved east to include much of the coast of Frisia. Louis, the German, received the Rhineland districts of Mainz, Speyer, and Worms "because of the abundance of wine." The western frontier of the Middle Kingdom followed the Rhône, Moselle, and Meuse, but included also several counties to the west of this line to compensate for the German occupation of the Rhenish territories. The Middle Kingdom included Italy. Germany lay to the east; France to the west.

Attempts have been made to interpret the partition of Verdun as evidence of the growth of nationalism within the Carolingian empire. It is true that the French and Teutonic languages were becoming recognizable as such, and were used in defining the terms of the treaty, but nationalism was a very distant result rather than a cause of the Verdun partition. The subsequent history of Europe has been described, with rather greater reason, as the record of the struggle between the Eastern and Western Kingdoms for the possession of the Middle, a struggle of which we may in 1945 have witnessed the last episodes.

The Middle Kingdom was an unmanageable unit. Italy dropped away, a semi-independent principality in which the Pope of Rome was slowly building a considerable temporal power. The political geography of Italy at this time is described




FIG. 29. PARTITIONS OF THE CAROLINGIAN EMPIRE AT VERDUN (843) AND MERSEN (888)

The maps show the gradual development of the system of frontiers of later medieval and early modern times.

later. North of the Alps, the kingdom of Lorraine, as we may describe that portion of the Middle Kingdom, was divided in 870, by the Partition of Mersen, between the French and German Kingdoms, along a line closely resembling the Worms line of over forty years earlier. It is worth noting that it occurred to none of the political geographers of the ninth century that the Rhine might be a suitable eastern frontier to France. The equation of France with Gaul had not yet been put forward.

THE FRENCH STATE

The ninth and tenth centuries saw the Western Realm a prey to invasion by the Vikings from without, and within disturbed by frequent wars between the successors of Charlemagne. In these circumstances the exercise of political power devolved upon the provincial nobility. In this way France came to be divided into a number of duchies, in much the same way as Great Britain was divided in 1940 in anticipation of invasion and the collapse of the central Government. Political feudalism, whatever were the Roman or Germanic institutions from which it grew, was in effect the exercise by private individuals of the functions of local government and justice. The kings of France tended to become shadowy figures, having the trappings of royalty without the firm roots in one or other of the provinces which the leading nobles possessed.

On the extinction of the Carolingian line in France, their place was taken by the family of Hugh Capet, whose broad estates lay between Paris and Orleans. These lands, compact, fertile, at the focus of the valley routes of the Paris basin, offered to the Capetian dynasty the possibility of expanding and absorbing neighbouring estates in the North of France. When the Capets accepted what nature offered they laid the foundations of the French State.

There was at this time no feeling of French nationality, lying dormant and waiting to be touched into life by a monarch of genius. The French kings had to struggle against the centrifugal tendencies of the peripheral regions of France. In Southern France this was perhaps most marked. During the

period of the Roman Empire, Gaul south of the Garonne, the Tarn, and the Rhône had been organized as two separate provinces—Aquitania and Gallia Narbonensis. Later the same




FIG. 30. THE ESTATES OF THE EARLY CAPETIAN KINGS OF FRANCE, TENTH AND ELEVENTH CENTURIES

- In relation to the Seine and Loire waterways.

area, centring in Toulouse, formed the Visigothic Kingdom. Under the Carolingians, Aquitaine was more often than not a separate duchy, while Septimania, the coastal fringe of




FIG. 31. THE EXPANSION OF THE ROYAL DOMAIN IN FRANCE

After L. Mirot

Gallia Narbonensis, remained part of Visigothic Spain until the Moslem conquest. Broadly speaking, a line from the Gironde mouth to the Lake of Geneva has divided France until modern times into two cultural provinces.

Just as Southern France was oriented towards Spain and

the Mediterranean, so Western has tended at various times to form part of a West European maritime state. We have already considered how Brittany formed during the Dark Ages part of the Celtic empire of Western Britain. The Vikings detached the duchy of Normandy, and conquered southward into Maine and Touraine. Conquest added England, and marriage the duchy of Aquitaine, so that in the second half of the twelfth century the Angevin empire stretched from Scotland to the Pyrenees and embraced the whole west of France. Sea-ways held this empire together, reinforced by the strong economic ties between Aquitaine and England. England was the chief market for Bordeaux wine; and Southern France a market for English wool, cloth, dried fish, and metals. The line of the river Seine was the most natural way of expansion of the French state. The duchy of Normandy was lost in 1204, and during the first phase of the Hundred Years War, before 1360, all Northern France was occupied and accepted the rule of Paris. It is indicative of where England's interests lay that in this year only part of Aquitaine was left to her of the Angevin empire, in addition to Ponthieu and Calais. When the war ended nearly a hundred years later these same territories were the last footholds held by England on the continent of Europe. It is interesting to notice that with the loss of Aquitaine came an increasing interest in Portugal. Our "ancient ally" was the heir of the Angevin Empire; port-wine replaced claret on the tables of the English nobility, and the Methuen Treaty (1703) set its seal upon the new, and but little different, orientation of English interests in Western Europe.

At the accession of Hugh Capet, the eastern boundary of the French kingdom had stretched from Scheldt southward to Cambrai, and thence south-south-eastward, parallel to and a little to the west of the Meuse, to the Faucilles hills. From here, it followed the course of the upper Saône, but kept to the west of the Rhône, excluding the Lyonnais. This line was an entirely arbitrary one, and the territory between the frontier and the Rhône was essentially that given to the kingdom of Lothair in 843 to compensate for the loss of the territories of Mainz, Speyer, and Worms. In the twelfth century the French kings expanded eastward from their nuclear region

of Paris, up the Oise, Aisne, and Marne. The allegiance of Vermandois and Champagne was gained. Flanders and the duchy of Burgundy were dominated. The conquest of south-eastern France was of the nature of a crusade. The Albigensian heresy was associated with opposition to the French Crown, further evidence of the cultural as well as political conflict between the North and the South. The South was subdued during the first half of the thirteenth century. The influence of the North soon became apparent. *Bastides*, small fortified towns, were built to dominate the country and detract from the importance of the older urban centres of separatist feeling; the French of Paris began to supplant the *Langue d'oc*; Gothic architecture of the Paris basin began to appear beside the Romanesque of the south.

The bounds of medieval France were rounded off by the absorption of Lyonnais, Dauphiné, and Provence and, at the very end of the fifteenth century, of Brittany.

THE SPANISH PENINSULA

On the bare uplands of Spain we can see the formation of a medieval state in its bare simplicity. The peninsula had never been wholly conquered by the Moors. Small groups of Christian peoples, Visigothic and others, found refuge in the mountains of Northern Spain. The Pyrenean region had been occupied and the Spanish March established by Charlemagne. Although for a time the Christian peoples of the mountain belt were unified under Sancho the Great (tenth and early eleventh centuries), five political units eventually crystallized. In the north-west, Leon; in the centre, Castile, and, along the southern face of the Pyrenees, and in places extending across the range to the north, Navarre, Aragon, and the County of Barcelona. Each of the five advanced its frontiers southward, as it conquered land from the Moors. Leon and Castile had an uninterrupted field across the plains of the Douro, bounded on the east and west by the La Demanda-Alberacin mountains and the gorges and mountains downstream from Zamora respectively. The two states became united at an early date, and then, after a halt along the line of the Sierra de Guadarrama, advanced into the plains of Toledo and New Castile.

The three Christian states of North-eastern Spain each advanced southward into the Ebro basin until checked by the Iberian Mountains, which flanked the line of Castilian advance. The field of conquest offered Navarre was small and




FIG. 32. STAGES IN THE RECONQUEST OF SPAIN BY THE CHRISTIAN STATES
Compare with Figs. 72 and 73.

quickly occupied. Backed as it was by relatively easy routes across the western Pyrenees, this state expanded to the north, developed a French county of Navarre, and eventually gave France a ruling family. Aragon advanced farther, before its progress was halted, and the County of Barcelona filled out the state of Catalonia, based on the Mediterranean. With no fresh fields to conquer within the peninsula the state of Catalonia expanded by sea, occupied the Balearics, and, after its

'natural' union with Aragon, built up a sea state embracing Sicily and Southern Italy.

On the western side of the peninsula the kingdom of Portugal arose from duchies established below the scarp of the Meseta, at Oporto and Coimbra. Its southward expansion was eventually checked, like that of Catalonia, by the sea, and, in this too resembling Catalonia, it continued its conquests and its crusades beyond the sea, until, following the natural lines of expansion, the galleons of da Gama anchored at Calicut.

The political pattern of medieval Spain thus presents three latitudinal belts. In the eastern and the western, the limits of




FIG. 33. THE SEA-STATE OF ARAGON

After H. C. Darby

the Meseta the dour struggle against the Moslem went on until his final destruction in 1492. The Castellians had become a nation of crusaders.

The Moslems had made a great contribution to the economic life of Spain. They introduced several new crops, probably including rice, and the citrus fruits; in all likelihood, they brought the merino sheep to Spain; their irrigation works in the Guadalquivir valley and on the vegas of South-eastern Spain were a source of wonder to their conquerors. On the Meseta the most important activity was sheep-rearing, for which the arid steppe-land was suited. The sheep migrated north and south with the seasons along the *cañadas*, or sheep tracks. Wool was the chief export of medieval Spain. The sheep-owners, banded together in the *Mesta*, were able to prohibit any agricultural developments which limited their grazing grounds. Until the nineteenth century, economic development on the Meseta has been restricted by the vested interests of the sheep-owners, and the demand for fresh

land conquest were early reached, and the prospects of trade soon took the edge from the crusading zeal of their inhabitants. Portugal and Aragon became, in the later Middle Ages, essentially commercial countries. On




FIG. 34. PATTERNS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF ITALY
The tendency is clearly shown for the peninsula to 'break' about the latitudes of Genoa and Ancona.

pastures in the Middle Ages constantly spurred Castile to fresh conquests. •

THE ITALIAN PENINSULA

It is impossible in the short space available here to do more than trace in the broadest outline the evolution of the political pattern of Italy. The facility with which the Lombards from Germany conquered the North, and the inability of Justinian, with command of the Mediterranean, to occupy more than Southern Italy and the islands provides us with a sort of pattern which is common to all periods of Italian history, not excluding even the war which has just ended.

The geographical unit known as Italy may be said to comprise three parts.

(i) In the north it is a great plain, drained by the Po and its tributaries, with a climate which belongs rather to Central Europe than to the Mediterranean. It is bounded on north, west, and south by mountains. The Apennines here are high and regular and not easily crossed. The Alps, those "splendid traitors," are, by contrast, penetrated by a considerable number of routes passable to a medieval army. It is not surprising then that Northern Italy has been, for much of its history, dominated by Powers from beyond the Alps. To the Romans it was Cisalpine Gaul.

(ii) Southern Italy is a mountainous region of bare, or garrigue-covered limestone slopes, with narrow coastal plains. The climate is warm and typically Mediterranean. If the economy in the north is based on grain cultivation, that in the south depends on fruit. The Romans associated Northern Italy with Gaul; the South—Magna Græcia, as they called it—reminded them of Greece.

(iii) Central Italy, lying between the two, has a modified Mediterranean climate, and wider plains than Southern Italy. More protected from attack from beyond the Alps than Northern Italy, it was less vulnerable than Southern to attack by sea. Here, if anywhere, is a focus for an Italian nationalism, and it is no accident that here, in the Arno and Tiber valleys, that Italian art of the Renaissance achieved its finest expression.

The significance of these three divisions of Italy becomes

apparent when we consider the number of occasions on which Southern Italy or Northern Italy has been occupied by either a sea or land Power respectively. Justinian's empire (see Fig. 34), the Saracens, the Normans, and Aragonese, have each in turn occupied Sicily and Italy to a line just north of Naples. None has been able to conquer further. The last of these, the Spanish Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, lasted from early in the sixteenth century until 1860, when it too was conquered, not from the north, but by Garibaldi's amphibious expedition which landed in Sicily.

Northern Italy has in turn been occupied by Visigoths, Huns, Ostrogoths, Lombards, the Franks of Charlemagne, and the German followers of Otto I. Throughout the Middle Ages the iron crown of Lombardy went as a matter of course with the imperial crown of the Holy Roman Empire. German emperors led their *landknechts* down through the Brenner, the Septimer or the St Bernard Passes for a coronation at Milan or Rome, to plunder the rich cities of Italy or even to fight the French on the plains of Lombardy. City states and large political units grew up because imperial power was always fitful and often weak. Venice and the other trading towns of Northern Italy are considered more fully later.

Central Italy appears as a sort of no-man's land between the continental North and the insular South. From the time when the Roman emperors left Rome political authority was weak in Central Italy, and the field was left open for the Papacy to develop its temporal power and to build up the States of the Church, which have stretched between Rome and Ancona with but short intervals since the Dark Ages. Between the Papal States and the Apennine ranges to the north lay, for much of medieval and modern times, a group of small states, the most important of which was Tuscany, in a region of very broken relief.

THE CRUSADES

The Crusades were an attempt on the part of Western Europe to regain command of the Mediterranean by establishing Christian states in Palestine and Syria. As in all movements of this magnitude, motives were mixed. Pure-minded

enthusiasts fought alongside self-seeking Venetians and Byzantines. The immediate cause was the conquest of the Middle East by the Seljuk Turks (see Chapter IX). The tolerant Arabs had hitherto permitted, even encouraged, Christian pilgrims to visit the Holy Places. Their political power was weakening, and they constituted no threat to the Byzantine Empire. In 1071 the Seljuks stormed on to the plateau of Anatolia. Five years later they took Jerusalem.




FIG. 35. THE CRUSADES

The routes taken by the First, Third, and Fifth Crusades and the Crusade of Louis IX are shown. The Latin Kingdom of Constantinople (1204) and the Kingdom of Jerusalem (black) are indicated by shading.

In 1096 the first Crusaders forgathered and marched to Constantinople. They had to approach Jerusalem by the more difficult land route, across Asia Minor and through the passes of the Taurus. They had not got the command of the sea nor the ships necessary for a movement against the coast of Palestine. Jerusalem fell in 1099 and a number of Christian states were set up. But the problem facing them was the same as that which had troubled the Roman Empire, the difficulty of drawing a frontier across the Fertile Crescent. The fortress of Edessa was thrust out beyond the Euphrates. Opposite it was the Turkish Mosul. Edessa fell to attacks from the latter, and a second Crusade failed to regain it. Later in the twelfth century, the Turks pushed westward and southward through the Fertile Crescent, taking Jerusalem in 1187, and forcing

the Christians back into coastal strongholds of Antioch, Tripoli, and Acre. It is indicative of their increasing maritime importance that the Western Powers could hold these towns against the land-based attacks of the Turks. The Third Crusade was largely sea-borne but failed to do more than enlarge somewhat the bases along the Syrian and Palestinian coast. The Fourth was side-tracked by the Venetians into an attack on their commercial rivals of Constantinople. Its chief result was the emergence of the sea empire of Venice.




FIG. 36. VENETIAN POSSESSIONS IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

After H. C. Darby

The later Crusades—the last was in 1270—call for little comment. The idea of the holy war had ceased to inspire Western Christendom. The growing fleets and increasing sea power of the Italian cities allowed expeditions to be made without interruption to Palestine, Egypt, and Tunis, but the strength of the Turkish power prevented anything more than large beach-heads from being established. The chief result of the Crusades was the growth of trade in the Mediterranean. Acre was held till 1291; Cyprus and Rhodes till a much later date. The Venetians kept their trading bases in the Adriatic, Greece, and the Aegean until the end of the Middle Ages, and some even longer than this.

TRADE IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE

Trade and the Italian Cities. Trade had been practically extinguished in the Mediterranean after the Arab conquests, but by 1000 there were signs of a revival. Venice from her island base, north of the Po delta, developed first local trade in salt and then dominated the Adriatic, established connexions with the Byzantine Empire and even reached out to Egypt. In the south, Amalfi and Salerno traded with Moslem Sicily and North Africa. Genoa was slowly building up her trade in the western Mediterranean. The Italian cities were so far advanced that they were able to establish commercial centres in the Levant as soon as the Crusades made this possible. Their growing strength allowed them to barter their help to the Crusaders in return for trading concessions. Venice, and then Genoa, came to dominate the city of Constantinople; the Greek islands are littered with the remains of their settlements. We are reminded of the offer of Henry Dandolo, Doge of Venice, to the leaders of the Fourth Crusade:

We will build transports to carry four thousand five hundred horses, and nine thousand squires, and ships for four thousand five hundred knights, and twenty thousand sergeants of foot. And we will agree also to purvey food for these horses and people during nine months . . . on condition that you pay us for each horse four marks, and for each man two marks. . . . For the love of God, we will add to the fleet fifty armed galleys on condition that, so long as we act in company, of all conquests in land or money, whether at sea or on dry ground, we shall have the half, and you the other half.¹

From Genoa, trading routes passed along the Riviera coast and across France by way of the Rhône valley or the Gap of Naurouze. The gaps across the Apennines behind the city led to Turin and the passes of the French Alps, of which the Mont Génèvre, Mont Cenis, and Great St Bernard were the most important. The commerce of Venice passed northward to Germany by the Brenner, Septimer, Pontebba, and Birnbaumer routes. In the thirteenth century the St Gotthard route was opened up and became the most important of them

¹ G. de Villehardouin and J. de Joinville, *Memoirs of the Crusades* (Everyman Library).

all. By these routes the merchants of Venice and Genoa passed on to Western Europe the riches of the East, silk goods, damask and carpets, jewels and gold, spices, sugar, coffee and wines, receiving in exchange wool and cloth. In the fourteenth century Venetian galleys made the voyage to North-western Europe. They came to England, to the disgust of not a few English, and

these galleys for this liking ware
And eating ware, bare hence our best chaffare,
Cloth, wool and tin.¹

The security of her land-routes was always a matter of great concern to the Venetians. Early in the fifteenth century the Venetians began to occupy the western part of the Lombard plain, including all the routes which run up to the Brenner. But such precautions were left too late. Soon afterwards Constantinople fell to the Turks, who regained that sea supremacy which they had, to some extent, lost during and after the Crusades. Egypt was occupied by them in 1517, and the route to Asia by way of the Red Sea was closed. But already the Portuguese were in India and the Spaniards in Central America, and Venice, which once held "the gorgeous East in fee," now decayed, and the Mediterranean became a *cul de sac*.

The Commerce of Northern Europe. A Roman road had run up the Rhône valley, through Lyons across the limestone plateau of Langres to Rheims, and so to Flanders. Traffic revived along this route-way at a relatively early date. Fairs grew up on it where it crossed the downland of Champagne. Merchandise from Italy was distributed here to Paris and Flanders. The cloths of Northern France and the Flandertowns, the wool of England and Spain, metal goods and furs from the distant Baltic were offered for sale. In the fourteenth century the traffic of these fairs moved slowly northward to Flanders.

Trade had been developed here in the ninth and tenth centuries by the Frisians from their emporia of Dorestadt and Utrecht, and the local cloth was marketed within the Carolingian Empire. With the expansion of the latter beyond the Rhine, Flanders ceased to be marginal and assumed a central position in North-western Europe. The enterprise of the

¹ *The Libell of Englyshe Policye.*

people, who dyked and reclaimed from the sea low-lying lands of the Flemish coast, the wool, easily imported from England, and the flax, grown locally, together with the land and sea routes which met here, contributed to the rise of the Flemish clothing towns. These were new foundations, growing up beneath the shelter and protection of abbey or castle; very few owed anything to Roman predecessors. Most were on navigable rivers, and water transport played then, as it does to-day, an important part in their economy. Ghent and Bruges, chief of the Flemish towns, lay within reach of the sea. The decline of Bruges in the fifteenth century, accompanied the silting of its river, the Zwin, and of its successive outports.

During the Middle Ages Flanders was the most highly industrialized area of Europe. Only here can it be said that urban population exceeded rural and that manufacture was more important than agriculture. The earliest of the *villes drapantes* had been between the Scheldt and the sea: Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, St Omer, Lille; urban development later spread south of the Scheldt to the sandy plateau of Brabant, to Cambrai, Valenciennes, Brussels, Louvain, and Maastricht.

In the later Middle Ages the Flanders towns lost trade to the Hansa League (see Chapter VII). The opening up of the sea route between Italy and North-western Europe detracted from the importance of the overland route, and Flanders began to lose its importance as an emporium of trade. The increasing size of ships tended to concentrate traffic at a few centres, of which Antwerp became outstanding. Wars in the fifteenth century and Spanish occupation in the sixteenth further restricted the trade and industry of the Flanders cities, and as we pass from medieval into modern times, the centres of commerce move northward to the United Provinces.

Towns of the Middle Ages. The Roman towns had become during the Dark Ages merely shells, inhabited at most by groups of agriculturalists. All signs of urban life had departed. In the tenth century the first signs were visible of a regrowth of urban life and institutions, and towns came again into being as commerce revived. It is significant that Southern France, the most prosperous part of the country under the Roman Empire, was the last to be influenced by this revival. It began instead in the North, in the valleys of the Rhine; Meuse, and

Scheldt. This new development of trade was a delicate, fragile growth, needing protection not merely from robbers and from civil strife, but also from the social conditions of the time, its law and administration, its prejudices and beliefs. The merchants wanted, above all, self-governing city-states, or *communes*, whose law and institutions would assist and not hinder the practice of industry and commerce. But first they needed the physical protection of stone walls. This was provided in one of several ways:

(i) Roman towns. The decaying walls of a Roman town, as at London, Exeter, Winchester, and York in this country, at Cologne, Trier, Lyons in France, might be rebuilt and used.

(ii) Fortress towns, deliberately established for military reasons, to hold conquered territory or protect a frontier, might become the nuclei of commercial towns. The 'burhs' of Edward the Elder in this country, built to hold land newly conquered from the Danes, grew into such towns as Nottingham, Bedford, Stafford. Similar 'burhs' were established in the Low Countries and Germany.

(iii) Rather similar in origin was the town that grew up round a castle, backed rather than surrounded by its high walls. It was to the advantage of the owner of the castle to encourage the growth of a fair, a market, and eventually of a commercial 'suburb'; the profits were valuable to him. Many towns in Western Europe grew in this way, and many more incipient towns failed to get beyond the initial stages of having a market and fair.

(iv) Lastly an ecclesiastical foundation might replace the secular as the nucleus of the town; Bury St Edmunds, Glastonbury, Bodmin, are examples. But the Church appears to have had a restrictive influence on municipal development. The burgesses had to fight for those municipal rights and liberties, which were readily granted by secular lords.

Around the nucleus of the protective *bourg*, without any strictly urban functions, the commercial *faubourg*, *suburb*, or *port*, grew up, with its warehouses, workshops, markets, and merchants' houses. The inhabitants, functions, and even administration of the two differed radically. Town walls were built or extended round the newer growth. The *faubourg* sometimes grew until it encircled and virtually absorbed the

older *bourg*, and extensions were at intervals made in its walls. The situation of medieval towns was determined by the geographical factors, rivers and river crossings, route-ways, navigable rivers, and tidal estuaries, but these alone did not insure the growth of a town. The human factors, the encouragement of a lay lord, the opposition of a monastery, fearful for the souls of those who trafficked with the devil, often overruled the purely physical. The morphology of towns, the lay-out and interrelationship of its component parts—streets, churches, walls and gates, and, perhaps, castle, cathedral, or abbey, similarly reflect the interplay of the local forces, topographical possibilities and human prejudices and passions. "Nature prepares the site, and man organizes it in such fashion that it meets his desires and wants."

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CHAPTER SEVEN

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

ROMAN civilization had left little impression beyond the line of the Rhine and Danube. Here an agricultural society was built up by various Germanic tribes, with varying degrees of political integration. From the fourth century onward these peoples had flooded into the Empire and had settled there. By the seventh century we can distinguish a sparsely populated belt of country, running from the Vosges Mountains to the North Sea, with Germanic settlement relatively dense to the east. Here German dialects eventually developed. To the west the Latin language ripened into French. The Germanic infiltration was not strong enough to break down the predominantly Roman cultural traditions. The line of division tended, as one might expect, to follow the lines of natural barriers. The highlands of the Ardennes and the Vosges tended to form regions of refuge, where a Romance *patois* survived. In Flanders the Forest of Carbonnière and, in the Rhine rift valley, the Forest of Hagenau tended to set limits to the expansion of the main body of Frankish peoples. In the Moselle valley and across the Kaiserslautern Gap, where there is no natural obstacle, the linguistic frontier has since tended to swing backward and forward with the alternating ascendancy of France and Germany. The Alamanni crossed the Upper Rhine and settled the plain of Alsace, but appear never to have crossed the Vosges in appreciable numbers. The Burgundian and Gothic peoples who conquered the Rhône valley and the South of France appear always to have been too few to alter the cultural development of this strongly Romanized region. The western part of Switzerland is predominantly French-speaking, but Germanic language and culture have entered across the upper Rhine and now claim over 70 per cent. of the total population.

MEDIEVAL GERMANY

From the sixth century the Frankish state lay across the middle and lower Rhine, its eastern frontier set by the bounds

of the still unconquered Saxon peoples. To the south the Alamanni, stretched from Swabia to Alsace. The eastward advance of Frankish rule made little progress before the time




FIG. 37. THE 'MARCHES' OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE

These protected early medieval Europe from the Moors, Celts, Scandinavians, and Slavs.

Based on J. M. Thompson

of Charlemagne, who in a long series of military campaigns, subdued the Saxons, who lay to the north of the central German highland zone, and the Swabians and Bavarians living to the south. The eastern limits of the Carolingian Empire, as shown in historical atlases, represent the limit of his military conquests. Border regions were loosely held, and Christianization made slow progress. Of economic and

commercial development and the origins of town life, there was little evidence. Instead these eastern regions were a prey to Avars, a people of similar origin to the Huns, who came up the Danube valley into South Germany, and to Slavonic tribes in the north. A long, and largely unchronicled struggle was fought against these latter among the forests and lakes of North Germany. It has left, as its legacy to modern Europe, an almost instinctive hatred between Teuton and Slav.

The unwieldy empire of Charlemagne broke up, and in the Partition of Verdun (Chapter V) the Germanic areas east of the Rhine were separated off from the remainder, and the whole empire was reunited only momentarily after this date. From the mid-ninth century Lotharingia began to break up. Italy first became an independent kingdom. The remainder of this strip, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, formed neither a physical nor a cultural unit. It was drained by the Rhône and its tributaries, the Rhine and Moselle, the Meuse and the Flanders rivers. It had no natural centre, and although its political pattern was continuously changing, it tended to fall into four groups of territories, each having a certain degree of homogeneity. These groupings are examined in a later section. The linguistic and cultural affinities of this middle belt of country tended to attach at least the northern and central portions of it to Germany, and it formed part of the medieval Empire. It was, however, marginal and in practice virtually independent.

Medieval Germany was not conceived of as a territorial unit of precise shape and size. It was the Holy Roman Empire, an assemblage of Christian states, ruled by its twin heads, temporal and spiritual, Emperor and Pope. In theory the lay empire, like the Catholic Church, was universal, and embraced the Christian states of the west as well as those newly converted in the north and east. In fact, the supremacy of the emperor was regularly acknowledged only in Germany, the middle belt to the west, and in Italy. The pretensions of the Holy Roman Emperors to be oecumenical rulers militated against the establishment of a strong national state, embracing the German-speaking people.

The geography of Germany tended no less towards disunity. A central belt of mountains, from the Rhenish plateau to Bohemia, separated two areas of widely differing resources,

culture, and history. The great river valleys, which in Germany provided the earliest and most important avenues of communication, discharge to the North Sea, the Baltic, and the Black Sea. There is no unifying factor in the geography of




FIG. 38. MEDIEVAL GERMANY

The four Duchies are shaded.

Germany. Regional capitals there are in plenty, but no town like Paris or London, which can focus the activities and reflect the aspirations of the whole country. In spite of its strongly unifying policy, the Nazi Government of Germany allowed three poles of attraction—Munich, Nuremberg, and Berlin—to exist, instead of one.

In medieval Germany there were, under the emperor, four hereditary, tribal dukedoms. Saxony covered North-western Germany, between the Lower Rhine and the Weser. It was the area conquered by Charlemagne; it was organized by the Franks at a relatively early date, and was the home of the first German emperors. To the south lay Franconia, with its focus in the Main valley, embracing also the northern end of the rift valley with its vestiges of Roman civilization and the closely grouped towns of Mainz, Worms, Speyer, and Frankfort. Swabia was the old Alamannic region of South-western Germany, from which Alsace tended to detach itself owing to the barrier nature of the Rhine above Strasburg. Bavaria, lastly, occupied the Upper Danube and Inn valleys. These four duchies provided the early emperors, first Saxony, then Franconia and Swabia. The title was elective. There was no fixed capital, and the *Diets* of the Empire met in many different towns, most often, however, in one of the Rhineland group between Speyer and Frankfort, located in one of the richest parts of Germany. Not only did the duchies which made up early Germany become, in effect, independent; they were themselves each the scene of a similar movement on the part of their own vassals and servants. The extinction of the ducal houses left a large and growing number of counts and margraves, subject only to the emperor himself, each ruling relatively small units of territory. The political confusion was rendered even more acute by the estates of the German bishops, the chief of which were those of the Rhineland archbishoprics, Cologne, Mainz, Trier, and of the bishops of Münster, Würzburg, Bremen, Magdeburg, and of the Free Imperial Cities.

The geography of Germany did not make political unity probable; the political and theocratic ideas of the times made for political disunion. The Golden Bull of the Emperor Charles IV (1356) was in part a recognition of this condition of affairs. At the same time, by limiting the privilege of electing the emperor to seven of the territorial units of the empire, Charles hoped to attach more prestige to the imperial position and to create an order of imperial electors, which might make for unity within Germany. The imperial policy met with little success. The title came to be attached to the House of Habsburg, rulers of Austria, which pursued a dynastic

policy, strengthening its family possessions rather than the imperial position and German unity. Lastly the Reformation had the effect of strengthening the German princes, weakening the position of the emperors and introducing one more line of cleavage into the divided realm of Germany. The solution reached in 1559 was that each territorial prince might determine the official religion of his state, and compel obedience




FIG. 39. THE EASTWARD SPREAD OF GERMAN TOWNS

After R. E. Dickinson

to it. Very broadly, the North became Protestant; the South remained Catholic. The sequestration of Church lands added to the economic strength of certain Northern states, particularly of Brandenburg.

German Borders in the East. Natural lines of movement in Germany lay east and west. The most obvious of these followed the Danube valley, passing between the Alpine ranges and the massif of Bohemia, into the plain of Hungary. Not only did this tend to funnel the movement of German peoples towards South-eastern Europe; it also guided peoples from the Plain of Hungary north-westward into Germany. The Huns and,

after them, the Avars came by this route. Charlemagne had attempted to block this route-way by establishing a march, or frontier province, where the valley is narrowest, below Bavaria. This was revived by the emperor, Otto I, who established the Ostmark, the frontier, or march, state which grew into the *Oesterreich*, or Austria. Towards the end of the thirteenth century, Rudolf of Habsburg, a Swabian, became the Count of Austria, and entered upon that mission which it has been




FIG. 40. THE GERMAN PENETRATION OF THE PRUSSIAN LANDS EAST OF THE VISTULA
After G. Conzen

the historical duty of Austria to perform, the defence of the south-eastern approaches of Western Europe.

North of the central mountainous belt a strip of open, loess-covered country stretches from the Low Countries, through Saxony and Silesia, into Poland. Movement was relatively easy. This land lacked the marshes and forests of the plain of North Germany; its soil was productive, lending itself readily to early cultivators. Nearby mountains gave water-power and minerals and, in later times, coal. Movement was more difficult over the moraine-covered plain, among the marshes

and *urstömtaler* to the north. Few towns were founded in this area, and much of it was a trackless waste. The north coast, lastly, provided a further route to the east. Ships, with cargoes to trade with and settlers to inhabit the Baltic land, sailed from the Low Countries. The Strecknitz Canal, cut in 1398,




FIG. 41. THE OCCUPATION OF THE BALTIC LANDS BY THE MILITANT RELIGIOUS ORDERS AND BY THE CHURCH

linked the Elbe estuary with the Baltic. Lübeck was founded in 1143, followed by Rostock, Wismar, Stralsund, Stettin, Danzig, and Königsberg. The eastward advance of German settlement had produced by the end of the Middle Ages the three prongs of German speech, Pomerania, Silesia, and Austria, well shown in the map of Germany in 1939.

The plain of North Germany narrows between the mountains of Bohemia and the Baltic coast to form the wide corridor, which in modern times has been commanded by Berlin. Here, the Altmark, a frontier province whose origin and

function were similar to those of the Ostmark, was set up to the west of the Elbe in the tenth century. Part-way through the century the Elbe was crossed and the Wendish stronghold of Brannibor (Brandenburg) was taken. A series of march states (Fig. 37) was set up between the Elbe and the Oder. The attacks of the Wends were held and a position gained from which a fresh advance could be made against the Slavs. It has become almost an axiom of historical geography that a march state has the possibilities of an almost unlimited political development. Assyria and Rome were march states. The marches of Brandenburg and Ostmark came to be, in virtue both of their positions and of the ambitious, strong-willed dynasties which ruled them, the most important of the marches of medieval Germany. In these frontier provinces, the consciousness of immediate and ever-present danger, and the long-drawn-out struggle against Slavs, Avars, and Turks, gave to their inhabitants a stronger sense of military preparedness, a greater virility, and a more realistic approach to the problems of Germany. This was most marked in Brandenburg, with which Prussia was later to be united. When the Prussian sword was no longer needed in struggles against Slavs to the east, it was ready for immediate use in extending Prussian power in Germany.

Most spectacular of the eastern advances of German people and culture into the lands of the Slavs was the settlement in the East Baltic region of the two military and religious orders, the Teutonic Knights and the Knights of the Sword. In 1231 the former invaded Prussia and established or occupied the cities of Königsberg, Kulm, Thorn, and Marienwerder. The native people resisted these inroads, and many fell in the struggle or withdrew eastward into Lithuania. They were replaced by settlers brought from Germany. In this way German language and economic control spread outward from their initial bases on the Baltic coast. At the same time the Knights of the Sword, subject to the Teutonic Knights, carved out an estate further north, in Livonia. It was inevitable that the expansion of the Teutonic Order should clash with the rising state of Poland (see p. 124), which succeeded at the battle of Tannenberg (1410) in setting bounds to the lands of the German Orders. The Germans,

advancing coastwise to the east, had avoided the harbourless stretch of the West Prussian coast, and, in spite of certain settlements on the Vistula, its hinterland remained predominantly Slavonic and under the direct rule of the Polish Crown. Thus we find the medieval origin of the Polish "Corridor."

The Economic Development of Medieval Germany. Colonization and town building in Germany came later than in France and the Middle Kingdom. The Germanic peoples had very largely




FIG. 42. THE TOWNS OF THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE

passed out of the hunting and collecting phase, and an agricultural economy was general at the time of the Roman Empire. By the ninth century there was evidence of the slow break-down of medieval self-sufficiency and of the rise of markets and, in the western lands, of towns. After about the year 1000 land reclamation made rapid progress. Colonists moved eastward into the still virgin forest lands, sometimes of their own volition, more often at the will of their lords. Compact villages were established, conforming to one of a small group of village plans, according to the exigencies of the site and the necessity for defence. Commonest were the 'roadside' village and the 'ring-fence' village. The latter, in which the houses face inward from the periphery of a sort of village

green, has been identified, not altogether correctly, with the areas of Slavonic settlement. It served too well the needs of defence to be confined to any one people. In newly cleared forest land a rather more scattered village pattern was apparent. In this work of clearing and colonization, the monastic Orders, especially those which were constrained by their rules to inhabit the waste and solitary places, made great inroads into the medieval woodland. In Great Britain the Cistercian Order founded its houses, such as Rievaulx and Tintern, in remote valleys, where they tilled their crops and bred their sheep in isolation. East of the Elbe the Slavonic tribes had not wholly abandoned their collecting economy. German settlements were founded in their midst, and they gradually approximated, often under pressure from above, to the higher standards of the latter. The eastward movement of German settlement had reached its peak before 1360, and the boundaries of German speech in modern times had been very roughly delimited.

Local trade, urban institutions, and trade of a wider, inter-regional scope followed. As in the Frankish lands to the west, the castle or monastery was usually the nucleus about which the new town grew. Towns were developed earliest in the Rhineland. Thence they spread eastward into the forest-free lands of Thuringia, Saxony, and the Upper Danube valley. By about 1200 these areas were fairly well urbanized. In the following century urban institutions spread to the Elbe valley. Towns became numerous in Silesia and South-western Poland, and the foundations of the Teutonic Knights dotted the Lower Vistula valley. During the ensuing two centuries towns were founded in Pomerania and East Prussia, Southern and South-eastern Poland; more towns were established in areas of dense population, such as Saxony; and in areas of repulsion, such as the Bohemian Forest, the Ore Mountains, and the forested lands of the Warthe and middle Vistula valleys, urban institutions made progress.

The rise of towns was accompanied by the development of trade. Each was the site of a market and the scene of specialized, non-agricultural crafts. Most, like the small towns of medieval and modern England, focused the activities only of the immediate neighbourhood, but those most favourably sited served also a wider area. From the Lower Rhineland at

Cologne and the upper Rhineland at Frankfort routes ran eastward into Germany, and on them towns such as Magdeburg, Leipzig, Stuttgart, Nuremberg, Regensburg, and Augsburg developed as centres of trade and manufactures. The transalpine trade from Italy had at first impinged on Basle and the Rhineland. With the bridging of the Reuss gorge and the opening of the St Gotthard route in the thirteenth century, trade began to take a more easterly route northward into Germany. At the same time the vessels of the Hansa merchants traded with the Baltic ports or sailed inland, up the northward-flowing rivers, to the heart of Germany.

BURGUNDY

The middle belt, intermediate between France and Germany, tended, as has already been noted, to break up into smaller units, four of which maintained a certain stability into modern times. There is something arbitrary in the development of these political groups. The region in which they developed is not readily divisible into physical units; there are no obvious foci of state development. Accident and caprice have, in large measure, determined which of the many possibilities held out by nature man would accept and make his own. Of no other area is Vidal de la Blache's saying more true than of this, that "it is man who reveals a country's individuality by moulding it to his own use . . . till at length it becomes, as it were, a medal struck in the likeness of a people."

The northern part of the old middle kingdom, broadly speaking that lying to the north of the Ardennes, was the scene of considerable urban and industrial development in the twelfth and following centuries (see Chapter VI). The physical and economic unity of this region probably assisted its political unification in the fifteenth century under the Dukes of Burgundy. This Burgundian state was extended to the east of the Zuider Zee and included also a portion of Flanders, hitherto considered as belonging to France. Such was the nucleus from which Charles the Bold hoped to build up a new Middle Kingdom by conquering the Palæozoic plateau to the south, the units which made up Alsace and Lorraine, and the Swiss cantons. The opposition of France,




FIG. 43. THE ESTATES OF CHARLES THE BOLD, 1477
 The map illustrates an attempt to recreate the Middle Kingdom.

together with Charles's death before the walls of Nancy (1477), put an end to any prospect of achieving this. The Burgundian state, lying across the boundary of Romance and Teutonic language, is an example of a bilingual state. The area was held together by its common interests, and there was never any real tendency for it to split along linguistic lines.

Between the headwaters of the Paris rivers and the Rhine is a group of well-known territorial units, Lorraine, Alsace, Burgundy, Franche-Comté. They lay outside the boundaries of medieval France, and were parts of the Empire, though cut off from Germany by physical barriers. Individually these units were too small and weak to resist France, and no successful attempt was made to weld them into a larger unit. The result was that they were gradually absorbed by France.

The third division of the middle kingdom was the Rhône-Saône valley. For a short time in the earlier Middle Ages this unit comprised a kingdom, also known as that of Burgundy. It then fell to pieces. The rivers, the heart of the region, and the thread linking its diverse parts, served as a political frontier, and France, in possession of all to the west, strove to annex that to the east also. One by one the territories which made up this region, Franche-Comté, Dauphiné, Provence, Lyonnais, and others, were absorbed by France. Only one of the components of this Rhône-Saône group of political entities remained independent. The broad belt of the French Alps, far from forming a political frontier between the Rhône valley states and Italy, proved to be itself the nucleus of a state—the mountain state of Savoy—which for the greater part of the Middle Ages sat astride the French Alps, controlled the major passes, and served as the porter at the gates of Italy.

The last of the political groups into which the Middle Kingdom split was Switzerland. The area of the present state had been included within the Roman Empire, though evidences of Roman civilization are slight. It then lay between the two integral parts, Germany and Italy, of the later Empire. These Alpine lands were, paradoxically, avenues of trade and communication and, at the same time, remote, conservative and self-contained. The unit was the canton, the group of interconnected, or interrelated, valleys. The Swiss Confederation dates from the successful resistance of the mountaineers

gathered about the St Gotthard to the dynastic ambitions of the Swabian Habsburgs. Its nucleus was formed by the valleys around Lake Lucerne, which composed the cantons of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden. Its earliest citizens were "the people of the valley of Uri, the community of the valley of Schwyz, and the mountaineers of the lower valley," who, "seeing the malice of the times," solemnly bound themselves




FIG. 44. THE GROWTH OF THE SWISS FEDERATION

in the defensive league of 1291. To these were added Luzern and Berne to the west, Zug and Zurich to the north, and Glarus to the east. Before the end of the Middle Ages the addition of fresh cantons to the union brought it to the Rhine below Waldshut. Switzerland did not attain its present boundaries until modern times, nor was the independence of Switzerland acknowledged until 1648. The cantonal organization arose very largely from the topography of Switzerland, which tended to divide the country into compartments. At the same time this organization made for toleration, and fresh units could readily be added to the Confederation. The frontier was advanced on the north-west to an irregular line running through the Jura, and on the north to the Rhine, beyond

which lay the canton of Schaffhausen. To the east Grisons; to the south, Ticino and Valais rounded off the Confederation. The southern frontier was as arbitrary as the rest. It follows the watershed between the Rhône and Po rivers from Mont Blanc to the head of the Toce valley, in which the Swiss conquests of the early years of the sixteenth century were lost, but the valley of the Ticino, the upper end of Lake Maggiore and Lake Lugano were retained after the Swiss *débâcle* at Marignano (1515), thus including a section of the Milanese, with its Italian-speaking population. The extension of the Confederation to the so-called Plain of Switzerland brought within its boundaries the more industrialized towns of Zurich, Berne, Basle. The small traffic of the Swiss increased along the routes which they controlled, and before the end of the Middle Ages Switzerland was well set on the path of economic progress.

SLAVONIC LANDS

The Polish state grew in the tenth century on the flat, forested plain of the Vistula, where only the abandoned fluvio-glacial valleys provided easy routes. Gniezno and Poznan, between the great bend of the lower Vistula and the Warthe, were the earliest centres of Polish civilization. Poland was in the earlier Middle Ages an entirely inland state; it stretched beyond the Warthe and into the valley of the Upper Elbe. Unable to advance westward or even withstand the progress of German settlement, the Polish state gradually shifted eastward. The capital was transferred to Krakow and later to Warsaw, and the eastward movement of the Polish state was accentuated in 1386 by the marriage of the Polish heiress with Jagello of Lithuania. The personal union of the two states was followed by the Polonization at least of the upper classes of Lithuania. The personal union was strengthened in 1569 by the Union of Lublin, and the boundary of the Polish state reached the valley of the Dnieper and touched the Black Sea. Medieval Poland was a country in which a primitive agriculture supported a feudal social structure. Towns were few and small, except in the areas of German settlement; trade and industry were undeveloped. Nowhere was the medieval conception of society divided into the mutually exclusive

castes of the nobility, clergy, and peasantry more faithfully portrayed than in Poland. The towns of Danzig, Torun, and Königsburg as well as Riga further north, were centres of German speech and culture; they were ports of the Hanseatic League, through which a small trade passed between Poland and the outer world.

The East Baltic lands were not strictly Slavonic (see Chapter 10). The ancestors of the Letts and Lithuanians spoke various Indo-European dialects, but formed no distinct political units. German crusaders of the military orders conquered the more accessible areas, where they built their castles. German traders of the Hansa established towns and exchanged goods with the primitive peoples of the interior, producers of timber, honey, wax, and hemp. The hinterland fell under the sway of the Polish nobility.

Within the mountain *enceinte* of Bohemia, however, a higher stage of economic development had been achieved. This area was settled by Slavs early in the Christian era. They were converted by missions from Constantinople, and their attachments were at first with lands down the Danube. The incursion of the Hungarian peoples and the rising standards of culture and growing sphere of conquest of the Western Empire turned Bohemia from being the western outpost of the Orthodox religion of Eastern Europe to becoming the most advanced of the Catholic states of the West. A native dynasty built up the state of Bohemia with its capital at Prague. It became almost surrounded and isolated by the eastward advance of German trade and settlement. German miners settled in the mountain border, later to become the Sudetenland, and traders linked Prague with Nuremberg and the towns of Saxony. The native Premyslids were replaced by the German house of Luxemburg. Teutonic influence grew, in spite of the politico-religious rising of Jan Ziska in the fifteenth century, and was consummated by the absorption of the kingdom into Austria at the beginning of the Thirty Years War (1619).

Both Polish and Czech national cultures have shown an amazing persistence and tenacity in the valleys of the Vistula and the Vltava, but a good deal that is characteristically Polish and Czech has been derived respectively from North and South Germany.

The Magyar peoples are closely associated with the open grasslands of the middle Danube Basin, to which their traditional modes of life had been suited. Here a vigorous people of Turki-Mongol origin succeeded in imposing itself upon the native Slavonic people. Racially submerged, it has passed on its oriental language to the Hungarians of to-day. The Magyars succeeded in dominating politically, without absorbing or influencing culturally, the tribesmen of the bordering hill ranges, Slovaks, Roumanians, Croats. At the same time German influences made themselves felt increasingly. Germans worked the mines of the Slovakian Ore Mountains and settled in trading communities in the plains. As in Bohemia, the native dynasty, that of Arpad, was succeeded for a time by a German house. German, later Austrian, influence continued to increase in Hungary, giving rise, as among the Czechs, to a nationalist opposition before the end of the Middle Ages. This was most vigorous in the eastern parts of Hungary, most remote from German control. It was no accident that Rakoczy and Bethlen Gabor, Hungarian nationalist heroes, were Transylvanians.

All three of these border countries of Eastern Europe were overwhelmingly agricultural. In all of them an aristocracy controlled large estates which they cultivated with the help of a poor and servile peasantry. The degree of personal freedom of the peasant tended to diminish rather than improve. At the same time, however, personal status and economic progress were more conspicuous in the newly settled colonies of Germans. Towns, as in the German lands to the west, were generally gathered round a castle or strong point; sometimes round a monastery. The life of the typical village community was, in general, self-contained and self-sufficient. Trade was slight and limited to such commodities as salt and iron, though, on the margins of the Hungarian Plain, an inter-regional trade grew up between the grasslands and the forested mountains.

SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

The area south of the Danube was, in the Middle Ages as in the twentieth century, more backward and more undeveloped than that to the north. The region is poorer in

natural resources, is more mountainous, and communications are more difficult. The mountains and river valleys of the Balkans are so arranged that the area can be penetrated with comparative ease from the middle Danube valley, by way of the Morava; from the delta lands of the Danube, across or round the end of the Stara Planina (Balkan Mountains), and from the north-eastern Ægean. On the other hand, the Dinaric Alps and the Karst plateau at the head of the Adriatic cut off the Balkans from Italy, and the Mediterranean lands




FIG. 45. THE EMPIRES OF THE BALKANS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES;

(a) THE BULGARIAN, (b) THE SERBIAN

Areas shaded black belong to Venice

to the west. South-eastern Europe, like Bohemia in its early days, was Christianized from the east, but, with the exception of the Croats and Slovenes, its inhabitants have remained true to the Orthodox creed. The advances in the civilization of Western Europe had very little influence on South-eastern, and after its isolation and capture by the Turks (see Chapter IX) Constantinople could make no contribution to the betterment of the peoples of the Balkans. Influenced first by the stagnant, hidebound culture of Byzantium, and then overrun and persistently misruled by the immeasurably inferior Ottoman Turks, these regions have become a by-word for political unrest and cultural backwardness.

Greece remained under Byzantine rule until its conquest by the Turks. It was relatively prosperous; silk was produced and woven at Thebes and Corinth, which carried on a certain amount of trade. But this development was confined to the periphery. The mountainous interior, settled in part by immigrant Slavonic tribes, remained exceptionally poor.

The Bulgars crossed the Danube in the seventh century, and




FIG. 46. THE RELIEF OF THE BALKANS

The arrows point outwards from the upland basins of Serbia, and indicate the directions of Serbian expansion to reach the sea. See also Chapter XX.

occupied the platform between the Danube and the Stara Planina, which they subsequently crossed, to occupy the valley of the Maritza and the upland basins about Sofia. Occupying the hinterland of Constantinople, the Bulgars developed a not inconsiderable volume of trade, serving as intermediaries between the plains and mountains of the Danubian basin and the metropolis of Constantinople. The state of Bulgaria thus grew strong and in the tenth century expanded westward, across the Vardar valley to the mountains of Albania, thus laying the foundation of those territorial claims which Bulgaria

has put forward in the present century. The Bulgar state declined before the attacks of the Byzantine emperors and the growing power of the Serbs.

The nucleus of the Serb state was the series of upland basins drained by the Vardar, Morava, Ibar, and Drin. It is a "hydrographic area of dispersion," and the possibility was thus offered to the Serb state to expand radially down its river valleys. The Drin valley is of considerable importance in that it provides the only route-way that is not supremely difficult across the ranges which border the Adriatic, from the Karst plateau behind Fiume to the Gulf of Corinth. By its means the Serbs could reach the sea on the west. The Macedonian and Thracian plains to the south were in turn the scene of Serb settlement and of the raids of Serbian tribesmen. The kingdom, of legendary grandeur, which spread outward from its nuclear area about Prizren and Pristina, was overthrown by the Turks in the battle of Kossovo in 1389, an event that gave rise to the great cycle of Tsar Lazar. Kossovo Day (June 28) came to be remembered by the Serbs as a day of national mourning, and it was on this day in 1914 that a Serb murdered the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand in a little Bosnian town, thus setting in train the events that led up to the First World War.

The peoples of both medieval Bulgaria and Serbia were primitive pastoralists and agriculturalists. Nomadism was important and a frequent cause of intertribal jealousies and feuds. Feudalism, as known and practised in Western Europe, did not exist, but the individual was restrained by traditions and obsessions, as well as by the limitations of a harsh, unyielding environment. In such a society economic and social progress could only be very slow and halting. The exposure of the Balkans to inroads from the north and south-east, the poverty which leads to brigandage, and the narrow parochialism of the mountain valley, engendering feuds and vendettas, have made that progress infinitesimal.

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PART II MODERN TIMES

CHAPTER EIGHT THE GREAT DISCOVERIES

THE world known to medieval people was no wider than that of Ptolemy and Strabo. Christendom, the peninsula between the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas, was well-known to travelers, but beyond it was a sort of penumbra of lands, visited occasionally and frequently misunderstood. Beyond were the dark lands of Asia and Africa. But Western Europe was not without its contacts with these outer lands. Islam stretched over much of the Mediterranean and in Spain and Southern Italy, Moslem and Christian scholars and traders met. On the east Islam reached India and the Russian steppes. Moslems met on their pilgrimages to Mecca and had a fair knowledge of the varied regions in which they lived. They traded across the Sahara with the Savana lands to the south, and Arab sailors, from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, were well known in the ports of India and South-eastern Asia. A small and intermittent trade was maintained through the Middle Ages between Christian and Moslem, liable at any time to be interrupted by the intolerance and passions of either side, but never wholly disappearing until in 1517 the Ottoman Turks occupied Alexandria, the emporium and link between East and West.

Another link between Europe and the outer lands was the Great Khanate, established by the Tartars in the thirteenth century. It stretched from China to the borders of Poland and southward to Arabia. The Great Khan, who ruled from Cambaluc, had the allegiance of lesser Khans, of whom the Khan of the Kipchak Khanate, or the Golden Horde, was, from the European standpoint, the most important. The destruction by the Tartars of the Caliphate of Baghdad inclined the leaders of Christendom to view them with greater favour than might have been expected. Legends spread that the

Khans were themselves Christian, and that many of their subjects were really long lost groups of Nestorian Christians. The Prester John story was a product of this wishful thinking. The Tartars were a nomadic people, the centre of whose power lay in the dry grasslands of Central Asia. Their political organization was not sufficiently developed to permit the growth of a stable political unit, and their domination of the settled cultivators of their borderlands was ephemeral. The




FIG. 47. THE MEDIEVAL TRADE ROUTES TO ASIA

After J. N. L. Baker

importance of the Khanate was that for a short period in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it brought an enlightened peace to Central Asia, and permitted and even encouraged trade and missionary activity. The first Christian to reach the Court of the Great Khan was the Franciscan missionary, John of Plano Carpini. He was followed by William of Rubruck and several others, missionaries, travellers and traders, among whom Marco Polo was incomparably the most important.

The relief of the Middle East determined three routes to the Far East. The first lay north of the great mountain belt which stretches from Asia Minor into China. A bundle of routes took off from the shores of the Black Sea, where the Italian merchants had established their ports of Trebizond and Kaffa,

passed north or south of the Caspian Sea, threaded the gaps of the Tien Shan and so reached Mongolia and Northern China. From Merv and Samarkand routes struck southward to India. A second route followed the Fertile Crescent from the Syrian ports to the Persian Gulf. From the port of Ormuz, traders either crossed the Iranian plateau to Balkh, and so joined the more northerly route, or they crossed the Arabian Sea to Malabar, to the ports of Calicut, Cochin, and Quilan, and thence to South-eastern Asia and the Chinese ports of Cynkalon (Canton) and Zaiton. John of Plano Carpini had followed the more northerly route. Marco Polo used the southern to Ormuz and then crossed Persia to follow the more northerly, returning by the sea route to the Persian Gulf. The third route to the East ran from Alexandria, up the Nile valley and across to the Red Sea. It was throughout in the hands of Moslems, and, although Italian merchants bought Eastern goods in the markets of Alexandria, they never had the freedom of movement along this route which they enjoyed on those to the north.

For almost a hundred years the Tartars had brought peace to Central Asia; in small quantities the products of the East had reached Western markets, and, through the writings of Marco Polo, William of Rubruck, and others, Western peoples gained some knowledge of the wealth of the East. But this was only an episode. In the fourteenth century travel became increasingly dangerous and difficult. Islam spread northward into Turkestan, and with it a fanatical hostility to Christendom, while at the other end of the great land route across Asia, the Great Khanate was overthrown by the Ming dynasty of China, which closed its doors to all outsiders. In Asia the terror of the Moslem Tamurlane replaced the rule of the enlightened Khans.

The knowledge possessed by Christians of Africa was less than that of Asia. Trans-Saharan routes were difficult, were largely in the hands of Moslems, and offered no such tempting prizes as those across Asia. Early in the fifteenth century certain Genoese tried to establish in Africa markets to replace those which they had lost in Asia, but their success was small, though scraps of information were gained about Guinea and the Niger. Africa remained, however, the continent where legendary figures could be located with the greatest degree of probability or the least likelihood of being disproved, and

Prester John was ultimately believed to inhabit the mountains of Ethiopia. Africa was cut off from Europe, not only by the Sahara but also by Islam, which "lay like a wall between Europe and all the trade-routes to the East."

PORTUGUESE VOYAGERS

The Portuguese, by reason of their position opposite the most productive part of North Africa and of the early completion of the conquest of their homeland, were the first to undertake the exploration of Africa. Their achievement began as a crusade, though commercial motives were not entirely absent, and ended as a wholly commercial and imperial venture. In 1415, inspired by the Infante Henry, called the "Navigator," the Portuguese occupied the town of Ceuta, the first permanent foothold of a European people on the continent of Africa. Knowledge was gradually acquired, not only of the dangers and difficulties of the coast of Africa, south of Mauritania, but also of the wealth of the lands which lay beyond the Senegal river. For the next seventy years Portuguese sailors probed farther and farther south. Each year a small advance was made, and the terrors of the unknown seas retreated before them. In 1433 Cape Bojador, like many other headlands, a barrier to sailors who hugged the coast, was rounded. In 1445 Cape Verde was passed, and in 1484 the Congo was reached. Thereafter progress was more rapid, and in 1485 Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cabo Tormentoso, renamed, from the infinite prospects it held out, the Cape of Good Hope.

By now trade was dominant in the minds of the Portuguese, and prospects loomed ahead of a sea route to India, difficult but cheaper than any overland route, and for their exclusive use. In 1498 almost a century of Portuguese effort was consummated when Vasco da Gama anchored at Calicut, on the Malabar coast of India. He had broken into a sphere of trade controlled hitherto by the Arabs. The Indian ports were the focus for routes which reached out to East Africa and the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the East Indies, and the China Seas. In summer Chinese junks brought the silks, spices, and drugs from their own land to Malacca. Valuable woods, pepper, cinnamon, and spices came from the Moluccas, Borneo and

Java. The Arab trade of the Indian Ocean was backed by little material power. The Portuguese fleets which followed in the wake of Vasco da Gama were more strongly built and better armed than the Arab. Their activities were co-ordinated and directed to the sole object of replacing the Arab commercial hegemony by that of Portugal. In this the Portuguese were successful. Strategic positions were occupied on the coast of East Africa and of Arabia, and, under Affonso de Albuquerque, they captured Goa, which they made the capital of their empire, and Malacca, its Eastern emporium. Outports were established in China and far down in the East Indies. Comparatively little territory was conquered; the Portuguese Empire was based on sea-power and a firm control of the leading ports. These served as *entrepôts* for the sugar, silks and spices, woods, metals, and other luxury goods of the East, which were sent by the Cape to Europe.

THE NEW WORLD

In 1499 Pedro Cabral, commanding a Portuguese fleet bound for the Indies, lost his course after leaving the Azores, and touched the coast of Brazil, near Bahia. From this chance discovery sprang the Portuguese empire of Brazil. It also serves to show how inevitable was the discovery of the American continent. If we except the tenth century voyages of Norsemen from Greenland, the American Continent was first reached by Columbus in 1492. Sailing from Palos, near Cadiz, with a small expedition equipped by the Queen of Castile, he landed on October 12 on one of the Bahama group. In three subsequent voyages, the last of which he made in 1502, he mapped out the islands of the West Indies and much of the coast of Central America between the mouth of the Orinocco river and Yucatan. The discovery of the New World was followed by fifty of the fullest and most eventful years in the history of exploration. By 1500 Pinzon, Amerigo Vespucci, and Bastidas had traced the whole north-eastern coast of Brazil. Soon afterwards Nuñez de Balboa crossed the isthmus of Panama and

star'd at the Pacific—and all his men
Look'd at each other with a wild surmise—
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.

Cortes conquered Mexico, and Coronado, de Soto, de Vaca, and many others crossed the Rio Grande into North America. Many were lost in the deserts and grasslands of the great continent; much was added to the rapidly growing body of geographical knowledge, but the Spaniards made very few permanent settlements. They entered the continent where it is least productive and most inhospitable, in contrast with the English people who lighted upon the most congenial parts of the continent. From Panama the Spaniards spread southward along the western coast of South America, conquering Peru and the neighbouring highland plateaux of Bolivia and Ecuador. In the middle of the century Valdivia conquered Chile, and Spaniards crossed the Andes into the Rio de la Plata basin and the Pampas.

The question has often been asked whether Columbus knew that he had not reached the Cathay and Cipangu of the Far East, which he sought. It is possible that he was confident until his death in 1509 of his success; more likely "his constant endeavour was not to be mistaken for the man who had discovered a new world."¹ It was certainly known to many before Waldseemüller coined the name "America" in 1507. Already Spanish sailors were pushing down the eastern coast of South America, like the Portuguese in Africa during the previous century, but more quickly and more confidently. Success was achieved in 1520, when Fernando de Magallen broke into the Pacific. His voyage was undertaken primarily to determine whether the islands of the East Indies lay on the Spanish or the Portuguese side of the great circle which the pope had laid down as the boundary of their respective spheres of empire. Brazil became Portuguese and the Philippine Islands Spanish. Magallen was killed on one of the Philippines, and his lieutenant, del Cano, brought his ship back to Spain, completing the first and greatest of all the voyages of circumnavigation.

The discovery, exploration, and settlement of the New World and of hitherto unknown areas of the Old introduced new problems into the political geography of Europe itself. The rivalry between state and state was carried outside the bounds of that Continent at a time when such rivalries were

¹ Lord Acton, *Lectures in Modern History* (Macmillan).

becoming increasingly bitter. A second important result was that the economic strength of European countries no longer depended wholly on the resources of their European possessions. Portugal and Spain, among the poorest, became, with the wealth of India and the Indies and the precious metals of Peru and Mexico, the richest. The wealth of the Spanish Empire was thrown into the struggle in Europe between Catholic and Protestant Powers—a New World brought into existence to redress the balance of the Old. But the balance was never wholly redressed, because Powers in North-western Europe also, over a long period of time, built up their own overseas empires.

The voyages of John Cabot followed close upon Columbus's discovery, and actually reached the mainland of America before him. But the storm-bound, forested lands of the North held little attraction to a country whose chief imports were of sub-tropical origin. English claims were staked out in North America, to be realized many years later. Activity in these waters was connected with the fisheries, and the attempts to find a new route into the Pacific, rather than with colonization. In 1535 Jacques Cartier sailed up the St Lawrence river to the site of Montreal, introduced a small group of French settlers and founded French Canada. Martin Frobisher and John Davis, and, after them, Henry Hudson and William Baffin, tried unsuccessfully to force a passage between the islands east of Greenland. The fourth outlet from the Atlantic basin lay to the north-east. Willoughby and Chancellor in 1553, and Hudson and Barents early in the seventeenth century, attempted to reach the Far East by this route, and succeeded in opening up a trade-route to Russia. Within a few years the earliest Dutch sailors to the Far East touched Australia, which was first circumnavigated by Abel Tasman in 1642. The known world was expanding fast, and vast additions were being made to the store of geographical knowledge, but many of these lands were not destined to influence the practice of European politics for many years.

The great discoveries of the sixteenth century had given a fresh orientation to European countries. Geographical values which had depended on the routes from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean were reversed. The Italian cities

declined; Augsburg and Nuremberg ceased to be the centres of German trade. Instead, peoples of Western and North-western Europe, hitherto on the fringe, found themselves at the centre of trade and commerce. The Netherlands and England profited most from the new values; trade and industry were stimulated, and these countries became the foci of trans-oceanic routes, the intermediaries between America, Africa, and the East on the one hand and Europe on the other. French commercial development was slower, handicapped by the religious wars and the last struggles of the provinces against the encroaching powers of the French State. The bright prospects of Spain and Portugal were dimmed by the policy of exploitation rather than development that was adopted in their overseas possessions. They gave nothing to their colonies and had no inducement to develop manufacturing industries at home, living instead on the steady flow of bullion which came into Europe.

The most important of the new overseas empires were those of Holland, England, and France. The first Dutch expedition to the Far East sailed in 1595. Some fifteen years earlier Portugal had been attached to the Crown of Spain. The Portuguese Empire was weakening, and could no longer resist the inroads made in its territory. Within a few years the Dutch East India Company had made itself supreme in the Indies, and effectively diverted the later English attempts at imperialism to the mainland of Asia. In the course of the seventeenth century the English established several trading posts on the coast of India, and the Dutch extended the sphere of their trade to China and even Japan. Pepper, cloves, nutmegs, mace from the Indies, calico, silk and indigo from India, were brought to Europe and distributed from London or Amsterdam.

In the New World the Spanish Empire stopped at the Rio Grande, and the continent to the north was settled mainly by people of English and French speech. The earliest settlers were the French of Canada, followed by abortive English attempts to settle Virginia. Greater success attended the second foundation of Virginia in 1607, and this was followed by Massachusetts, Maryland, and what are now the Maritime States of Canada. Small groups of Dutch, Swedes, and Finns

settled in the intervening territories. Many of these settlers went to the New World for the express purpose of contributing with what they could produce to the economic strength of their home country. The volume of transatlantic trade steadily grew in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the New World colonies grew to political maturity and developed into the United States of America, the Dominion of Canada, and the Republics of South America.

The political geography of Europe must henceforward take into consideration the countries of the New World and the fresh geographical values which their existence has given to the countries of the Old.

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CHAPTER NINE.

THE TURKISH EMPIRE

SOME account has already been given of the medieval kingdoms of the Balkans. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries these were overthrown by a fresh wave of conquerors, the Ottoman Turks. The empire of the Seljuk Turks had embraced Palestine and Syria, a varying portion of the plateau of Anatolia, as well as an ill-defined area in the Tigris-Euphrates valleys, and Armenia. They did not enter Europe. The attenuated relic of the Byzantine Empire still remained in the Ægean and the Straits. Bulgaria and Serbia had broken away from it; Albania and Epirus were independent in all except name, and the colonies of the Venetians were scattered round the coast of Greece and among the isles of the Ægean. In 1204 would-be Crusaders were diverted by the Italian merchants, to whom they were indebted for their passage, to Byzantium. They captured the city, which they ruled for 57 years, while the Byzantine emperors ruled from Nicæa a fragment of their territories, and the Italians monopolized the trade of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Ottoman Turks were a tribe of Asiatic origin who appear to have been driven into the territory of the Seljuk. About 1300 the leader of the Ottomans assumed the title of Sultan. This event marked a change in leadership of the Turkish people and the inception of a more vigorous policy rather than the replacement of one people by another. The conquest of the plateau of Anatolia was completed early in the fourteenth century. The coastal towns, under Greek influence, held out longer. The Turkish invasion of Europe was inevitable as soon as the Turks had established themselves on the shores of the Sea of Marmora. It came in 1345 at the invitation of a pretender to the Byzantine throne. Within a few years the Gallipoli peninsula was captured and the coasts of the Dardanelles were in Turkish hands. From this point the Turks advanced to control Eastern Thrace, and made Adrianople their European capital. Keeping to the south of the Rhodope mountains, they overran Macedonia as far as the

Vardar by 1372, and were a few years later in Bitolj and Ochrida. Following the natural corridor offered by the Vardar, Ibar, and Morava valleys, the Turks entered Serbia, captured the route centre of Niš in 1385, and four years later overthrew the Serbian kingdom, then at almost its greatest extent, on the field of Kossovo. Many of the Serbs withdrew into the mountains of Montenegro and Bosnia, where they continued to defy Turkish authority.

A few years later the Turks advanced up the Maritza valley, crossed the Balkan Mountains, and captured the Bulgar capital, Trnovo, and the town of Nikopoli, on the Danube. The third line of Turkish advance was southward from Macedonia, through Thessaly to the Gulf of Corinth. All this while the Emperor still ruled in Byzantium. He had accepted Turkish overlordship, but the city, provisioned by sea and protected by water on three sides and by the concentric walls which had become a model of the art of defence, remained unsubdued. The Peloponnesus and many of the islands of the Ægean remained part of the Empire, which also included part of the opposite shore of the Sea of Marmora. About 1400 the Turks were weakened by the attacks of Tamerlane, whose followers even invaded their territory as far as Ankara. In the North the Turks failed to get beyond the Danube, where the fortress town of Belgrade was held by the Hungarians. In Albania, Skanderbeg led a rising and defied the Turks from the fastnesses of the Albanian mountains. His was but the first of many such risings, which were destined to make parts of the Dinaric and Pindus ranges virtually independent of Turkish rule. In 1453, after a long siege, and distracted by internal jealousies, the city of Byzantium fell to the Turks. Its buildings were restored by the conqueror, and, once again in the full enjoyment of its natural hinterland, the city regained a measure of its past prosperity. The Turks set out to complete their conquest of the Ægean. Athens fell, the petty Latin princes of the Morea were subdued, and the islands of the Cyclades, except Rhodes, occupied.

Wars in the Balkans and Ægean had interrupted trade, but it is a mistake to consider that it had completely stopped. In fact, Venetian trade continued and possibly increased as a result of the treaty of 1454 with the Turks. In 1479, after a

war between the two Powers, the Venetians were allowed to keep their possessions in the Morea and their trading rights in the territories of the Turkish Empire. At the beginning of the




FIG. 48. THE TURKISH CONQUEST OF THE BALKANS

Montenegro, shaded obliquely, was never effectively conquered. Venetian possessions are shown black.

sixteenth century further Italian possessions in Southern Greece were taken, but the most important event was the Conquest in 1516 of Northern Mesopotamia, followed in the next year by that of Syria and Egypt. It was this, rather than the fall of Constantinople, which closed the eastern trade-routes, but already the Portuguese were in the Indies, and the Spaniards had reached the Pacific. Geographical values had

been slowly changing for half a century, with the gradual shift of trade from the routes converging on the Levant to those around the Cape route to India.

Meanwhile the Turks had slowly extended their control over Serbia, Bosnia, and the territories to the west of the Vardar valley, but the kingdom of Hungary barred any conquests beyond the Danube. Belgrade was at length taken, and Hungary invaded in 1526. The battle of Mohacs was a complete victory for the Turks. Budapest was taken and Vienna attacked in 1529. Although the Turks besieged the city again in 1683, the middle of the sixteenth century must be regarded as the high-water mark of their conquests. At this time they controlled the whole of the Balkans south of the Danube, with the exception of part of the Dalmatian coast, the Ionian Islands, Crete, and certain of the Cyclades, which remained in the hands of Venice and Genoa. The Plain of Hungary was conquered as far as the river Raab and the foothills of the Slovakian and Transylvanian mountains, together with Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania, and the territories of Bessarabia and Jedisan, between the mouths of the Danube and the Dnieper. The Turks also controlled the southern coast of the Crimean peninsula and also the Taman peninsula. It is interesting to see how long the sea empire of Venice maintained itself against the land-power of Turkey. On the landward side limits were set to the Turkish conquests by Vienna, the Carpathian mountains and the plains of Russia. Turkey never became an effective sea Power, though pirates, particularly the redoubtable Khairaddin Barbarossa, became a menace to Mediterranean trade from their nests on the Barbary Coast. The defeat of the Turkish fleet at Lepanto, off the coast of Greece, in 1571, contributed nothing to the overthrow of the Turkish Empire, because this was essentially a land-state, not dependent on the sea for communications or trade. It was vulnerable only in the north where it met the Habsburg realms and the kingdom of Poland.

At its greatest extent, in the mid-sixteenth century, the Turkish Empire stretched from the Danube below Bratislava to the Persian Gulf, and from the Sea of Azov to the port of Aden. Its population has been computed at fifty millions, probably as many as there were in the rest of Europe. This

empire was organized in twenty-one governments, which were in turn divided into Sandjaks, some two hundred and fifty in number, each of which was ruled by its *Bey*. The Turks were not sufficiently numerous to settle their conquered lands in Europe. They controlled the towns and route-ways and exacted taxes; their rule was only lightly felt in the more remote mountainous areas. But Turkish rule had a damping influence on industry and commerce. The old towns did not grow, new ones were not established, roads were not built. Christianity was tolerated and proselytization was not encouraged; nevertheless there were many converts, chiefly on account of social and economic advantages accorded to Moslems. The Balkans still have a considerable Moslem population and most towns in Southern Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have a mosque. The population probably declined during the centuries of Turkish misrule. Every revolt against Turkish misrule was harshly suppressed; the Turkish corps of Janissaries was recruited from Christian children, who were trained from their earliest years under Spartan conditions for the service of the Sultan. Lastly the petty oppression and capricious rule of the Turks was hostile to economic progress, the first condition of a rising population.

In the second half of the seventeenth century the Turkish Empire was stirred from the lethargy which had settled upon it by the Kiuprili family, and a final assault was made upon Central Europe. Two lines of attack were used. The first was from Moldavia, along the open, loess-covered platform, which extends through Galicia along the foothills of the Carpathians. The fortress of Kamieniez was taken, followed by Lwow, the key to Southern Poland, and for a time the threat was serious. The second was from the Hungarian Plain westward up the Danube. Vienna was besieged in 1683, and its relief by the Polish army of John Sobieski was the beginning of the Turkish recoil, which continued until 1913.

There were elements of strength in the Turkish state which allowed it to survive as long as it did, despite the weakness of its sultans and the corruption and inefficiency of its administration. Its territorial unit was compact, and it had little to fear from such maritime Powers as there were in the Mediterranean. The valleys of the Maritza, Vardar, Morava, and

Danube provided route-ways, and their convergence between Belgrade and Niš might have made this the centre of a Balkan empire. Its limits on the north, very approximately the ranges encircling the Plain of Hungary, cut it off from the Great European Plain. The weaknesses in its northern frontier were the Danube gap at Vienna and the plain of Moldavia, between the Carpathians and Black Sea. It is significant that it was by these two routes that German and Russian penetration of the Balkans took place. It is doubtful, however, whether a more enlightened rule would have reconciled the Balkan peoples both with the Turks and with one another.

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CHAPTER TEN

THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE

It is convenient to preface an examination of the historical and political geography of modern times with an account of the distribution of peoples and races in Europe. This is made necessary by the growing importance of the nation-state and the confusion of thought, in the past century, between racial, linguistic, and political groupings of the human race. This last factor has become in the present century of increasing importance, though the ascription to a particular linguistic group of 'racial' and psychological qualities, mainly imaginary, did not begin with the publication of *Mein Kampf*. It is a truism to say that the population of Europe is mixed. It is derived from numerous strains which have entered Europe from the south or east at various periods during prehistoric and historic times. It cannot be supposed that any of the immigrant peoples were composed of racially pure types, uniform throughout in stature, head shape, pigmentation, hair, and other essentially racial qualities. Each varied within limits, though the limits were narrow in the cases of some. The intermarriage of these groups inside Europe, and the perpetuation, according to the Mendelian laws of heredity, of certain of their anthropometric characteristics in different degrees, have increased the variety and range of European physical types. As is to be expected, physical variation is greatest in such countries as France and Spain, where many lines of migration converge. The uniformity of physical type is greatest in Russia and the plain of North Europe, where it is matched by the simplicity of the topographical setting.

RACE IN EUROPE

It is beyond the scope of this book to examine the mechanics of heredity or even the detail of racial changes in historic times. It is sufficient to demonstrate the nature of race in Europe, to describe the distribution of three of the most important criteria of race; cephalic index (the ratio of the

length to the breadth of the head), stature, and pigmentation. The population of Europe is often said to be made up of a central belt of broad-headed people, the Alpines, and northern




FIG. 49. HEAD-SIZE IN EUROPE
After G. S. Coon

and southern belts of long-heads, the Nordic and Mediterranean people. This is roughly true. Excessive broad-headedness tends to conform with the mountain belt of Central Europe. It is conspicuous on the Plateau of Anatolia, less so round the Ægean, but again predominant in Yugoslavia, the mountains of Roumania, in Czechoslovakia, parts of the Alps

and Northern Italy and the hilly districts of France. Popular movements have carried this tendency to brachycephaly southward from Anatolia in a belt which follows the coastal




FIG. 50. STATURE IN EUROPE

After C. S. Coon

mountains of Syria, from Yugoslavia into the Pindus mountains of Greece, and from the Alps southward through the Apennines. The Berbers of the southern shore of the Mediterranean are predominantly long-headed, with groups of a rather broader type along the coast, where later immigrants from across the Mediterranean have settled. Spain is intermediate between these belts.

Scandinavia is, in the main, an area of long-heads, though the degree of dolichocephaly nowhere approaches that found in North Africa. The cephalic index increases southward across Germany and Poland, where the population may be described as mainly meso- to brachy-cephalic. Relatively long-headed people inhabit Denmark, North-west Germany, the Low Countries and the Rhineland as far up as Switzerland, and it is to be supposed that the population of this area is mainly derived from immigrants from the neighbourhood of the North Sea. Lastly, in Northern Sweden and Finland is an area of broad-headed population, corresponding approximately with that of Lapp settlement.

The map showing the stature of European peoples is in some respects similar to that which shows cephalic indices. The Baltic and North Sea regions appear as areas of relatively great height. The population of the Rhineland is again distinguished from that to east and west by being relatively tall. The average stature in France, Spain, and Italy is relatively short; that of Eastern Europe and Russia is generally medium, with enclaves of relatively tall and relatively short people. A prominent feature is the area of relatively tall people in East Prussia and the Baltic areas of Teutonic settlement. Stature is not, however, wholly a product of heredity. It has been shown that the stature of Americans has increased, as has that of the English settlers in Queensland, and this is said to be more or less general in countries which have been modernized progressively and thoroughly within the past century. The converse is found where stunted growth results from malnutrition or mineral deficiencies. The Limousin of Central France is a well-known example. The short stature of almost all peoples living in very high latitudes is also, in all probability, a result of environmental influence.

Pigmentation is also, in some measure, an adaptation to environment. Blondism is associated in some areas with mineral deficiencies, and it is well known that dark pigmentation is associated with regions of great heat and intense sunshine. In Europe, the North Sea and Baltic areas are inhabited mainly by people of light skin and hair colour, which is thus seen to correspond very approximately only with the distribution of tall stature and low cephalic index. But this area can

in no sense be identified with Germany. Of these three characteristics, only the fair pigmentation is really prominent in Germany, and this extends also across Poland and into




FIG. 51. SKIN AND HAIR COLOUR IN EUROPE

After C. S. Coon

Russia. The Mediterranean is distinguished by the predominance of dark pigmentation, and in France and Central and Eastern Europe pigmentation deepens southward.

It becomes apparent from a comparison of the two maps that it is impossible to speak of any area as having a homogeneous race, and it is probable that the nearest approach to a pure type exists in certain 'poverty spots,' where close

inbreeding has tended to evolve something approaching a uniform stock. The attempts to correlate racial with psychological types, made in the last century particularly by Joseph de Gobineau and H. S. Chamberlain, and seized on in this by German propagandists, is invalidated from the start, and can lead only to intolerance and ill-will between nations.

LANGUAGE IN EUROPE

Upon this mixture of physical types were imposed the cultural-linguistic divisions which we know to-day. Most people are not particularly conscious of purely racial differences, at least in Europe, but cultural differences are the chief barriers between peoples. The nation-state tries to include within its frontiers all who speak a particular language. Disputed frontiers have been settled by appeal to culture and especially to language. Attempts have been made to alter the language of a minority group and to absorb it into the majority, and thus to justify, after the event, its inclusion in the state. A linguistic group, regarded as of only cultural or even antiquarian interest, may develop, as it has done in Catalonia, a political consciousness and tendency towards separation from the rest of the country.

The frontiers of linguistic groups are a matter of history; they may accord, though not often, with physical features; they are liable to shift and are sometimes in process of gradual movement. They are almost never a narrow line; instead they are usually a broad zone of transition from one language to another, and from one economic or cultural level to another. Language is itself in process of slow change. It was not until the introduction on a considerable scale of printing and, in particular, the printing of the Bible in the vernacular, that any degree of fixity was attained. There has been no widespread shift of language since the sixteenth century.

The languages now spoken in Europe may be grouped under seven heads. Each language group has affinities, so close in some cases that the languages may be regarded as little more than dialects of one another. Those *italicized* are either extinct or likely to become so.

This table is not completely accurate. Some languages—

EUROPEAN LANGUAGES

| CLASSICAL | ROMANCE | CELTIC | TEUTONIC | SLAVONIC | PRE-INDO-ARYAN | ASIATIC ORIGIN |
|-----------------------|---|---|--|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| Greek <i>Latin</i> | French (with Walloon) Spanish Portuguese Roumanian Catalan Italian Romansch | Erse Gaelic Welsh Cornish Breton <i>Manx</i> | German English Dutch Danish Swedish Norwegian | Russian Ukrainian White Russian Polish Czech Slovak Slovene Croat Serb Bulgar (with Macedonian) | Basque Albanian Lithuanian (?) | Turkish Magyar Finnish Estonian Lapp <i>Livonian</i> |

Bulgar, for example—have close affinities with those of another group. All except the last two groups are Indo-Aryan, and are, in the main, derived from the tongues introduced into Europe probably by the Beaker folk in the second millenium B.C. Two Indo-Aryan dialects were introduced by invaders into Greece and Italy, and from them grew the classical languages. Greek remains, much modified in syntax and vocabulary, the language of the Ægean region. Latin became the lingua franca of much of the remainder of the Roman Empire, but survived in anything resembling its classical form only as a literary language and in the services of the Church. But it gave rise in the provinces of the Empire to the group of Romance languages. These grew, incorporated words brought by invaders, and lost many of the inflections of Latin. It is important to notice that in most of the area west of the Rhine and south of the Alps the classical tradition was strong enough to absorb the Teutonic-speaking invaders—Franks, Burgundians, Visigoths, and others—and turn them into Frenchmen or Spaniards. A language clearly recognizable as an ancestor of French first appeared in the ninth century. During this period of little movement and only local intercourse localisms, dialects, and even sub-languages, and local peculiarities were intensified and, in remote areas, have survived until to-day. French developed in Northern France. In the South

the Langue d'oc was spoken and a line very roughly from Lyons, through Angoulême to Bordeaux, marked the boundary. The Langue d'oc stretched over into North-eastern Spain, where, as Catalan, it survives and is vigorous to the present day. Spanish is even closer to its Latin progenitor than French, and Portuguese, separated from Spanish by a distinct geographical barrier of mountains and gorges, closely resembles it. In the Italian peninsula Latin ripened into Italian, but in the Alps to the north isolation was chiefly responsible for the survival of the quasi-languages, Romansch, Ladin, and Frioul. The northern boundary of Romance speech in Europe is one of the most complex of linguistic boundaries. Western Switzerland is French-speaking, but the whole of the plateau, with most of the larger towns, is German. Here the frontier of German speech was advanced by the Burgundian invaders beyond the boundary of the upper Rhine. From near Basle the present linguistic frontier follows very roughly the ridge of the High Vosges. Near Saverne it turns north-westward to Luxemburg and then stretches across the Ardennes to a point near Liège, whence it strikes westward to the sea near Dunkirk. The area between this line and the Rhine frontier represents not the limit of Teutonic advance, but the area which Teutonic people were able to settle in sufficient numbers to replace the classical language by their own. For part of its length it follows a sparsely populated, negative area, a true 'natural' frontier, the Vosges, the Ardennes, and the Carbonnière Forest, now cleared, which was the border between Flemish and Walloon in Belgium.

An outlier of Romance speech is formed by the Roumanians and the groups of Vlachs of South-eastern Europe. Their tongue appears to have been derived from that spoken by the Roman settlers of Dacia, whose speech was preserved in the mountain fastnesses of Transylvania.

The Celtic languages were probably brought to Western Europe by the Celtic Folk during the Bronze Age. The Gallic form was displaced by Latin in the area which is now known as France. Britain never became even predominantly Latin-speaking. The rural districts retained a Celtic language until they were conquered by the Anglo-Saxon, Jutish, and Scandinavian peoples. The Highland Fringe was not

extensively settled by the invaders and continued to be Celtic-speaking through the Middle Ages. English gained ground in Cornwall after the Reformation and supplanted the Cornish form of Celtic in the eighteenth century. Welsh was more enduring and, though replaced by English in the eastern and southern valleys, maintained its hold in the mountainous centre and north and, with the influx of miners into Glamorgan, has revived in the south. Much of Wales is a bilingual country. Manx may be regarded as defunct, and Gaelic is spoken only in the Scottish Highlands. Though Erse is still a live language in parts of Ireland, its recent development is something of a revival, carefully cultivated for political and sentimental reasons. Celtic was carried to Brittany by emigrants from Britain, who re-established the language there. Its replacement by French is now almost complete.

The Celtic languages are divisible into two groups, generally known as 'p' and 'q.' The 'q' Celtic languages were those of Ireland, Man, and Scotland, and are commonly supposed to have been the first to arrive, having been brought by the Bronze Age leaf-sword people. The 'p' Celtic languages of Wales, Cornwall, and, at one time, the whole of Lowland Britain probably came with the La Tène Iron Age invaders.

The Teutonic languages appear to have developed on the North European Plain, east of the Rhine, and in the adjoining areas of Scandinavia. Here related dialects have become differentiated as Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and the German languages. The Teutonic speech spread southward during the Dark Ages into Celtic and Romance-speaking areas of Central and Southern Germany. Thus were evolved Alemannic and High German. In the northern plain Dutch and Frisian were differentiated from the Low German of the rest of the area. Middle German developed between the northern and southern areas. Dutch has acquired the status of a separate language. Frisian is virtually extinct, and Alemannic survives only as a dialect in the Upper Rhineland. Within Germany itself Middle German became the chief literary language, was used by Luther in his translation of the Bible, and has become general over most of the country. During the Carolingian period the eastern frontier of German speech followed approximately the valley of the Elbe and the Bohemian Forest. From

this line it spread eastward, carried by German settlers, traders, and miners. The frontier of German speech expanded also in the west, and came to follow, very approximately, the Vosges, the Ardennes, and the Carbonnière Forest. The language frontier in the West has moved slightly, with the recovery of Romance tongues. In the East the German language frontier has advanced far into the lands of Slavonic settlement.

Slavonic languages are spoken in a broad belt, southward from the Baltic states to the Ægean, and stretching eastward into Russia. They fall into three groups.

SLAVONIC LANGUAGES

| NORTHERN GROUP | SOUTHERN GROUP | RUSSIAN GROUP |
|---|---|---|
| Polish Czech Slovak Lithuanian and Lettish (?) | Slovene Croat Serb Bulgar and Macedonian | Great Russian Ukrainian White Russian |

The nucleus of Slavonic speech appears to have been in Eastern Poland, probably in Galicia. From here it spread outward, and its dialect forms matured into languages. The German advance down the Danube, combined with the Magyar occupation of the Hungarian Plain, cut off the northern from the southern Slavs. Each of the Slavonic languages is identified with a nuclear area where, presumably, it assumed its characteristic forms—Polish, in the valley of the middle Vistula; Czech, in Bohemia; Serb, in the small upland plains of historic Serbia; Great Russian, in the Volga-Oka area, where the broad-leaved forest dies out towards Asia. Slovak developed in the valleys of the Tatra; Croat and Slovene in the valleys of the Sava and Drava. The Bulgar folk were, like the Magyars, invaders from the Asiatic steppes, but, unlike them, failed to maintain their language. Modern Bulgar is largely Slavonic, Macedonian is a hybrid, and, though mainly Slavonic, its exact affinities are difficult to trace. Lithuanian and Lettish, the languages of Lithuania, appear to be very early examples of Slavonic tongues, and are perhaps not far removed from that originally spoken in Eastern Poland.

Turkij-Mongol languages, of Asiatic origin, entered Europe by three routes. The steppe route passes between the Caspian Sea and the southern end of the Ural Mountains, lies to the north of the Black Sea and along either the Loess plateau into Central Europe or across the Carpathians where they narrow, near the headwaters of the Tisza, into the Plain of Hungary.



FIG. 52. THE DISTRIBUTION OF PEOPLES OF ASIATIC (URAL-ALTAIC) SPEECH IN EUROPE

The black represents groups of Mongol peoples.

Slightly modified from C. S. Coon

Huns, Avars, and Magyars followed the latter course. The first two of these peoples were defeated in battle, and it is to be supposed that their remnants found refuge where they could and were eventually absorbed into the native people. The Magyars conquered the plain of the middle Danube, with which they have ever since been associated. It is improbable that they were numerous, and racially they were absorbed by the native Slavonic-speaking people. The racial maps show

only a slightly higher average cephalic index and rather darker pigmentation in the Hungarian Plain. The Magyar language has, however, survived, and with it a distinct culture, which has on most sides come into conflict with the surrounding Slavonic peoples.

A second line of movement has been through the northern forests into Finland. One of the elements which make up the present Finnish, Estonian, and Lapp peoples came by this route. The last is from the Middle East, across the plateau of Anatolia, into the Balkans. The Turkish invasion of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has had a great cultural influence, mainly of a negative character, upon South-eastern Europe, but, although evidences are common of Turkish influence on architecture and ways of life, only a few very small groups of Turkish-speaking peoples are found outside the boundaries of Turkey-in-Europe. In the eastern parts of European Russia are several other peoples speaking one of the forms of Uralic or Altaic speech. These include the Chuvash and Morvins of the middle Volga, the Bashkirs of the Urals, and the Samoyeds, Voguls, and others of the northern forests.

Mention should be made of the surviving proto-European languages. The ancient Prussian language, which was one of them, is now extinct. Survivals are Basque, still spoken in Viscaya and Guipuzcoa, but of diminishing importance, and Albanian, which has incorporated a great many Romance and Slavonic words. Lithuanian and Lettish may perhaps be proto-European languages which have assimilated a considerable amount of Slavonic.

TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS

The territorial problems, which will occupy much of the remainder of this book, are closely related with the distribution of these linguistic groups. It is significant that ideas of race, as such, have had little influence in determining political groupings, except in a perverted form in Germany. The persecution of the Jews was first justified on religious grounds, and the racial argument is of German origin. Certain European nations, particularly the French, Spanish, and Italians, have mixed on equal terms with peoples whose racial elements were

certainly different from their own. Language and culture are the chief elements of difference between European peoples, and most of the minor and certain of the major international disputes have arisen along their zones of contact.

The territorial problems of much of Europe may be grouped under one or more heads. It must be remembered, however, that the conquests of Napoleon or Hitler represent far more complex phenomena and are not explicable on these lines. Most of the strictly territorial problems, however insoluble in some cases, are at least explicable.

I. A group of problems arise from "old and sterile imperialisms"; the memory of a Greater Bulgaria or Serbia, of the Poland of the Jagellons, or the Gaul of the Cæsars leads to a kind of irridentism, which frequently has little economic foundation and is mainly sentimental, but none the less important.

II. Another and more pressing group are due to the non-coincidence of the various kinds of frontiers. The linguistic frontier may not coincide with the strategic or historical, as in Bohemia. A port inhabited by one people may serve a hinterland inhabited by another; Trieste, Fiume, and Danzig are examples.

III. There is, lastly, the intermixture of peoples which makes frontier drawing a matter of extreme difficulty. Many examples will be quoted later. Only the possible ways by which this intermixture has come about are mentioned here.

- (a) The simplest is the migration and settlement of one people in the lands of another. German settlement in Eastern Europe provides an important example, but there are many others; Swedes in Finland, Italians on the Dalmatian coast, Greeks in Asia Minor.
- (b) The demand for labour, which may develop, as on a coalfield, may lead to a complex intermixture of peoples, such as exists in Upper Silesia. Seasonal movement of Poles, Belgians, and Italians into, for example, France, is similar.
- (c) Somewhat similar is the resettlement of an agricultural area devastated by war. In this way can be explained the fragmentation of peoples in the southern part of the Plain of Hungary.

- (d) War and invasion, lastly, may drive a people into the territory of another. Examples are less common from modern times, but during the early Middle Ages this was an important reason for the mixing of peoples.

The Jews. The Jews are a people held together by ties of culture and history rather than of blood. They had been a nomadic, Semitic people who settled in Palestine in the second millenium B.C. and had there, despite the warnings of the Hebrew prophets, intermarried with the Hittite and other peoples they found in possession. They were already a very mixed people when their dispersion first began. Numbers were taken into Mesopotamia in the sixth century B.C., and most remained there, spreading into Persia and Southern Russia. A more gradual expansion of the Jews accompanied the spread of Hellenic civilization in the fourth and later centuries B.C. This dispersion was greatest after the siege and destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. In this way the three main groups of the Jewish people developed.

I. The Ashkenazim Jews of Western and Central Europe. They were driven in succession out of England, France, and Spain. Many settled in the Rhineland, and moved, frequently under compulsion, eastward into the Slav lands. They carried with them a High German dialect, which became Yiddish. In Eastern Europe they met and mingled with the second group.

II. The Sephardim Jews, whose ancestors had settled, mainly before the Roman conquest of the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, Balkans, and even Southern Russia.

III. The Oriental Jews, communities formed by migrations over a long period of time. They include the communities in Persia and Turkestan.

It is generally assumed that most Jews have certain facial qualities which distinguish them from other peoples, but these characteristics of nose, mouth, ears, and hair, belong in greater or lesser measure to most Mediterranean peoples. "There is no known physical criterion or set of criteria by which this quality may be measured." It has been suggested that the Jewish 'look' is a socially induced expression, a result rather of the psychology than of the physical make-up of the Jewish people.

The persecution of the Jews, which has been a feature of

Western civilization for approaching a thousand years, has derived from two different sources. In the Middle Ages the Jew was persecuted for the sins of his fathers, and persecution was justified by appeal to certain portions of the Jewish religious writings. Because they were non-Christians living in a society permeated by Christian thought, they were barred from holding land or offices of state and from joining guilds and engaging in industry. They became merchants and accumulated the capital to become usurers. In more recent centuries, the Church, the Army, and land-owning have been closed to them. They entered the professions, and they became the money-lenders. The money-lender might be described as almost a necessity in a peasant society, but in Central and Eastern Europe, as in India, he was far from popular, and it has never been difficult to work up a passion against the Jew. To this primitive hatred should be added the jealousy aroused by the strong position held by Jews, particularly in Germany, in the professions. This became particularly serious after 1918, when the drastic reduction of the German armed forces forced a considerable proportion of its officer caste to seek other employment. The modern objection to Jews has largely been economic in its motives. But in Holy Russia, the pogroms sprang also from religious and political motives. The eastward expansion of the German Jews into Poland and Russia's absorption of Turkestan greatly increased the number of Jewish subjects of the Tsar. These were grouped in the western provinces of Russia in the area which came to be known as the "Jewish Pale." Even here they were not allowed to settle as they chose, but were gathered into overpopulated and insanitary ghettos.

In the countries of Western Europe, the Jews were emancipated and absorbed into the economic and social life of the country. They imagined that they had also achieved this in Germany. But in Eastern Europe and Russia there were no such prospects; here the Jews were almost medieval in their outlook and were quite unaffected by modern scientific and religious thought. Zionism, the desire to recreate in Palestine a Jewish state, sprang very largely from these Jews of Eastern Europe. The problems raised by Zionism in the Middle East are considered in the next part of this book.

It was left for Nazi Germany to justify on purely racial grounds its persecution of the Jews on a scale even larger than that practised in Tsarist Russia.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE RUSSIAN STATE

THE history of Russia, probably more than that of any other European country, can be understood only in the light of its geography. The Plain of Europe, east of Poland, is unbroken by any topographical features more conspicuous than the morainic Valdai Hills, until the Ural Mountains are reached. This great level area, which cannot be divided into physical regions, falls readily enough into vegetational. Across the north is the relatively narrow belt of Tundra, easily crossed only by means of its rivers, and cutting off the forest lands to the south from the cold Arctic Ocean. The coniferous forest stretches from Sweden to the Ural Mountains, and across Siberia to the Pacific. A wedge-shaped area of deciduous forest, based in the west on the Baltic Sea and Germany, and tapering to a point near Moscow, lies to the south. Both the deciduous forest and the coniferous forest east of Moscow thin southward into the grassy steppes, and these, on the south-east, merge into the deserts of Turkestan and Central Asia. These vegetational regions and the soil divisions, which in large measure corresponded with them, reflect the variations in climate, the rainfall diminishing towards the east, the average temperature falling towards the north, and the range increasing away from the sea.

The continent of Europe narrows between the Black and the Caspian Seas, and north and south movement across this isthmus has scarcely been of smaller consequence in the history of Russia than east and west movement along the vegetational zones. The former has been assisted by the Russian rivers, the largest of which rise on a watershed stretching south-west of Moscow, and flow to the Black and Caspian Seas. The early medieval traders, whether Arab or Varangian, followed these river-routes, crossing by easy portages the low-wooded divide between the Black Sea and the Baltic rivers. The earliest Russian state lay along these rivers, held together by the easy means of communication which they afforded. The second Russian state grew up in the mixed woodland of the Moscow




FIG. 53. VEGETATION BELTS OF EUROPEAN RUSSIA

region, near the watershed of European Russia. Its expansion was guided by the radiating rivers which reach the four seas, until at last the Russian state reached the White Sea, the Gulf of Finland, and the Crimea.

The Kingdom of Kiev. Between the fifth and the ninth centuries the Slavonic language spread over large areas of what is now European Russia. It was spoken by a very sparse population of peasants, settled in the forest clearings and on the better-drained, moraine-covered land. Their material culture was simple. They fished, hunted, collected wild honey and the forest fruits, and cultivated with primitive tools their small clearings. Slav peoples penetrated the steppes, but never settled it except in very small numbers. The steppes were an east to west corridor by which the Tartar peoples of Asia overflowed into Europe. This route had been followed by the Huns, the Bulgars, and the Avars, and at this time the steppes were occupied by the relatively tolerant Khazars. The economy of the steppes was pastoral and nomadic, in spite of the high fertility of the *chernozem* soil. Political insecurity prevented the growth of settled communities.

It was across these vegetational zones, coniferous and deciduous forest and steppe, that the first Russian state, that of Kiev, was established. Reference has already been made (Chapter V) to the Swedes who crossed the Baltic Sea and travelled up the east Baltic rivers, the Dwina, Volkhov, and Ilmen. They were traders and pirates; the two terms were not readily distinguishable. These Russmen, or Varangians, crossed the steppe in the eighth and ninth centuries, following the river Dnieper, reached the Black Sea, and traded with Constantinople. They founded fortified towns along the riverways; Novgorod, Pskov, Perislavl, Tchernigov, Smolensk, and Kiev. The last lay on the west bank of the Dnieper, near where it left the woodlands for the more open grassland. Its exposed position on the steppe-frontier gave it a position of greater political importance, and it gathered beneath its sway the smaller territories which had been organized around the Russ towns. But the Norse influence was neither deep nor lasting. The Russmen, though strong militarily, were quickly absorbed by the Slav people whom they found. Even their names became Slavonized. In the tenth century, Svyatoslav, Grand Prince of




FIG. 54. THE FIRST RUSSIAN STATE

A loose federation of towns on the Baltic Sea-Black Sea route.

Kiev, conquered the Khazars, and dominated a large area of the steppe, but the Russian supremacy was short-lived. The destruction of the Khazars merely reduced resistance to the Polovtsy, a Tartar people of the eastern steppe. The Russian control of the steppe began to relax, and trade with the Black

Sea and Constantinople diminished, interrupted continually by Tartar inroads. Lastly, in the thirteenth century, the Tartars of the Golden Horde conquered the steppe, which their Khan ruled from his headquarters in the Lower Volga country. The Tartars despised rather than rejected town life, and, in Russia at least, they made trade along the rivers difficult, without completely preventing it. Their overthrow at the end of the fourteenth century by Tamurlane put a complete stop to the thin trickle of trade which had survived earlier invasions.

Great Russia. The Tartar invasions drove the Russian settlers of the steppe back into the parkland to the north. Here, like the Western European peoples after the Moslem conquests, the Russians turned to a self-sufficient agricultural economy, and the dangers of attack contributed to the growth of feudalism. The Tartars made inroads into the wooded country, but, in general, were content to exact a tax from the Russian people, whose territory was unsuited for their economy and settlement. The centre of this new Russia was the triangle of land, known as Suzdal or Niz, between the Volga and its tributary the Oka. It lies near the eastern extremity of the deciduous forest; to the north is the coniferous forest, to the south, the steppe. Within this region the town of Moscow, seat of the Princes of Suzdal, grew up in the twelfth century, and became the most important. Other towns in this region were Vladimir, Rostov, and Perisavl, between the two rivers, and Tver, Yaroslavl, and Nizhni-Novgorod, on the Volga. To the west of Suzdal were the principalities of Novgorod and Pskov, where were the eastern outposts of the Hansa. Furs, hemp, timber and other products of the northern forests were sold to traders from the West. The soil of Novgorod and Pskov was glacial and poor; grain was imported from Suzdal, and in this way probably began the supremacy of Moscow.

In the fourteenth century the Golden Horde began to break up, and the Russians of Suzdal were able to overthrow its hegemony. Tamurlane created a fresh threat to Suzdal, but after his death the Russians were independent of outside controls. Their internecine feuds were settled in favour of Moscow; Nizhni Novgorod was absorbed, and at the beginning of the sixteenth century a compact, unified Moscow lay




FIG. 55. THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF THE MUSCOVITE STATE
AFTER THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES

at the hub of river routes, which invited the state to expand and occupy the territory of modern Russia. The history of Russia is written in her rivers, and the stages in Russian expansion can best be examined in relation to the groups of rivers which guided them, first northward, then eastward and

southward, and, lastly, the only direction in which movement was across and not with the rivers, eastward.




FIG. 56. THE MAIN DIRECTIONS OF EXPANSION FROM THE SUZDAL REGION AROUND THE VOLGA HEADWATERS

Russian Expansion. Northward. The forests north of Moscow and Novgorod were sparsely populated by a Finno-Ugrian people. Both principalities traded northward into this area, which was the chief source of the furs exported by Novgorod. It was known as Zavolochie, or "land beyond the Portages," and was reached down the Dwina and neighbouring rivers.

This advance was unopposed, and the Swedes, the only organized enemies, were too far away to interfere. Excessive hunting reduced the numbers of fur-bearing animals, and the Russians were forced to expand further to the east, into the Pechora basin and beyond. The towns of Vologda, on the Dwina, and Vyatka were established in the coniferous forest, and the monasteries of Byelozero and Solovetsky were centres of trade and industry and fortresses against Karelia. Fishing, sealing, and whaling communities grew up along the Arctic coast, and salt was made and sent southward by river. This was the economy which Chancellor found when he entered the White Sea in 1553 and opened up a direct trade between England and Russia. The Muscovy Company was founded in London, and in 1585 the Russians established the port of Archangel.

The North was in the sixteenth century Russia's pioneer fringe, where a greater degree of personal freedom existed along with prosperity and a comparative freedom from the restraints of feudalism. For over a century it was the most important section of the frontier of the Russian state, not only affording the articles of trade, but also the avenues through which the trade-routes passed. Not until the Russian state reached the Baltic at the beginning of the eighteenth century was the importance of the North at all diminished. Two wars of the twentieth century have shown that, when a strong and hostile Power rules Central Europe, the northern seaway can still be of vital importance.

Westward. The Great Russian, the most easterly of the Slavonic peoples, was cut off from the Baltic Sea during the Middle Ages by the Finns, Letts, and Lithuanians, groups which have been slow in developing any degree of national consciousness. Their territory was occupied by the German military orders and by the Swedes, stronger peoples which blocked the natural direction of Russian expansion. Novgorod maintained a precarious trade down the Volkov and Neva, and withstood the attacks of the German knights in the thirteenth century, when Alexander Nevsky defeated them at Pskov. In the later Middle Ages German groups were in decline as political factors, and the strong states of Sweden and Poland occupied the eastern shore of the Baltic (see Chapter XIII). Poland's union with Lithuania had given her control of much

of Ukraine and of the Russian cities of Kiev and Smolensk. Although there was disorder along the western frontier throughout most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, progress was slow. Efforts were first concentrated on driving the Poles out of Ukraine; in 1667 Smolensk and Kiev were regained. Later the Swedes were driven back to the sea, and in 1703 St Petersburg was founded, Russia's window on the west, which was built with appalling difficulties in the marshes of the Neva and decorated with all the refinements of neo-classical art and architecture. By 1720 Russia held a substantial area of the Baltic coast, from Karelia to the mouth of the Dwina.

For some fifty years Russian advance in the west was halted; then, between 1772 and 1795, the eastern part of the Polish state was occupied, and to this was added in 1815 the territory, centring in Warsaw, known as "Congress Poland." The territorial relations between Russia and Poland require, however, a more detailed treatment, in view of the almost traditional mutual hostility which characterizes these two Powers. If they cannot be persuaded to forget their past the next best thing is to understand it.

With the exception of "Congress Poland," Russia's acquisitions at the expense of Poland were confined to the "western lands," originally Lithuanian, and not Polish at all. They had formed part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, united with Poland by a marriage tie since 1386 and since 1569 in the closer Union of Lublin. These areas of forest, lakes, and marsh were sparsely populated by a peasantry, whose cultural ties were rather with the Russians than the Poles. Their languages, White Russian and Ukraine (Ruthene), were little more than dialects of Great Russian, and they were Orthodox in religion, like the Russians and unlike the Catholic Poles. We must beware, however, of attributing any national aspirations to these peoples of the "western lands." They were peasants, bound to the soil and ruled by a Polonized aristocracy. Indeed, the success of the Polonizing movement in the "western lands" was remarkable. Not only were Vilna and Lwow established as Polish towns, set in a Lithuanian and Ukrainian countryside respectively, but the upper classes were attached to Poland and became Catholic. Only the ignorant peasantry remained Orthodox in religion and many of these were lost to the Uniate

Church, which was established in 1596, and was Catholic in doctrine but Orthodox in ritual and institutions.

In the course of the three Partitions of Poland, Russia acquired the whole of the "western lands," and her frontier in this direction corresponds very approximately with that suggested by Curzon and that actually adopted in 1939. These lands had never before been ruled by the State of Muscovy, but they had been subjected to that earlier Russian state of Kiev, and Russia claimed the territory in virtue of this and of the linguistic and religious connexions of its people. Appeal to the aspirations of the people has always been impossible; appeal to history is double-edged, and Russia and Poland have generally resorted to the arbitrament of the sword to decide where their mutual frontier shall run. The nuclei from which the Russian and Polish states emerged, the Suzdal region and the middle Vistula, are about 700 miles apart. Between them lay a waste of forest, marsh, and steppe; a passage-land, dominated in turn by Swedes and Tartars. By the end of the Middle Ages the Tartar menace was slight, and the earlier maturing political units of Sweden and Poland occupied most of this disputed territory. The Russian state, with vastly greater resources than either, grew to maturity later, partly because of its greater size, but also because of its exposure to attack by Asiatic peoples. But when in the eighteenth century it had filled out most of what it considered its natural sphere, its strength was such as to brook no opposition from Poles and the peoples of the Baltic states.

Southward. The steppes of Southern Russia had been conquered by the Russians of Kiev and were brought by trade into close contact with Byzantium. The orientation of Russia at this time was southward to the Black Sea. The invasions of the Tartar Pechenegs closed the steppes to Russian trade, and Russia's outlook was turned westward and northward. Novgorod became the link between Russia and the west, to be replaced by Archangel in the seventeenth century, and then by the newly founded St Petersburg. Then Russian interests again became focused upon the South; the wooded steppe and then the open steppe was overrun; the Crimea was occupied; an advance was made into the Caucasus, and the Russian Government began to think in terms of Constantinople

and the Mediterranean. The Golden Horde had broken up, and in the mid-sixteenth century, the Russian peoples, advancing down the Volga, occupied the Khanate of Kazan, and reached Astrakhan, where the Volga flows into the Caspian. Towns were established along the river—Samara, Saratov, Tsaritsyn—to hold the newly won land.

Movement to the south, down the Dnieper and Don, was more difficult, and the Tartars of the Crimea offered a prolonged resistance. They occupied a relatively fertile and productive region, with higher rainfall and better soil than the Volga steppe. Their political structure was more integrated than that of other Tartar peoples, and they possessed in the Crimea, "half steppe and half Mediterranean garden," a link with the civilization of the Middle East. Above all, the Turks lay behind the Crimean Tartars, supporting them, protecting them, almost as if they anticipated the Russian conquest of the Ukraine, domination of the Black Sea, and threat to Constantinople.

In the eighteenth century the steppe was the pioneer fringe, as the northern forests had been two centuries earlier. Here there grew up an example of the true type of frontiersman, freedom-loving, egalitarian, resourceful, and resentful of political controls; these were the Cossacks of the Don valley. A similar group, the Zaporozhian Cossacks lay across the lower Dnieper, on the southern border of Poland. They were horsemen, who lived by hunting and animal rearing. They were, in the main, Great Russian people, accepting the rule of the Russian Tsar, but unruly and a barrier to settlement and progress in the steppe. Nevertheless, Russian settlement slowly invaded the wooded steppe. Small groups of peasants broke the black earth and grew their crops, and fortified and garrisoned towns, many of which have since grown to great industrial importance, in order to secure the newly won territory—Kursk, Orel, Byelgorod, Voronezh. In 1696 Azov was captured, and lost again soon afterwards, and it was not until 1774 that the Russians reached the mouth of the Dnieper, and 1783 before they occupied the Crimea. In 1812 Bessarabia was occupied, and the frontier was advanced to the south. To the east of the Black Sea the Terek and Kuban rivers were reached, and the Russians crossed the Central Caucasus and

occupied Georgia. The Turks retained command of the Black Sea and its coasts and also of the Caspian littoral for considerably longer (Fig. 56), an interesting comment on the interrelations of a land and a sea Power.

The Russian advance to the Black Sea was across the eastern part of the Ukraine. The western part remained Polish until the Second Partition in 1793. The Ukraine was the original territory of the Russia of Kiev. Its inhabitants were driven back to the belt of wooded steppe between Kiev and Lwow, and from this base they spread south-eastward into the more open steppe, with the decline of the Tartar power. Their language, really a group of Russian dialects, with certain broad differences from the Great Russian speech, was carried down to the Black Sea, forming a large and compact cultural unit. Yet the Ukrainian people had never known political independence, though there had been many revolts of the Ukrainians, together with the western Cossack groups, against the Poles. The development of the Ukraine from the eighteenth century has been characterized primarily by its rapidly increasing population, the development of its wheatfields and, later, its sugar-beet and iron and steel industries, and, secondly, by the development of Ukrainian nationalism, resulting from, and in turn further sharpening, the policy of Russification, adopted by the Moscow Government. The Ukrainian language was "condemned to non-existence," and feeling against the Great Russian ran the more strongly, but, as the events of 1919, when a Ukrainian Republic was set up, were to show, this nation of some 40,000,000 peasants lacked the political experience and the political leaders for independent existence. It is now a federal unit in the U.S.S.R., a position which perfectly reflects its differences from and fundamental unity with the Great Russian people.

Eastward. Russian progress to the East was guided by the two vegetational belts, the coniferous forest and the steppe. It was at first confined to the forest. Not only was this area sparsely peopled and resistance slight, but the forests provided the Russians with what they sought most eagerly, the pelts of fur-bearing animals. Climate became more severe to the East, but did not differ essentially from that of the corresponding region of European Russia. From the sixteenth century small

groups of Russians, imbued with a spirit of adventure, strong, courageous, greedy, like the French settlers in Canada, pressed eastwards. The Ural Mountains were passed, the Ob was reached by 1600, the Yenisei in 1607, and the Lena in 1632, and a few years later the Pacific itself was reached. Timbered forts were built to serve for protection and as collecting centres. In the seventeenth century the mineral wealth of the Ural Mountains was discovered, and mining attained great importance and spread farther east to Siberia. A parallel movement along the steppe to the south came later, and it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that Russian peasants settled this region in large numbers, assisted after 1891 by the Trans-Siberian Railway.

It was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the Russian provinces of the Far East were developed, but little progress could be made until a railway link had been established between this area and Europe. The port of Vladivostock was founded in 1860; Sakhalin was obtained from Japan, the Amur Province acquired, and the Amur river frontier established against China. Russia now strove to get a warm-water port, further south on the Pacific coast. Port Arthur was annexed in 1895 and lost again ten years later; Japan had set a limit to Russian expansion along the Pacific coast. Russian pioneers spread across the Bering Strait and pushed southward along the Pacific coast of North America, but Russian commitments were too great, and this territory was sold to the U.S.A.

Between 1864 and 1873 the Russians penetrated beyond the desert of the steppe margin into the oasis lands of Turkestan, and the legendary cities of Samarkand, Bokhara, and Tashkent, with their non-Russian population, were acquired. Small gains were made at the expense of Persia, and northern Persia became a Russian sphere of influence, and the Russian came to the borders of Afghanistan and was conceived of as threatening the British Empire in India.

In point of time the Russian approach to the Black Sea and the Caucasus came first, followed by the attempt to control the outlet from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. As if warned off from the approaches to the Mediterranean, Russia probed her southern frontier eastward of the Caspian Sea and occupied Turkestan up to the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs.

If she ever seriously entertained the idea of advancing to India, she was effectively discouraged by the difficulties of the terrain even more than by the resolution of the British Government in India. The tide of Russian advance then washed eastward round the protruding mountain bastion of Outer Mongolia, into the Amur Province and Manchuria, the last outward thrust of imperial Russia.

Economic Development. The economic development of Russia under the Tsars becomes of great interest in view of Soviet organization of industry and agriculture. The Russian people were largely agricultural peasants, and produced mainly for their own consumption, as transport was too undeveloped for any except peripheral regions to export. From medieval times the most important area had been that between Moscow and the Baltic. After 1700 St Petersburg inherited and developed the trade of Novgorod. Canals, dug by conscripted labour, linked it with the Volga and brought much of European Russia within its hinterland. Furs were the most important export at first, replaced later by what were known as 'naval stores'; soft woods, spars and masts, hemp and flax for ropes and sails, tallow and turpentine. Riga grew up to supplement the port of St Petersburg and exported the flax and hemp from Livonia and Lithuania.

The economic importance of the North-west came in the nineteenth century to be equalled by that of the Urals and the Ukraine. The former was essentially a mining and industrial region. Non-ferrous metals were mined and smelted, and in the eighteenth century iron-ore was worked on a large scale, assisted, like the early iron industries in Western Europe, by the timber and water-power. Production methods, however, were primitive, and the Russian iron industry declined before those of Great Britain and the West. In the Ukraine a comparatively free peasantry were beginning in the late eighteenth century to cultivate one of the most fertile areas in Europe. It was not until well on in the nineteenth century that the export of wheat from Odessa attained any great importance, but this, and the later metallurgical developments in the Donetz basin, led the South to equal and in the end surpass the economic importance of the Moscow-St Petersburg region.

Russian factory industries grew up much later even than

the mining, and until the end of the Tsarist regime most of the industries of Russia were fostered by the State and closely connected with the equipment of the armed forces. This was due partly to the social backwardness of Russia. Russia was still a feudal state, and a feudal society does not have a reservoir of mobile labour, such as the factory industry demands. Attempts were made to operate factories with serf labour, a strange effort to graft industrial institutions on to feudal society. The old domestic and craft industries had, of course, survived from earlier times; villages continued to produce their local and traditional articles. In the first half of the nineteenth century the factory cotton industry was expanded, partly by German capital. The town of Łódź, just within the western frontier of Russia, became the premier textile town, and cotton, linen, and other textiles were made in the small industrial towns which lay in a ring round Moscow. Toward the end of the nineteenth century foreign capital and enterprise were developing the iron-ore field of Krivoi Rog and the coal measures near Kharkov. In 1850 Russia had no railways, and roads were few and bad. By the end of the century her equipment was still far from adequate, but great strides had been made. Within these years the production of coal had increased over sixtyfold; that of pig-iron nearly tenfold, and that of steel was 15 times as great.

The industrialization of Russia was still slight compared with that of the Western Powers, and had been achieved with foreign money, initiative, and skill. Industries were located mainly in the West, around Moscow and in the Ukraine. Methods were extravagant, and there was little collaboration or co-ordination between the various branches of industry. It remained for the Russians to recast the economic geography of their country, in accordance more with the distribution of natural wealth than with the factors which have influenced Russia in the past.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

FRANCE AND HER EASTERN FRONTIERS

WE have already examined in the first part of this book the political unification of France. It is the purpose of this chapter firstly to trace the stages in the territorial expansion of France and the attainment of the Rhine frontier, and secondly to examine the development of the economic geography of France from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.

The Natural Frontier. The eastern frontier of France at the end of the sixteenth century differed only in detail from that of the Middle Ages, and this, in turn, was essentially the line adopted at the partition of Verdun. The only conspicuous modification had been between the Rhône and the Alps, where the provinces of Dauphiné and Provence had been added to France. The frontier ran from Calais, retaken from England in 1559, southward to the Authie river, and from this point eastward to the Meuse below Charleville. Artois was thus excluded and also Cambrai and Landrécies. From Charleville the frontier approximately followed the Meuse almost to its source, struck southward to the Saône, near Gray, crossed to the Doubs, followed the foothills of the Jura for some thirty miles, and then returned to the Saône above Mâcon. In few places was the frontier in any way a natural one. For some twenty miles west of Charleville the boundary followed, and still follows to-day, the ridge, some 1200 feet high, which forms the westward extension of the Ardennes. This is the only point of coincidence between the sixteenth- and twentieth-century frontier. In Burgundy the frontier followed the sharp eastern edge of the Plateau of Langres, but the Meuse was only intermittently a frontier. Portions of the bishoprics of Metz and Verdun reached across it to the west. A fragment of imperial Lorraine lay west of the river near Commercy. On the other hand, France stretched across the Meuse between Stenay and Sedan and near Toul. Judged by modern standards, the eastern frontier of France was irregular and irrational in the extreme, but the sixteenth century did not conceive of frontiers as we do. They were not finite lines, drawn on maps

and on the ground with the greatest cartographic skill. Instead, treaties which provided for the inclusion or exclusion of this or that town or territory implied that the frontier was to run somewhere through the no-man's-land of forest, moorland, or marsh which surrounded them. An accurately demarcated frontier became necessary only when the intervening waste-land began to acquire an economic value. All frontiers were 'natural,' in the sense that they followed tracts of sparse population and slight economic value. A river was not, in general, a 'natural' frontier, unless fringed by marshes, like the Rhine below Basle, thus making movement difficult.

In the seventeenth century two new conceptions were introduced, the strategic frontier and the national frontier, the lines respectively easy to defend and embracing all the people of a certain language and culture. Under Richelieu and Louis XIV a policy was openly pursued of reaching *les limites naturelles*. "I would identify France with Gaul," wrote Richelieu in his *Memoirs*, in justification of his policy. It cannot be doubted that he looked for a clearly marked, easily defended frontier. Probably he also wished to embrace within France all of French speech, but he also made the mistake, not uncommon among statesmen, of dividing the smooth geographical continuum into compartments by choosing quite arbitrarily such boundaries as rivers and mountains provide. They then identify a political unit with each compartment, and try to expand the former until its boundaries are those of the latter, so we get the political doctrine of the "Natural Frontier," whether found in France, Spain, Italy, Ireland, or the many other countries which have striven to round off what they conceived to be geographical units.

France's first gains beyond the medieval frontier were made in Metz, Toul, and Verdun, three bishoprics, whose estates were scattered over Bar and Lorraine. These were occupied in 1552. A century later small corridors of land were acquired, allowing them to be reached without crossing the territory of ducal Lorraine. Most significant was the corridor which linked Verdun with Metz and was continued south-eastward to the borders of Alsace. At the end of the Thirty Years War France acquired the Habsburg interests in Alsace, which included the rich province of Sundgau, between Basle and Montbéliard.




FIG. 57. THE FRENCH ADVANCE TO THE RHINE, 1500-1789

The acquisition of the Free Country of Burgundy (Franche Comté) brought the frontier up to the Jura between Sundgau and Gex, excepting only the enclave of Montbéliard. Successive




FIG. 58. THE FRENCH FRONTIER IN 1803,
WITH TRIBUTARY STATES

the upper valleys of the Po, about Suza and Saluzzo. The excuse for this is to be found in the relative ease with which the passes of the Graian Alps could be crossed.

The French Revolution and Napoleon. The French Revolution gave a fresh impetus to the French advance towards the Rhine. The river, hitherto the frontier only from Basle to a point near Karlsruhe, became the frontier also as far as Emmerich.

wars in the seven-teenth century extended the French frontier in Flanders approximately to the line it now occupies. In Alsace scraps of land, imperial territories, feudal survivals from the Middle Ages were added one after another. The duchy of Lorraine was in practice subject to France, and was actually absorbed in 1766. Nevertheless, there remained in Alsace and Lorraine until the Revolution a number of such territories, subject to the Emperor and not to the King of France.

South of Lyons there was little change in the two centuries preceding the Revolution. The county of Barcelonnette was added in 1713, and for the time

The Austrian Netherlands were absorbed into France; the Dutch became the Batavian Republic, controlling the mouths of the Rhine. Napoleon's campaigns in the Lombardy Plain allowed France to annex Nice and Savoy, thus allowing the frontier to follow the watershed of the French Alps, which




FIG. 59. EUROPE IN 1810

Areas directly under French rule are shaded. The stippled areas were tributary.

were thought to constitute a 'natural' frontier. The north of Italy was controlled through the Kingdom of Piedmont, at first tributary and then annexed to France, and the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics. It is a comment on the ineffectiveness of the Alpine range as a strategic frontier that Austria and France should determine their disputes in the valley of the Po.

The territorial ambitions of Napoleon expanded. He no longer desired to recreate Roman Gaul; his object was to re-establish the Carolingian Empire. The limits of France were extended north-eastward to reach the Baltic and to include Lübeck. The tributary Confederation of the Rhine included

Germany between the Rhine on the west and Mecklenburg, Saxony, and Bavaria in the east. The Helvetic Republic, the Kingdom of Italy, and the Illyrian provinces completed a state which resembled very closely that of Charles the Great. But Napoleon's empire resembled that of Charlemagne not merely in its territorial extent. Like its predecessor it was a land-based empire, and such sea-power as it possessed was decisively beaten at the Nile and Trafalgar.

French political theorists stressed the importance to the state of agriculture, which they regarded as the only true source of wealth. Dependence upon trade they considered a source of weakness; the ideal state could subsist, wrote Rousseau, without other nations. A self-sufficing political unit had existed in the Middle Ages, but to recreate it in the nineteenth century seemed to observers in Great Britain the height of absurdity. Napoleon considered that Great Britain, the commercial state, vulnerable at so many points, could be defeated by closing the avenues of her trade. The Continental system, slowly elaborated and extended, would have excluded British commerce from the ports of Europe. Some form of stalemate would have been a probable outcome if Napoleon had succeeded in controlling the whole Continent. He failed to control the Spanish peninsula, a region always liable to be influenced by sea-power, and he failed in his attempt to conquer Russia. Converging attacks from these two extremities of Europe overthrew the Napoleonic system. The parallel between Napoleon's control of Europe and that exercised by Hitlerite Germany is close. Both were overthrown because their Continental systems just failed to be quite complete. Russia resisted successfully in each instance. Great Britain, in Europe but not of Europe, was safeguarded by the sea from the attacks of a land-power based on the continent of Europe, but was enabled at the same time by its possession of sea-power to strike where it liked on the coastline opposite, to bring help to its allies and present a constant threat to the land-power. The question we may ask is whether these geographical values are not being changed by the use of air-power, submarines, and long-range weapons, whether, if a third attempt should ever be made to create a land-state in Western Europe, Great Britain would not be forced to become part of it.

After Waterloo (1815) the French frontiers of 1789 were

restored, rectified here and there, and anachronisms, such as the imperial territories in Alsace, removed. Since this date territorial changes on the French frontier have been limited to the loss (1870) and restoration (1918) of Alsace and part of Lorraine and the cession to France in 1860 of Nice and Savoy. The latter territories rounded off the French state in the south-east, and brought the frontier to the line of the Alps. They were demanded by France as the reward for her assistance to the new kingdom of Italy. Feeling in Nice and Savoy appears to have been by no means wholly in favour of France, and the plebiscites which were held in these territories are admitted to have been mismanaged. The loss of the Rhine frontier was not accepted with equanimity by considerable sections of French opinion, and the revolt of the southern part of the Netherlands appeared to offer an opportunity for French intervention. British foreign policy, which had been responsible for the creation of a state embracing the whole of the Netherlands, objected to a French control of the port of Antwerp, and the state of Belgium was eventually established.

The war of 1870-71 resulted in the loss of Alsace and part of Lorraine. These were areas in which German speech was predominant, but the western limit of the annexed territory was determined rather by the existence of workable deposits of iron-ore than by the feelings of the local population. There can be little doubt that feeling in the annexed territories was very much in favour of France. A considerable number of people exercised their right to move, with their chattels, into France, and it is said that over 500,000 people thus left Alsace and occupied Lorraine, either through voluntary migration or expulsion. This was very nearly balanced by immigration from Germany. The provinces were more exclusively German in speech in 1914 than they had been forty years before, but the attitude of the inhabitants during the war of 1914-18 showed that they were by no means reconciled to German rule. But opposition to Germany did not necessarily mean friendship for France. The two provinces, particularly Alsace, are strongly particularist and independent.

Agriculture. Agriculture was the most important occupation in France, as in every other European country, before the nineteenth century, and the majority of the people were

peasant cultivators. Serfdom was common in the sixteenth century and in places lingered on until the French Revolution. It was most conspicuous in the level or undulating plains of




FIG. 60. THE MAIN AREA OF OPEN FIELDS IN FRANCE

The areas left unshaded are either regions of Bocage or of Mediterranean vegetation, and, in general, unsuited to the economy of open-field farming.

After J. H. Clapham

high agricultural value; least, on the poor, thin lands of the ancient massifs.

*Li paisan et li vilain
Cil des bocages et cil des plains.*¹

¹ Roman de Rou: "the peasant and the villain; the former from the bocage, the latter from the plain."

The open fields, with their scattered strips, existed longer than in England, and Arthur Young described and condemned them on the eve of the French Revolution. This fragmentation was, like serfdom, less common in hilly districts, such as Brittany, and in the South. Wheat was the chief cereal, but barley and oats were grown, and rye and buckwheat were important items of human consumption in the poorer districts. The potato was introduced in the seventeenth century, and was slowly adopted as a food crop. Beetroot and fodder crops allowed larger stock to be carried on the land, and, as in England at the same time, an increased interest in farming led to improvements in stock-breeding and in cultivation. Real progress was, however, restricted by the uneconomic confusion of holdings, the result, in part, of the law of equal inheritance, which led to the division of a farm between sons, and by feudal rights and dues, the depredations of game which might not be killed, absenteeism on the part of landlords, and lack of capital on the part of the peasantry. The introduction of the mulberry-tree at the end of the Middle Ages, and its acclimatization in the Rhône valley, led to a great expansion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the silk industry, but attempts to extend the rearing of silkworms to the Loire and Seine valleys were less successful. The grape vine was cultivated more widely than at present, owing to the difficulties of conveying wine. All parts, except the extreme North and North-west, were self-sufficing in wine.

The Revolution, followed by the Napoleonic codification of civil law, swept away the vexatious restrictions on agriculture and restricted and discouraged the subdivision of holdings. The blockade of France led to an intensification of agriculture, and new crops, particularly the sugar-beet, were cultivated. France became a nation of peasants, but not all owned the land they cultivated. The large estates were taken from their former owners, broken up and sold, but were often recreated by the new, self-made men of the Revolution.

Towns, Industry, and Trade. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the population of France was expanding steadily. In 1700 it was about 18,000,000; in 1820 it had risen to 31,000,000. Fears were expressed of the ability of France to feed her growing population, and the export of foodstuffs was

forbidden or strictly controlled. Even the export of wine was burdened with a tax. In the seventeenth century imports, mainly of a colonial nature, increased from the Levant and from French colonies in India, and France exported linen, cotton, and woollen cloth, and silk from her own mills. Attempts were made, as in England, and by strictly analogous methods, to expand the French merchant marine. Export in other than French ships was limited, and some attempt was made to limit, in the interests of shipbuilding, the felling of timber. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the chief ports of Northern France were Dieppe and Rouen. Dunkirk suffered severely during the campaigns in the Low Countries. Le Havre was founded early in the sixteenth century to replace Harfleur, which had silted up; its foreign trade increased steadily in the seventeenth century. St Malo and Nantes were the chief fishing ports, from which the boats sailed to the cod-fisheries off Newfoundland. The navigation of the Loire up to Nantes became increasingly difficult, but the port retained its West Indian trade. Lorient was founded in 1666 as a port for the Indies trade. La Rochelle had a smaller traffic, exporting wine and salt from the salt pans of the nearby coast. Bordeaux was the port of the wine-growing South, but it developed also an increasing trade with the Americans and became, like Bristol, a centre for the colonial slave trade, and the cutting of the Canal des Deux Mers, which linked the Garonne with the Mediterranean, increased its importance. On the Mediterranean coast Marseilles had eclipsed the several small and often silted ports. It was the centre of the Levant trade, but it was not until the opening of the Suez Canal (1869) that it leaped into the place of first importance among the ports of France.

Apart from Paris, which contained some 400,000 inhabitants as early as the sixteenth century, the chief towns of France were Lyons, Lille, Rouen, Orleans, and Toulouse, but there were few large towns. Instead, many small ones served as market centres for their surrounding districts. The great fairs of Champagne were defunct, but there were still fairs of international importance, particularly those at Beaucaire and Rouen, and animal fairs of more than local importance in many parts of France. Roads were generally bad in the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and travel extremely difficult. In the eighteenth century the king's right to forced labour on the roads, the *corvée*, was organized and resulted in a great improvement on the main roads, but cross-country routes remained in a very poor condition. The main roads radiated from Paris, and there was a secondary convergence, a survival from the Roman period, on Lyons. Inland navigation was more important than in other countries, partly on account of the badness of the roads. The chief rivers had long been used, but trade was hindered by vexatious tolls, which were charged at frequent intervals. Attempts to remove these were not altogether successful before the Revolution. The Seine, Saône, Rhône, Garonne, and Loire were most used. As early as the sixteenth century proposals were put forward to link up these rivers by canals and so to encircle the Central Massif. At the very beginning of the seventeenth century the Loire was joined in this way with the Loing, a tributary of the Seine. Other rivers in the north of France were made navigable and were joined to one another by canals. In 1681 the canal, already mentioned, was opened between Aquitaine and the Mediterranean.

In accordance with the prevailing mercantilist doctrines, the state encouraged industries and tried to prevent the export of industrial raw materials. The Minister Colbert was instrumental in establishing and extending the textile industries and glass, china, and paper manufacture. Foreigners were invited to bring new techniques, and the nobility was encouraged to show an interest in such pursuits. The medieval guilds, developing into closed societies, tried to stop the development of industries outside their ranks. Labour was short, and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) and emigration of many of the Huguenots was a serious loss to industrial France. Though there was very little factory industry before the Revolution, the shortage of coal and of easily worked iron-ore was acutely felt. It is too early to speak of industrial regions, but in the early eighteenth century the textile industry was beginning to concentrate in areas that have remained among the more important: Lille, Rouen, and Lyons. Pottery manufacture developed at Limoges and near Paris; glass, in Lorraine and Normandy, and before the end of the eighteenth

century the beginnings are seen of the steel industry at Le Creusot and in Lorraine.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

GERMANY AND THE BALTIC

GERMANY

GERMANY, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, was only a geographical expression. Its many political units, lay and ecclesiastical states, and imperial cities were held together by a common allegiance to the emperor and by a flimsy constitution, but the bond was slight. The Reformation had created further disunion. North Germany, with certain exceptions, became and largely remains Lutheran; the South remained Catholic, and Calvinism spread northward into the Rhineland from its home in Switzerland. The Thirty Years War (1618-48) destroyed what was left of German unity. Its causes were partly religious, partly dynastic. Its consequences were incalculable both for Germany and for Europe. Thirty years' campaigning devastated the countryside, destroyed crops, villages, and towns and reduced Germany to a state of such destitution that she had not fully recovered two hundred years later. Economic development was arrested. At the same time political development and the formation of a single German state was postponed until the nineteenth century. The influence of the Austrian Habsburgs, who had since 1438 kept the imperial title in their family, was reduced almost to nothing, and the way was left clear for the strongest among the German princes to become stronger still.

Two non-German Powers intervened prominently in the Thirty Years War; they were France and Sweden, each pursuing a policy of territorial aggrandizement, aimed, in the case of the one, at acquiring the Rhine frontier; of the other, at making the Baltic a Swedish lake. By the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) France gained Alsace and with it a foothold on the Rhine and a predominant influence in the old Lotharingia (see p. 90). Sweden took Western Pomerania, with the port of Stralsund and the island of Rügen, and also the territory between the Weser and Elbe estuaries making up the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden (see p. 194). Austria conquered the

Czech-speaking lands of Bohemia and Moravia, and set her feet firmly on the path that led to the creation in the eighteenth century of an empire of the middle Danube. Inside Germany, Bavaria, Saxony, and Brandenburg each extended their territories and increased their military and economic strength. The most significant of these gains were made by Brandenburg.

The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia. The electorate of Brandenburg originated in a group of 'marks' between the Elbe and the Oder. Their nucleus, the Mittelmark, lay on each side of the Havel river and contained the Slavonic stronghold of Brannibor, which grew into Brandenburg (see p. 117 and Fig. 61). In 1455 the Neumark, east of the Oder, was added. Early in the seventeenth century the acquisition of the three Westphalian territories of Cleves, Mark, and Ravensburg and of East Prussia extended the interests of Brandenburg westward to the Rhineland and eastward into Poland. East Prussia had been secularized by the last Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, from one of whose successors it passed to the elector of Brandenburg. Thus, by a series of accidents, the state of Brandenburg came to straggle across the North German Plain. Territorially disunited, it enclosed neighbouring and weaker states. Its geographical distribution was a source both of weakness and of strength. Without strong and far-sighted leadership in Brandenburg, fragments might have been detached and absorbed by neighbouring states; with it, the electorate had many bases of attack, could interfere in German affairs where it chose, and was encouraged to add state to state and to build 'bridges' from one territory to another. The ramifications of Brandenburg ran through all North Germany.

There was nothing inevitable in the rise of Brandenburg. The electorate was poor; it commanded few routes. It is true that it had been a frontier state in the Middle Ages, but it can hardly be said that this added to the strength and virility of the population in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The greatness of Brandenburg was achieved in defiance of nature and was created by members of the house of Hohenzollern, who were adequate to the task of organizing the land they had inherited. The Great Elector, Frederick William I (1640-88), profited from the Thirty Years War and added the bishoprics of Halberstadt, Magdeburg, Minden, and Camin

and the duchy of East Pomerania. Already arms are put out to east and west to hold the outlying territories of Brandenburg and link them with the centre. Further small territorial acquisitions were made, among them part of West Pomerania, including the port of Stettin. Frederick II conquered Silesia from Austria (1740-42) and added East Friesland, greatly increasing the area and agricultural wealth of Brandenburg,




FIG. 61. THE EXPANSION OF BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA, BEFORE 1800

and giving it control of what was to become the second coal-field in Germany. Between 1772 and 1795 the Hohenzollern dream was very nearly realized. The addition of Western Poland joined East Prussia with Pomerania and Silesia, and the state of Brandenburg-Prussia reached in a compact and united block from Warsaw to Magdeburg and from Upper Silesia to the Baltic.

At the same time steps were taken to increase the economic strength of Brandenburg. The marshes of the Havel and Oder valleys were drained by Dutch engineers. Farming methods were improved; fresh crops, such as tobacco and the potato, introduced; better stock was bred, and the marketing of farm produce improved. Industries were encouraged.

Huguenot refugees from France, and Catholic from Salzburg brought their respective crafts. Cloth-making, paper, glass, metallurgical, and mechanical industries were established. The towns grew in size. Berlin grew from a country town of 6000 people in 1648 to a city of 114,000 in 1786. Arms factories were built at Spandau and Potsdam. The port of Stettin was opened up. Königsberg was joined to the sea by a canal. A system of inland waterways was begun by the Great Elector, and continued in the eighteenth century, and the nucleus established of Germany's present system of canals.

The Rest of Germany. A mosaic of little states, with one or two of greater size among them, made up the rest of Germany. In none of them was there a clearly conceived policy of expansion, such as we see in Brandenburg, nor was there any such economic development as we find there. Serfdom was general, and rural conditions might be described as medieval. Industry, other than the rural crafts, was almost non-existent in the seventeenth century, and developed only slowly and in particularly favoured areas in the eighteenth. The great fair of Leipzig declined as the territories of Brandenburg began to extend to the east and south-east of it, diverting its trade to Berlin. Saxony developed, however, the porcelain industry at Meissen, after the accidental discovery of kaolin. Mining remained important in the Ore Mountains and the hills of Central Germany, and a mining school was set up at Freiberg. Cloth-making developed in the hill ranges which surround Bohemia and in Moravia, and these regions became the industrial areas of the Habsburg empire. At the same time the manufacture of oriental cotton threads was developed in Chemnitz and in such South German towns as Augsburg and Nuremberg.

The routes across the Alpine passes into Italy had declined in importance since the beginning of the sixteenth century, and much of the business of the great emporia of South Germany had been transferred to Hamburg, Lübeck, the ports of the Low Countries, and even to Lisbon. With, however, the expansion of Austria down the Danube, the group of routes from the head of the Adriatic to the valley of the Sava acquired a new importance. In the eighteenth century Fiume and Trieste were developed as bases of Austrian trade with the

Levant. The Danube was opened to Austrian shipping, which was permitted, by a treaty between Joseph II and the Sultan, to sail into the Black Sea and through the straits into the Mediterranean.

The chief political units of the Empire in the later seventeenth century, and the eighteenth, were Bavaria, which occupied the Danube valley above Passau, together with the valleys of its tributaries, the Isar, Inn, and Nab; Würtemberg, in the Neckar valley; Baden, between the Black Forest and the Rhine, and the Palatinate, which lay on both sides of the Rhine between Speyer and Mainz. The hilly country of Central Germany was broken up into a large number of small units, among which Cassel, Nassau, and the ecclesiastical states of Cologne, Mainz, Trier, and Munster were relatively important. North-western Germany consisted similarly of small states, among which Hanover and the outlying territories of Brandenburg were the most important.

SWEDEN AND THE BALTIC

There is a superficial resemblance between the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean. Both are small and island-studded; navigation is relatively easy, and has been practised since the earliest times. Both are the termini of trans-Continental routes, and both are entered by narrow waterways, controlled with comparative ease by the neighbouring land Powers. But to the north of the Baltic is the Scandinavian "shield," with poor soil and harsh climate. Political and economic development was slow, and for a long period these areas were exploited by traders from the North Sea and North-west Germany. The Hansa towns spread along the coast of Germany to Courland, Livland, and the Gulf of Finland. Russia, Poland, and Brandenburg, with their nuclei in the Volga-Oka triangle, in the middle Vistula and in the Havel valley, were cut off from the sea, though always striving to reach it.

The first state to establish a sort of hegemony over the Baltic Sea was Denmark. The Baltic is entered by three narrow waterways, the Sound and the Great and Little Belt. Of these the Sound is the deepest and most easily navigated. The Danish state, its nucleus on the island of Zealand, spread

across all three waterways, could levy tolls and control trade. Only the Elbe-Trave Canal provided a way into the Baltic free from Danish control. The Danish Empire, until the middle of the fifteenth century, embraced the populated parts of Sweden and Norway. This broke up, and near the beginning




FIG. 62. THE EXPANSION OF THE SWEDISH STATE

of the sixteenth century the Swedes of the northern dales revolted and asserted their independence. The nucleus of the new Swedish state was the fertile, productive strip of low land between Lake Wener and the Baltic. It embraced the coastal strip of Northern Sweden and also Finland, but its boundaries in the south stopped at the poor highland country of Gothland, which formed the frontier against Denmark. The latter continued to hold, not only the Danish archipelago, but the whole

eastern coast of the Kattogat, the southern provinces of Skane and Blekinge, and the islands of Gotland and Bornholm.

Sweden was able to dominate the Baltic Sea in the next century in virtue of her superior material resources. Her ruling family of Vasa, enriched by the spoliation of the Church and the profits of the metalliferous mines, unified the territory under their rule, and then expanded beyond it. Swedish expansion was favoured by the lack of any strong military Power to the east of the Baltic, while the decay of the Empire and the religious factions weakened those to the south. The result was the progressive extension of Swedish power to these coasts; Ingermanland, at the head of the Gulf of Finland, in 1617, Livland in 1629, and several ports on the coast of Lithuania, Prussia, and Poland. Then came Sweden's intervention in the Thirty Years War, in the course of which Western Pomerania, Wismar, Bremen, Verden, and the islands of Gotland and Osel were added. Still the power of Denmark was untouched, and Sweden was confined to the Baltic. The conquest of the Swedish peninsula was rounded off ten years later, and Sweden now had a secure access to the sea on the west and at least part control over the passage of the Sound.

The rise of Sweden had been made possible by the absence at that time of any strong Power to the east and south of the Baltic. Swedish hegemony of the Baltic lasted only until such states appeared. By the middle of the seventeenth century Brandenburg-Prussia had set a limit to Swedish expansion in the south, and the conquests of Peter the Great drove the Swedes from a belt of country stretching from Karelia to Riga. The sea state was overthrown by the continental Power, which, developing more slowly because of the greater size and variety of its territory, came thereby to possess a much greater material resource. Finland was lost by Sweden in 1809, and the last Swedish foothold on the German coast fell in 1815 to Brandenburg.

Only in Finland was the Swedish rule long enough to have left a permanent mark. Here a coastal belt of Swedish speech attests the former predominance, of Sweden, and styles of architecture, culture, and education show the debt which modern Finland owes to Sweden.

Some mention is needed of the position of Norway. The medieval kingdom of Norway was united with Denmark in the Union of Kalmar (1397). This union continued after the successful revolt of Sweden. The provinces of Jamtland and Herjedalen were occupied by Sweden in the mid-seventeenth century, and for a very short period the Swedes even occupied Trondhjem. In 1814 Norway was attached to Sweden, whose conversion from a Baltic sea Power to a Scandinavian land Power was thus complete. Though granted a measure of home rule, the Norwegians were never reconciled to Swedish rule, and in 1905 the two countries separated peacefully.

GERMANY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The Zollverein. The Holy Roman Empire had at last been snuffed out by Napoleon, and Germany came to be a congeries of sovereign ties held together after 1815 in a loose confederation. The number of political units had been greatly reduced. Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and Hanover had increased their territory, and Brandenburg, though losing the middle Vistula valley, which, as "Congress Poland" went to Russia (see p. 170), recouped herself by considerable extensions of territory in Saxony, Westphalia, and the Rhine Province. Brandenburg-Prussia, with whose activities the rest of this chapter will be concerned, thus consisted in 1815 of two compact blocks of territory, the larger consisting of the eastern half of the North German Plain, with extensions into industrial Saxony and Upper Silesia; the smaller, between the Weser and the Moselle, contained the coalfields of the Ruhr, Aachen, and the Saar valley, as well as the great industrial towns of the lower Rhineland. Though industrialization had in 1815 made no very great progress, it was becoming clear that the two parts of Prussia formed respectively an agricultural east and an industrial west, and that their mutual trade was likely to grow in volume.

The long frontier of Brandenburg-Prussia was difficult to guard, and smuggling was easy. Import duties were reduced to a minimum, but heavy dues were levied on goods passing across Prussian territory to other states. As Prussia controlled the chief routes of North Germany, this was a powerful means

of influencing her neighbours. In 1819 a treaty was concluded with Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, a little Thuringian state wholly surrounded by Prussian territory, by which a customs union was formed. This was extended shortly afterwards to embrace other enclaves in Prussian territory and then to neighbouring states. For a short period Saxony, the Thuringian




FIG. 63. THE FORMATION OF THE ZOLLVEREIN

states, and Hanover formed a separate trading union, lying between the two portions of the Prussian controlled Zollverein, but by 1834 pressure of economic and geographical circumstances had forced most of these into the Zollverein. There only remained certain frontier states, which from their position were less at the mercy of Prussia. Schleswig, Holstein, Mecklenburg, and Hanover contained the chief ports of Germany, but between 1851 and 1867 these also became members.

The Zollverein was the means by which Prussia acquired

an economic supremacy in Germany. It was a union more real than any that had existed hitherto, and prepared the way for the political union which Prussia imposed by right of conquest on the rest of Germany.

The Unification of Germany. While Prussia was building up and extending her Customs Union, the feeling of a German nationhood was developing and spreading. It derived from various sources—the romanticism of the age of Goethe, the ideals of the French Revolution and the almost national rising that defeated Napoleon and drove the French from German soil. It displayed itself in revolutionary activity and in opposition to the often tyrannical rulers of the German states who were thought to lie in the way of the realization of German unity. The policy of union was identified with one of political Liberalism. Both failed in the revolution of 1848, and if Germany was to be united it could only be around one of the greater German states. Austria, though influential in Southern Germany, was chiefly interested in prosecuting her Danubian ambitions, and the role fell upon Prussia.

It is beyond the scope of this work to consider in detail the steps by which Bismarck fulfilled this part. It should, however, be emphasized that Prussia triumphed because she possessed the greater part of Germany's developing heavy industries. Broadly speaking there were two stages. In the first Prussia defeated Austria, secured a predominant position in North Germany, and established the North German Confederation (1866). The second phase was the defeat of France and the destruction of French influence in Germany as that of Austria had been destroyed four years earlier. The states of South Germany, led by Bavaria, joined the North German Confederation, the German Empire was established (1871) with the King of Prussia as its Emperor, and Alsace and Northern Lorraine were taken from France and added to the Reich. An outward unity had been achieved, which only disguised the disunity that continued to exist. Prussia had further extended her territory in North Germany by the absorption of Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, Schleswig, Holstein, and other territories, but the Empire, the "Second Reich," according to recent German nomenclature, remained a federation in which the greater duchies were powerful autonomous units.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

THE nineteenth century was, in Western and Central Europe at least, the most peaceful in modern times. It was a period of rapid economic development, when, with the utilization of newer forms of power and faster means of transport and with the growth of factory industries, geographical values underwent a change as great as those which resulted from the discoveries of the sixteenth century. During this period the Western European countries, particularly Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany ceased to be predominantly agricultural, though the volume of agricultural production increased in all of them during the period, and manufacturing industry became an important, if not the most important, occupation of the people. This revolution is intimately associated with the improvement of transport by road, canal, river, and rail, and with the development of coal mining. It was accompanied by a sharp rise in population, which provided the labour for the factories and mines. Although the domestic production of foodstuffs increased in these industrializing countries, consumption increased yet more in most of them and foodstuffs were imported. The sections of this chapter will survey these features of the geography of Europe in the nineteenth century.

RAILWAYS AND CANALS

The construction of canals in England and France long preceded the opening of railways. The Canal de Languedoc had been constructed during the reign of Louis XIV; in England Brindley's first canal was built from Manchester to Worsley in 1761. After 1815 canal-building was revived. By 1830 2100 km. of canal were open, and before 1848 most of the important canals, including those from the Rhine to the Marne and to the Rhône, were in operation. In the second half of the century the pattern of French canals was complete. They were modernized, but few extensions were made. Some

of the rivers, such as the Seine and its tributaries, were canalized. The development of inland navigation in Germany was hindered by political and customs barriers. Navigation on the Rhine had been reduced by these obstacles to very small proportions, and a commission was appointed at the Vienna




FIG. 64. THE PROGRESS OF RAILWAY BUILDING IN BELGIUM
After Jouffroy

Conference of 1815 to remedy this state of affairs. With the coming of the steamboat, however, and the gradual lessening of political obstacles (see Chapter XIII) conditions improved. The Elbe and Baltic rivers began to be used, but canal-building was not revived until after the formation of the Empire (1871). The Dortmund-Ems canal was opened in 1901, but was not connected with the Rhine until 1914. The Kiel Canal was

opened, but was chiefly of strategic importance, though it did lead to an increase in the trade of Lübeck. The greatest use, however, was made of the navigable rivers. The formation of a complex system of canal and river routes, linked by an east-west artery, is a creation of the twentieth century.

The first English railway had been opened in 1825; the first on the mainland of Europe followed ten years later. It




FIG. 65. THE PROGRESS OF RAILWAY BUILDING IN GERMANY
After Jouffroy

was a short line between Brussels and Malines. Within five years Belgium had a railway axis from near Liège to Ostend. In Germany a considerable number of short, independent lines were slowly integrated into a national system, but development was hindered by the political fragmentation. By 1848 the state of Prussia had a continuous system from Düsseldorf to Posen and Upper Silesia, and lines ran also to Warsaw, Krakow, and through the Moravian Gap to Vienna. The French railway system began to emerge even later than the German, and as late as 1848 consisted essentially of a line from the Loire valley,

through Paris to the industrial North, with a few branches and some short lines in Southern France. By 1870, however, the French system, with its focus in Paris, had been mapped out. Elsewhere the development of railway construction was slower, but all countries except the Balkans had a rudimentary system by 1870.

During the century there was a gradual improvement,




FIG. 66. THE PROGRESS OF RAILWAY BUILDING IN FRANCE

After Jouffroy

though not an extension of the road system in most countries. It was not until the twentieth century, with the coming of the motor, that surfaces and gradients were much improved and the roads straightened and adapted to fast traffic.

COAL AND IRON

At the end of the Napoleonic wars only Great Britain was a coal-producer on a large scale, and here the cheapness and abundance of coal was an essential condition of her industrialization and export trade. Coal had been mined in the Northern

French coalfield as early as 1725, but in 1807 there were said to be only six mines. The Saint Étienne field was at this time more important, with nineteen collieries. Output increased slowly, chiefly because France had not got the extent of easily worked deposits which Great Britain and Germany possessed. Belgian production in the first half of the century was very




FIG. 67. COAL PRODUCTION IN WESTERN EUROPE 1871-1910

much larger than French, and output had been encouraged when, under Napoleon, the Austrian Netherlands had been incorporated in France, and Belgian coal had access to the French market. Belgium was able, however, to use her coal output; she "was, in fact, the one country in Europe which kept pace industrially with England, in the first half of the nineteenth century." More intensive development of the coal-field of the North came after 1850, and by 1870 French coal production was approximately equal to that of Belgium.

The coal resources of Germany were second only to those of Great Britain, but serious mining did not begin in the Ruhr and Aachen fields until after 1815, and not in Upper Silesia until after 1840. But by the middle of the century Germany had overhauled both France and Belgium in coal production. After the formation of the German Empire German coal-output rose very sharply, evidence of what Professor Clapham has called "the stupendous industrial momentum of the imperial age." From the first the Ruhr area was the chief




FIG. 68. IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION IN WESTERN EUROPE

P represents pig-iron; S, steel

producer, and gathered to it a vast complex of heavy industries. Coal-mining was not of great importance outside these countries, and, in fact, the rest of Western Europe has coalfields of only local importance.

Iron-ore is very much more widely distributed than coal, and in many parts of Europe, where reserves are not now considered workable, ore was mined and smelted locally with charcoal; the Weald of Kent and Sussex, the Sauerland, various centres in and about the Auvergne, Liège. Iron-ore is associated with most coal-seams, but the only really large deposits of iron-ore on the mainland of Europe are in Northern Spain, in Lorraine, and in Northern Sweden. Soon after 1860 the Bessemer converter and the Siemens-Martin furnace greatly improved the technique of steel-working. The demand for ore

increased, and the existing centres of French steel production were opened up: Le Creusôt, Anzin, and Denain in the North; Longwy, Briey, Hayange in Lorraine. The chief ore deposits in Germany were in the old rocks of the Rhenish plateau, east of Bonn. The high quality of the metal, smelted by the local peasantry with the help of charcoal from near-by woodlands, was consumed in the Solingen cutlery industry. Iron of a similar quality was imported from Sweden. The vastness of the Lorraine deposits was in part realized, but the ore was phosphoric, difficult to use in steel-making and unsuited to the Bessemer process. In 1850 the production of iron-ore in the three leading countries was¹:

| | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Great Britain | 5,000,000-6,000,000 tons |
| France | 1,821,000 tons |
| Germany (with Luxemburg) | 838,000 tons |

Ten years later the production of pig-iron was:

| | |
|---------------|----------------|
| Great Britain | 3,888,000 tons |
| France | 898,000 tons |
| Germany | 529,000 tons |
| Belgium | 320,000 tons |
| Austria | 313,000 tons |
| Sweden | 185,000 tons |

After the war of 1870 Germany took the developed portion of the Lorraine iron field. Eight years later the discovery of the Gilchrist-Thomas process of treating these basic ores revolutionized the field. It was developed intensively by the Germans, who made the Lorraine ore complementary to Ruhr coal. It was found that the western part of the field extended into France, and this was also developed. In all countries the output of pig-iron and steel increased, but particularly in Germany, which became in the twentieth century the world's foremost producer.

MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

At the beginning of the century the textile industry was very widely distributed in France. Few regions lacked a

¹ These figures are from J. H. Clapham, *The Economic Development of France and Germany*, p. 283.

domestic woollen or flax industry. The silk industry was very largely confined to the region of Lyons, and the cotton industry newly introduced into France was carried on only in a few localities. These were Rouen and district; the North, particularly in Lille, Valenciennes, Roubaix, and Tourcoing, and in Alsace. The last had the very great advantage of water-power, but elsewhere mechanical power was only very slowly adopted. The woollen industry followed the cotton to the steadily growing industrial towns near the northern coalfield, which was beginning to supply them with a source of power.

But other crafts were slow to become mechanized; they were carried on in market towns and villages, generally by very small concerns, as occasion demanded. The distribution of the textile industries in Germany resembled in its broad outline that in France. The woollen and widely distributed linen industries were either domestic or were carried on as a part-time occupation by men engaged in farming or in some other craft. Only the small silk and cotton industries can be said to have had a definite localization. These were carried on chiefly at Krefeld and Elberfeld.

Peasant industries, wood-carving, the manufacture of toys and musical instruments, the working of embroideries, were carried on in the cottages, and the products marketed. The metallurgical industries were carried on in the towns and villages, wherever an iron master had set up a furnace. But by the end of the first quarter of the century the beginning could be seen of the Ruhr industry. Iron mills were set up in Oberhausen, Sterkerade, Ruhrort, and, above all, in Essen.

In the second half of the century manufacturing industry was encouraged by the widening market at home and abroad and also by the improvements in transport and communications. In France power-looms only slowly replaced hand-looms. North-eastern and Eastern France were becoming increasingly important as industrial, and particularly textile centres. Lille was becoming the centre of a great conurbation, which included Tourcoing and the mushroom growth, Roubaix. The Alsatian towns, using water-power from the Vosges streams, grew until their seizure by Germany in 1871, and after that date part of the textile industry was resettled west of the frontier in French Lorraine. The use of power in the silk

industry of the Lyons region grew even more slowly than in the cotton and woollen textile mills. Domestic production of silk was tending to decline as exports of cheaper silk from the Far East increased in amount. Other industries grew slowly in France. The chemical industry was handicapped by the smallness of coal reserves and by the comparative lack of salt deposits. While the luxury trades and industries associated with food production grew, especially in Paris, manufacturing industries generally were limited by the small size of establishments. In Germany, on the other hand, the large industrial units increased in number at the expense of the small, and the application of power to industry, particularly in the textile mills, made faster progress than in France. The cotton textile industry was located chiefly in the Wupper valley, in the towns which have since become Wuppertal, and in Saxony, particularly in Chemnitz. Krefeld became the centre of the silk industry. All could obtain fuel with relative ease. The woollen industry was older, and, partly as a result, more widely scattered and more independent of water-power. The towns of the Saxon and Thuringian foothills, of Silesia, München-Gladbach, and Elberfeld were merely the most important of many which engaged in the industry.

The chemical industry was helped by generous resources of coal and of salt, and developed not only in the coalfield towns of the Ruhr, but also in Saxony, near the salt and potash deposits. At the same time the electrical engineering industry grew up particularly in Berlin, but also in towns of the Ruhr and Rhineland. During the nineteenth century German industry tended to concentrate on or near the coalfields, particularly the Ruhr, Upper Silesia, and in Saxony, where, however, the reserves of black coal are very much less. A characteristic of the twentieth century was rather to disperse industry more widely, to link factories with rail or canal, and to supply them with electric power.

AGRICULTURE

France. Throughout the first half of the century France remained overwhelmingly agricultural; the movement from the land into towns was very slight. As a result of the French

Revolution and of the Napoleonic reforms, France was predominantly a peasant country, in which the tendency for holdings to become smaller through division between heirs was to some degree offset by the eagerness of the peasant to acquire more land and to increase his farm. The efficiency of agriculture increased, and the area under crops was extended.




FIG. 69. WHEAT PRODUCTION IN FRANCE DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In 1815 common land scarcely existed in the better-cultivated areas. The following figures show the change in the half-century:

| PRODUCTION IN MILLIONS OF HECTARES | | |
|------------------------------------|------|------|
| | 1789 | 1848 |
| Fallow | 10 | 5 |
| Wheat | 4 | 6 |
| Improved pasture | 1 | 3 |
| Root crops | 0.1 | 2 |

The cultivation of the sugar-beet was greatly extended during the Napoleonic Wars, and has remained considerable. At the same time the cultivation of the mulberry and the rearing of silkworms was increased. The productivity of the land increased steadily through the century, and the average yield of wheat very nearly doubled (Fig. 69), and in most foodstuffs France is self-sufficient. Apart from certain foods of tropical or

subtropical origin, the only conspicuous import is of wine. The annual production has varied, falling off very considerably during the eighties owing to the ravages of the Phylloxera. In general the more highly priced wines are produced from the marginal climatic areas in relatively small quantities. A great deal of the ordinary wine is imported from North Africa or from Italy.

Most holdings are small: considerably over a third are of under $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres, and over three-quarters contain less than 25 acres. The number and size of holdings was fairly steady during at least the latter half of the century. The adoption of mechanical methods on the land has been very slow, and most holdings are too small for the employment of machinery to be economic. The rural population declined, both relatively and absolutely, comparatively little during this period, dropping from 67.6 per cent. in 1876 to 55.9 per cent. in 1911.

Germany. Although no clear borderline separated them, there were marked differences between Eastern and Western Germany. Broadly speaking, serfdom survived longer in Eastern Germany; estates were larger and, at least before the war of 1914, the importance of agriculture was never eclipsed by that of industry. Earlier methods of agriculture, the inter-mixed strips in the open fields, and the practice of grazing stock, good and bad, diseased and sound, together on the same common pasture, survived even more obstinately than in France, and made, of course, for inefficiency in agriculture. The large estates of the east were well farmed, and their 'Junker' owners were quick to adopt improved methods and materials. Much of the backwardness of German agriculture, and also, to some extent, the existence of the large estates, could be attributed to the devastation of the Thirty Years War. Nevertheless, until about 1870 Germany was a net exporter of food, chiefly of wheat, which was sent from the eastern provinces through the port of Danzig. In spite of the gradually rising agricultural output at home, Germany turned during the eighties into a food-importer. Duties on imported corn assisted the German farmer, and up to 1914 not more than a third of the wheat consumed was imported. The import of rye was negligible, and in good years there was even an export. There was a varying import of oats and barley.

Sugar-beet had been grown since the beginning of the century, but it was not until the second half that the acreage under it began to increase much. The most important areas for its production were in the Elbe valley, and the chief centre of the industry was at Magdeburg. Potato growing also increased, and large quantities were used industrially for the production of alcohol. Much of Germany is made of poor agricultural land. Throughout the century at least a quarter was under forest. Only intensive draining and manuring could make productive parts of the northern plain, consisting either of glacial outwash gravels or of heavy clay. The number of cattle and pigs increased; dairy farming, for which much of the land was most suitable, became more important; the number of sheep declined with the extension of agriculture to all land that was possibly cultivable.

A similar change had come over the agriculture of Denmark near the end of the century. The cheapness of imported grain had led almost to the abandonment of wheat cultivation and a concentration on dairying and the growing of fodder crops. In the Low Countries agriculture had become more intensive. Dairying became relatively very important in the Netherlands and in Northern Belgium. On the more sandy soils of Southern Belgium vegetables and root crops were more important.

POPULATION

In 1720 the population of Europe, including European Russia, was about 110,000,000. France was the most populous, with a little under 19 millions. European Russia, Germany, and Italy followed. The population map of Europe shows no areas of particularly dense population and there is no indication of the close urban network that was within two centuries to grow up in North-western Europe. A hundred years later the population had risen to about 209,000,000. The rise was most marked in Great Britain, Ireland, and European Russia, which more than doubled in population. It was only a little less than 100 per cent. in France. Hungary, which was being repopulated after the Turkish wars, also more than doubled in population. This increase was not associated with industrialization except in Great Britain, and resulted, it appears from

figures for this country, rather from a diminished death-rate than from any increase in the birth-rate. The next period, from 1820 to 1930, saw an even greater increase of population. Every country for which we have reliable statistics more than doubled in population. That of Russia increased almost four-fold; that of Great Britain, threefold. In general, industrializing countries increased their population most rapidly. Belgium, Germany, and the area later to become Czechoslovakia, in which was established the greater part of Austria's




FIG. 70. GRAPHS ILLUSTRATING THE GROWTH OF POPULATION IN GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE PERIOD OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

After G. T. Griffith

manufacturing industry, increased respectively 200, 175, and 100 times. France, which remained predominantly agricultural, increased by only 35 per cent.

The increase of factory industry and the improvement, extension, and intensification of agriculture accompanied, partly as cause and partly result, the growth of population. The food-producing capacity of Europe increased very much less rapidly than its population. Great Britain, followed by Germany and the Low Countries, became net importers of food, and other countries had diminishing surpluses for export. In some, particularly the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, the concentration on those crops and products for which their climate, soil, and economic conditions were most suited led to an export of specialized crops and the import of wheat

and others which could be produced more economically in the 'new' countries. Within Europe the population regrouped itself, concentrating in the developing industrial areas, where it helped to produce the ugly sprawl of the English Black Country, the Northern French industrial belt, the Ruhr, and Upper Silesia. In England the north-west to south-east axial belt of population gradually formed. On the mainland of Europe a similar axial belt grew up from the Channel coast, north of Dieppe, to Upper Silesia. This broadly followed the outcrop of the coal measures, and included Northern France, most of Belgium and Holland, the industrialized areas of the North German plain, together with the industrial regions of Bohemia and the Rhineland. In certain parts of Southern Europe areas of very dense population also emerged, based partly on intensive agriculture, partly on the utilization of other forms of power than coal. These included parts of the coast of Spain and Portugal, Northern Italy, and parts of Central and Southern Italy and of Sicily. In addition, a number of large urban centres grew up outside the densely populated belts, chiefly as administrative and communication centres. These were chiefly towns of considerable antiquity; they included Paris, Vienna, and Budapest. In most the existence of a large consuming public has attracted a wide variety of industry, usually of a 'light' nature, requiring little fuel and raw materials relative to the value of the finished goods. Towns of this group have tended to grow very quickly.

In a few areas of Europe the agricultural population rises almost to the density of an industrial area. This is generally where favourable climate and soil have permitted the intensive cultivation of specialized crops. The Mediterranean coast of France, the *vegas* and *huertas* of the Spanish coast, Southern Italy, and the plain of Belgium are examples.

But the 'black countries' of Europe are a comparatively recent growth. The great industrial towns of the Continent were little more than large villages a hundred and fifty years ago. The population of Essen was only 4000 in 1800, and in 1880 was only 57,000. In 1920 it was 439,000. The growth of Chemnitz, Düsseldorf, and Duisberg was almost as rapid. In France Roubaix is the supreme example of a 'mushroom' town. The great capitals, with the exception of Berlin, grew

less spectacularly. The population of Berlin, 419,000 in 1850, rose to 1,122,000 in 1880, and to 4,332,000 in 1939. It has been pointed out that the great cities of Europe before 1870 were mainly those which had been important throughout the Middle Ages and modern times. The great industrial towns are mainly developments of the post-1870 period.

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• *PART III*
THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

CHAPTER FIFTEEN
**TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS OF THE
WESTERN POWERS**

THE countries of Western Europe are a varied group, ranging from the almost wholly agricultural Spain to the predominantly industrial Belgium. But they have this in common: all front the Atlantic Ocean and are, though in varying degrees, dependent upon it for protection and commerce. All lie at the western ends of those routes which stretch through the North European Plain, across the Mediterranean and along the north coast of Africa to the Middle East and to the early centres of dispersion of both the human species and of arts, crafts, and learning. Mankind reached the Atlantic seaboard relatively late, but there the various strains met and mixed, resulting not merely in a very varied racial type but also, a consequence of their inter-breeding, of a rich social and intellectual heritage which has made France the centre and source of western civilization.

THE SPANISH PENINSULA

Spain belongs to Atlantic and to Mediterranean Europe. It is a bridge between Europe and Africa. Joined to France only by the isthmus between Bayonne and Roussillon, its communications hindered by the Pyrenees, Spain has been, in effect, an island. It is the least continental of European countries and, in spite of the difficulties of relief, the most open to maritime influences. Its position in the international groupings of modern times may be briefly discussed. It became in the sixteenth century part of the Habsburg Empire, which embraced also the Low Countries, Franche-Comté, the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Milan, Naples, and Sicily. But it was a sea empire, and the United Netherlands broke away at the end of the century when Spanish control of the western

sea-route was broken by the English victory over the Armada. A century later, when a French Bourbon succeeded to the Spanish throne, Spain was united momentarily with France. But the boast of Louis XIV, "Il n'y a plus de Pyrénées," was not fulfilled. It was not that these mountains were too great a




FIG. 71. THE EMPIRE OF THE HABSBURGS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

barrier, but rather that the sea-power of Britain and the centrifugal tendencies of certain of the Spanish provinces held Spain aloof from France. In the struggle to determine the destinies of Spain, English sea-power ultimately triumphed over French land-power. The seizure of Gibraltar by England in 1704 and the short occupation of Minorca only emphasize this state of affairs. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Napoleon invaded Spain. Not only was he resisted by the Spanish people but his navy lost command of the sea. Forces could be landed by his opponents at almost any point and

evacuated when necessary. Eventually Napoleon's forces were hustled out of Spain by the British who had been landed at Lisbon. The Germans after 1940 refrained from invading Spain. Had they done so, there is no reason to suppose that the verdict of history—that Spain cannot be conquered by a land-power in the face of the opposition of sea-power—would have been contradicted.

The Spanish peninsula consists essentially of a central table-land, whose old and resistant rocks, mantled in parts by a veneer of younger sediments, show through in a series of ridges. On the north they are bounded by the Cantabrians, from which a broad ridge of higher land reaches south-eastward, between the central Meseta and the Ebro valley, to the Mediterranean. On the west the plateau drops rather abruptly to the Portuguese lowlands. Rivers have cut deep gorges into this border region, which, though not particularly high, presents serious barriers to movement. In the south and the north-east are the deep, broad valleys of the Guadalquivir and Ebro respectively, beyond each of which are high ranges, of Alpine formation, the Sierra Nevada and the Pyrenees. It is customary to divide the peninsula into a northern and western 'pluviose' region and a central, southern, and eastern 'arid' region. Mineral wealth is considerable, but its development has been irregular. The Spaniards themselves have done little to use the considerable resources they possess. Spain is predominantly agricultural, though only some 32 per cent. of the total area is under cultivation. Large areas, particularly on the Meseta, are almost bare of soil, and elsewhere the rainfall is so low that the land is barren steppe. The agrarian problem turns on the rainfall and the fertility of the soil. In the North, where the rainfall is adequate—and often more than adequate—the land is hilly and the soil thin and leached. In general this is a region of small and medium-sized holdings, cultivated by a peasantry which is generally backward in its methods and in some areas almost self-sufficient in its economy. Holdings are smallest in the rain-drenched mountain valleys of Galicia. On the northern part of the Meseta, in the grain-growing country around Palencia and Leon, holdings continue to be fairly small. The better-watered parts of Aragon and Catalonia are similar. The regions mentioned so far have in

common "a fair rainfall and Christian traditions that go back to the tenth century."¹ They were only momentarily under Moslem rule; they

form the nucleus of an older Spain, which, both geographically and culturally, has always been closer to Europe than to Africa. . . . In the main . . . they derive their spirit and




FIG. 72. THE SIZE OF AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS IN SPAIN

After G. Brennan

vigour from the days of the Spanish Mark, when the most urgent task of the kings and nobles was to repopulate the empty territories and when a peasant was often as much needed to fight as to plough.

On the Mediterranean coast the bare mountains come down to the sea, but here and there are small, fertile and irrigable patches, which form the intensively cultivated *huertas* and *vegas*. Here the holdings are small, as befits the form of agriculture practised, and the level of rural prosperity is higher than in most other parts of Spain.

¹ G. Brennan, *The Spanish Labyrinth* (Cambridge University Press, 1943), p. 100.

On the Meseta medium-sized holdings extend as far south as the Tagus, beyond which, in Extremadura, La Mancha, and Andalusia estates are very large and the degree of poverty as high as is to be found in Europe. The country is naturally dry, poor, and unproductive, but the lot of the peasantry is made very much worse than it might be by their lack of land, the backwardness of cultivation on the great estates, and the utter dependence of the peasants on absentee landlords or their bailiffs. This is the only corner of Europe, except Hungary, where no attempt has been made to break up the *latifundia* and to distribute holdings among the peasantry. This agrarian problem is the most pressing in Spain and every government which fails to take some measures to solve it is merely hastening its own overthrow. The importance of agrarian problems in aligning political parties is mentioned below.

Spain is commonly contrasted with Italy. They have large areas of waste and unproductive land, and the climate of both has much in common. But Italy, with rather more than half the area, supports almost twice the population of Spain. She lacks mineral resources comparable to those of Spain, but is very much more highly industrialized. It is insufficient to say that the Spanish people have been unprogressive and conservative, because considerable advances have been made in Catalonia and the Basque country. In no country have Anarchist and Syndicalist ideologies been accepted more readily. The reason is rather that there are in Spain only two classes; the upper fifth, "who vote, read newspapers, compete for Government jobs and generally manage the affairs of the nation," and the peasantry, in general, uninterested in politics and often illiterate. This division is essentially medieval and feudal. It was broken down in North-western Europe by the rise of a commercial class; it was kept alive in Spain by the long crusade against the Moors. The feudal grip on Spain was intensified because the newly conquered lands of the South were apportioned among the Spanish nobility, thus creating the *latifundia*. At the same time the pastoral industries were deliberately fostered to the detriment of agriculture. Only in marginal areas, particularly in Catalonia, did the Spanish people escape from these obsessions and preoccupations. The Spanish peasant has, particularly in the South,

exchanged Anarchism for Catholicism, but the centuries-old pattern of existence remains almost unchanged. Only some 21 per cent. of the total population is engaged in industry and commerce. Where the mineral resources have been exploited, as in the Basque territory and Asturias and in the Sierra




FIG. 73. THE POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF SPAIN IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Compare with Fig. 72.

After G. Brenan

Morena, it has mainly been by foreign capital, and the produce has generally been exported in its native state.

The history of the nineteenth century was in Spain interrupted by the Carlist Wars, in which a clerical faction tried to maintain its grip on the country. If it failed in this object it succeeded in preventing any economic progress, except in especially favoured areas. In the last quarter of the century

the Bourbon line was restored in the person of Alfonso XII, succeeded in 1902 by Alfonso XIII, who abdicated in 1931. The reigns of these two kings have seen the growth of political ideologies, deriving in the main from the teachings of Marx and Bakunin, which have gone far to replace Catholicism as the religion of the masses. Brennan has described with great clarity the spread of Communism, Anarchism, and Syndicalism, and this is not the place to consider them further. It is sufficient to point out that their distribution accords very closely with the distribution of large estates, and that this has a geographical basis. The South is predominantly Socialist and Anarcho-Syndicalist. Political events of the last thirty years can be summarized only very briefly, in order to make a little more clear the present international position of Spain. The early years of the century had seen a steady growth in Catalonia of an autonomist movement (see p. 223), and the chaotic conditions here communicated themselves to other parts of the country. In 1921 Spanish forces in the Rif country of Morocco were cut to pieces by the tribesmen of Abd-el-Krim, and the King, on whom a measure of responsibility for the disaster fell, handed his executive powers to Primo de Rivera, who became dictator. Subsequent events were:

- 1930. Fall of Primo de Rivera, who had lost the support of the Army.
- 1931. Abdication and flight of Alfonso XIII after the anti-royalist feeling of the country had been expressed in municipal elections.
Establishment of the Republic. Governments of Alcala, Zamora, and Azaña (Socialist).
- 1933. Right Republican Government of Lerroux, after elections.
- 1936 (*February*). Elections showed a swing to the Left; Socialist Government of Azaña.
(*July*). Revolt of troops in Morocco led by Francesco Franco; beginning of the Civil War, which ended in 1939 with the victory of Franco.

Nowhere has the pendulum of history swung with greater violence than in Spain during these years. In no case has the Government taken serious measures to deal with the agrarian

problem; those of the Socialist Government very largely remained on paper.

The rival factions in Spain were not unevenly matched in 1936, though the Republicans possessed the greater part of the slender industrial resources. They were defeated by their own internal feuds and by the intervention of Germany and Italy. Republican and Socialist Spain was, in the main, the east and south; the north was mainly Catholic and Conservative. The forces of the latter first cut off Republican Spain from Portugal, taking the key town of Badajos, and then, by taking Irun, closed the route into France. Sea-borne assistance was brought to the insurgents by Italy and Germany and to the Republicans, at a later date and on a very much smaller scale, by Russia. A scheme of non-intervention was worked out by the Great Powers in an attempt to limit the struggle to Spain. A patrol of the coast was set up, but the articles of the non-intervention agreement were consistently violated by certain of their signatories and very considerable help was brought to Franco. The influence of sea-power on the course of the struggle was great. Franco invaded Spain from Africa, and he was, in effect, dependent upon Italian shipping for reinforcements and supplies, and these established him in power. With the eclipse of the Italian navy, the Western Mediterranean came to be dominated by the British, now less self-effacing than hitherto, and a situation closely resembling in its outlines that of 1809-12 was created. The threat of British sea-power probably prevented the Germans from attempting the conquest of Spain. At the time of writing, the Fascist regime of Spain appears to be tottering to its fall. It could exist either when the Italians dominated the encircling sea or when Germany occupied France. One wonders how long it can continue when both conditions have ceased to exist.

An important issue in the Civil War was the separatist tendencies of certain of the Spanish provinces. This was most marked in Catalonia, but existed also in varying degrees in the Basque provinces, in Galicia and the Asturias, in Valencia, and in Andalusia. The Catalans had been an important sea-faring and commercial people in the Middle Ages, and after their incorporation in a united Spain continued to exercise considerable rights and privileges of home rule. It was "linguistically

and culturally . . . an extension of the South of France rather than a part of Spain," and in the mid-seventeenth century very nearly became part of France. The antipathy between the Catalans and the Castilians continued, sharpened by inevitable differences on the question of tariffs between the industrializing Catalans and the agricultural Castilians of the Meseta. The Catalan movement of modern times sprang from




FIG. 74. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS OF SPAIN

After W. J. Entwistle

two roots, the industrial protectionists of Barcelona and a literary revival of the early nineteenth century. The language, closely related to *Lange d'oc*, was rescued from the obscurity of remote villages and transformed into a literary language. Catalan nationalism was the heir to Carlism, which had been widely supported in the province because it offered prospects of regional autonomy and privileges. The nationalist movement followed a very tortuous course, in which 'Left' and 'Right' nationalists were always against one another and

usually against Madrid. In 1931 Catalonia declared strongly in favour of the Republic and was rewarded in 1932 by passage through the Cortes of its statute of autonomy. This was




FIG. 75. THE BASQUE PROVINCE (*shaded diagonally*)

reversed by Franco, but it can hardly be supposed that the ambitions of the Catalan people have been abandoned.

In some ways the Basque territories resembled the Catalan. Both are more industrial than the rest of Spain, and are more progressive and prosperous than other parts of the country. The Basques were supporters of Don Carlos, and have remained Catholic and Conservative. They are, however, cut off from Castile by the Cantabrian mountains; their interests are beyond the Basque (Biscay) sea, where they sell their iron-ore.

They were opposed to the domination of Castile, though never wholly reconciled to the Republic. About 510,000, out of the total population of 850,000, in the three Basque provinces were said in 1934 to speak the Basque language, though most of them were bilingual. It was least spoken in the southern province of Alava. There is a Basque-speaking minority in Navarre and also across the Pyrenees in France. Navarre, originally also Basque, lies with its back to the Pyrenees, facing southward across the Meseta; its interests have not been diverted by trade and industry, and the fire of its crusading zeal burns undiminished. A Basque Nationalist party was active in the Cortes during the years of the Republic, but its autonomy statute was never passed.

The movement for autonomy was less developed in Galicia. The language spoken here is distinct, being more closely akin to Portuguese, and the region has its peculiar economic problems, arising mainly from its poverty and the minute size of its peasant holdings. A Galician statute of autonomy was promised by the Republican Government, but never became law. The neighbouring Asturias has economic and social problems, which led, for example, to the rising of 1934, but these have not produced any widespread demand for autonomy.

In Valencia a form of Catalan is spoken, and this, coupled with hostility to Madrid, has brought into being a very immature Nationalist movement. That of Andalusia is even less developed. The centrifugal tendencies of parts of Spain are so marked that it would appear that some form of federal organization, such as that adopted in Yugoslavia, might meet the circumstances.

Brenan has pointed out that "there is perhaps no country in Europe whose economic organization presents fewer difficulties than that of Spain." The country has resources of minerals and of fuels which can be supplemented by hydro-electric power in the North. Agricultural productivity is potentially very much higher than at present, especially if greater use is made of irrigation. There is a European market for the specialized agricultural produce of Spain. The variety of resources and the comparative self-sufficiency of Spain invite planning, but in the way there stands the individualism and conservatism of the Spanish people.

PORTUGAL

Portugal is important in virtue of its geographical position. The shipping lanes to the Mediterranean, Africa, and South America pass close to its coast, and 700 miles to the west the Azores form a stepping-stone on the way to Central and North America. The country consists of the rather hilly lowlands below the edge of the Meseta. It is exposed to the westerly winds for much of the year, and many parts of the country are fertile and productive, though the South is dry and barren. Portuguese history is, as we have seen, closely linked with the sea. The natural limits of the country were filled out in the Middle Ages, and the Portuguese turned to North-west Africa as a field for their colonization. Their expansionist policy took them southward; trade linked them with North-western Europe. Portugal replaced Gascony in the economy and affections of the English, and imports of port wine, after the Methuen Treaty of 1703, encouraged a sentimental regard for England's oldest ally. But Portugal was of great value to England on account of its harbour, Lisbon, the best in Western Europe, and the strategic position of its coast. The number of naval actions, including Lagos, St Vincent, and Trafalgar, that have been fought here is an indication of its importance. The coming of submarines and of air-power has increased rather than diminished the international importance of Portugal. Lisbon has become the terminus of the trans-Atlantic air route by way of the Azores and Bermuda. Rather late in the course of the Second World War the old alliance was resurrected, and Portugal permitted the Allies to use the Azores as a naval and air base from which to patrol the surrounding seas and safeguard convoys.

Portugal is a poor country, without the mineral resources of Spain, but her position has been made very much worse by the chronic disorder that has prevailed in recent years. There were, for example, sixteen revolutions and forty changes of ministry between 1910, when the monarchy was overthrown, and 1926, when the dictatorship was established. Portugal, a weak Power with a large colonial empire, had always pursued the policy of friendship towards Britain; a Power able to some extent to guarantee the integrity of her possessions,

and the strict observance of international agreements, in the hope that other Powers would in turn respect her own possessions. Nevertheless, the Portuguese Empire seemed somewhat precarious, and in 1914 Great Britain and Germany had reached a tentative agreement on its partition, should Portugal be unable to preserve it. The Spanish Civil War and the introduction of the ideological *motif* into European relations influenced Portugal's policy. She feared the triumph of 'Left' forces in the only state which she bordered, and could only be alarmed by the scarcely disguised scheme of Socialists to absorb Portugal into a federated Iberian state. Portugal was thus not quite neutral and clearly favoured the Fascist forces in Spain. Only when the defeat of Germany seemed certain, if not imminent, and Franco's prestige began to wane, did Portugal revive her ancient friendship and traditional policy.

FRANCE

It is difficult to assess the international importance of France. She has suffered severely in both prestige and resources during the Second World War, and the gallantry of the rising in 1944 can only partially offset the defeat of 1940. But France remains a nation of over 40 millions, intelligent and gifted, with agricultural and mineral resources above the average. Much has been written on France in recent years. The following pages can only attempt to set out those geographical facts which have a bearing on her international position and policy, and these may be summarized under three headings.

Population. In the later Middle Ages the population of France is estimated to have been about 20,000,000. This rose slowly between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, and in 1801 stood at 27,300,000. During this period the population of France had stood higher than that of any other European country. This is the demographic background of the conquests of Louis XIV and Napoleon. But during the nineteenth century the population of France continued to rise only slowly. From about 1850 it was exceeded by that of Germany, and from the end of the century by that of Great Britain. The outcome of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 emphasized the changed relationship. France lost the million and a half

inhabitants of Alsace and annexed Lorraine, though this was partially offset by migration back into France from these territories. The birth-rate in France has dropped steadily since 1801 with only a slight rise recently. During the period of 1914-18 it fell to less than 13 per 1000. The lower birth-rate was offset to some extent by a reduced death-rate. The population in 1936 was the highest ever recorded in France, but the average age was relatively high and the older age groups larger than the younger. The number of potential parents is smaller than it was a generation ago, and the population will inevitably decline further.

The results of the fact that the population will decline in the near future has had important results, which are considered later, on French policy and strategy. It has led to the formation of coloured units in the French army, such as the Spahis and Senegalese, to the comparative neglect of, and the unwillingness to make sacrifices for, the more distant parts of the Empire, such as Indo-China. It has resulted also in a shortage of labour at home, and to the immigration of foreign workers, particularly Italians, Poles, Spaniards, and Belgians. Most settled in the North-east and the larger towns; some, mainly Italians, in South-eastern France. They were engaged chiefly in mining and industry, but were tending increasingly to engage in agriculture as a whole-time occupation. Seasonal immigrants were employed chiefly in the harvest fields and vineyards. In 1931 there were 2,715,000 foreigners more or less permanently resident in France, where, in some areas, they composed villages entirely alien in speech and sympathy. They consisted of:

| | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---------|
| Italian | . | . | . | . | . | 808,000 |
| Polish | . | . | . | . | . | 508,000 |
| Spanish | . | . | . | . | . | 352,000 |
| Belgian | . | . | . | . | . | 254,000 |
| African (French subjects) | . | . | . | . | . | 102,000 |
| Others | . | . | . | . | . | 691,000 |

There were also 361,000 naturalized French subjects—French nationality is easily acquired—and an indefinite and variable number of seasonal immigrants. Eventually, of course, those resident in France will be assimilated, but meanwhile they do

not constitute an element of strength. Another problem arises from their lower standards and willingness to accept a smaller wage than Frenchmen. •

Agriculture and Industry. France is an agricultural country. Some 63 per cent. of her area is cultivated, and about 35 per cent. of her active population works on the land. The land is varied, and much of it is highly productive. France is normally almost self-sufficing in foodstuffs, the only imports being tropical fats and beverages. There is a small export of food, consisting mainly of wines, vegetables, and certain luxury foods and amounting to about 6 per cent. of that produced. A country so nearly self-sufficing is relatively immune to the shocks of trade depressions, and that of 1930 was felt less severely in France than in other industrial countries. Most of the cultivated land is occupied and tilled by peasants. Three-quarters of the holdings are owned by their occupiers; 5 per cent. of the peasants are share tenants, or *métayers*. These rent not merely the farm but also stock and equipment, and the owner may also provide fertilizer, in return for a fraction of the crop. Holdings are in the main small; 62 per cent. of them are under 25 acres, and only 4 per cent. contain over 125. There has been a slight tendency for the number of medium holdings of over 25 acres to increase. Most peasants employ no hired labour, and the landless rural class is small. This is important. The peasant wants to hand on his holding intact to his son, and he often does not want more than one son. The peasant is industrious, frugal, conservative, but, together with admirable qualities of character which have led politicians to sentimentalize over him, perhaps unduly, has a narrowness of vision and an unwillingness to take risks. In France the peasant mentality has dominated when it has not controlled French policy. This, taken in conjunction with the trend of the French birth-rate, helps to explain the caution with which foreign policy has been conducted, the refusal to take risks and the quest for 'security.' This attitude towards international affairs is summed up in a story which Professor Fleure tells of the peasant, who, after dilating on his sons' achievements in the war of 1914-18 and expressing his own opinion of the Germans, exclaimed that it must not happen again: "La terre souffre." The French love of the soil and

standards of living are incompatible with a periodic war of defence against the *furor teutonicus*. A virile peasantry was a source of strength in the times when wars were won by marching infantry, but its very excellences may now be a source of weakness.

The manufacturing industries of France have similar advantages and defects. With certain significant exceptions, they are crafts rather than industries. Owing to her comparative poverty of coal resources, France cannot easily compete in the heavy industries with either Great Britain or Germany, and her vast reserves of iron-ore are of little value without coking coal, which she possesses in only small quantities. Large-scale industry is limited to Lorraine, to the North-east, where a prolongation of the Belgian coalfield reaches into France, and to the Paris region. Small industrial units, employing less than, say, twenty men, exist in these regions, but are predominant outside. It is a truism to say that the industrial produce of France displays a taste and bears witness to a centuries-old tradition that is lacking in most of her competitors. But artistry and craftsmanship are wasted on, for example, a tank. Owing to the organization of its industry, the rapid production of instruments of war is impossible, and French refinement is incompatible with preparation for modern war. The shortcomings of French industry emphasized her weakness as against her great neighbour. The policy of French Governments between the two wars did little to remedy this situation. The 'forty-hour week,' a luxury which France could not afford, was introduced at an inauspicious moment. The prosperity of French agriculture was maintained by high tariffs—peasant cultivation is not the most economic. A remedy, "national and controlled exodus from the land towards industry," might have been opposed by the peasants themselves, but was also "the very process which every French Government attempted to check."

The Search for Security. The German invasion of 1870 occurred when the demographic balance had just tipped in Germany's favour. By 1914, with the rapid development during the preceding half-century of German heavy industries, her superiority was out of all relation to her greater population. France narrowly averted defeat in the autumn of 1914, and in 1918 emerged victorious, but with the loss of 1,357,000 men

killed and nearly 5,000,000 wounded and missing. Furthermore, her most important industrial region was devastated, and much of her best agricultural land wasted. France could not afford the physical loss of another such war. The methods by which she strove to avoid it may be grouped under the four headings:

(a) *Collective Security.*

France was from the first a member of the League of Nations, and shared in its actions as long as there was any likelihood of its forming an effective check on aggression.

(b) *Bilateral Treaties and Alliances.* France, however, would take no risks, and she insured herself against the possible failure of the League by alliances with any Powers likely to be endangered by a recrudescence of German militarism. She abandoned the Rhine frontier (see p. 178) in return for the promise of a joint Anglo-American guarantee of her integrity. This was not ratified, and she turned to East European Powers. In 1921 an alliance was made with Poland, and as the prestige and




FIG. 76. ALLIED ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN THE RHINELAND, 1919-29

After I. Bowman

possibilities of the League began to wane, treaties were signed with Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia. In 1925, with a return to more or less normal economic conditions in Europe and the accession to power in Germany of the



FIG. 77. THE BOUNDARY OF FRENCH SPEECH
IN ALSACE AND "LORRAINE ANNEXÉ"

After "Atlas of Alsace-Lorraine"

In 1935 France made an alliance with Russia, and, with Italy hesitantly adopting an anti-German tone, the encirclement of the Reich seemed complete.

(c) *The Rhine Frontier.* In the words of Marshal Foch, "Re-course must be had in the first place to all the means provided

supposedly moderate Stresemann regime, Briand on behalf of France, entered into the Locarno treaties. These, signed by the Western Powers, including Germany, guaranteed the inviolability of the frontiers established in the west by the Treaty of Versailles. Germany at the same time, however, refused to guarantee in a similar fashion her frontiers on the east and probably deliberately kept the door open for an eastward advance. At Locarno France renewed her treaties with Poland and the countries of the Little Entente. The Locarno treaties had no elements of permanence; the second part was contradicted by the first.

by Nature, and Nature has placed but one barrier across the line of invasion: the Rhine." The attainment of the Rhine frontier would have involved the inclusion in France of considerable areas of exclusively German speech, together with the towns of Cologne, Coblenz, Mainz, and Ludwigshafen. Under pressure France relinquished her designs in return for the joint Anglo-American guarantee, which was never ratified. Frontier changes were made in France's favour in :

- (i) *Alsace-Lorraine*. This territory was returned to France, who thus regained the iron and potash resources which she had lost and also a very small quantity of coal near Saint-Avold. She had not, however, the coking coal required for the furnaces and was obliged to import this from the Ruhr.
- (ii) *The Saar Basin*. This is a relatively small but important coal basin, which had before the war yielded up to 12 million tons of coal a year, was leased to France for fifteen years, after which a plebiscite was to decide its future. It returned to Germany in 1935. The allies also garrisoned the whole left bank of the Rhine and held bridgeheads on the right bank. Beyond was a demilitarized zone.

(d) *The Maginot Line*. The French now attempted to strengthen their rather unnatural frontier between the towns of Dunkirk and Weissebourg by the construction of stone and concrete defences which came to be known as the Maginot Line. The French probably placed too much reliance on these defences, which were, in any case, incomplete. But its construction was symptomatic of the France of the 1930's. It was a nation consciously on the defensive and not altogether sure of the values it was defending. It was not to be expected that defeatism would not show itself in the counsels of the Government.

The frontier which was restored in 1918 had been acknowledged for over a century before 1870. In spite of a small area of Flemish speech around Dunkirk, it presented no problems other than the difficulty of its defence. The Italian frontier had been modified in 1860 by the cession to France of Nice and Savoy, where the population was at least mixed. Italian claims to these territories were revived in 1939, but were not pressed.

In May 1945 France revived a claim to the Val d' Aosta. Here, in the Val di Susa and perhaps elsewhere around the headwaters of the Po tributaries, are small groups of French-speaking people. The claim has not been pressed, but the inhabitants of the Val d' Aosta, who had been oppressed under Fascist rule in much the same way as the South Tyrolese, established an autonomous regime in the valley. The districts of Saluzzo and Pinerolo had, in fact, been attached to the French Crown, the one from 1543 to 1601, the other from 1631 to 1713. North of Nice some sparsely populated mountainous territory on the French side of the watershed was left to Italy in 1860 as it constituted a favourite hunting-ground of the house of Savoy. Rectifications, which are far from costly to Italy and of no more than sentimental value to France, have been made here.

BELGIUM

Belgium is the heir of the Spanish and Austrian Netherlands. Its short union with the Kingdom of the Netherlands was ended by a revolt, and an international guarantee, violated by Germany in 1914, of Belgium's neutrality, integrity, and independence. But it was demonstrated in 1914 and again in 1940 that neutrality is particularly desirable but virtually impossible. The hill ranges which stretch from Switzerland to the Ardennes terminate south of the Meuse, and between this and the marshes of the Flanders coast is a low, undulating plain which forms an open corridor between the Paris basin and the German plain. This has been a high road for invading peoples and marching armies since prehistoric times, and there have been few European wars which have not impinged on this region. Frankish invaders brought the language frontier, which may be said originally to have been along the Rhine, back to a line running east to west through Brussels. The northern frontier of Belgium is continuously to the north of the language boundary, follows no obvious natural features, and is as illogical as a frontier could well be. The same applies to the southern.

The Spanish Netherlands was that part of the old unit of Lower Burgundy which was left to Spain after the successful

revolt of the United Netherlands. Their mutual frontier, established in the Truce of 1609, divided the territories, each party holding the territory it occupied at that moment. It was a frontier determined by the exigencies of campaigning, and while leaving to Spain the city of Antwerp, gave to the United Netherlands control of both banks of the Lower Scheldt. This Dutch control of the approaches to Antwerp has always been a bone of contention between the two states. Napoleon, when he absorbed Belgium into France, and created the Batavian Republic, made the frontier follow the deep channel of the Scheldt. In 1815 Belgium was united with Holland, but when in 1831 Belgium gained her independence the old frontier south of the Scheldt estuary was followed.

Another issue has been the possession of Limburg, the 'peninsula' of Dutch territory which reaches up the Meuse valley to Maastricht. The latter town had been captured by the Dutch in 1641, and although it and the surrounding territory had been claimed by Belgium in 1831, her claim was not made good. The same is true of the Duchy of Luxembourg. It was claimed by Belgium, but remained under the rule of a member of the House of Orange, though separated from Limbourg by forty miles of the Ardennes plateau. In 1842 it joined the German Zollverein. In 1919 its union with Germany was broken, and Luxembourg decided by a majority vote to become part of France. It was, however, attached by a strong economic union to Belgium, in deference to the wishes of the Belgian Government, which the French wished then to placate.

The frontier problems of Belgium are less serious than the internal problem arising from the differences between Walloons and Flemings. The former are French-speaking, and a century ago there was some desire for a political union with France. The Flemings speak Dutch. The boundary between the two is not only geographical but also social, and there is a tendency in the North for Flemish to be the language of the working classes. The Flemish movement has tended to cultivate all that is peculiarly Flemish in art and culture to the exclusion of Walloon, in spite of the fact that one may legitimately speak of a Belgian civilization. Disputes are apt to reflect the linguistic divisions, and relations have at times become very embittered.

Belgium suffered severely in the First World War, and was

at the end entitled to considerable reparation payments from Germany. In fact, much of her industrial equipment was renewed, thus improving her competitive position in world trade. At the same time Belgium secured the territories of Eupen and Malmédy in order to strengthen the defences on her frontier in the Ardennes. Throughout the nineteenth century Belgium's policy was one of complete neutrality, which seemed most likely to safeguard her interests. After the war of 1914-18 she abandoned this policy, subscribing to the




FIG. 78. THE LANGUAGE BOUNDARY IN BELGIUM
The Dutch territory to which Belgium has voiced a claim is shaded.
After I. Bouman

Locarno treaties and guaranteeing the frontiers set up in the West in 1919. In 1936, when Germany renounced the Treaty of Locarno, Belgium reverted to her traditional policy.

In Belgium industry and agriculture are evenly balanced, and, like France, Belgium has escaped the extremes of depression. The Meuse-Sambre industrial belt provides a ready market for agricultural produce. Belgian agriculture has been highly protected in the past, but is now steadily turning over to dairying, for which type of products there is a large market. Belgian industry is assisted by the large coalfield, and in the textile, glass, and metallurgical industries Belgium has built up a strong position. The Belgian heavy industries are located mainly in a belt lying between Liège and Mons. More

recently the coal basin of Campine, stretching westward from Aachen, has been opened up, and also the Peel field, farther north near Venlo. The Dutch attempted to canalize the coal trade from these new areas through Rotterdam by improving navigation on the Meuse and constructing a canal, the Juliana Canal, entirely on Dutch soil northward from Maastricht, where the Meuse forms the frontier. The Belgian reply was the construction of the Albert Canal from Liège to Antwerp, so that movement from the Belgian coalfields was no longer forced to rely on Dutch waterways.

THE NETHERLANDS

The United Netherlands are poorer in industrial resources than Belgium, and agriculture is relatively more important. About 70 per cent. of the country is under cultivation, and the reclamation of large sections of the Zuider Zee has added over half a million acres of highly productive land. The standard of cultivation is high, as is necessary to support a population of more than nine millions (or 673 per square mile) at the relatively good standard which obtains in Holland. A quarter of the total is engaged in agriculture, and about 38 per cent. in industry. Coal production has steadily increased from the mines of Campine and Peel, and in 1937 output amounted to over 14,000,000 tons. But most of the industries of the Netherlands are of the kind known as 'light,' demanding labour and skill rather than large quantities of raw materials. Many, such as the manufacture of margarine, the preparation of sugar,




FIG. 79. THE TERRITORIES OF EUPEN AND MALMÉDY, ACQUIRED BY BELGIUM FROM GERMANY IN 1919

After I. Bowman

tobacco, diamonds, have depended on imports from the Dutch empire. Textiles, light engineering, and electrical goods are manufactured chiefly for home consumption.

The great commercial importance of the Netherlands derives from its position at the Rhine mouth and the early development of commerce in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.




FIG. 80. CANALS AND NAVIGABLE RIVERS OF BELGIUM AND THE SOUTHERN NETHERLANDS

After Sir Oswald Manze

Amsterdam, at first the most important port of the Netherlands, has been linked with the North Sea by the canal to IJmuiden, and by the Merwede canal with the Lek. Further canals have been projected to link Amsterdam with the Rhine, so that it can handle more easily the exports of Germany. These have concentrated on Rotterdam, and Germany has been able to divert relatively little of the trade of the Rhineland to the ports of Emden, Bremen, and Hamburg.

The Netherlands has in general adopted a policy of neutrality, similar to that of Belgium, and has refused to be drawn into alliances and entanglements. As with Belgium, this results from her relatively small military resources and the exposed position of the country. The Netherlands were able to remain neutral during the First World War and in the Second until she was forced into it by German aggression. Great Britain has always been closely interested in the fortunes of the Low Countries, and it has been, in general, a cardinal point in her foreign policy to prevent any major Power in Europe from securing control of this region. It was partly with English help that the United Provinces established their independence. The trade rivalry between England and Holland in the seventeenth century did not prevent them from uniting to prevent France from advancing to the Rhine mouth. If not the only motive, the defence of the Low Countries was an important factor in Britain's declaration of war against the French Republic in 1793, and the Kaiser in 1914. Britain appeared momentarily to abandon this policy after the last war, declining to guarantee France's eastern frontier, but it was revived in the Locarno treaties, and it would appear that the development of air power and the invention and perfection of long-range weapons and missiles will render such a policy imperative for the future.

Both the Netherlands and Belgium have suffered severely, less perhaps from the physical damage to property, though this has been immense in certain areas, than from the less calculable injury to health and wellbeing through years of semi-starvation. In some areas, as along the lower Rhine, fighting was intense, and great damage was done to the polders of Holland by breaching the dykes and allowing salt or brackish water to enter.

Both countries have tropical empires with great and, in the case of Belgium, largely undeveloped resources. These possessions have contributed to the commerce and industries of the home countries and have gone far to lift them out of the ranks of the lesser Powers. The administration, development, and problems of these colonial empires are considered in the last part of this book.

With so much in common, one might have expected a

greater degree of unity and understanding between Holland and Belgium than has generally been displayed in the past. The two countries have taken a century to live down the rancours aroused by their separation in 1831. Quarrels about the navigation of the Scheldt, about Luxemburg, Limburg, and their interconnected canal systems have kept the two Powers estranged from one another. It might almost be said that it required the threat of Nazi aggression, healer of so many feuds, to bring about a measure of collaboration, which appeared in 1939 to be ripening into a real friendship.

Holland is a more integrated country than Belgium. It has no linguistic minorities and no language division such as divides Belgium. Domestic policy has developed with an almost Scandinavian degree of smoothness and tact. The events of recent years will probably have deepened the unity among the Dutch people, and if they have also brought Holland and Belgium closer together this can only contribute to European peace and to the economic development of the whole of North-western Europe.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE MEDITERRANEAN

In earlier chapters we have examined both the influence of the Mediterranean on the course of history and the growth of the idea of a Mediterranean political unity. But the Inland Sea is no unit in the geological sense. It is closely associated with, and partially at least results from, the Tertiary earth movements which created the Alps, but it consists of two contrasted basins. The Western, between Sicily and Gibraltar, is encircled by the folded Tertiary mountains. Its shores rise steeply from narrow coastal plains, and islands occur where the shattered remnants of ranges are continued into the sea. Gaps in the encircling mountains provide routes, strictly limited in number and direction, so that a few sites of great strategic importance hold, as it were, the keys of the region.

The eastern basin, by contrast, is extra-Alpine. Its coasts tend to be low, flat, and regular, where the ancient plateau of Africa comes down to the sea. Harbours are few, and Cyprus is the only conspicuous island. Climate, like structure, tends to be African rather than European. Expressed in terms of historical development, the western basin is a cradle of European art, culture, trade, and navigation; the eastern belongs to the Arab and Moslem Middle East. Standing somewhat apart, like microcosms of the greater basins, are the two lesser, the *Ægean* and the *Adriatic*. The map (Fig. 81) shows that they are respectively intra- and extra-Alpine. With its islands, harbours, and routes through the bounding mountain ranges, its narrow coastal plains, its climate and products, and, above all, its precocious development and contribution to Western civilization, the *Ægean* is a concentrated and epitomized version of the western basin. The *Adriatic*, on the other hand, resembles rather the eastern basin. It is really extra-Alpine. At least its Italian shore is straight and harbourless, and the island-fringed *Dalmation* coast is backed by ranges which have always been a barrier to communications. Thus the Western and the *Ægean* basins have tended throughout

history to be political, cultural, and economic units. This is not so in the eastern basin, where community of interests between its different shores is much less apparent. In spite of the Venetian colonies and the Dalmatian and Albanian ambitions of Italy, such a unity is also lacking in the Adriatic basin.

The Mediterranean has been, at least since the fall of the Roman Empire, a link between Western Europe and Asia. Early routes linked the Italian cities with the Nile and Red Sea, with Syria and the Persian Gulf, and with the Black Sea




FIG. 81. STRUCTURE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN

and Turkestan. From the fifteenth century the sea-route through the Straits of Gibraltar began to replace the land routes through the Alpine passes, and grew in importance through succeeding centuries. The "Straits," the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea were of only intermittent importance for trade, and routes were always liable to be cut by Tartars or Turks. It was not until Russia had conquered the Ukraine and the Caucasus that any considerable volume of trade began to enter the Mediterranean by this route. The third outlet is man-made. The Sucz Canal, conceived by the Pharoahs and attempted on several subsequent occasions, was completed and opened in 1869. At once values in the Mediterranean were changed. It was transformed into a thoroughfare for the trade of nations.

MEDITERRANEAN COLONIZATION

The unity of the greater area was achieved only during the period of the Roman Empire. Since that date the sea has tended to divide into compartments, each dominated by one or two Powers. This has been most marked in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when France established colonies in Algeria and later acquired a protectorate over Tunis. The Western basin, as a whole, was dominated by France, but to the west, the little Alboran basin tended to be a Spanish sphere.




FIG. 82. THE WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE FRENCH 'TRIANGLE'

In 1911 Italy succeeded in conquering the African coast between Tunis and Egypt and established a preponderant power in this central region of the Mediterranean. She gained possession of the Dodecanese Islands and attempted to extend her control to the mainland of Asia Minor. The eastern Mediterranean might be described as a British sphere. Each of these colonial Powers is considered in turn.

The French in the Mediterranean. Algeria was invaded by French forces in 1830, and in the course of the next fifty years these advanced into the interior. Tunis was occupied in 1881, and a protectorate was established. A period of economic penetration of Morocco was followed by the creation of a protectorate here too in 1912. North-west Africa consists of a narrow coastal plain, backed by a mountain range and a high

but not unproductive plateau. Nevertheless, French North Africa is a poor and infertile country, and its considerable production of wine, grain, and other agricultural produce is from small and scattered areas. Algeria is an integral part of France, has received almost a million settlers from metropolitan France, and French citizenship has been extended to considerable numbers of the native Berber population. Algeria plays an important role in French economy, and its exports of food-stuffs and minerals, chiefly iron-ore and phosphates, are an important accession to French economic strength.

In Tunis the French were preceded by Italian settlers. The Italians have since been a large and, particularly when Mussolini was in power in Italy, difficult minority. They retained, in many cases, their Italian nationality, though an arrangement was reached in 1935 by which ultimately they would become French subjects. It is not to be expected that this decision will be greatly modified. Nevertheless, the birth-rate among the Italian-speaking Tunisians is greater than among the French, and the latter have legitimate fears that the former may come to be a sort of state within the state. Tunis has not benefited, like Algeria, from free access to the French market, and she suffered more severely during the depression of the early thirties from the restricted demand in other countries for Tunisian oil and wine. In 1939 the Italian Government revived in a cruder form its claims to Tunis, putting forward the scarcely tenable plea that French possession of the naval base of Bizerta, near Cape Bon, constituted a threat to Italian security.

Morocco, over which the French protectorate was established in 1912, has only about eight miles of coast on the Mediterranean. Its port and the greater parts of its population lie along the Atlantic coast. This territory was the scene of Franco-German rivalry, which culminated in a series of incidents. A compromise was reached at the Algeciras Conference in 1905, and the problem was decided in favour of France after the Agadir incident in 1911. Morocco has agricultural and not inconsiderable mineral wealth, but its chief importance is strategic. Though it does not include any part of the shore of the Strait of Gibraltar, it is a base from which the free passage of ships could be threatened or interrupted. At the same time,

Morocco lies on the route from north-western Europe to South America and covers the sea route to South Africa. To a country, such as imperial Germany, intent on building up an overwhelming naval and strategic power its possession would have been invaluable.

Spain. The northern strip of Morocco, which contains the Rif range is a Spanish Protectorate. The earliest settlements were made on this coast about 1500, and in recent years




FIG. 83. THE SPANISH ZONE OF MOROCCO

the Spanish forces have pressed into the poor and mountainous interior. During the present century the leader of the Rif tribesmen, Abd'el Krim, waged a long and at times successful war against the badly led and ill-equipped Spanish troops, inflicting on them the severe defeat of Anual. It was only with French help that the interior of the Spanish Zone was eventually subdued. The coastal towns, Ceuta, Tetuan, and Melilla, have some economic value, but the gain to Spain from the conquest of the interior has not been proportionate to the immense cost. Ceuta lies opposite Gibraltar, and is a strategic prize of high value, but Tangier, at the western entrance to the Strait has been placed under international control (see p. 251).

Italian Colonies. These were not established until after the Italo-Turkish war of 1911, when the territory between

Egypt and Tunis was seized. The eastern frontier was subsequently modified to Italy's advantage at the end of the First World War. This region, collectively termed Libya, consists of a narrow coastal belt of poor steppe backed by the desert,




FIG. 84. ITALIAN LIBYA

where only the oases afford means of subsistence. The rainfall rises to 8 inches near Tripoli and in Cyrenaica, between Benghazi and Derna, and only here was the settlement of Italians possible. The oases of the interior were dominated by the Senussi, members of a reformed section of Islam. Their subjugation was not completed until 1932.

Two motives appear to have guided Italian actions in North Africa. The first was to secure an outlet for surplus population from Italy; the other was, by occupying part of the southern shore, to strengthen the Italian grip on the central Mediterranean. From 1928 Italian peasants were settled in Libya, but by 1937 less than 12,000 were engaged, directly or indirectly, in agriculture, and the total Italian population was estimated in 1938 as less than 50,000. Libya is thus only a minute outlet for Italian population and affords no appreciable solution to that problem. The cost of the developments so far achieved has been very high, and "nothing that the territory promises to produce is likely to counterbalance the money swallowed by the desert." The extension of agriculture deprives the Arab pastoralists of their scanty pastures and antagonizes a people whom the Italians, since the barbarities of Senussi war, have been anxious to placate. The type of development in which the Italians have engaged has been one calculated to absorb a maximum population and yield immediate results. The area is probably more suited to the plantation of trees, particularly olives, but this would have been a long-term investment, demanding relatively little labour and unsuited to the military and demographic requirements of Italy.

The English in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was not until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the consequent reduction of the sea-route to India by 60 per cent., that Britain's interest in the Mediterranean as a commercial highway became a major preoccupation of her policy. In 1875 nearly half the shares in the new canal were acquired by the British Government. In 1878 Cyprus was acquired from Turkey and in 1882 Egypt was occupied, largely for strategic reasons. This control was maintained until 1922, when, by a treaty with the Egyptian Government, the British protectorate terminated, but Great Britain retained "an exceptional position" in Egypt. She possessed a controlling voice in Egyptian foreign policy; maintained a garrison and used the Alexandria naval base in order to protect her own communications and safeguard the territory of Egypt, and undertook to secure to Egypt a fair share of the waters of the Nile. Thus it was that British forces, during the recent war, defended the territories of the still neutral Egypt against Italian attack, and

ships of the Royal Navy were fitted out and provisioned at Alexandria.

Palestine was conquered from the Turks in 1918 by British forces under Lord Allenby. Great Britain was already committed to the policy of establishing a national home for the Jews (see p. 265), and she received the Mandate for this territory, partly on account of her interest in securing the eastern approaches to the Canal. Great Britain was at the same time given the Mandate for the new Arab state of Iraq, with which she concluded in 1930 a treaty similar to that with Egypt. Syria and Iraq together constitute a bridge between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. In the early twenties the railway route had not been completed and air travel was in its infancy. But the development of the latter and the necessity of airfields to the north of the Arabian Desert have greatly increased Britain's interests in the region, and Germany's strategy in the spring of 1941 has further emphasized, if this was necessary, the strategic importance of this area. These territories, unlike the French, Italian, and Spanish regions of North Africa, cannot be regarded as spheres of British settlement. The cultivable area of Egypt is already over-populated, much of the other territories of the Eastern Mediterranean are at best steppeland. Jewish settlement in Palestine has met with the strong resistance of the Arab peoples.

THE WESTERN BASIN

The basis of British power in the Western Mediterranean is Gibraltar, little more than a barren rock projecting from the south coast of Spain. It was captured in 1704. Its early advantage was its impregnability, but with the development of long-range artillery and of bombing aircraft, it has lost something of its importance. The harbour of Gibraltar is exposed on the west to guns that might be mounted on the Spanish coast near Algeciras. There is no room for an adequate aerodrome. It has been suggested that Gibraltar might be exchanged for Ceuta, but the Rock has the inestimable advantage of presenting no minority problems. The population is mixed but predominantly Spanish. Over two centuries of British rule have given it higher standards and material benefits

which it would lose if the British were to abandon Gibraltar. The Spanish governments have regarded with undisguised hostility the British occupation of Gibraltar, considering it a threat to Spanish independence and an insult to Spanish ideas of nationality.




FIG. 85. THE STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR AND THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE OF TANGIER

Ceuta is a Spanish town of some 60,000 persons. In Spanish hands it constitutes no threat to the greater Powers, but there was a fear that Italo-German domination of Spain would lead to its control by a Power hostile to England. Tangier is thirty miles to the west, on the opposite corner of the shoulder which projects northward from the Rif mountains. The town was occupied by England for a short period in the seventeenth century, only to be abandoned to Rif tribesmen. It then

became the chief residence of diplomats accredited to the Sultan of Morocco and the chief centre of trade in the area. It became part of no colonial Power "simply because no one Power could afford to see Tangier pass to any other." And so a sort of international status developed, but negotiations to regularize the situation did not result in any agreement until 1923. The Tangier Statute provided for the neutrality of the port and surrounding territory, which was ruled jointly by the signatory Powers, joined after 1928 by Italy. In 1940 Spain arbitrarily took over the administration of Tangier, and five years later, with the turn in national fortunes, the international administration has been restored. Russia has shown an interest in the negotiations, which reflects her increased interest in the Mediterranean, and, together with the U.S.A., is likely to be represented in the new controlling body.

France's chief interest in the Western Mediterranean is the safeguarding of the vital sea routes between Marseilles and her North African ports. These are flanked on the east and west by Corsica and Sardinia, and the Balearic Islands respectively. The latter are Spanish and constitute no threat as long as Spain is not lined up with Continental enemies of France. Corsica, with three by no means negligible naval bases at Bastia, Ajaccio, and San Bonifacio, tends to offset any threat presented by the Italian island of Sardinia. On the North African coast are the two naval bases of Bizerta and Mers el Kebir, the latter begun only in 1937. Within the strategic triangle formed by these three, together with Marseilles, France felt reasonably secure. But sea-power as such has ceased to be of serious consequence in the Mediterranean, which is small enough to be dominated by land-based aircraft. In the future France will protect her routes by giving them an adequate cover from airfields in the South of France, Corsica, and North Africa.

ITALY

Italy is and must inevitably remain the dominant Power in the Central Mediterranean. Certain underlying factors in Italian geography and history have already been discussed, particularly the tendency for Northern Italy to attach itself to Central Europe. In recent years this has been further

emphasized by the long continued German occupation of the Lombardy Plain and the differences of political opinion between South and North Italy. The North is very much more highly industrialized than the South.




FIG. 86. GERMANS AND ITALIANS IN SOUTH TYROL

This map illustrates the position about 1920. It has since been modified in detail.

After I. Bowman

The greater part of Italy was united politically in 1860. Six years later Venezia was added, and in 1870 Rome was occupied. There were still a number of outstanding territorial problems.

South Tyrol. This territory remained Austrian until 1918, when its possession became one of Italy's rewards for her entry into the First World War. Broadly speaking, the southern

half of the area was Italian-speaking and the northern part about Brixen, Meran, and Bozen was German in language and Austrian in sympathy. According to the Austrian census of 1910, there were 234,568 Germans in South Tyrol; according to the Italian of 1921, 195,650. The latter were subjected to a policy of Italianization, strong enough to call forth a sharp complaint from the German Government. In 1939 the German minority was, in part, removed, following a plebiscite, in which about 70 per cent. are said to have opted for a return to Germany. In 1919 the frontier was re-aligned along the Alpine watershed, passing through the crest of the Brenner Pass. This was more logical than the administrative line which had hitherto served, but there has been for many centuries a marked tendency for peoples living to the north of the Alps to press southward and settle the Italian slope. Austria's claims for the retrocession of at least the northern, Bozen, part of the area have not been allowed by the Allied powers, but an agreement reached in September, 1946, promises a degree of autonomy to the German-speaking area.

Istria, Gorizia, and Fiume. In 1918, the Italians also claimed the regions at the head and to the east of the Adriatic. To certain areas (see Fig. 87) there was a claim on linguistic grounds, but the Julian Karst and Istrian peninsula were wholly Slavonic, and Italy here gained a frontier that would serve as a base for further aggressions. The small port of Fiume, inhabited mainly by Italians, served as the chief maritime outlet for Yugoslavia, and was established as a free city, eventually to be seized by the Italian 'free corps' leader, D'Annunzio, and incorporated in Italy. Both Fiume and Trieste, whose ownership was not seriously in question in 1919, are Italian cities set in Slavonic countryside and serving a Danubian hinterland. It is agreed that Fiume, with much of the Julian Karst, must be retroceded to Yugoslavia, but the port of Trieste raises more complex problems. It is largely Italian in population and serves a hinterland which embraces much of Central Europe. Agreement has been reached to make it a 'free territory.' It is administered by an international body, and embraces a small area behind the port.

Dalmatian Coast. Since the days of the Venetian Empire



FIG. 87. THE ADRIATIC SEA

Detached Italian territories, Zara, Lagosta, and Sassano, are marked. The dotted line indicates the area on the eastern shore claimed by Italy, 1919.

there have been Italian settlements on the Dalmatian coast, and the ports, such as Zara, Spalato (Split), and Ragusa (Dubrovnik), are permeated by Italian influences. Italy's claim to the whole coastline was denied, and she had to be content with the northern islands of Cherso, Lussin, and Uni; Zara, on the mainland, an important centre of Italian settlement, and Lagosta and a few neighbouring islets in the South. Italian ambitions were not forgotten after the accession to power of Mussolini, and an Italo-Yugoslav rivalry was one of the constant factors in international relations.

Albania. In 1915 it was planned to give part of Southern Albania to Italy, and in 1920 the Italian attempt to annex part at least of Albania was defeated by the resistance of the native people. The country was undeveloped, and the Albanian people preserved a tribal organization, which made economic progress difficult. A Moslem chieftain, Ahmed Zogu, rose to power and eventually made himself king. A period of economic development followed, in the course of which capital was provided by the Italian Government, which acquired an economic control of the country. The military occupation of Albania in April 1939 was, in effect, a confirmation of the existing state of affairs, and was probably desired chiefly as a preparatory step to the attack on Greece.

Ionian Islands. This small group off the west coast of Greece was controlled by Great Britain until 1863, when it was returned to Greece. The island of Corfu was bombarded and occupied by the Italians in 1923 as a means of putting pressure on the Greek Government. The islands are inhabited exclusively by Greeks, and the Italian Government has no legitimate claim on them.

Savoy, Nice, and Corsica. The first two have been mentioned in the previous chapter. Corsica, a poor, rocky island, was acquired by France in 1769, just early enough to allow Napoleon to be born a French subject. The population of the island remains predominantly Italian-speaking, but there seems to be little doubt of its loyalty to France.

Italy has become during the present century the most highly industrialized country in Southern Europe, and in doing so has overcome the serious disadvantages of lack of fuel, minerals, and other raw materials. Nevertheless, Italy must count in her

present state of development as one of the over-populated countries of the world. Industry has been a partial solution to the population problem, but reserves of iron-ore are small, and of coal, negligible; the raw materials of the rubber and textile industries have to be imported. These disadvantages are to some extent offset by the relative cheapness of labour, but this has the effect of diminishing the home market, which is of great importance in all industrial countries. Standards of agriculture vary, and are lowest in Southern Italy and Sicily, and from these regions and also from Piedmont and Venezia, there was a large and steady emigration before 1914. Italy's internal problem has been, since 1918, to absorb into industry and agriculture as large a proportion as possible of the annual increase of population and to step up domestic food production. The Fascist regime achieved a measure of success. Land reclamation, as, for example, in the Pontine marshes, has been considerable, but very costly. The settlement in North Africa has been small, and carried through at a high price. The Fascist solution would have been to acquire possession of the sources of raw materials and to dominate the markets for manufactured goods. The conquest of Abyssinia might eventually have given a measure of relief; in time it could have yielded cotton and perhaps other raw materials, but whether Italian peasants would be prepared to settle in the Ethiopian Highlands, competing with a native people with lower standards, is very doubtful.

Italy's foreign policy derives, if only partially, from her economic weaknesses. She wanted further colonial territories to help to satisfy her requirements, and she hoped, by the possession of strategic bases in the Mediterranean, to balance her lack of real military assets. Italy was the foremost among those Powers anxious to revise the terms of the Versailles and other treaties drawn up at Paris. This, and their common hostility to Yugoslavia, led to her alliance with Hungary. Within the Mediterranean, Italy was faced with the rivalry of France and Great Britain. She demanded, and very largely obtained, the right to build a naval strength equal to that of France. Italian warships were unlikely to serve outside the Mediterranean; they were, therefore, lightly built and fast, suited to the generally calm and restricted waters of the Mediterranean.

Italy, dependent to so large an extent upon foreign trade, derived about 85 per cent. of her imports by sea, and approximately half of her foreign trade came from beyond the Strait of Gibraltar or the Suez Canal. This was the background of the Italian claim that she was "a prisoner in her own sea" and the basis of her ambition to make the Mediterranean a Roman lake. To this end she intrigued in the Arab countries, established naval bases at Leros, Tobruk, and Tripoli, asked for a voice in the control of the Suez Canal, jockeyed Franco into power in Spain, bullied Greece, demanded Tunis and Corsica, and attacked France in the summer of 1940. But Italy failed to make good her claim. Her economy was unsuited to the strain of war, and, in the words of a recent judgment, "she has not the slightest chance, under modern conditions, of maintaining the position of a Great Power."¹

At the time of writing the future of Italy's imperial possessions is far from clear, though one may anticipate that she will lose a good deal more than Abyssinia, which has already regained her freedom. Italy's domestic economy has been disturbed by the fighting, and much damage has been done in the industrial towns. The immediate future for industries as dependent on foreign trade as those of Italy is far from bright, but it may be presumed that conditions resembling in their broad outlines those obtaining before 1939 will gradually be restored.

THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

This may for convenience be taken to be that area of the Mediterranean which lies between Tunis and the longitude of the Island of Rhodes. The strategic importance of the Sicilian straits, by which this section of the sea is entered from the west, is only less important than that of the Strait of Gibraltar or the Suez Canal. Italy did not disguise her chagrin at failing to command this stretch of sea and revived her claim. From the summer of 1940 until 1943 both Sicily and Tunis were in the possession of hostile or quasi-hostile Powers. The Mediterranean was closed to British and allied shipping, and the ordeal of the Malta convoys was indicative of the thoroughness of the Italian and German control of this part of

¹ *Bulletin of International News*, Vol. XVIII (1941), p. 1802.

the Mediterranean. Malta has served as a half-way station from Gibraltar to Port Said. In the past it gave shelter and protection to ships and was a base from which patrols could be maintained. During this air age geographical values have been modified. Control of a sea now belongs to that Power which is able to dominate, by means of either shore or 'carrier' based aircraft, the skies above it. It is clear that patrols over the Central Mediterranean can be maintained from Italian and North Africa airfields. Malta is large enough to support aerodromes and to give a fighter cover to convoys. Assuming that the effective range of the fighter is 500 miles, it is clear that land-based aircraft from Malta can cover the sea lanes from Sardinia to Crete. The air age has emphasized rather than diminished the importance of Malta.

This small group of islands, of which Malta, with 92 square miles, and Gozo, with about a quarter of this area, are the only ones of importance, was captured by the British in 1800 from the Knights of St John, in order to prevent its falling into French hands. It has been strengthened as a naval base and strongly fortified. The population of some 240,000 is similar in physical type to the population of Southern Italy, but almost all speak the distinct Maltese language, which is basically Arabic. Only a relatively small number of the more wealthy classes speak Italian, and Italian 'irridentism' is not strongly developed. Maltese nationalism, however, has been well marked, and led to a bitter clash in the latter twenties with Anglophil opinion, as a result of which the limited self-governing rights were abrogated. The Maltese are almost exclusively Roman Catholic, and during the nationalist controversy it was difficult to distinguish between Catholicism and nationalism. It is possible that as long as there is no strong, anti-British feeling in Italy, Maltese nationalism is likely to be quiescent.

The Italian island of Pantelleria, an arid, volcanic rock, with a small, poor harbour, lies between Sicily and Cape Bon. It is too small to be of much value as an air base.

Italian command of the Central Mediterranean was strengthened between the two wars by the establishment of a 'quadrilateral,' consisting of the naval bases of Taranto in Apulia, Tripoli and Tobruk in North Africa, and Leros in the Dodecanese. The latter group, consisting, as its name implies,




FIG. 88. THE DODECANESE (TWELVE) ISLANDS RETAINED BY ITALY
AFTER HER WAR WITH TURKEY, 1911

of twelve major islands and many islets, was occupied by the Italians in 1911, during their short, successful war with Turkey. The war of 1914 began before they had evacuated the islands, and their possession was confirmed to Italy in 1923. The island of Rhodes, the largest and most important in the group, became a centre of Italian propaganda, Leros and Astropalia were fortified as naval and air bases. The population




FIG. 89. THE ITALIAN 'QUADRILATERAL' IN THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN

is mainly Greek, and a majority would prefer to be reunited with Greece, in spite of the relative prosperity that has followed the Italian occupation. There are comparatively few Turks, and Turkey has never formally reclaimed the islands, though she has viewed with justifiable suspicion the Italian occupation of them.

Though never occupied by Italy, the Ionian Islands, and particularly Corfu, the richest of them, was an objective of Italian policy. These islands were long in the possession of the Venetians, from whom they were captured by the Turks. The

French occupied them for a short period during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and in 1815 they passed to Great Britain, by whom they were given back to Greece in 1863. The islands are mainly Greek-speaking, though Italian is predominant in the towns—a legacy of the long period of Venetian occupation. In 1923 Corfu was bombarded and occupied for a short time by Italian forces. This particular incident was closed shortly afterwards, but it nevertheless became clear that Corfu lay on one of the Italian lines of expansion. The northern part is off the Albanian coast, and only fifty miles away lay the Italian occupied island of Saseno.

Crete closes the *Ægean* on the south, and forms strategically, as it does structurally, a bridge between Southern Greece, on the one hand, and the Dodecanese and Asia Minor, on the other. The island is Greek in speech and sympathy, though not restored to the Greek kingdom until 1908. Its harbours are not good, but it possesses airfields, and has gained in international importance during the air age. Its control must henceforward be a matter of considerable moment to the Great Powers, as was shown by its function in the German scheme of conquest of 1941. The same is true of at least the southern part of Greece, whose international role is likely to increase in importance rather than diminish.

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

During the past half-century this has been a region in which British interests have been dominant. It was relatively the least important part of the Mediterranean until the opening in 1869 of the sea route into the Indian Ocean. This event was followed in 1878 by the British occupation of Cyprus and, in 1882, of Egypt. In 1918 the Turkish state sustained a military defeat, and lost its outlying and mainly non-Turkish dependencies. These went to make up Palestine and the predominantly Arab states of Syria and the Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt. The great mass of Arabia, whose allegiance to the Sultan had rarely been more than nominal, eventually came to be the state of Saudi Arabia. These territories present problems of outstanding international importance.

Syria and Lebanon. France had interests in this region dating from the Middle Ages. She came to be the traditional protector of the Christian minorities, and her schools and missions were prominent in the Levant. The Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 provided for the eventual French possession of at least the coastal strip of Lebanon and Latakia, and this




FIG. 90. THE HATAY TERRITORY AND THE SITE OF ANTIOCH

was extended in a later agreement of 1920. Meanwhile the British Military advance from Egypt in 1918 had freed Syria from the Turks. Arab Nationalists had seized as much of the area as they had been able and had proclaimed Feisal of the Hejaz King of Syria. A few weeks later the Allied Powers agreed to the French Mandate in Syria and Lebanon, which was ratified by the League of Nations as from September 1923. The object of the Mandate was stated to be the progressive development of the two states, so that they might become independent as soon as possible. By an agreement with

Turkey, the French evacuated Cilicia, but retained Alexandretta and the surrounding 'Sandjak.' The northern frontier was made to follow approximately the Baghdad railway.

The two territories consist of a narrow coastal plain, backed by a range of mountains, highest in the South in Lebanon. This range is broken by gaps, of which that behind Antioch is most important. Behind is a lower range, also highest in the South, where it contains Mount Hermon. To the East the undulating desert floor stretches beyond the Euphrates to the Turkish and Iraq frontiers. In the South it is broken by the hilly massif of Jebel Druz. Rainfall is low, and much of the country is steppe and desert. Only in the hills and on the coastal plain of the West is agriculture carried on in any considerable scale. Arabic is spoken over most of the area, and religion forms the chief lines of division within the Syrian and Lebanese people. In the Lebanon about half the total population of some 800,000 are Christian, mostly Maronites, with considerable numbers of Greek, Armenian, Syrian and Chaldean, Catholic and Orthodox Christians. The other half is mostly made up of various Moslem sects. The population of Syria is about 2,500,000, of which 85 per cent. are Moslem, mostly Sunnite, and the remainder Christians, Israelites, and others. In both territories the minorities are numerous and scattered, and their protection has been one of the foremost considerations of the mandatory Power. The concentration of Christians in Lebanon was a reason for its independent administration, and it has also made it more friendly to France than Syria.

The administration of so confused a population has been extremely difficult. The republic of Lebanon, under French mandate, was established, with its capital at Beirut. Latakia, which has a considerable majority of Alawayites, members of a heterodox Moslem faith, for a time resisted inclusion in a Syrian Republic. The Jebel Druz, where the Druze sect is predominant, also gained a large measure of autonomy. These two territories did not become part of the Syrian Republic until 1936. Another distinct unit in Syria was the Hatay, or Sandjak, of Alexandretta, in which the Turkish population is considerable. In 1937 this became the autonomous Republic of the Hatay, which two years later was ceded to Turkey. Its

cession, prompted in part by France's desire for Turkish friendship in view of the deteriorating international position, met with strong opposition from the Arab Nationalists in Syria. These also opposed the final separation by the treaties of 1936 of the Lebanon from Syria. The fulfilment by France of her moral obligation to protect Christian and other minorities contributed to the hostility with which Syrian Nationalists viewed the mandatory Power. The relations between France and the mandated territories were becoming increasingly strained before 1939. The infiltration into Syria of German forces in 1941 led to the British and Free French conquest of Syria and Lebanon. General Catroux, the French commander, announced to the native peoples, "I come to put an end to the mandatory regime and to proclaim you free and independent. You will therefore be from henceforward sovereign and independent peoples." It is hardly surprising, in view of this unequivocal statement, that the Syrian and Lebanese people regarded their countries as completely independent. The French, however, were in no hurry to relinquish what remained of their power in the Levant. They claimed that their special interests in this region were undiminished and that treaties with Syria and Lebanon would follow only when France had regained her international status as a Great Power. A crisis followed in the Lebanon, where the Government attempted to revive the constitution and exclude French political influence. By 1945 a more acute situation had developed in both territories, and violent opposition was shown towards French occupying forces. The French forces have since been withdrawn; the political atmosphere is quieter and Syria and Lebanon are firmly set on the road to complete independence.

Syria remains a territory of very great strategic importance, lying at the meeting-place of Europe, Asia, and Africa. It has rightly been emphasized that the Western Powers require safe and rapid means of transport in time of peace and even more in time of war to the Far East. Syria is in a position to threaten sea communications through the Suez Canal. The air route to India lies across Syria, and unrest and disturbance here have a way of communicating themselves to other Moslem states of the Middle East and North Africa. A pipe-line links

the oil-fields of Northern Iraq with the port of Tripoli and also with the Palestinian port of Haifa. France received before 1939 about 75 per cent. of her mineral oil from this source. The security of these supplies is closely linked with political stability in Syria.

Palestine. The Lebanon mountains are continued in the hill country of Galilee and Judæa, bounded on the east by the Jordan trench and on the west by the sea. Rainfall diminishes southward, and much of Palestine is at best steppe. Until the First World War it was sparsely inhabited by Arab pastoralists and cultivators, whose agricultural standards were of the lowest. The Jewish and Christian population was relatively very small. It was the persecution of the Jews in Europe and particularly in Russia during the nineteenth century that led to the desire among many of these peoples to return to Zion. This was the origin of the Zionist Movement. By 1914 over 10,000 Jewish settlers had been set up in Palestine, mostly from Poland, Russia, and Roumania.

An impetus was given to the movement by the Balfour Note of 1917, in which the British Foreign Secretary announced that "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object." The rights and privileges of non-Jewish communities were safeguarded. The policy of establishing a Jewish National Home was confirmed in the mandate itself. This project conflicted with an earlier undertaking into which Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, entered with the Sherif of Mecca. In return for help against the Turks, the Arabs were promised independence within certain vaguely defined limits, which the Arabs certainly took to include Palestine. The Palestinian State was eventually established and entrusted to Great Britain as the mandatory Power. This was not the only occasion on which the Arab Nationalists were disappointed.

This diplomatic background to the Palestinian problem is less important than the economic and political. At the time when the mandate was established Arabs made up 93 per cent. of the population of Palestine, and claimed that they should have been consulted before the future of the country was




FIG. 91. AREAS OF JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE

decided. The Jews, however, brought higher techniques in agriculture and industry and contributed greatly to the income of the country. Their long association with the country, the contributions which they had there made to the advance of civilization, and the unhappy plight in which they found themselves in Europe, all contributed to enhance their claims in the eyes of the Allied Powers. The Arabs have been, justifiably perhaps, afraid of a growing Jewish majority. In 1938 there were 424,000 Jewish settlers in Palestine, a five-fold increase since the mandate was first established. Purely religious differences, the quarrels, for example, for the possession and use of the holy places which are common to both the Jewish and Moslem faiths, were important. But even more significant are the different standards of the Jewish and Arab peoples. The former, with the advantages of Western skill and technique, were able to buy and improve the poor land, and by irrigation and manure raise crops undreamed of by the Arabs. The Arabs are tending to become a depressed class. It is not surprising that periodic outbreaks of violence occurred, becoming increasingly serious and violent after Mussolini had assumed the role of protector of the Arab peoples.

After the rise to power of the Nazi Party Jewish immigration increased, and with it Arab resistance. Disorders became more serious, and a Royal Commission, appointed to investigate their causes, declared in the Peel Report that the mandate was unworkable and recommended the partition of the country into Jewish and Arab sectors. A second commission, the Woodhead Commission, was appointed to examine the proposal to partition the country, and reported that this project was also unworkable. Meanwhile the disorders in the country had grown to the proportions of a civil war, and it was manifest that, with the worsening European situation, foreign Powers were fomenting anti-British feeling and even supplying the Arabs with arms. A conference, called by the British Government, failed to reach agreement, and the British Government formulated a policy towards Palestine in the summer of 1939. It was pointed out in the White Paper that since 1922 over 300,000 Jews had immigrated and that the Jewish population was approaching one third of the total population of the whole of Palestine. It was proposed that the Jewish population should

not be allowed to exceed this figure, and a limited immigration was permitted only for another five years. In order to preserve the Arab standard of life, further sales of land to the Jews were to be controlled. Lastly self-government within ten years was envisaged. Neither side was really satisfied with these proposals, the whole question passed into the background of political affairs until the end of the war in Europe. In the meantime, the idea of Arab nationalism had progressed and the appalling circumstances of those Jews who had survived in Europe intensified their longing to settle in the National Home. Arab resistance to further Jewish settlement has been met by the determination of the Jewish community to bring into the country very large numbers of their kinsmen. The Anglo-American commission proposed a further limited immigration. Meanwhile, the burden of maintaining order and checking illicit immigration increases, and any hope of a compromise between Jews and Arabs recedes.

Jewish achievement in Palestine has been striking, particularly in view of the fact that most of the immigrants were town-dwellers with little or no agricultural knowledge or experience. Fig. 91 shows the extent of the land which they have acquired and cultivated. Most lies on the coastal plain and in the low-lying areas of the interior, particularly the Plain of Esdraelon and around Lake Galilee. Most of their efforts have been on the land, but at the northern end of the Dead Sea they have established a chemical works. Smaller industrial enterprises have been set up in Haifa and the new town of Tel Aviv.

Transjordan. This steppe and desert country lies to the east of the Jordan valley. It is inhabited almost exclusively by Moslem Arabs, and in 1923 was detached from Palestine, though the British officers are appointed by the Palestinian Government. The territory is of some importance as a buffer between Palestine and Saudi Arabia. It was extended southward to include the port of Aqaba, to which Ibn Saud has laid claim, and north-eastward to the frontier of Iraq, thus cutting off Syria from Arabia. The country is sparsely populated, but much of the higher ground is fertile and well enough watered for cultivation. With a more intensive form of land utilization, a greater population could be maintained.

TURKEY

At the end of the First World War the Turkish Empire was faced with dismemberment. The mainly Arab territories of the Middle East became mandated territories of either France or Great Britain. The Agreement of Saint Jean-de-Maurienne, of 1917, would have given Italy the southern part of Anatolia; Armenia and the zone of the Straits would have passed to Russia, and Cilicia to France. This agreement was never ratified, but the Treaty of Sèvres, of 1920, was scarcely less drastic. On the territorial side, it provided for a Greek zone, centring in Smyrna, an independent Armenian state in the east, and 'free zones' in the chief ports of Turkey. Though accepted by the Sultan, the treaty was rejected by Mustapha Kemal, and a Nationalist rising drove the Greek forces from Anatolia, invaded Armenia, even reaching Georgia, and then attacked the French in Cilicia, forcing them to evacuate this area. By 1923, when a second conference sat to draw up a treaty between the Allies and Turkey, the position of the latter was immensely strengthened. The result was that Anatolia was left intact, and extensions were made in Thrace beyond the frontier laid down at Sèvres (see Chapter 20).

In five areas, however, the boundaries of the new Turkey were still unsettled.

(i) *Kars*. The district of Kars was occupied during the Turkish advance in 1920. Russia has recently revived her claim to it.

(ii) *Mosul*. The region south of Lake Van is inhabited by Kurds, a numerically small mountain-folk, whose affinities are closest with the Turks. Their territory was first included in Iraq which was mandated to Great Britain. The oil-fields of Mosul, which lay in the region, were an attraction to both sides and raised what was really only a minor frontier dispute to a crisis of international importance. Disturbances among the Kurds were followed in 1924 by a Turkish invasion. Turkey submitted to the decision of the League of Nations, which in 1925 allocated to Iraq the greater part of the disputed area, including most of the oil wells.

(iii) *Cilicia*. This fertile plain was claimed by France, who, however, relinquished it in 1921. The Hatay, including the

port of Alexandretta, was retained by France until 1939. This region is of considerable economic importance, not only on account of its extensive area of low-lying land, but also because it provides an outlet for the produce of the Anatolian plateau.

(iv) *Smyrna*. The Greeks relinquished their claim to this territory, and its Greek population was established in Macedonia.

(v) *The Straits*. These remained in Turkish possession, and the frontier of Turkey in Europe was restored to the line which it had followed in 1914. The shores of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were demilitarized, together with adjoining islands. A similar demilitarized zone was established along the Greek and Bulgar frontiers. The Montreux Convention of 1936, which restored to Turkey the right to fortify the Straits, is discussed in Chapter 20.

What was for Turkey a successful conclusion of the war was followed by an internal revolution, in which Mustapha Kemal attempted to destroy the old, unprogressive social system. In this he met with considerable success, especially in the towns, but in the remote country districts little more than lip-service was paid to his measures. The standard of literacy remains very low; village life remains primitive and hedged by restrictions and prohibitions. It is doubtful whether such a revolution as he envisaged can be accomplished in less than two or three generations. Most important, as far as external relations are concerned, of Mustapha Kemal's social measures, was his abolition of the Caliphate, the spiritual headship of Islam, which had hitherto been united with the person of the Turkish Sultan. Turkey remains predominantly Mohammedan, but this faith is, as it were, disestablished. The ties which formerly linked Turkey with the world of Islam have been broken.

The social was accompanied by an economic revolution, and would, in fact, have been unintelligible without it. A plan of industrialization—a faint shadow of the Russian—was drawn up and begun with the help of foreign loans. Turkey's resources are not outstanding for such a project. There is a coalfield at Zonguldak, sufficient to maintain a considerable measure of industrialization. There are scattered deposits of iron-ore; that at Divrik is most important. Chrome-ore is abundant;

copper is worked, and there is a small oil-field in the Siirt district of the South-east. Hydro-electric power is being developed in the Pontic Mountains, where the rainfall is greater than in other parts. An iron and steel industry has been established at Karabuk, near the Zonguldak coalfield, and textile industries have been established in many of the larger towns. An obstacle to industrial development is the inadequate transport facilities and the large area and sparse population. Agricultural advances have been less conspicuous. The Turkish peasant is backward and conservative, and attempts to teach him better methods have been rewarded by only slow development. Much of the country is steppeland, too dry for cultivation without irrigation, but a number of dams have been built to husband the available water-supplies. Nevertheless, the output of cotton has been trebled and that of other crops considerably increased.

Turkey's improved economic position has been reflected in her international standing and foreign policy. The problems of Mosul and Alexandretta have embittered relations with Great Britain and France. Turkey has been justifiably suspicious of Italy's policy, and has resented her close proximity in the Dodecanese islands to her own mainland. Friendship with Greece followed the exchange of population, and this ripened with membership of the Balkan Entente. Outwardly relations with Russia continued to be good, but it is not to be supposed that Turkey could readily forget Russia's traditional policy of expansion towards the Mediterranean.

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

GERMANY IN THE MODERN WORLD

THE chief event of the forty years preceding 1914 was, in the international sphere at least, the division of the greater European Powers into two rival camps, which flew the banners respectively of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.




FIG. 92. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE
The 'encirclement' of Germany.

This division was due, in the main, to the unification and extension of the German realm between 1866 and 1871. Fears aroused by Germany's policy were a factor in the grouping of Germany's enemies. Germany was ringed by potential enemies; it was her studied policy to prevent them from uniting into an anti-German alliance. Germany was created, at the expense of the Slavs, by the eastward expansion of Teutonic-speaking peoples. Centuries of campaigning and conquest in

the east have produced among the German people a deeply rooted hostility to the Slavs, a readiness to regard them as an 'inferior' people, and a conception of the whole of Eastern Europe as a field for its expansion. These ideas have been brought to focus on Russia, the largest and most important Slavonic Power.

With the creation of the German Empire—the Second Reich, according to the Nazi nomenclature—a new enemy, France, was created in the West. As the price of her unification Germany became a prey to fears of encirclement, and her constant endeavour was to prevent an alliance between Russia and France, her neighbours to east and west. The machinations by which Bismarck strove to achieve this end belong to the political history of Europe. He failed, and by 1896 it was clear that France and Russia were allies and that the mainspring of their alliance was resistance to Germany. Germany had meantime obtained the close alliance of the only Power near enough and strong enough to be of great assistance, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. To this alliance was appended Italy. Great Britain, early in the twentieth century, abandoned her isolationist policy, and suspicions of the designs of Germany drove her into the Franco-Russian camp. The alliances were thus:

| | | | | |
|---------------|---|----|---|-----------------|
| France | } | v. | { | Germany |
| Russia | | | | Austria-Hungary |
| Great Britain | | | | Italy |

The First World War may be said to have originated in two sets of circumstances.

(i) The formation of the alliances and the virtual encirclement of Germany. This was considered to be a threat to Germany, who sought the first opportunity to break the ring around her.

(ii) German policy, which appeared to be aimed at creating a dominant position in Europe and in the world. This was most apparent in the Balkans, to which region the German *Drang nach dem Osten* had been diverted in the nineteenth century. Reference has already been made to this policy and to the programme of railway construction. Germany came, at the eve of the First World War, to dominate the foreign trade

of Austria-Hungary, which included the territory of modern Czechoslovakia, together with much of that of Roumania and Yugoslavia. Most of the foreign trade of Roumania and Serbia and much of that of Bulgaria was with Germany or Austria-Hungary. A large proportion of Germany's foreign investments were in the Danubian countries. German political and economic expansion to the south-east conflicted with Russian plans to reach the Mediterranean.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Serbia lay at the geographical centre of the Balkans. It was the meeting-place of German and Russian lines of expansion. Neutrality was impossible for it, and its internal politics turned upon whether German or Russian friendship was the more desirable. Recently the Russophil party, represented by the ruling Karageorgevic dynasty had triumphed in spite of the obvious economic benefits of alliance with Germany and Austria. The incorporation by Austria of the Serb provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 had aroused great feeling, but Russia was not yet prepared to help Serbia. In 1914 Russia was more prepared, and an incident at Sarajevo touched off the struggle between Russia and Germany-Austria.

By Germany at least the war of 1914 had been long prepared. Geographical and strategic factors—the dangers and difficulties of a war on two fronts—were dominant, and Germany had weighed her chances with the greatest care, and only by the narrowest margin were her estimates proved wrong. Very broadly, German strategy was to defeat France by a swift blow, delivered by the greater part of her forces, and then to turn against the Russians, whose complete mobilization would be delayed by the great distances and backwardness of their country. This plan, worked out in the greatest detail by Schlieffen, was only modified in detail in 1914. France was to be invaded by the most powerful army that Germany could muster. Its right flank was to move rapidly through the plain of Belgium; its centre and left more slowly through the Ardennes and the hills of Lorraine direct on to Paris, while the fast-moving right crossed the Lower Seine and took Paris from the rear. In the event, the German right flank was robbed

to supply a small holding force in Eastern Germany; the lower Seine was not reached, and the German advance was halted at the Marne. The victory of Tannenberg could not make up for the defeat before Paris. By small errors of judgment the Germans failed to reach Paris and, in the event, lost the war.




FIG. 93. THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN, AS IMPLEMENTED IN THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN OF 1914

The line of advance, represented by a broken line, on the German right flank, was not followed.
After Winston Churchill

After more than three years of war the Russian armies were forced to ask for an armistice. They were short of supplies owing to their own undeveloped industries and the difficulties in the way of supplying them from the Western countries. The Russian Revolution of November 1917 was brought about in part by the sufferings and war weariness of the Russian soldiers. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was not signed until March 1918, but, taken with the Treaty of Bucharest concluded with Roumania in 1939, it provides evidence of Germany's schemes of Eastern conquest. By the terms of the former treaty, Russia

abandoned all claim to its territories west of a line from the Gulf of Riga to Tarnograd, and in the following August relinquished also what remained of Estonia and Livonia. The treaty provided also for the establishment of independent states, which would clearly be puppets of Germany, in Ukraine and Finland, and later the independence of the Georgian republic, to the south of the Caucasus, was recognized. It is interesting to note that Russia would be allowed access to the German-controlled Baltic ports of Reval, Riga, and Windau. The districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum were ceded to Turkey.

The treaty of Buftea between the Central Powers and Roumania was contemporary with that of Brest-Litovsk. By it Roumania lost the whole of the Dobrudja, together with the crest-line of the Carpathians. This had never been a linguistic frontier, but it had been easy to defend. The new frontier resembled rather that which was imposed on Czechoslovakia by the Munich settlement, with this difference, that there was here no pretence that it accorded with linguistic divisions.

Both treaties were denounced at the German surrender in November 1918, but German schemes of Eastern conquest, which were older than Brest-Litovsk, survived it and blossomed again under Hitler: "When we talk of more territory in Europe we can think only of Russia and the border States." In the Ukraine Germany stirred into life the nationalist aspirations of the Ukrainian people. This nation of 37,000,000 peasants resisted the Russian reconquest of its territory in 1920, and found help where it could, but it is doubtful whether it had that essential for nationhood, a literate and educated class sufficiently large to provide administrators and civil servants. The Ukraine has become one of the federal units in the U.S.S.R., but Germany revived her propaganda before 1939, not without a small measure of success. Small groups of Ukrainian people lived in South-eastern Poland, in that part of Eastern Slovakia known as Ruthenia or Sub-Carpathian Russia, and in Bessarabia. The friendship of these groups was cultivated, and Germany clearly intended to use them as stepping-stones to the wider dominion of all Ukraine. The black earth lands of the Ukraine were a tempting prize. Their possession, with that of the mineral resources and the-not-far-

distant oil-fields to the north and south of the Caucasus range, would go far towards freeing Germany from dependence upon imports. Since the German defeat of 1918 other considerations have prompted the seizure of these regions. The German school of geopoliticians emphasize that this is the 'heartland' of the Old World; that whoever possesses it can dominate the three continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa, immune to the threats of sea Powers without (see Chapter XXVII). Certainly it would facilitate the realization of a dream, dear to German imperialists, of a German-controlled route to the Middle East, and thence to the Indian Ocean.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

The clauses of the Versailles Treaty, concluded between the Allied Powers and Germany, may be summarized under five headings.

(i) *Territorial*. Alsace and that part of Lorraine which had been taken from France in 1871 were restored. The Saar basin, a small carboniferous trough to the south of the Ardennes Massif, was given to France for a period of fifteen years in order to recompense her for the losses she had sustained during the war in the coalfield of the North. The region is wholly German in speech and sympathy, and in 1935 returned to the Reich.

Belgium acquired the two small areas of Eupen and Malmédy, largely on strategic grounds, though there was a shadowy historical claim and a small Walloon-speaking population.

The plebiscite held in North Schleswig was really a fulfilment of a promise made by Prussia at the time of her war with Austria. The Northern part of the territory chose to return to Denmark.

The most radical changes of frontier were made in the east, where the state of Poland was resurrected. A frontier was restored not very dissimilar to that which obtained before 1772, but it raised many problems, which are briefly examined in the next chapter.

(ii) *Disarmament*. The German army was reduced to 100,000 long-term enlistment troops, without heavy military equipment.

(iii) *Reparations*. Germany was called upon to make amends

for the material damage she had done. This she did by the export of raw materials and manufactured goods, which were welcomed in France and Belgium, but had a depressing effect on English trade, as Lord Keynes had predicted. The payment of reparations was maintained until 1931.




FIG. 94. THE LANGUAGES OF SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN
After I. Bowman

(iv) *Military Occupation.* Only the west bank of the Rhine and certain bridgeheads on the east were occupied, and the Army of Occupation was withdrawn in 1929.

(v) *The German Empire.* Germany's colonies were transferred as mandates to certain of the Allied Powers.

The Treaty of Versailles left Germany almost intact territorially and her industrial and agricultural resources but little diminished, and she was free to rebuild her economy and re-establish herself as a Great Power. The internal politics of the Weimar Republic are beyond the scope of an essentially geographical study. It may suffice to say that the forces which had operated in Imperial Germany were only momentarily

scotched; that they revived within ten years in an exaggerated form. In most respects Nazi policy, internal and external, was only a blatant caricature of that which had led up to the war of 1914.

Foremost in the foreign policy of Germany was revision of the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and in this the German Government could count on a measure of support outside Germany. In 1925 Germany accepted the Versailles delineation of her western frontier as final, but was careful to keep the door open in the east for a fresh attempt at expansion and conquest into the Slavonic lands. In 1929 the allied evacuation of the Rhineland began. Within a few months the economic blizzard struck Europe; unemployment mounted in Germany, and the public became increasingly ready to accept extreme measures, and from 1933, the Nazi Party was in power and prepared to force the issue of treaty revision by all means at its command.

The object of German policy was the political domination of at least the Old World, and redress of grievances under the Versailles Treaty was incidental to this end. Such a policy involved risk of war, and military preparedness in the economic sense was essential to German policy. German economic policy is touched on in a later section of this chapter. At the same time the policy was adopted of tightening the bonds between Germans living outside the Reich and the Mother Country, of absorbing into the Reich the territory they occupied, and, by careful propaganda among the minority peoples, of weakening the powers of resistance of neighbouring countries.

TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS

Rearmament and reoccupation of the Rhineland were preparatory to more drastic revision of the territorial clauses of the Versailles Treaty. The five following territories were added to Germany during the period of Nazi rule.

(i) *Austria*. Austria had ceased to be part of Germany during the nineteenth century, but the small state left by the Treaty of St Germain was wholly German in speech and culture, and it is possible that a majority would have preferred

in 1919 to join a German state. This *Anschluss* was forbidden in the treaties and subsequently, though Austria was economically unstable. In particular, the diminutive country was overshadowed by its over-great capital. A peaceful attempt in 1931 and an abortive *Putsch* in 1934 were followed early in 1938 by the absorption of Austria, which became a province, the Ostmark, in the Reich. Austria has now been detached and has become again a republic, though divided between four allied powers into zones of occupation.

(ii) *Sudetenland*. The acquisition of Austria gave Germany an advantageous position for an attack on Czechoslovakia. The 'waist' of that country, the low plain of Moravia, was pinched between Silesia and Austria, and Bohemia, the richest, most populous, and most industrialized part of the country, was almost surrounded. In September 1938 German demands for the cession of the Sudeten territories inhabited mainly by people of German speech were fulfilled.

(iii) *Memel-land*. This small territory with the important port of Memel lies to the north of the Niemen. Its population, especially in the town, is mainly German, though it serves as a port for Lithuania. Until 1923 it was controlled by the French on behalf of the Allies, but in that year was seized by the Lithuanians. It formed part of Lithuania, though allowed a measure of autonomy. In March 1939 it was reabsorbed into Germany.

(iv) *Bohemia and Moravia*. By the loss of its mountain barrier Czechoslovakia was robbed of all natural means of defence. In March 1939 what was left of Bohemia and Moravia was occupied by the Germans, and the poorer, more mountainous, and, to the Germans, less valuable territory of Slovakia was erected into a semi-independent state. For the first time Germany had absorbed the territory of a people non-German in speech and sympathy.

(v) *Polish Corridor*. The reduction to a state of servitude of Czechoslovakia put Germany into a very favourable position for an attack on Poland. She claimed the town of Danzig, very largely German in population, as well as the "Corridor," to which Germany's claims were at best tenuous. In September 1939 Germany conquered Poland as far east approximately as the longitude of Brest Litovsk.

GERMANS IN EUROPE

After the end of the First World War there had been a considerable migration of Germans back to their country of origin. Most were from the territories ceded to France, Belgium, Denmark, and Poland. But large numbers of peoples of German speech and culture remained remote from the frontiers of the Reich. The largest and most important of these bodies of German-speaking subjects were those in Czechoslovakia and Western Poland. German estimates of their number are:¹

| | |
|--|-----------|
| In Czechoslovakia | 3,500,000 |
| In Poland (including Danzig) | 2,200,000 |
| In Russia | 1,600,000 |
| In France | 1,500,000 |
| In Roumania | 900,000 |
| In Yugoslavia | 700,000 |
| In Baltic States | 270,000 |
| In Italy | 250,000 |
| In Hungary | 250,000 |
| In Belgium | 115,000 |

In addition to these are some 2,600,000 German-speaking Swiss. Most of these *Deutschstammige* live in relatively small groups scattered through Eastern Europe. Those of the Baltic States and Russia are the descendants of early immigrants, the advance-guard of the German advance into the Slavonic lands. North of the Alpine fold mountains they tended to follow either the Baltic coast or the loess belt of the mountain foot. In the Middle Ages they were welcomed to Hungary, where they developed mining towns and trade. In Transylvania the "Saxon" settlers, who live mainly about Sibiu, Brasov, and Bistrita, have maintained their identity now for over seven hundred years. The "Swabians" live mainly in the plain country of the Banat, and are descendants of settlers introduced after the expulsion of the Turks in the eighteenth century. The most famous of these German groups was that, comprising almost half a million, which was settled on the Volga, opposite Saratov, where it became an autonomous S.S.R.

¹ These figures are quoted by I. Bowman from W. Gerbing's *Das Erdbild der Gegenwart* (1926).

Until 1933 these groups had constituted nothing more than cultural and administrative problems to the countries in which they lay. After that date the Nazi conception of racial political unity was used to detach these people from their allegiance to the state in which they lived. Propaganda emphasized the




FIG. 95. THE GERMAN-SPEAKING POPULATION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE c. 1920

unity of German race, and taught the German "how strongly anchored he is in his German homeland." A German minority from being a source of economic strength had become a political liability, an excuse for German intrigue and fair evidence of Germany's desire to incorporate the area.

At the beginning of the war certain changes were made in these groups of *Volksdeutsche*. Hitler's speech of October 6, 1939, contained, "The whole east and south-east of Europe is partly filled with splinters of Germans who cannot exist by themselves.

'They are a cause of constant international disturbances.' This was a remarkable *volte-face*, and caused some trepidation among the *Volksdeutsche* of South-eastern Europe, but its purpose appears to have been to justify the movements of population




FIG. 96. THE RETURN OF THE AUSLANDSDEUTSCHE TO GERMANY AND GERMAN-OCCUPIED POLAND, 1939-44

This does not include those driven from Poland and Czechoslovakia after May, 1945.

After "The Displacement of Population in Europe" (International Labour Office)

then under way—chief of which were the return of the Balts and the South Tyrolese.

The Balts. These were the descendants of the medieval settlers. They appear to have numbered about 16,000 in Estonia, 64,000 in Latvia, and 50,500 in Lithuania. Except in the last, they were mainly urban, consisting of artisans, industrialists and merchants. Only in Lithuania did a majority

belong to the poor peasant class. Most of the Balts were brought back to Germany in the autumn of 1939, and the evidence is that they were settled in the Vistula basin. It would appear that this movement was made tolerable to the Balts only by their fear of Russia.

The South Tyrolese. It appears that the *Volksdeutsche* of the Alto Adige valley were given the chance to remain in Italy if they chose, but a large majority voted in favour of returning to the Reich. Nevertheless, by 1942 only 72,000 had done so.

It is difficult to say whether the German Government contemplated the recall of more *Volksdeutsche*, though many more have returned involuntarily after their expulsion from the liberated countries.

NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY

The economic development of Germany was so guided as to give the greatest benefits in time of war. Germany is an important agricultural country, and almost 20 per cent. of the population was engaged on the land. She was normally self-sufficing in grain crops, and could produce about 80 per cent. of her total food requirements. But not much over half the animal and vegetable fats and oils were of domestic origin, and to increase the home production would necessitate an increased import of fodder crops. Germany was dependent to a very much greater extent upon imports of industrial raw materials. All the raw cotton, over 90 per cent. of the wool, and 80 per cent. of the flax were imported. Among mineral raw materials, Germany has a surplus only of coal, potash, and magnesite; in all others she is deficient, in most almost wholly lacking. Germany has been described as "poor in rich deposits of ore, but rich in poor deposits." Poor deposits cannot, in general, be worked economically under conditions of free international competition. Germany was thus faced with the strong probability that she would be robbed of victory in the wars she contemplated by shortage of the material requirements not only of war but also of civilian life. The first and second Four-year Plans were intended to remedy this state of affairs. Several methods were adopted.

(1) Agriculture was intensified as far as possible; artificial fertilizers were made available on an increased scale; labourers were prevented from leaving the land. The physical area of agricultural land was increased by the drainage of the *Märschen* of the north coast, and the 'light,' sandy areas of *geest* were improved by the addition of alluvium and fertilizers. In 1934 1,500,000 acres were thus added, but the cost of such undertakings steadily rose, and they were only practicable with large conscripted labour corps.

(2) Foreign trade was oriented to strengthen Germany's war economy. Trade was encouraged with those countries—chiefly the Danubian—unlikely to be cut off from Germany during a war. The percentage of Germany's foreign trade with the Danubian and Balkan states more than doubled between 1929 and 1937. This trade was in general carried on by means of bilateral agreements, Germany taking the whole of the surplus of a particular crop and paying for it in blocked marks, expendable only in Germany. The countries of South-eastern Europe were thus reduced to a state of dependence on Germany. A sort of economic imperialism was established as a prelude to a more thoroughgoing political domination. The commodities thus supplied were mainly foodstuffs, vegetable oils, skins, hides, tobacco and textile fibres. Some minerals were furnished, though Germany failed to control the Roumanian oil output.

(3) Economic self-sufficiency was aimed at. Complete independence of imports is impossible for a country as small and as highly developed as Germany. Nevertheless a wide range of substitute materials was produced. These were, in general, more expensive and less efficient than those which they replaced, and their wide-scale use clearly resulted in a lowering of standards of living. Examples of such *ersatz* commodities are staple fibre, produced from cellulose, to replace the usual textile fibres; *buna*, or synthetic rubber, and synthetic oil, which was produced from coal at Gelsenkirchen, Pollitz, Leuna, and elsewhere. The production of minerals from low-grade domestic deposits has been advanced, particularly the low-grade iron-ore of Salzgitter.

The Distribution of German Resources. The Germany of 1929 consisted of a low northern plain, widest in the east, where it passes into Poland, and narrowest north of the Harz, where

little over 100 miles separates the mountain foot from the North Sea. This plain is the primary route between Western and Eastern Europe; it is crossed by railways whose termini are Brussels and Paris on the one hand, and Warsaw and Moscow on the other. The whole region is drift-covered. Terminal moraines and outwash gravels cover large areas, which are arranged in concentric arcs parallel with the Baltic coast. Between are shallow, often marsh-filled valleys. A belt of loess mantles the southern margin of the plain, and it is here, and in the neighbouring highlands that most of the mineral wealth, coal lignite, and potash, occur. A deeply dissected belt of highland stretches from the Fichtel at the north-western margin of the Bohemian massif, to the Ardennes. It is a region of poor soil except on the narrow valley floors, and harsh climate. Metalliferous mining has been important locally, but remaining reserves are small.

The south of Germany consists of dissected plateaux of generally secondary strata, which rise in Southern Bavaria and Austria to the Alps. Soils are better and the climate more genial than in other parts of Germany, and the region is well populated in spite of the relative lack of mineral resources.

Coal resources are distributed along the northern edge of the central highland belt. The Ruhr area is the most important, producing almost three-quarters of the total. Others are Upper Silesia, the Saar, and Saxony. Brown coal, of considerable importance in electric-power production, is worked in the Rhineland, Saxony, and Brandenburg. Domestic iron-ore deposits are small and of low grade, and Germany has been dependent on those of Sweden and Lorraine. Large potash fields occur in Saxony. Manufacturing industries are widely distributed and have not tended, as markedly as in certain other countries, to concentrate on the coalfields. This is partly because the broad outline of the railway network was completed before the intensive development of industries in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The older towns, such as Cologne, Munich, Frankfort, Leipzig, and Breslau became the chief route centres and have since tended to gather industries to them. This wide distribution of industries has necessitated a highly developed transport system. A system of motor roads was constructed, river navigation improved, and

the canal system extended so that the distribution of Ruhr coal would ultimately be possible to all parts of the Reich.

Germany's war industries were thus widely scattered even before the threat of allied bombing compelled the partial abandonment of some of the older industrial centres. It may, nevertheless, be said that German manufacturing industry is concentrated in a triangle, the base of which is formed approximately by the Rhine between the Swiss and Dutch frontiers,




FIG. 97. CANALS AND NAVIGABLE RIVERS OF GERMANY

After Sir Oswald Mance

and whose apex is the northern extremity of Czechoslovakia, between Dresden and Breslau. There are lacunæ within this region, formed by the hill masses of Central Germany, and there are industrial areas, such as the Northern ports, Berlin, Upper Silesia, and Munich, outside it. The areas south of the Danube and east of the Oder are relatively unindustrialized and that between the lower Elbe and the Oder has comparatively few towns. This should be borne in mind when considering the areas to be ceded to Poland. These are predominantly agricultural, and in normal times part of their function has been to feed Berlin. The area east of the Oder

and Neisse has a considerable surplus of grain, the loss of which may have serious consequences on Germany. The high degree of interdependence of all parts of the Reich makes any scheme of partition of the country extremely difficult.

The relatively non-industrialized regions of the north-east are, for the greater part, made up of large estates, associated




FIG. 98. GERMAN ACCESSIONS OF TERRITORY, 1938-39

with the Prussian "Junker" class. The size of holdings diminishes to the south and west, and is least in the Upper Rhineland. The large estates became in Germany models of agricultural practice, but it appears that they are now being broken up. This will be necessary if Germany has to support in the future a much larger agricultural population.

Lebensraum. It was part of the German propaganda in the years before 1939 to claim that the country was over-populated

and that more 'living-space' was needed in the less densely peopled lands to the east. Over-population is a relative term, depending on the degree of industrialization and the cultivability of the soil. Italy and China, both with very much smaller populations per square mile, have far more pressing claims on the empty spaces of the world. Over 40 per cent. of the German people are engaged in industry, and the only space they require is that occupied by houses, factories, roads and railways. Nor can it be said that the German peasant has shown any marked land-hunger. The reverse is probably the case. The absorption of Austria and the Sudetenland has reduced the average density of population by only 7 per cent. These claims must be regarded as (a) part of a drive to regain Germany's former colonies, (b) justification in advance of extensions of territory in Europe. As far as the latter is concerned, they were negated from the start by attempts to increase the birth-rate.

Germany, however, had been a late-comer in the colonial scramble, and the territories she picked up—Togoland, Cameroons, South-west Africa, Tanganyika, part of New Guinea, and various island groups in the Pacific, are not among the more acceptable colonial possessions. None, with the possible exception of Tanganyika, was really suited to white settlement, and their contribution to German economy was not great. In 1913 only about 0.5 per cent. of the total external trade of Germany was with her colonies. These could supply all Germany's requirements of sisal and cane sugar, which is, in any case, small owing to the heavy production of sugar-beet, and over half the bananas, cocoa, copra, phosphates, and vanadium, with smaller quantities of palm-oil and kernels, ground-nuts, coffee, and a few other commodities. This is not an imposing list, though the Germans claim that they would have exploited the colonies more fully than the mandatory Powers have done.

But Germany was probably more interested in a *Lebensraum* in Eastern Europe. In 1936 Hitler announced to his party conference that "if the Urals with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, the rich forests of Siberia, and the unending cornfields of the Ukraine lay in Germany, under National Socialist leadership, the country would swim in plenty." It

should be pointed out that the latter condition could be achieved only at the expense of greatly lowered standards among the Russians.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In September 1939 the process of filling out the German *Lebensraum* at last met with the armed opposition of Poland and her allies. Germany's ambition was to conquer the European continent and at least the nearer parts of Asia. With the immense resources that would then be at her disposal



FIG. 99. GERMANY'S PATH OF EASTWARD CONQUEST, 1941-43

she might hope to defy the maritime power of Great Britain, the Dominions, and the United States. This grandiose plan bears evidence of the geopolitical thought of the Haushofers of Munich. It failed, very largely owing to a serious underestimate of the strength and determination of Russia, but it has yet to be demonstrated that the general conclusions of the Haushofer school are wrong.

The problems of strategy in 1939 were similar to those of 1914, and equally dependent upon the geographical configuration of Europe, the orientation of its routes and the relationship to one another of the belligerent countries. Germany feared 'encirclement' and a war on two fronts no less in 1939 than in 1914. On the earlier occasion she relied on the slowness of Russian mobilization to allow her to complete the war in the West before that in the East really began. This was no longer possible. Instead, Russia was bought off at a high price, no less than a third of Poland and a free hand in the Baltic States. In the summer of 1940 Germany employed in the Low Countries and France a modification of Schlieffen's plan. Holland was included in the great turning movement of the German armies, which swept through the narrow Belgian Plain, crossed Northern France and outflanked Paris. The following winter was employed re-equipping the Reichswehr, and in the spring and summer it was launched against the Middle East and Caucasus, the goal of German hopes. Three lines of approach were available:

- (i) The route, which Italians were holding, along the north coast of Africa, into Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq.
- (ii) The old German route southward from the Danube to Bulgaria and Greece; from the last to Crete, Cyprus, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, and India.
- (iii) From Poland, through the grass belt of the Ukraine to the Volga, beyond which are the approaches to the Caucasus.

The time-table of the German campaigns shows how closely they were co-ordinated.¹ In the event none reached their

¹ The time-table of the 1941 campaigns was clearly based on the assumption

objective, and this, like the battle of the Marne in 1914, probably marked the turning-point in the war. Two features are of interest in the remaining four years of the struggle; the failure of the continental power (Germany) to prevent the maritime power from landing almost at will on its coasts—an interesting comparison with the course of the Napoleonic wars—and, secondly, the east-west course of the campaigns. The greater part of the fighting was in the North European Plain, between Normandy, where the plain abuts against the Breton massif, and the Volga, where the plain expands into Asia. An east-west drive in the Danube basin was of less importance.

POST-WAR GERMANY

The political geography of the new Germany has exercised the minds of many who have at heart the future peace of Europe. A suggestion often made is that Germany might be broken up into a number of statelets, "substantial entities with their own local traditions." This involves, of course, the resurrection of the German states, which alone of the lesser divisions of the country have their roots deep in the past and are able to focus the loyalties of their citizens. But it is impossible to welcome a revival of these units if they are to have anything more than powers of local government. Their frontiers are bizarre and at variance with the facts of economic geography. A less radical suggestion has been to partition the country by an east-west line into a northern plain region and a southern upland, to which Austria might be added. The same objections apply in a lesser degree. It was the economic

that sympathetic risings would take place in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and perhaps Afghanistan.

March 24: Rommel's attack; Germans reoccupy El Agheila.

April 3: *Coup d'état* of Rashid Aali al-Gaylani in Iraq.

April 6: Germans invade Yugoslavia and Greece.

May 2: Iraqi forces attack Habbaniya cantonment. (Rising suppressed in June.)

May 15: German aircraft land in Iraq and also in Syria, about this date.

May 20: German airborne invasion of Crete; complete by June 1.

June 8: Imperial forces invade Syria from Palestine. Damascus occupied June 21.

June 22: German invasion of Russia.

August 26: Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran.

development and integration of the country in the nineteenth century which made the earlier political groupings obsolete. These same developments prevent a return to the earlier system. The division of Germany between the occupying




FIG. 100. POLISH FRONTIERS, 1921 AND 1945

forces of four countries has created problems owing to the interdependence, greater than was expected, between these divisions.

It was inevitable that proposals should be made to add fragments of German territory to that of neighbouring states, but hitherto the only steps taken have been to give Germany east of the Oder-Neisse rivers together with most of East

Prussia to Poland,¹ while the remainder of East Prussia, with the port of Königsberg, goes to Russia. This region is, with the exception of Breslau and Upper Silesia, predominantly agricultural. Its loss will leave Germany relatively more industrialized than before, with a food shortage and increased dependence on imports. It does not appear, however, that any of the German population will be allowed to remain in Poland and Russia, and a large proportion of it has already been driven back into Germany. The same appears to be the case with the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia, whose ejection has begun. In this way, that portion of Germany west of the new Polish frontier may be expected to receive an accession of population of up to 12,000,000.

The Potsdam Declaration envisages a reduction of Germany's industrial potential. "Industrial capital equipment," to an amount to be determined later, is to pass to the Allied Powers by way of reparations, and Germany is to be left with only those industries natural to a predominantly agricultural Power. In the reorganization of German economy, "primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries." Thus far have the Allies accepted the Morgenthau thesis that Germany should be reduced to the status of an agricultural country. The problem raised in the new Germany is that of employing those whose former industrial occupation will have vanished. Agricultural occupations must be found for an increased proportion of the population, now denser than in 1939, and the agricultural potentialities of Germany cannot be greatly increased. The result must necessarily be a considerable lowering of the national income and reduced standards of living. This appears to have been recognized, for the same declaration specifies that the standard of living in Germany shall not be higher "than the average of the standards of living of European countries," excluding Great Britain and Russia. This is certainly below the standards to which Germans had been accustomed.²

¹ It would not appear, at the time of writing, that Great Britain is wholly in agreement with this alienation of German territory. The Oder-Neisse line is regarded as provisional only. Russia tends to support the claims of Poland.

² There appears to be some divergence of opinion between Russia, on the one hand, and Great Britain and U.S.A., on the other, on the interpretation of this clause of the Potsdam Declaration. The de-industrialization programme has met with severe criticism both inside and outside Great Britain.

Some reference is needed to the movements of peoples that have occurred during the past six years. These have certainly been on a scale greatly exceeding anything that has occurred in historical times. They may be grouped under three headings.

(i) *Volksdeutsche returning to Germany.* The return of the Balts was followed by that of Germans from Western Ukraine and Bielorussia (that is, Galicia, Volhynia, etc.). In 1940, by agreement with the Roumanian Government, Germans of Southern Bukovina and Dobrudja returned, and also those from the Russian-occupied regions of Roumania, Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina. Germans in Hungary and the Balkans were unmolested, but those of the Ljubljana district of Slovenia, which passed under Italian rule were recalled. It may be said that, in general, German minorities were recalled only from those countries with which Germany wished at that time to cultivate good relations—namely, Russia and Italy. Those of the Balkans were more useful as “an instrument of control, an advance-post of German domination.” Most of the Germans who were thus uprooted were peasants, and most appear to have been settled in German-occupied Poland, particularly the Warthegau and Danzig-West Prussia. The number of Germans involved in these movements appears to have been about 600,000.

(ii) *Movement of Non-German Peoples.* These peoples were mainly refugees. Over 1,000,000 Jews were expelled from Germany and German-occupied territory after September 1939. With the progress of the war considerable numbers of Dutch, Belgians, and French were uprooted, and in the Balkans, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Greeks, and Roumanians



FIG. 101. THE ALLIED ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA, AS ESTABLISHED IN 1945

Berlin and Vienna are held jointly by the four occupying Powers.

were either deported or forced to leave their home countries. An even bigger evacuation preceded the German invasion of Russia, though this was more disciplined, and much of the industrial equipment was removed by the retreating Russians. Certain coastal areas in Western Europe were evacuated as a precautionary measure against an Allied landing. The changes in the frontiers of Roumania were followed by small exchanges of population with Hungary and Bulgaria. Most of these peoples, except the Jews, will eventually return home, and in a long view there will be little change in national groupings.

(iii) *Conscription of Foreign Labour.* Most of the conscripted foreign workmen may also be expected to return to their homes, though serious problems of administration will certainly be presented. Up to the beginning of 1943 it is estimated that some 6,500,000 foreign workers were employed in Germany.

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE NORTHERN SLAVS

THE distribution of the Northern Slavs has been described in Chapter VII. They may be divided into three linguistic groups, the Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks, each with distinctive cultures and historical traditions, which make them distinct from one another and also from their neighbours to the east and west.

POLAND

History. The Polish state grew up in the tenth and eleventh centuries in the valleys of the middle Oder and middle Vistula. Its early capital, Gniezno, lay between the two rivers. During the Middle Ages the state, faced with the expansion of German peoples from the west, slowly moved its centre of gravity eastward, first to Krakow and then to Warsaw, reaching the sea on the north, the Carpathian mountains on the south, and on the east the headwaters of the Russian rivers. Poland absorbed the barbaric state of Lithuania and expanded eastward into the Ukraine and for a considerable time even included Kiev and had a foothold on the Black Sea. At this time the Polish state served the very useful purpose of taking the shock of Turkish and Tartar invasions. In the seventeenth century there was prolonged fighting round the Polish fortress of Kamenets Podolsk, where the Turkish invasion of North-western Europe by way of the open Northern Piedmont was checked, and it was a Polish army that repulsed the last Turkish attack on Vienna.

The Polish state, a prey to attack from without and dissension within, declined in political strength in the eighteenth century, and at last succumbed to the intrigues of its three great neighbours, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Between 1772 and 1795, Poland was partitioned between them, and disappeared from the map of Europe. A miniature Poland was recreated by Napoleon under the name of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, but this failed to survive the fall of its creator.

The greater part of the old Poland thus passed into the state

of Russia. It may be said that much of this area was inhabited by Russian peasants and would never have been Polish if the Russian state had evolved earlier. Western Poland became




FIG. 102. THE LANGUAGES OF POLAND

Frontiers as established 1919-21.

After H. G. Wanklyn

Prussian and later German. In the later years of the nineteenth century Bismarck here pursued a policy of Germanization, which ultimately failed to destroy Polish culture and aspirations in these regions. In the South the comparatively easy rule of

Austria allowed a cultural freedom to the Poles, whose nationalist propaganda was organized from such towns as Krakow and Lwow. It was in the Russian part of Poland, which made up about two-thirds of the post-1920 republic, that oppression of the Poles was most severe, and over a century of Tsarist rule has left a legacy of hatred and embitterment between the two peoples.

Pilsudski, the Polish nationalist leader, declared that the recreation of the Polish state depended upon the defeat of Russia by the Central Powers, followed by the defeat of the latter by the Western Allies. Polish forces helped to achieve this end, and in November 1918 the new Polish republic was proclaimed. The difficulties facing the new state were great. Fragments torn from three great Powers were thrown together. Almost the whole area had been fought over. Railway gauges differed in the three parts; there were serious problems in the unification of administration. The frontiers were undefined and there were difficulties with linguistic and cultural minorities.

Frontiers. It devolved upon the Allies, meeting at Paris, to lay down the frontiers of the new state on the north, west, and south, and these boundaries, subject to definition in certain areas on the basis of plebiscites, were accepted by Germany, Austria, and Hungary in their treaties with the Allies. The problem in the west was that no clear line separated Germans from Poles. The boundary was social rather than geographical. The landed and professional classes tended to be German, together with many of the businessmen, industrialists, and shopkeepers. These graded eastward into Poles. In two areas this problem became extremely complex. In Upper Silesia industrialization, based on the considerable deposits of coal and metals, had intensified the problem of frontier demarcation by attracting into the area yet other linguistic elements.

This area was acquired by Prussia in 1741, by conquest from Austria. It lies partly in the valley of the upper Oder and partly on the hilly country between the Oder and the Vistula. The rural population was largely Polish at the time of its conquest, with Germans in the towns. From medieval times metalliferous mines had been worked, and at the end of the eighteenth century the coal-measures were intensively




FIG. 103. THE UPPER SILESIAN COAL BASIN
As partitioned between Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
After I. Bowman

developed, leading to the growth of industrial towns and of a "Black Country." The Prussian Government adopted a policy of Germanization, and the Polish population was diluted by the introduction of foreign workers. The idea of a Polish Silesia was kept alive, however, by the Poles, and came to the front in 1918. Polish claims, based on history and to a small extent on language, were not wholly accepted by the Allies, and a plebiscite was held in 1921. Over half the population of Upper Silesia voted for retention in Germany. Though many of these were Poles, the higher cultural standards of Germany and fears for the stability of the Polish state led them to vote against Poland.

It is noteworthy that in the eastern, mainly Polish, part of Upper Silesia the towns were in general German. A frontier was drawn with the greatest difficulty through this densely populated area, and large minorities were left on both sides of the frontier. Poland gained about five-sixths of the productive capacity of the Silesian coal basin and a large proportion of the mineral resources. The difficulties of governing the portions of Upper Silesia as separate units were insuperable, owing to the integration of their public services and industries, and in 1922 a convention was signed regulating the intricacies of administration of both the German and Polish portions of the area, which were now governed for many purposes as a single unit. Half a million Poles remained on the German side of the frontier, and a third of a million Germans on the Polish side. Neither country was satisfied with the arrangement, and claims and counter-claims were almost continuous during the period between the two wars.

The frontier from Silesia northward to the Baltic has been described as the fairest that human ingenuity could devise. In view of the mixture of peoples, an equitable frontier would have been impossible, and both parties were left with grievances.

The second disputed area was the so-called "Corridor," a narrow strip of land linking the main body of Poland with the sea. Poland claimed this territory on three grounds. She demanded an outlet to the sea, and this claim had been accepted in advance in Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points." The port of Danzig, at the mouth of the Vistula, was the

natural outlet for a state which comprised the whole of the Vistula Basin. It was claimed, secondly, that the population of the area was predominantly Polish in speech and sympathy.




FIG. 104. GERMANS AND POLES IN POLISH POMERANIA (THE 'CORRIDOR')

After I. Bowman

Such a claim would have been true before Bismarck's Germanizing policy, and it remains true in part. The northern part of the "Corridor," outside the area of the Free City, is mainly Polish, but stretching across it from Schneidemühl,

through Bydgoszcz to Torun, is a belt of German-speaking people. Poland's third claim was an appeal to history. In their eastward movement along the Baltic coast, the Germans had settled Pomerania and East Prussia, but had been resisted savagely and in the end successfully in the valley of the lower Vistula, known alternatively as West Prussia or Eastern Pomerania. This area remained under Polish rule, until it was seized by Frederick the Great in the first Partition of Poland (1772). It became once again an integral part of a Polish state in 1919. Its commercial and strategic value, however, were dependent on control of the town of Danzig, with its population over 99 per cent. German. Though claimed by the Poles, this town with a small area of the surrounding country was erected into the Free City of Danzig, autonomous, but within the customs frontier of Poland, and presided over by a High Commissioner nominated by the League of Nations. The anti-Polish feeling of the Danzig Germans was displayed when, during the short war of 1920 between Poland and Russia, they adopted a non-co-operative attitude. The Polish reply was the construction on the site of the fishing-village of Gdynia, to the west of the Vistula mouth, of a well-equipped port. With the encouragement of the State the trade of Gdynia grew as that of Danzig declined. In 1938 the amounts of the merchandise handled were:

| | AMOUNT, IN TONS | VALUE, IN ZLOTE |
|------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Danzig . . | 5,982,000 | 376,000,000 |
| Gdynia . . | 8,712,000 | 1,183,000,000 |

The vacant quays and unemployed dock-workers of Danzig served to fan the fires of hatred towards Poland and were an advertisement for the Nazi cause. There were no more intense Nazis than those of Danzig. The division of East Prussia from the main body of the Reich offended many Germans; the institution of 'sealed' trains across the Corridor injured their pride, and the decline of Danzig touched their pockets. The Danzig problem differs only in degree, not in its nature, from that of Fiume, Riga, Salonika, and several other ports whose hinterlands do not belong to the same political unit as themselves.

East Prussia is a predominantly German-speaking area, having been conquered by German knights and developed by German traders in the later Middle Ages. Its originally Slavonic population has been Germanized, and the province, laid out in large estates, was a stronghold of the *junkers*. Plebiscites were held in the Allenstein and Marienwerder districts, which resulted in overwhelming majorities in favour of retention in Germany. It is probable that religious differences were of importance here; the natives of these districts were mainly Lutherans, and the Poles, Roman Catholics.

The Corridor problem, the immediate cause of war in 1939, is wholly an artificial one. Poland's claims were dealt with fairly but not unduly generously. Germany's grievances were used as bargaining weapons, and without the propaganda conducted by the Third Reich could have been capable of a pacific solution.

A mountain barrier enclosed the new Poland on the south. In the main, it was also a linguistic frontier, and presented little difficulty. Towards the west, however, where the open gap of Moravia provides a corridor into the Danube valley, Teschen and the two smaller territories of Orava and Spiš were disputed with Czechoslovakia. These were divided, rather in favour of Czechoslovakia. In 1938, when the Germans occupied part of Czechoslovakia, Poland seized what she considered her due in a fashion that showed how well she could imitate the methods of the Nazis. The population of Teschen is very mixed, and there remained after the division of the territory a considerable Polish minority in the Czechoslovak portion of the district.

The determination of Poland's eastern frontiers was left for Poland to arrange with Russia. The Poles claimed an area approximately that which had been lost in the Partition of 1774. But this vast area was by no means wholly inhabited by Poles. The so-called Curzon Line, which accorded fairly closely with the ethnic frontier, was an official Allied suggestion. In 1920, tempted by the unsettled conditions in the Ukraine (see Chapter XI), the Polish armies entered Russia and occupied Kiev, but were driven back and only halted their retreat on the Vistula, where they inflicted a severe defeat on the Red Army. In the Peace of Riga, which Russia accepted at the end

of the year, the provinces of Volhynia, Novogrodek, Podolia, and Tarnopol, became part of Poland. In the south the district of Galicia has a large Ukrainian or Ruthenian majority, but the Poles here are among the most aggressively nationalist of any, and the capital, Lwow, has become an important centre of Polish culture. To the north the plains are thinly peopled by white Russians with a sprinkling of Jews and Poles in the towns. Here, in the region of the Pripet Marshes, the Polish Government has carried through an ambitious programme of land reclamation and development, the result of which has been to increase the Polish element in the population. It, nevertheless, remains a poor and inadequately cultivated area, some 40 per cent. of which is covered with forest and marsh.

In the North the town of Vilna, with the neighbouring Suwalki region, passed into the possession of the new Lithuanian state on the retreat of the Russian armies. In 1921 they were seized by a Polish army, and remained part of Poland until 1939. Lithuania refused to recognize the loss of this territory as permanent, the frontier between the two states remained 'closed' until 1938, and there was no form of intercourse between them.

In September 1939 the Russian Army reoccupied the eastern provinces roughly as far west as the Curzon Line, following the agreement between Molotoff and Ribbentrop. There is much to be said for the Russian occupation of these territories, but Poland has been afraid that territorial losses on the East will endanger the political independence of the Polish state, and she has clung with a sentimental attachment to the two great Polish cities of Lwow and Vilna. Poland has been allowed to recoup herself by an extension of her frontiers westward. Although she has occupied the territory up to the Oder-Neisse line, complete agreement on this has not yet been reached between the Allied powers. It is, in effect, a reversal of her earlier eastward movement, except that the German population is being expelled in the face of the Polish advance. In the east the Poles had been able to develop a kind of imperialism in areas scantily peopled by Russian peasants, whose political consciousness was but slightly developed.

Economic Development. In the twenty years between the two wars the Polish state made considerable economic advances.

The population was rising sharply, and between 1921 and 1939 increased from 27,400,000 to 35,100,000. This was accompanied by an improvement in standards of agriculture, though it remained true that the north and centre of the country remained more sparsely peopled and less developed than the rather higher, and more open and fertile country of the south and west, and that standards deteriorated towards the east. Poland remains like Hungary and to some extent Germany also, a land of large estates and peasants, cultivating by generally backward methods uneconomically small tracts of land. Comparatively little was done in the period between the two wars to break up large holdings or to satisfy the land hunger of the peasants. The development of co-operative purchasing and marketing organizations was also slow (see Chapter XX).

The western half of Poland is economically the most valuable, contains most of the good agricultural land, and is the most densely populated. East of the river Bug productivity is very much lower, except in Galicia, and there are very large areas of forest and marsh, where, however, a very great deal of reclamation work has recently been achieved. Poland has become the fourth largest producer of black coal in Europe. The deposits lie in Upper Silesia, and in the hills of Kielce province, to the north-east, are Poland's deposits of iron, zinc, and lead. Brown coal occurs in Poznan, Pomorze, and near Lwow. The small oil reserves are located along the Carpathian foot-hills. Poland inherited in Upper Silesia an industrial region, based on the local coal and metals. Lodz and Bialystok, formerly Russian, are the centres of the textile industry. Most other industrial towns are west of Warsaw and the east of the country is relatively unindustrialized.

Since 1936 Poland has attempted, by large-scale regional planning, to develop an industrial area in the South of the country, the Central Industrial Region. The 'strategic triangle' lies between the Vistula and its tributary, the San. The organization of this plan bears a certain similarity to that of the Russian Five Year Plans, and its purpose was the same, to accumulate, by the exertions of the people, the equipment to make possible in the future a higher productivity and improved standard of living. Key industries were, wherever possible, to be transferred to this area, where their development

would be facilitated by power lines from hydro-electric plant in the Carpathians and steam generating plant in Upper Silesia. Railway, road, and canal transport is being improved and considerable progress was said to have been made in the development of this region by 1939. But the Polish Government was handicapped by lack of capital, and its creation bears no comparison with the ruthless achievement of the Soviet Union. Before the war began it was apparent that the increased spending power of the industrial workers was leading to a rather greater degree of prosperity in Polish agriculture. The latter had been backward, and in many areas self-sufficiency only was looked for. Agriculture became more diversified, and dairying and the cultivation of specialized and industrial crops was spreading. The problems shared by the Polish peasant with the peasants of other Eastern European countries are discussed in a later chapter.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

History. The Czech state, which was established at the same time as the Polish, has proved more stable politically than Poland, and has shown a more balanced economic development. The medieval kingdom of Bohemia had been extinguished by the Austrians in 1620, and its territory absorbed into the Austrian state, from which it was not again freed until after the First World War. The nucleus of the medieval state had been the basin of the Vltava, a tributary of the Elbe. For much of its history the mountain ranges to the south-west, the north-west, and the north-east have formed the frontiers of the state. On the south-east the rounded hills of Moravia presented no such barrier, and the low corridor beyond was often attached politically to Bohemia, and now the two are regarded as one cultural and linguistic unit.

The German Minority. Within these borders the Czech state developed, comparatively unaffected by the eastward movement of German peoples. This latter gave Bohemia the appearance of a bastion of Slavdom thrust westward between the Germans of Silesia and those of Austria. There was nevertheless a degree of Germanization of Bohemia in the Middle Ages. Not only did the kingdom form part of the

Holy Roman Empire, but its kings were often more German than Czech, and there were large German communities in its towns. It was, however, round the frontiers of the country that actual German settlement was most important. Here the Germans formed a compact area of settlement within the mountain frontier of Bohemia. This belt (Fig. 105) was deepest along the north-western frontier where passage of the Ore mountains was easiest. The distribution of these Sudeten Germans had assumed approximately its present shape by the end of the sixteenth century. It must not be assumed that the German-speaking population of the Sudeten territories was composed wholly of immigrants. Almost certainly large numbers of the native peoples became Germanized.

It was a result of the conditions under which industry grew up in early modern times that the area of German settlement became the most industrialized. Here water-power and, later, coal provided the motive-force. The minerals, which gave their name to the Ore Mountains, contributed to the industrialization of this region, which became the most industrialized in the old Austrian Empire. The Czech republic inherited over 80 per cent. of the textile industry of the Austrian empire, the whole of the china and glassware industries and considerable proportions of the metallurgical. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of this industry was concentrated in the Sudetenland. As a result of the new territorial arrangements the market for the Sudeten German industrialist was restricted. Economic difficulties followed. The Germans blamed the Czech Government for their commercial difficulties, pointing out that Czechoslovakia could not negotiate trade agreements with the facility of a Great Power like Germany. From this it was but a short step to demands for incorporation in the German Reich. The Czech land reform further embittered German-Czech relations. The break-up of large estates and the provision of peasant holdings was on much more thorough lines than in Poland. Czechs on the whole benefited more than the Germans. The latter, however, were in many cases the landowners, and considered themselves hardly served. In Czechoslovakia the linguistic difference between Czechs and Germans was duplicated in the economic and social divisions of the country. Grievances of the Sudeten




FIG. 105. LINGUISTIC MINORITIES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1938
 After E. Wickham and "Bulletin of International News"

Germans were intensified in times of depression and eventually they were captured by the propaganda organized from Berlin.

The German campaign of propaganda and intimidation reached its climax in the summer of 1938, and in September the Czech Government, under pressure from London and Paris, ceded the Sudeten territory to Germany at the Munich settlement. With the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia lost not only the greater part of her industrial plant, but also the strongly fortified mountain barrier which had protected the country on three sides and had constituted a political frontier for the greater part of medieval and all modern times. Now only a few miles of open plain separated the Germans from Prague, and this they crossed without opposition in March 1939, when they occupied the rump of Czechoslovakia and absorbed it into the Reich under the euphemistic title of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

The German occupation of the Sudetenland in September 1938 was the signal for both Poland and Hungary to settle their claims against Czechoslovakia. Poland seized the Teschen-Bohumin area and Hungary's claims, settled shortly afterwards at Vienna, resulted in the loss of tracts of plain to the south of the Carpathian Mountains in Slovakia (see Chapter XIX). Czechoslovakia's frontiers in the west have been restored to the positions they occupied before 1938, though agreement has not yet been reached on a settlement in the Teschen area.

Slovaks and Ruthenes. Slovakia is more mountainous than Bohemia and Moravia, and has been inhabited by the Slovaks, a less developed and more pastoral people. Until the end of the First World War they had been subjects of the Hungarian monarchy, by which they were not, on the whole, harshly treated. The Hungarians, however, resisted any attempt to develop any form of national consciousness among the Slovaks. In 1918 the latter were incapable of nationhood, and it was Slovak emigrés in the U.S.A. who were chiefly responsible for hitching the country on to the Czech territories of Bohemia and Moravia. It appears, however, that, in so far as the Slovaks had any feelings in the matter, they desired to become part of the Czech state.

East of Slovakia, where the Carpathian range narrows and is easily crossed, around the headwaters of the Tisza river, is a

smaller and even less developed group, the Ruthenes. Linguistically they are closely akin to the Ukrainians of Galicia and Russia, though separated from them by the mountain barrier. Like the Slovaks they had been Hungarian subjects. Their territory was given to Czechoslovakia chiefly for strategic reasons, to give it a common frontier with Roumania and to complete the ring round Hungary. It has now passed to Russia, which thus extends a strip of land into the Hungarian Plain.

The mountains of Slovakia and Ruthenia present, on the whole, a steep wall towards Poland, but break up on the south into a series of hill ridges which stretch southward towards the Danube and the great Plain of Hungary. The mountains are thus more easily penetrated from the south, and the contacts of the mountaineers have generally been with the plainsmen to the south. They traded their timber, skins, and animals for the crops of the plain, and the valleys of the Hron, Vah, and Tisza were the common avenues of communication. Economically the Slovaks and Ruthenes were linked with the Magyars of the plain rather than with the Czechs. Their hearts may have turned to the West, but their pockets bade them look to the south. Small areas of plain, at Bratislava, Komoron, Mukačevo, and Kosiče, stretch into the hills. Here the dominant population was Magyar. Railways ran southward to the Hungarian towns of Budapest and Miskolcz. In order to give the Czechs freedom of communication eastward to Ruthenia, it was necessary to give them tracts of Magyar-occupied plain. In this way the Czechoslovak state increased its minority problems and came into conflict with the aspirations of Hungary.

The Czechs numbered about 6,000,000 in a total population of about 14,000,000. The Slovaks were about 3,000,000. The rest of the population was made up of more than three million Sudeten Germans, half a million Ruthenes, three-quarters of a million Magyars in the plains of Slovakia, and a handful of Poles in Northern Moravia. The Czechs were the dominant political force in the country, but social standards were on the whole higher among the Sudeten Germans. The Slovaks were poorer, more illiterate, and less politically conscious than either. The steps taken by the Czechs to ameliorate conditions in

Slovakia were not always well received, and the Slovaks seemed to resent their educational and economic inferiority and to blame the Czechs for their misfortunes. Slovak nationalism grew slowly; grievances did not readily present themselves and had to be manufactured. The autonomist movement, guided at first by Father Hlinka, was powerfully influenced by the Roman Catholic Church, which was itself in contact with the Hungarians.

It was not until after the Munich settlement of 1938 that the Magyars regained part of the plain-lands of Southern Slovakia. At the same time the rest of Slovakia was granted a measure of home rule by the Czechs. In the following March disturbances in Slovakia were the excuse for the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, while Slovakia became a nominally independent republic and the small territory of Ruthenia was wholly absorbed by Hungary.

Strategic Importance of Czechoslovakia. The strategic importance of Bohemia and Moravia has been frequently emphasized. It dominated the easiest route from the plains of northern Europe, across the Central European highland zone to the Danube. This, the "Moravian Gate," has been traversed by armies many times in the past, has now become a trade-route between Austria on the one hand and Germany and Poland on the other. After the German absorption of Western Czechoslovakia the Germans proposed to cut a canal between Upper Silesia and the Danube near Vienna. Czechoslovakia, though the most industrialized of the Slavonic countries, except Russia, has no direct outlet to the sea. After the last war both the Elbe and Danube became international waterways, and carried a good deal of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade. Bratislava on the Danube became the foremost river port of the country. Much of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade passed through Hamburg or Trieste. It was always dependent on the goodwill, which was not always apparent, of Czechoslovakia's neighbours.

Czechoslovakia's position, half surrounded by lands of German speech, has determined her foreign policy. Czech statesmen visualised more clearly than those of Western Europe the trend of German Policy. The alliances with France and later with Russia were an attempt to reduce the disparity

between herself and Germany. The heavy Czech defences in her mountain frontier and her strength in mechanical weapons were also dictated by her fear of her western neighbour. Throughout the inter-war years Czechoslovakia was one of the firmest upholders of the League of Nations and collective security. Common fear of the 'revisionist' claims of Hungary brought Czechoslovakia into close contact with Roumania and Yugoslavia, which had both gained from the disruption of Hungary.

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CHAPTER NINETEEN

THE DANUBIAN STATES

THE attack on Vienna in 1682 was the high-water mark of Turkish conquest in Europe. At this moment the Turks controlled all Greece and the Balkans, except a few islands off the Greek Coast and some fragments of land on the coast of Dalmatia. North of the Danube they held the Hungarian Plain up to the Carpathians, Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldavia, and the northern coastlands of the Black Sea. After 1683 the tide of conquest ebbed back in the way it had come. New nations appeared and grew, some of them into nation-states, but all were bruised and damaged by their long submergence beneath the Turks. The Turks were unable either to assimilate their subject peoples or to rule them peaceably and equitably. Civilization and institutions were submerged and stultified, and when the Turks withdrew the peoples of South-eastern Europe were found to have missed five hundred years of social, political, and economic progress. In the marginal areas of the north and west the Turks were content to exact taxes, but otherwise to leave the subject peoples alone. In these areas political maturity is more pronounced.

THE RECONQUEST OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

The lead in driving the Turks from Europe was taken by Austria, and in this Austria was only fulfilling her historical mission. Ostmark had been established in the tenth century to hold the Danube valley, where it narrows between the Alps and Carpathians, against attack by the nomadic Mongol peoples from Asia. Her role was triumphantly justified when, in 1683, Vienna held the Turkish attack, and now Austria, relegating German interests to a second position, carved out a sphere of interest in the Danube and the Balkans.

The Little Alfold was quickly overrun. In 1686 Budapest, gateway to the Great Alfold, was taken, and two years later Belgrade occupied. A few years later the Russians captured Azof, part of the Turkish possessions on the Black Sea coast.

The two Powers, Austria and Russia, were destined for two centuries to tear at the decaying body of the Turkish Empire from different sides, until, with its disappearance, they came face to face in the struggle for Serbian independence. By the end of the eighteenth century Austria ruled the whole Hungarian Plain, the Carpathian Mountains to the north and Transylvania to the east. On the south the border was formed by the Danube and Sava rivers. The Austrian attempts to advance southward up the Morava valley and to cross the Transylvanian Alps into Wallachia had been foiled. North of the Carpathians the district of Bukovina had been occupied. Russian advances were less spectacular. The northern shore of the Black Sea was cleared as far as the Dnieper, but, as a foretaste of Russia's ambitions in this direction, a foothold was gained in Constantinople. A Church was established here under Russian protection, and Russians received considerable rights to trade and travel within the Ottoman Empire. Henceforward, the Russian Government would not lack an excuse to interfere in the affairs of the Porte, and for the next century the Russian Government kept steadfastly before it the object of getting a free and assured outlet to the Mediterranean.

In 1812 Russia seized Bessarabia; about the same time the little principality of Serbia struggled into existence as the result of a revolt against the Turks. Since the Middle Ages Roumania had consisted of the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. They had never been seriously occupied by the Turks, and, provided their taxes had been paid, enjoyed a considerable measure of independence. The Turks were never formally driven from the principalities; their power just lapsed. Roumania was seen to lie in the path of Russian advance towards Constantinople. The desires of the Roumanian people and the interests of other European Powers appeared to suggest a union of the two principalities. "You want to place a living barrier between Russia and Turkey," said Gladstone; "there is no barrier like the breast of free men." In 1861 the union of Wallachia and Moldavia was proclaimed, despite the opposition of some of the Great Powers, including Russia.

In the middle of the century discontent with Turkish rule and an incipient national feeling grew in the Balkans, assisted

by the Panslav propaganda of Russia. In 1875 the Christian subjects of the Turks revolted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the mainly Serb population was particularly heavily oppressed. The Bosnians were joined by the mountaineers of Montenegro, an inaccessible corner of the Dinaric Alps where Turkish rule had never been more than nominal. In 1876 the revolt spread to the Bulgars, who lived nearer the centre of Turkish rule and consequently felt it more heavily. The Bulgars suffered vicariously for all the rebellions of these years; thousands were massacred in the Bulgarian Atrocities, and Western Europe echoed with the denunciations of the "unspeakable Turk."

A year later, after the Turkish Government had either failed or refused to reform, Russian troops invaded Bulgaria across the territory of Roumania. The Turks sued for peace. The Russian terms envisaged the creation of a great Bulgarian state which would stretch from the Danube to the Ægean and from the Black Sea to the borders of what is now Albania. The importance of 'greater' Bulgaria lay in the immense increase which it gave to Russian influence in the Balkans. On this account it was resisted by Austria and also by Great Britain and France. The Tsar was forced to modify his claims on behalf of the new state of Bulgaria, and in 1878 a compromise settlement was reached at the Congress of Berlin. A small, independent principality of Bulgaria was established, between the Balkan Mountains and the Danube and including also the Isker valley and the Sofia basin. To the south the province of Eastern Rumelia was constituted in the Maritza and Tunja valleys as an autonomous unit within the Turkish Empire.

It is doubtful if Russia reaped the advantages which she hoped and was expected to do from the new territorial arrangements. Russia, like most of the Western Powers, under-rated the strength of Balkan nationalism. The Bulgars desired to be free of Russian tutelage only less than they did of that of Turkey. There was, as Gladstone had pointed out, no barrier to Russian imperialism like the breasts of free men. If the Russians were thought to have advanced their interests in the Balkans Austria demanded some compensation, and was allowed to occupy and garrison, though not to annex, the

territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, lying in the mountainous area between Serbia and the Adriatic. As a further foil to Russian ambitions, Great Britain helped herself to Cyprus. Russia advanced her frontier to the Danube delta by taking Southern Bessarabia, allowing Roumania to recoup herself at the expense of Bulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro both received small accessions of territory.

After 1878 the Balkans became more openly than hitherto the scene of Russo-Austrian rivalries, but a new factor was introduced. Behind the effete and divided Austrian Empire was the newly united German Reich, with a clear-cut policy of eastward expansion. This was in reality a continuation of the old German *Drang nach Osten*, but more deliberate and better planned. The existence of Poland and Russia diverted it to the Danube valleys, and here German theorists conceived of a *Mittleuropa* economically tributary to the Reich, a market for German manufactures and a source of foodstuffs. Beyond the Balkans lay Turkey, the Middle East, and India. A German railway linking these lands was to embody German aspirations. The Austrian occupation of Bosnia was a step in this direction, but the politics of the period between 1878 and 1914 largely revolved round Serbia.

Between Serbia and Montenegro was a corridor known as the Sandjak of Novibazar. It formed a corridor between the Drina valley and the Mitrovitsa basin and was one of the routes between the Hungarian Plain and Salonika or Constantinople. The San Stefano Treaty would have divided this territory between Serbia and Montenegro. The Berlin settlement kept it open and, nominally at least, in Turkish hands. Through this corridor the Germans hoped to build their line into the Balkans. But the Sandjak, together with Bosnia and Herzegovina, was inhabited by people of Serb culture and speech. Serbia acquiesced in the loss of this territory in 1878, but the national consciousness of the Serb people was developing steadily, and not many years later the Serbs were starting an irridentist movement to recover all lands of Serb speech. So the Austro-Serb feud increased. Behind Austria was Germany, behind Serbia, Russia, and any war between Austria and Serbia would involve also the two greater protagonists. Austria chose a moment in 1908 when Russia was

weakened and humiliated after her war with Japan to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without active Russian support the Serbs could only protest, but it was clear that no second clash between the expansionist aims of Austria and the nationalist aspirations of Serbia could have a peaceful issue. That second clash came in 1914; Austria attacked Serbia. Russia came to the help of her Slav ally, and Germany stood beside Austria.

Before this date, however, the two Bulgarian principalities had united, and later became the kingdom of Bulgaria. In 1912 Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece had combined to attack the Turks, and had succeeded in conquering almost all that was left of Turkey in Europe. Divisions between the victors led to a Second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria was very severely handled by her neighbours and lost the southern part of the Dobrudja to Roumania and most of her strip of the Thracian coast of Greece. Serbia absorbed the Sandjak, but her progress towards the Adriatic was checked by the creation of the state of Albania. The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 left a legacy of hatred and distrust, which broke out in 1914 in the Great War.

The last hundred years have seen various attempts to reconcile the national problems of the Balkan peoples with one another, and with the ambitions of the Great Powers. So far only a brief historical outline has been given; we now turn to the problems of individual countries, first Austria, Hungary, and Roumania; then Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Turkey.

AUSTRIA

Austria began her existence as the eastern frontier province of Germany. The ambitions of its Habsburg rulers and their preoccupation with the Danube basin diverted its interests gradually from Germany. The effect of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 was to destroy Austrian influence in Southern Germany, where it had remained considerable, and to make Austria an extra-German and predominantly Slavonic state. In the *Ausgleich* of 1867 the former Austrian Empire was divided, under the Habsburgs, into an Empire of Austria and Kingdom of Hungary. The Dual Monarchy remained until 1918, when it broke up into fragments.

The Austria which was left was a small, mountainous state. Of its population of about six-and-three-quarter millions, about a quarter live in the great city of Vienna, which grew to its present size as the administrative, financial, and distributing centre for an empire ten times the size of post-war Austria. The Austrian Republic inherited the liabilities, without the assets, of an imperial Power. Her industries were handicapped by a




FIG. 106. THE BREAK-UP OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE

shortage of the raw materials which she had previously imported from Bohemia or Hungary; her markets were in the succession states which adopted economic policies more or less nationalistic. Her food-supply, which had previously come from Moravia, Hungary, or Croatia, was inadequate. The solution was, of course, for Austria, now freed from her Danubian and Balkan commitments, to become once again a part of a German state. This was forbidden by the Allied Powers both in the peace treaties and as one of the conditions in which economic assistance had been given to Austria in 1922. In 1931 a form of economic union between the two countries was

concluded. The Western Powers, with whom the agreement of 1922 had been signed, protested against this step, and later in the year it was abandoned at the same time as the permanent Court of International Justice pronounced it illegal. It is probable that most Austrians would have willingly joined a Germany in which there was still some semblance of democratic forms. It is no less probable that the majority did not approve the forcible annexation of Austria to Nazi Germany. The first attempt was in June 1934. It miscarried, and Austria retained a precarious independence until February 1938, when *Anschluss* was accomplished by the armies of Nazi Germany.

Austria has since been regarded as an integral part of Germany, and its old name of Österreich has been replaced by Ostmark. At the Teheran Conference the Allied Powers registered their intention to re-establish a sovereign and independent Austria. It is possible that, in view of the history of the last ten years, this will be welcome to the Austrian people, but whether the re-creation of an Austria within its 1920 frontiers will make for peace and stability in post-war Europe remains to be seen.

The Austria established by the Treaty of St Germain was almost exclusively a German-speaking state. Its frontier towards Germany remained unaltered, but on the south the southern part of the Tyrol province was lost to Italy, in spite of a considerable German-speaking population. A natural and strategic frontier replaced one which followed rather more closely ethnic lines. A plebiscite was held in the Klagenfurt basin, in the Drava valley, and resulted in the whole area remaining in Austria. The Slovenes of this district were the only compact body of non-German people in the new state, and Yugoslavia has recently coupled this area with the Venezia Giulia in its demands for frontier revision. On the east Austria received the Burgenland, a narrow strip of plain, inhabited mainly by Germans, with a small Magyar minority. Its possession would ease the food position in Vienna, but Hungarian irregular forces showed no eagerness to evacuate it, and eventually it was decided to hold a plebiscite in the town and district of Sopron (Odenburg), where the Magyar population was greatest. As a result this area returned to Hungary.

HUNGARY

The Magyars, more than any other European people are associated with a definite geographical region, and with a particular environment. They were an Asiatic people who had settled and closely identified themselves with the grasslands of the middle Danube basin. Such racial characteristics had become submerged, but they had kept their language and much of their distinctive culture. Although Hungarian settlement was confined to the plain and the surrounding foothills, the Magyars conquered much of the surrounding hilly and mountainous country, between which and the plain the closest economic ties have developed.

The pre-1918 state of Hungary included the whole of Slovakia, with its prolongation in the Sub-Carpathian Russia or Ruthenia. On the east and south-east its frontier followed the crest of the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps, and on the south the Sava and Danube. To the south-west a corridor of Hungarian territory stretched to the Adriatic and included the port of Fiume. The surrounding highlands were complementary to the plains. The latter, treeless and almost devoid of any other kind of fuel, obtained timber from the forested highlands. In the period between 1867 and 1914 the Hungarians carried through a considerable programme of industrialization, in which they made great use of the minerals, timber, and agricultural produce of the mountain fringe. A railway system was developed, with its focus at Budapest and a radial system of routes linking the capital with the marginal areas. A further illustration of the interdependence of mountain and plain is found in the problem of flood control, for which the whole Tisza valley is best considered as a unit.

The economic unity of the Hungary plain is sharply contrasted with its cultural and linguistic diversity. The table shown at the top of p. 322 gives the composition of the people of Hungary in 1910 and 1920, before and after the break-up of the old kingdom.

The Magyars, who composed about half of the population of Hungary before 1914, were almost exclusively a plains people. But to the east, in the basin of Transylvania, a rich area of rolling uplands, surrounded by a mountain barrier,

the Szekeli had settled. These people, whose origin is still uncertain, though they are probably of Asiatic origin, had

| | 1910 | 1920 |
|------------------|------------|-----------|
| Magyars . . . | 9,944,627 | 7,147,053 |
| Germans . . . | 1,903,357 | 551,211 |
| Slovaks . . . | 1,946,357 | 141,882 |
| Roumanians . . . | 2,948,186 | 23,760 |
| Serbs . . . | 656,324 | 17,131 |
| Croats . . . | | 36,858 |
| Ruthenes . . . | 464,270 | 1,500 |
| Others . . . | 401,412 | 60,748 |
| Total . . . | 18,264,533 | 7,980,143 |

become Magyar in culture, though separated from the Plain of Hungary by the mountains of Bihar. The uniformity of Magyar settlement on the plain was broken only by the areas of German settlement and by the very varied ethnic groups of the Voivodina, the south-eastern part of the plain. German settlers were most numerous in Western Hungary, especially that area of it which was surrendered to Austria under the name of the Burgenland. There were, however, considerable groups in the Banat and in Transylvania. Many of these Germans are descendants of settlers who arrived many centuries earlier as miners, prospectors, and traders. Others were settled in the empty lands, laid waste by the Turks in their final retreat, and yet others had come more recently as the servants of the Habsburg Empire. The Germans were too scattered to give rise to serious minority problems, and their higher cultural standards and their attachment, which they never allowed themselves to forget, to the German state gave them an almost privileged position. In the Voivodina and the Banat the ethnic pattern is particularly complex. Here representatives of almost all the subject peoples of the Habsburg Empire were settled in village communities after the retreat of the Turks early in the eighteenth century. An ethnic frontier is impossible in this area, and toleration and mutual understanding, never yet manifested in this part of Europe, alone can assure peace and stability.

The highlands to the north of the plain are inhabited by the

Slovaks and Ruthenes, the latter a relatively small people closely connected with the Ukrainian. Both people were mainly pastoral and their standard of living was extremely low. These mountains were one of the poverty spots of Europe, where a state of semi-starvation was normal for the bulk of the population. Slovakia was the richer of the two areas, and mining was important. The wealth of Ruthenia was limited to its slight agricultural possibilities. These peoples sold timber, wool, and skins down the river to the Hungarian Plain. In summer they came south as seasonal labourers on the farms of Hungary, often taking back to the hills with them enough grain to last the winter. Along the foot of the hills a line of small market-towns grew up, the meeting-place of mountain and plain; Hust, Mukačevo, Uzhorod, Kosiče, Miskolcz. Rather similar conditions obtained on the east, where similar towns, Satul-Mare, Oradea, Arad, Temisoara, grew up where the Transylvanian rivers left the hills.

Like Slovakia, Transylvania contained a large and compact non-Magyar minority, consisting of Roumanians, who in 1920 made up about 55 per cent. of the total population of the province. The rival claims of Magyars and Roumanians to the province of Transylvania form one of the bitterest territorial disputes in Europe. There is much uncertainty concerning the date of the Roumanian occupation of the country, and Magyars claim that they and the Szekeli were there before the Roumanians. It was in the hills of Transylvania that Magyar culture survived the Turkish occupation and from here sprang many of the leaders of Magyar resistance. Quite apart from the economic ties between the hills and the plain, the Magyars have a great sentimental interest in Transylvania, which springs from the centuries of close connexion between them. The Roumanians of Transylvania are, like the Slovaks, primitive pastoralists, cultivators and lumbermen, coming to the plains as seasonal labourers, dependent on the market-towns of the foothills. Religion constituted a further barrier between the Roumanians and the Magyars. The latter have been Roman Catholic since their Christianization; the former are Orthodox.

The southern frontier of Hungary followed the Sava river up to its tributary, the Una, and then broke away to the

Adriatic, thus including within Hungary a compact area inhabited by Croats and Serbs. The former, much the more numerous, resented their domination by the Magyars, and many among them cherished ideas of a pan-Slavonic union south of the Danube. This Croat territory was of great importance because it contained Hungary's only port, Fiume.

In the half-century before her collapse in 1918 Hungary had pursued a policy of Magyarizing her subject peoples. This was resented by them all and actively opposed by the more vigorous, such as the Croats. With the defeat of the Central Powers imminent in 1918 the subject peoples, encouraged by the tenth of Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points," prepared to assert their independence. The formation of the Czechoslovak state and the addition of Ruthenia has already been described. In July 1917 the representatives of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes met at Corfu and agreed upon the formation of a state embracing their respective peoples. Roumania, who had entered the First World War on the side of the Allies in the hope of extending her territory at the expense of Hungary, demanded the cession of Transylvania. The frontier changes that were made were justified by appeal to the idea of nationality, which derived from Gladstonian Liberalism. The peoples of Austria-Hungary were to "be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development," and the frontiers were redrawn to allow them this opportunity.

The Kingdom of Hungary lost almost two-thirds of its former territory. The problems created by the loss of Slovakia and Ruthenia have been discussed in the previous chapter, and it is sufficient to repeat that the frontier drawn by the Allied statesmen was a little generous to Czechoslovakia, which gained the extensive area of plain between Bratislava and Estergom, north of the Danube, and smaller areas further east. Roumania gained, as was to be expected, the Transylvanian uplands where there was a Roumanian majority and also the Székeli and German-inhabited areas. But the line drawn across the Hungarian Plain, from the Czechoslovak frontier to the Danube, included within Roumania the foot-hill towns of Arad and Oradea with several others. These were predominantly Magyar, though closely linked economically with the Transylvanian highlands. The Voivodina and part of the

Banat, with their mixed populations and doubtful allegiance, went to the new state of Yugoslavia, together with Slavonia, Croatia, and the adjacent parts of the Dalmatian coast. On the west, as already described, the Burgenland was lost to Austria.




FIG. 107. HUNGARY IN 1914 AND 1920, AND ACCESSIONS OF TERRITORY IN 1938-41

Hungarian Foreign Policy. No country could have been expected to accept such losses with equanimity, but Hungary made the recovery of her lost territories the dominant motive in her foreign policy. The campaign for revision of the Treaty of Trianon was worked up and pursued with the greatest vigour. Any and every kind of foreign help was enlisted. The irritantism of Hungary led her neighbours, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia, to form in 1921 the Little Entente, an alliance of the three Powers which had profited most from the dismemberment of Hungary. As long as her neighbours

were united Hungary could achieve nothing without powerful allies in Europe. She first chose Italy, a country like herself with large claims and few friends. But Italian help came to nothing, and with the rise of Hitler Hungary transferred her




FIG. 108. THE LITTLE ENTENTE AND THE BALKAN ENTENTE

suit to Germany. The more troubled the political waters, the greater was the chance of Hungary's fishing being profitable. Hungary joined the Axis, and, as Hitler's ally, regained her first territory in 1938 from Czechoslovakia. By the Award of Vienna, November 1938, Hungary was allowed to take the Magyar-settled plains of Slovakia and Ruthenia. In the following March, with Hitler's occupation of the rump of

Czechoslovakia, Hungary was allowed to take the rest of Ruthenia, so that her frontier now met that of Poland along the crest of the Carpathians. In August 1940 a further 'revision' of frontiers took place under German direction; the northern part of Transylvania, including Satul-Mare and Oradea, the Transylvanian capital of Cluz and the territories inhabited by the Szekeli were restored to Hungary. The population of this area was about two and a half millions; one and a half millions of them were Roumanians. There remained a considerable number of Magyars in the Eastern Banat and in Southern Transylvania, and Hungary intimated that she hoped to regain these territories as well. Roumania protested against the loss of territories which she considered to be historically and ethnographically Roumanian. The Russian occupation of the lower Danube countries in 1944 appears to presage the restoration to Roumania of the whole of Transylvania.¹ After the German conquest of Yugoslavia in April 1941 Hungary was allowed to reoccupy the southern part of the Baranje, between the Danube and the Drava, and also the Backa, between the Danube and the Tisza, but the rest of the former Hungarian territory went to form the puppet state of Croatia. The frontier on this side has been restored to its position before the German invasion of Yugoslavia.

ROUMANIA

The Roumanians are unique among the peoples of Eastern Europe in speaking a language derived from Latin. This they claim to have inherited from the Roman settlers of Dacia. After the abandonment of the latter province by the Romans the Goths, Huns, and other invaders are said to have driven the Romanized people into the natural fortress of Transylvania, where they absorbed groups of other peoples who penetrated their fortresses, and acquired fragments of Slavonic speech and elements of Slavonic culture and institutions. With the return of more settled conditions in the later Middle Ages the Roumanian people spread outward, chiefly to the east and

¹ There has been, under Russian ægis, a marked improvement in the relations of Hungary and Roumania, and it seems likely that Hungary will be allowed to keep the portion of Transylvania which she has occupied, with, perhaps, some revision of the frontier.

south, and settled what came later to be called the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. The alternative explanation is that the Romanized Dacians withdrew to the south of the Danube and later spread northward to the principalities. These two theses have been put forward with great warmth by the Roumanians and Hungarians respectively, and on them




FIG. 109. ROUMANIA, AS ESTABLISHED IN THE PARIS TREATIES OF 1920, SHOWING TERRITORIES LOST TO HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND RUSSIA, 1939-41

have been based the rival claims for the possession of Transylvania.

Wallachia is the low plateau between the Transylvanian Alps and the Danube, an area of high fertility with to-day a dense peasant population. Moldavia lies to the north, between the Carpathians and the river Pruth. In the Middle Ages they were brought within the economic sphere of Byzantium. Later the Turks dominated, without actually conquering and occupying the country. They left it to the Phanariot Greeks,

but were always careful to check any national rising. Nevertheless, about 1600 a Roumanian state was set up for a short time, embracing all Roumanian people both of the principalities and of Transylvania. As the power of the Turkish Empire declined it tended to be replaced by that of Russia. In 1812 the Russians occupied Bessarabia, and ten years later secured what was in effect a veto on the choice of *Hospodars*, or governors of the two principalities. These were now Roumanians. A national consciousness began slowly to develop, and a political union of all Roumanian peoples became a matter of political policy. In 1861 the two principalities were united under a native prince, replaced five years later by King Carol, a German. In 1856, at the end of the Crimean War, Russia was forced to renounce her vague authority over Roumania, and to give up to it a semicircular strip of southern Bessarabia. This was again lost in 1878. The remainder of Bessarabia was occupied in 1918. Soon afterwards the Bukovina, Transylvania, and the Hungarian provinces immediately to the west were added to the Roumanian state. The northern part of Dobrudja, the limestone tableland between the lower Danube and the sea, was gained from the Turkish Empire in 1878, and the remainder during the second Balkan War (see Chapter XX) in 1913. These marginal territories each present individual problems and are best considered separately.

Bessarabia. Bessarabia is a fertile plateau, with extreme climate, lying between the deep valleys of the Dniester and the Pruth. It is a western continuation of the Russian plain, into which elements of Russian and Baltic peoples have intruded. Over half the population is Roumanian, and a quarter possibly is Russian or Ukrainian. There is a very large Jewish population, mainly urban in its distribution. In spite of the considerable agricultural resources of Bessarabia, the people are poor, and are generally unable to market their surplus produce owing to the almost complete lack of transport facilities. The Roumanian Government has been inefficient and corrupt. Trade has been very largely in the hands of Jews, who have been the victims of a series of pogroms. In June 1940 the U.S.S.R. demanded the return of Bessarabia, and it was ceded at once.

Bukovina. Bukovina is a small fertile province of mountains

and hills lying to the north-west of Moldavia. Its population is Ukrainian and Roumanian, with a large body of German settlers, and has suffered, like the Bessarabian, from Roumanian misrule. From 1774 to 1918 it was an Austrian province, after which it became Roumanian. The northern part of Bukovina, including Czernowitz, the capital, passed to Russia along with Bessarabia in 1940. It would otherwise have constituted a salientic Russian territory after the occupation of eastern Poland.

Transylvania, Banat, Crisana, and Maramures. The problems relating to these formerly Hungarian territories have already been noticed. Roumanians constitute little more than a half of the population of Transylvania, and there are large Szekeli and German minorities. These groups are most numerous in the towns, and their standards are generally higher than those of the Roumanians. The population of the Banat is more varied, and the ethnic groups are intermixed to a greater degree than elsewhere. The provinces of Crisana and Maramures, lying to the north of the Banat, each contain an area of the Hungarian Plain, with a Magyar majority, and a hill region to the east, mainly Roumanian. Towards the north are found groups of Slovaks and Ruthenes and, chiefly in the towns, there are numbers of Germans and Jews. The whole area has considerable agricultural wealth, which is greatest in the Banat, and in Transylvania are reserves of minerals, including coal, iron, bauxite, and copper. As has been noticed earlier, the Vienna Award of 1940 gave to Hungary Maramures and the Northern parts of Crisana and Transylvania.

Dobrudja. Dobrudja is the area of fertile steppe between the lower Danube and the sea. The northern part of the territory was gained in 1878 as compensation for the loss of Southern Bessarabia, and the southern in 1913 as far as the Deli Orman range. Roumanian losses during the First World War were annulled at the Armistice. Roumanian treatment of her Bulgar minority in the southern part of the Dobrudja was not above reproach, and in August 1940, by the Craiova Agreement, the southern part of the territory was surrendered to Bulgaria. The wealth of the Dobrudja is confined almost entirely to its agricultural possibilities. On its coast is

Constanța, which is linked by pipe-line laid across the Dobrudja with the oil-fields of Wallachia.

Roumania before 1940 was closely comparable in population and economic resources with Czechoslovakia. It was, however, less industrialized, and the population is mainly agricultural. Standards of farming and the level of crop yields are both low, and without far greater state help than has ever yet been available the peasants cannot get the necessary tools of their trade. Mineral resources are not great, but Roumania has sufficient coal and iron, assuming that she retains Transylvania as a result of the present settlement, for a considerable degree of industrialization. Roumania has derived much of her importance in international affairs from her possession of the largest oil-field in Europe, excluding Russia. Her production in 1938 was about six and a half million metric tons, and for several years previously her output had been dropping, in spite of every incentive to increased output. It is possible that the exhaustion of the Roumanian fields is in sight. Roumania has become a byword for political corruption and maladministration, inherited in large measure from the evil days of Turkish rule. This has checked the progress of economic development, and gains that have been made have been purchased at an altogether excessive price. But, given a stable and honest Government, there is no reason why the progress already made in the industrialization of the country should not be continued. Metallurgical, chemical, and textile manufactures have been developed most, and Brasov has become a centre of the heavy industries. Problems of peasant agriculture, common to Roumania and all other countries of south-eastern Europe, are considered in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER TWENTY

THE BALKANS

In the previous chapter only passing reference has been made to those countries lying south of the Danube, which together




FIG. 110. STAGES IN THE DISRUPTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

make up the Balkans. The modern kingdom of Serbia emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the mountainous country between the Sava and the Serbian Morava. Greece revolted and gained her independence within rather narrower limits than those which she now enjoys, in 1830, and in 1878 Bulgaria was recognized as an independent principality.

These three states occupied a relatively small area of the Balkans; around and between them was Hungarian and Turkish territory. The first to augment its territory was Serbia, which added in 1878 the valley of the Bulgarian Morava as far up as Vranje, including the towns of Nish and Pirot. The principality of Bulgaria, as constituted at the same time, consisted of the platform between the Balkan Mountains and the Danube, together with the upland basins to the southwest, drained by the upper courses of the Struma, Isker, and Nishava. To the south was Eastern Rumelia, consisting of the valleys of the Maritza and the Tunja, a Bulgar province which enjoyed a measure of home rule under the Turks. In 1885 Eastern Rumelia, essentially Bulgar in population and sympathy, was absorbed into the Bulgarian state. The failure of Turkey, through internal weaknesses and dissensions, to prevent this unification of Bulgaria was indicative of her coming collapse.

THE BALKAN WARS

The independent states of the Balkans can be regarded as each the nucleus of a larger state, and the intervening territory of the Turkish Empire as awaiting distribution among them. It proved easy, by a combined effort, to take this territory from Turkey; it was more difficult to divide it equitably among themselves. The former was accomplished in the First Balkan War, of 1912. The four Balkan states; Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and the little principality of Montenegro, which had asserted and maintained its independence in the rugged mountains behind the Gulf of Kotor, attacked Turkey. Victory was complete, and the Bulgar forces reached the Tchataldja lines, which protected Constantinople. Peace was followed by the division of the spoil. Montenegro extended her territory beyond the Tara river and included Djakovica, in the Metoya basin; Bulgaria reached the Ægean, and Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria divided Macedonia among them. Two territorial problems presented themselves, one concerning the relations between the Balkan and the Great Powers; the other, the interrelationship of the Balkan states themselves.

Albania. The Dinaric mountains present a barrier to communications between the Danubian Plain and the Adriatic,

but are interrupted in the North, behind Fiume, and in Albania, where several rivers rise to the east of the ranges and cross them to the Adriatic. Chief of these are the White Drin, which affords a route from Prizren to Scutari, and the Skumbi and Semeni which flow from the region of lakes Okhrida and Prespa westward to the Strait of Otranto. The landlocked state of Serbia looked upon these, particularly the Drin, as its natural outlet to the sea. Bulgaria had claims, however slender, to the Okhrida-Prespa area. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary objected to Serbian control of this important section of the Adriatic coast, and Italy hoped to control both sides of the narrow Strait of Otranto. Since the time of King Pyrrhus—the third century B.C.—there has been a tendency for Albania and Apulia to be held by the same political unit. The solution reached by the Great Powers on this occasion was to establish an independent state of Albania, to be ruled by a German prince, William of Wied.¹

The difficulty of drawing the frontier reflected the amorphous nature of Albania. The country is very mountainous, and communications are difficult except along the few through routes. The population, a large majority of which is Moslem, was at this time held together by no common feeling of nationality. Instead, a tribal division predominated; feuds were normal. The valleys were self-contained units, and trade was negligible. It can hardly be claimed that Albania was ripe for political independence. It relapsed in 1914 into a condition of anarchy. The Treaty of London, of 1915, recognized Italy's interest in Albania and would have given her the port of Valona and adjoining territory. But the Italian occupation of Albania in 1920 was resisted by the tribesmen, and the independence of the country was again established. A local chieftain, Ahmed Zogu, became president and later king, and began Westernizing his country. This, however, only made it tributary to Italy. The development of the minerals, industries, and communications was made possible with Italian capital, and in 1927 Albania entered into a defensive alliance with Italy.

In April 1939 Italian forces occupied the country. The

¹ For an excellent account of these negotiations see Lord Grey of Falloden's *Twenty-five Years*.

political developments which made this step necessary are uncertain, but it would appear that the Italian occupation could make little real difference to the position of Albania. The occupation was, however, only the prelude to the invasion of Greece which began in the following year. The independence of Albania has now been restored, and the state is now a Communist republic.

Macedonia. This ill-defined territory occupies the lower valleys of the Vardar and Struma. Its relief is low, and opening on to it are natural route-ways which have made it a focus of human movement since prehistoric times. Chief of these is the Vardar valley, which is continued northward by a series of valleys and basins to the Morava, thus providing the only clear-cut route-way from the Danube to the Ægean. A natural outlet for the trade of Serbia was down the Vardar valley to the port of Salonika, near its mouth. Of less importance as a route-way is the Struma valley, which drains the basins of South-western Bulgaria. East to west through Macedonia and its eastward continuation, Thrace, is a line of communication from Constantinople to the Adriatic. Lastly, a route-way, now followed by the Athens-Salonika railway, runs southward along the western shore of the Ægean. The population, as might be expected, is extremely mixed. This is an area where nationality has no meaning; the inhabitants describe themselves as Serb or Bulgar, Greek or Turk, according to their convenience. Most are Slav-speaking, but it cannot be claimed that their language is either Serb or Bulgar. The Greek-speaking population has been increased since 1924 by the settlement of evacuated Greeks from Asia Minor, and some are found outside the boundary of the Greek state. There are also Albanians in Western Macedonia and small groups of Vlachs, whose language is akin to Roumanian. From as early as 1870 Greeks and Bulgars had attempted to win a following in Macedonia, and their success was proportionate to the benefits they could offer. The chronic misrule by the Turks led in 1903 to an international regime in this unhappy country, but this was abandoned when the Turkish Government showed some signs of reforming itself.

Such was the country which the victors of the first Balkan War set out to partition among themselves. The frontiers had

hardly been laid down when the Bulgars, dissatisfied with their share of Macedonia, attacked Serbia and Greece. Turkey joined the fray against Bulgaria, to be followed by Roumania, anxious to acquire the southern Dobrudja. As a result of the two Balkans Wars, Montenegro increased her territory; Greece and Serbia divided Macedonia between them; and Bulgaria, after gaining Thrace, with the port of Kavalla in the first war, lost all except a strip of eastern Thrace, with the port of Dedeagatch, in the second.

The defeat of Bulgaria and of Austria-Hungary in the First World War led to even more radical changes in the political geography of the Balkans. Bulgaria lost territory to both Serbia and Greece, and Serbia became the nucleus of the kingdom of the Southern Slavs. We have now to examine the geographical problems of these two states.

YUGOSLAVIA

The distribution of the Slavonic-speaking peoples has already been described. Those living south of the Danube comprise the three closely related groups, the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. In spite, however, of similar languages and broadly similar racial make-up, their historical and cultural traditions were very different. Serbia lay east of the dividing-line of the Roman Empire; it was Christianized from Constantinople, and adopted the Orthodox faith, and, in literary matters, the Cyrillic script. It remained under Turkish rule from the time of the battle of Kossovo (1389) until after 1800, with the backwardness and demoralization that result from such an occupation. The Croat and Slovene territories were in closer contact with the West, derived their faith and culture from Italy and were subject to the Turks only for a relatively short period. The Slovenes passed under the rule of Austria, and the Croats were given a measure of home rule within Hungary. Standards of agriculture, housing, sanitation, and education were higher among the Slovenes and Croats than among the Serbs. On the other hand, it was the Serbs who asserted their independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and thus established a moral superiority which they strove to convert into a political supremacy.

It was assumed that, with the defeat of Austria and Hungary in 1918, their Slavonic subjects would break away and form political units of their own. In 1917 representatives of the three Slavonic peoples met at Corfu, and agreed on the formation, in the event of the defeat of the Central Powers, of a




FIG. 111. YUGOSLAVIA: RELIEF, LANGUAGES, RELIGIONS, AND RAILWAYS

single state of the Southern Slavs, comprising "all the territory where our nation lives in compact masses and without discontinuity, and where it could not be mutilated without injuring the vital interests of the community." A genuine pan-Slav sympathy contributed to this decision, but more potent was the fear of the ambitions of Italy.

The new state was born divided. Its total population of a little more than 12,000,000, was made up of:

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|
| Serbs | 6,000,000 |
| Croats | 2,600,000 |
| Slovenes | 1,100,000 |
| Macedonian Slavs | 500,000 |
| Moslem Serbs | 625,000 |
| Magyars | 450,000 |
| Germans | 400,000 |
| Albanians | 250,000 |
| Roumanians | 150,000 |
| Others (including Italians) | 175,000 |

The first three of these groups lived in compact bodies of population, the Slovenes in the valleys of the Drava in the extreme north-west of the future Yugoslavia; the Serbs in the centre and east; the Croats distributed in a ring in the western half of the country, around the Bosnian Serbs. The Serbs had the advantage of a compact distribution and more than a century of independent or quasi-independent existence. It is impossible here to survey the course of the internal politics of Yugoslavia. They were eventful, and most of the disputes revolved round the Croat-Serb problem. It was not until 1939 that a solution was reached with the establishment of a federal system, in which the Croats had a measure of home rule. This compromise was reached, like the pact of 1917, only in the face of a threat from outside, this time from Germany. The present regime in Yugoslavia is clearly modelled on that of Russia. The country is divided into six autonomous republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and one autonomous area, the Voivodina.¹ All possible is done to blur the old differences between the cultural groups of Yugoslavia and to substitute a Southern Slav nationalism for the feuds of Croat and Serb.

Frontiers. The frontiers of Yugoslavia were nowhere free from controversy and dispute. They may be divided into those fronting (i) Austria, (ii) Hungary, (iii) Bulgaria, (iv) Greece and Albania, (v) the Adriatic and Italy.

(i) *Austria.* The problem here was to decide the affinities of the portion of Carinthia lying in the Drava valley below

¹ See *The Times*, September 21, 1946.

Villach and centring in the town of Klagenfurt. A plebiscite resulted in a majority vote for retention in Austria, though it is probable that many here, as on the German-Polish border, really voted for retention in a long-established and stable state




FIG. 112. THE PROVINCES OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1938
Autonomous Croatia is shaded.

rather than union with one new and untried. It appears that Carinthia and adjoining areas of Styria have been Germanized only in comparatively recent times, and in her more chauvinistic moods Yugoslavia has claimed the whole region.

(ii) *Hungary.* The frontier laid down in 1919 was made to follow very approximately the courses of the Mur and Drava rivers, but turned to the north-east before the junction of the

latter with the Danube, to include in Yugoslavia the plain on each side of the lower Tisza. This rich plain-land, comprising Slavonia, Baranje, Bačka, and Banat, was dominated by the Magyars before the Turkish invasions. With the reconquest,




FIG. 113. FEDERAL DIVISIONS OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1946, ACCORDING TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION

There are six autonomous republics (Montenegro is not named) and two autonomous areas, Voivodina and Kosovo-Metohija (K.M.).

early in the eighteenth century, large areas were depopulated and resettled by village communities drawn from different sources. This explains the confused linguistic pattern now found in the Bačka and the Banat. At the same time large estates were formed, owned by the Magyar aristocracy. The map makes it clear how difficult was the problem of frontier

drawing in this region, and how inevitable were grievances on both sides. The German and Magyar minorities in these areas were a continual problem, which became more serious with the rise of Nazi Germany and its alliance with Hungary.

(iii) *Bulgaria*. The frontier here follows sparsely populated mountainous country, where only minor rectifications have been made since 1878. This consists of four salients ceded by Bulgaria in 1919 for strategic reasons. The most important of these, the Strumitza area, was conceived to be a threat to the Yugoslav railway down the Vardar valley. All these areas are predominantly Bulgar in speech and sympathy.

(iv) *Greece and Albania*. There was no alteration in the political frontier on this side, but Yugoslavia shares with Greece the problem of ruling the mixed population of Macedonia and of countering the irridentist activities of Bulgaria. Yugoslavia's relations with Albania are perhaps more complex. A solid body of Moslem Albanians inhabit the mountainous country north of Skoplje, through which passes the route to the Ibar valley. Their political consciousness has not yet been sufficiently excited to constitute a danger to the Yugoslav state, but they are a potential threat. At the same time control of the mouth of the Drin is, as has been explained above, a matter of some interest to Yugoslavia. In spite of these facts, the relations of Yugoslavia and Albania, both Communist states, are closer than ever before.

(v) *The Adriatic and Italy*. The eastern coast of the Adriatic was controlled in the Middle Ages by Venice and has since been settled on a considerable scale by Italians. We have seen the international complications arising from Italy's claim to Albania. In 1915 she claimed, and was promised in the Treaty of London, which was not made public, the whole Dalmatian coastline. The union among the Slav peoples prevented the realization of these claims, and Italy received in this region only the province of Venezia Giulia.

The influence of the Dinaric mountains on communications in Yugoslavia has already been stressed. They prevented Italian settlement from advancing far into the interior, but at the same time they cut the interior of Yugoslavia off from the coast. This has given a quite exceptional importance to the few gaps and routes across these ranges. The Drin valley




FIG. 114. VENEZIA GIULIA AND TRIESTE, SHOWING LANGUAGES AND DIVISION INTO ZONES A (BRITISH-AMERICAN HELD) AND B (YUGOSLAV-HELD)

After A. E. Moodie

route has already been mentioned. Two railways have been built through the ranges of Primorska, one following the winding course of the Narenta from Sarajevo to Metkovic and Dubrovnik, and another to Sibenik and Split (see map). Neither is suitable for heavy traffic, and the natural outlet of the country to the Adriatic would appear to be through Fiume, which is connected by rail with both Ljubljana and Zagreb. Fiume, however, like most other towns of the Dalmatian coast, has a large Italian population, and was, in fact, claimed by Italy. Italian feeling ran high in this matter, and in 1919 D'Annunzio, with a following of irregular troops, occupied the town. Yugoslavia was forced to recognize the *fait accompli*. A free city of Fiume was established until 1924, when it was incorporated in Italy, together with the town of Zara, a number of small islands in the Quarnero Gulf, and Sasseno off the Albanian coast. Fiume was thus cut off from its natural hinterland, and, like Danzig, declined in economic importance. The Yugoslavs developed the adjoining but much inferior port of Sušak, and the trade of Split and Dubrovnik also increased in spite of their weak landward communications.

North of Fiume the frontier was made to run along the Julian Karst and the Julian Alps, to meet the Austrian boundary near Villach. The boundary on the Karst was expected to follow the watershed, very difficult to determine in this region of subterranean drainage, and the line actually drawn appeared to favour Italy. In fact, some 500,000 Yugoslavs were left on the Italian side of the line. This frontier had been established by an Italy which, if not a glorious victor in the last war, had at least espoused the winning cause. In 1945 a defeated and divided Italy faced a victorious Yugoslavia, and the latter country claims the port of Trieste and the Julian region to the north of it. The rural population in this area appears to be predominantly Slovene, and the town of Trieste, though Italian in speech and probably in sympathy, serves as an outlet for Northern Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Austria.

Yugoslavia has had the misfortune to lie in the path of the German political and economic advance south-eastward into the Balkans and also to be an obstacle in the way of Italy's realization of her ambition to control the Adriatic littoral.

For the first half of the period between the two wars threat of Italian expansion was ever present, and for part of this time Italy was allied with Hungary. Yugoslavia became a member of the Little Entente in order to help to check aggressive designs in Hungary. Her alliance with France was some slight protection against Italy and Germany, and the Balkan Entente (Yugoslavia, Roumania, Greece, and Turkey) intimidated Bulgaria. But Yugoslavia had no help in solving her internal problems. The feud of Serb and Croat ran on through the whole period of her independent existence; it paralysed resistance to Germany both before and after the German attack in April 1941, and it may be that the events of the period 1941-45 have served only to exacerbate the problems of these two peoples.

Like the other Balkan countries, Yugoslavia is mainly agricultural. Some 80 per cent. of the employed population and their dependents work on the land. Population is greatest in the north, in the provinces of Duna, Drava, and the lowland part of Sava; least in the mountainous Primorje, Zeta, and Vardar. Areas of high agricultural productivity are thus furthest from the ports, and Yugoslavia has been encouraged to sell her surplus of foodstuffs in Central Europe rather than Western. Germany became her greatest single market, taking in 1939 over 50 per cent. of Yugoslavia's exports. Yugoslavia's dependence on the German market was accentuated by Germany's policy of offering a favourable price for the whole exportable surplus of a given crop, and paying for it with some form of blocked marks, usable only in Germany. Trade thus degenerated into a sort of barter. Mineral resources are thought to be considerable. There is little black coal, but bauxite is important, and there are easily worked deposits of non-ferrous metals. All things considered, Yugoslavia could be made a useful adjunct to an industrial Central Europe.

BULGARIA

In contrast with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria has no appreciable linguistic minorities. Her territorial problems are concerned entirely with the recovery of peoples and territories outside her frontier. The nucleus of the present Bulgarian state is the

fertile, loess-covered platform between the Balkan range and the Danube, and to this was added the Maritza valley. The history of the medieval Bulgar state and the abortive Treaty San Stefano encouraged ideas of a "Greater Bulgaria" stretching far to the west of the Vardar valley. Her participation in the First Balkan War brought her the Strumitza valley, Thrace between the ports of Kavalla and Dede Agach, and a scrap of territory on the Black Sea coast south of Burgas. In




FIG. 115. THE EXPANSION OF BULGARIA FROM THE PRINCIPALITY SET UP IN 1878

The dotted line indicates the frontiers proposed in the Treaty of San Stefano. Areas shaded black were lost to Greece and Yugoslavia in 1914 and 1920.

the next year Southern Dobrudja and Western Thrace, with Kavalla, were lost. Bulgaria's entry into the First World War and her attack on Serbia brought her temporary gains, but in 1920 these were lost by the Treaty of Neuilly. Territories in Western Bulgaria were lost to Serbia. Greece gained the whole of Thrace up to the Maritza, the frontier of Turkey, and Roumania was confirmed in her possession of Southern Dobrudja.

Bulgaria's intransigence, and the scarcely veiled connexion between the I.M.R.O., the Macedonian revolutionary and

terrorist organization, and leading figures in Bulgarian political life, has led her neighbours to form the Balkan Entente, an alliance of Roumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. The territories claimed by Bulgaria have already been mentioned and their problems briefly discussed. The loss of Thrace deprived Bulgaria of her Ægean ports, and left her with only Burgas and Varna in the Black Sea. Bulgaria's hostility to Yugoslavia and Roumania made her look for friendship to Italy, Germany, and Hungary, the countries which considered themselves unjustly treated in the peace treaties of 1919-20. Single-handed she could do nothing, but if only the political waters of Europe became sufficiently troubled Bulgaria could probably fish with some profit to herself.

Her reliance on agriculture is probably greater than that of Yugoslavia, the productivity of the country per acre is less, and standards of living lower. The chief exports are tobacco, livestock, cereals, and other vegetable products. Before the depression a considerable proportion of the surplus was exported up the Danube to the industrialized countries of Central Europe. Germany, pursuing the same methods as in Yugoslavia, had come to control by 1939 an even larger proportion of Bulgaria's foreign trade. It is not surprising, then, that the German occupation of Bulgaria in the winter of 1940-41 was unresisted, and that Bulgaria was rewarded for her compliance with the return to her, by the Craiova Agreement, of the Southern Dobrudja. After the defeat of Greece she again acquired an outlet to the Ægean, the whole of Macedonia as far as the Vardar river and the southern part of Yugoslavia. With the restoration of order in this unhappy country, it can only be supposed that the 1939 frontiers will be restored. Nevertheless, nothing daunted by her series of ill-judged and unsuccessful ventures in foreign policy, Bulgaria has again (August, 1946) put forward her claim to Eastern Thrace, only to be countered by a Greek claim to a strip of territory in the Rhodope. It would appear that Bulgaria has a measure of support from Russia.

Bulgaria is essentially a peasant country, and her outstanding internal problems are those common to all countries where peasants are in a majority. But peace and security in South-eastern Europe is bound up not merely with the problems of

economic development. As long as racial feuds such as those which have characterized the relations of the Bulgars with the Serbs and Greeks continue, there is no prospect of great economic development. Such feuds belong to the childhood of nations, but it is to be feared that the Turkish conquest has postponed the maturity of those of the Balkan. In each great war the passions of these peoples are loosed, and atrocities add to the hatred with which they regard one another.

GREECE

Greece stands rather apart from the other countries of the Balkans, both by reasons of its maritime situation and of the great classical civilization to which it is heir. Greece is one of the most mountainous of the countries of South-eastern Europe and cultivated land is as little as 16 per cent. of the total. The coastline is one of the largest, in proportion to the area of the country, and is fringed with islands which have encouraged the sea-faring activities of the Greek peoples and guided them across the Ægean.

Modern Greece came into existence in 1830 after a successful revolt against the Turks, in which the Greeks were greatly assisted by the British command of the sea. The expansion of its territory was gradual. In 1864 the Ionian Islands, British since 1815, were ceded to the Greek Government. In 1881 the frontier was advanced from the Arta-Volos line to include Thessaly, and the war of 1912—13 secured the whole of Epirus, Macedonia, and Western Thrace. The island of Crete was incorporated in 1908. The kingdom of Greece in the nineteenth century was a land state, chiefly concerned with advancing its northern frontier. The Athenian Empire of the fifth century B.C. had been a sea state. Its centre was the little island of Dhiolos, in the Cyclades. People of Greek speech and culture inhabited the whole shore-line of the Ægean, abandoning the hinterland to *barbaroi*. Throughout the ensuing two thousand years Greek trade settlers and culture continued to give a unity to the whole Ægean basin. The Greek state, as established by the conquests of 1913, was regarded as incomplete. It lacked the eastern coast of the Ægean, with the town of Smyrna and the east Ægean islands, and these territories

were claimed by Greece as the reward for her participation in the First World War. The abortive Treaty of Sèvres would have granted her extensive areas in Asia Minor and the Straits and also part of the Dodecanese Islands, in Italian occupation




FIG. 116. DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREEK STATE

since 1911. But the treaty was rejected by Mustapha Kemal, voice of the Turkish people, and the Greeks, encouraged by the Western Powers to take what they claimed by force of arms, were decisively defeated and expelled from Asia Minor. The town of Smyrna, the largest Greek-speaking town in the Mediterranean, was destroyed in the fighting. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) terminated the war. Greece lost her foothold

in Asia Minor, but retained all the major islands except Imbros and the Dodecanese. In order to forestall any future claims by Greece on territory of Asia Minor, arrangements were made for an exchange of national minorities. Between 1922 and 1924 800,000 Greeks from Asia Minor, most of them from Smyrna, were settled in the depopulated lands of Macedonia and Thrace, and also in Thessaly, Athens, and Piræus. At the same time 388,000 Turks living in Greece were returned to Turkey. Up to this date this was the biggest attempt to transfer minorities, and its success has often been quoted in justification of such methods of removing the causes of international disputes. It must be remembered that these movements were carried out in countries where there was sufficient room for resettlement, and that the numbers involved were small in comparison with those likely to be concerned in similar movements in Central Europe. Movements on a far greater scale have taken place in Europe in the last six years at a cost in human suffering that cannot be measured.

The characteristics of Greek economy, both closely related to the geographical environment, are her dependence on specialized crops and the importance of her merchant marine. The steep slopes, stony soils, and warm, dry climate encourage the growth of trees rather than grain crops. The olive and grape vine cover a relatively large area, and in the North tobacco-growing is important, and cotton has been introduced. Some 70 per cent. of Greece's exports are made up of tobacco, olives, and olive-oil, raisins, currants, and wine, for which a market was normally found in North-western Europe. They are, however, articles of luxury nature, and their sale is dependent upon a high purchasing-power in other countries. Sales and prices dropped alarmingly during the depression of 1930 and following years, and Germany, pursuing the same policy as in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, acquired a dominating position in Greek trade. The policy of the Greek Government, has, nevertheless, been to diminish her dependence upon a precarious market for specialized agricultural produce. The home production of wheat was increased and on the eve of the Second World War was considerably more than double that of 1929. The cotton crop was increased and, though still small, went some way towards obviating Greece's reliance upon

imported raw materials. It was nevertheless true that in 1938 cereals and other foodstuffs made up more than 30 per cent. of Greece's imports. The importance of the merchant marine reflects not only Greece's dependence on overseas trade, but also the difficulty of expanding agriculture and increasing the employment on the land. In 1937 it amounted to over 2,000,000 tons, mainly tramp-steamers.




FIG. 117. THE SEA OF MARMORA AND THE ZONE OF THE STRAITS

THE STRAITS

The Sea of Marmora and the Straits which join it with the Black Sea and the Ægean have been a focus of political interest at least since the time when Agamemnon captured Troy. Its importance in mediæval and early modern times has already been touched on. Geographical values were completely altered in this region when the Russian state established itself on the shores of the Black Sea. Turkey, controlling the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, could stop Russian access to the Mediterranean. When, in 1770, the Turkish fleet was defeated by the Russian in the Ægean the latter had been

forced to sail by way of the Baltic and the Straits of Gibraltar to the scene of the action. To pursue too deliberately the policy of gaining control of the Straits would have aroused the opposition of the Western Powers. At bottom, the issue in the Crimean War was the clash of interests between Great Britain and Russia in this area. The objection to the creation in 1876 of the "Greater Bulgaria" was that Russian influence would be thereby increased. Towards the end of the last century the Russian threat became secondary to the German. The political focus moved north-eastward to Serbia, and the issue in Eastern Europe, superficially at least, from 1908 to 1914 was between Russia and Germany for control of Serbia.

The campaigns of the First World War re-emphasized the importance of the Straits, one of the few possible routes by which the British could bring help to the Russians. The Gallipoli campaign (1915) showed that the Turkish control of the Straits was too strong to be broken, and Russia remained isolated from help from this quarter. The Germany-Bulgaria-Turkey line barred the use of the Aegean-Straits-Black Sea route. At the end of the last war the Allied Powers wanted to see the Straits open to the shipping of all nations; they wanted access to Russia as much as Russia wanted access to the Mediterranean. The Treaty of Sèvres provided for a demilitarized "Zone of the Straits"; in 1924 the zone was reduced in size by the Treaty of Lausanne. The Zone of the Straits continued thus until 1935, when the Turkish Government approached the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty with a view to its revision. By the Convention of Montreux, signed the following year, the neutralization of the Straits was abrogated, and Turkey was permitted to set up coastal guns. While the right of passage of merchant ships was safeguarded, limits were set to the number and size of warships which might pass, though the warships of belligerents were allowed passage. The result of the agreement was greatly to enhance the political importance of Turkey as 'Guardian of the Straits.' The disappearance of Italy as a naval power and the increased prestige and strength of Russia combine to make some revision of the Montreux desirable. American proposals, put forward in 1945, would make little serious alteration in the existing treaty, but in August 1946, Russian proposals were made

public. They would have the effect of creating in the Zone of the Straits a Russian base such as Great Britain has hitherto possessed on the Suez Canal.

The strategic importance of the Straits outweighs their economic. The most important commodity passing through is Russian oil from Batum, and Roumanian from Constanta. Ores and grain are also handled. The town of Constantinople is but a shadow of its former self. It is large, 801,000 in 1940, and has a complex of industries and services, but its hinterland is small and its foreign trade by no means large. The Greeks of its Phanar suburb have very largely gone back to Greece, and the seat of the Turkish Government has been removed to Ankara.

PEASANT EUROPE

It is a truism to say that the countries of Eastern Europe, from Poland to Greece, are mainly peasant countries. Peasants are owner-cultivators of small holdings, frequently no more than three or four acres. These holdings are often fragmented; farming methods are backward; the agricultural community is largely self-sufficing, and its standards of livelihood are low. Some 40 per cent. of the population of Czechoslovakia consisted of peasants in 1939. In Hungary and Greece it was over 50 per cent.; in Poland over 60 per cent., and in Roumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria about 80 per cent. Some statistics will give an idea of the size and distribution of peasant holdings. The following table shows that small holdings of under five hectares (two acres) formed a majority in these countries:

| | PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL HOLDINGS | | |
|----------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | <i>Up to 2 hectares</i> | <i>2-5 hectares</i> | <i>5-10 hectares</i> |
| Czechoslovakia . . . | 44 | 27 | 16 |
| Poland | 34 | 31 | 32 |
| Hungary | 38 | 34 | 13 |
| Roumania | 19 | 33 | 17 |
| Bulgaria | 23 | 39 | 25 |

The smallness of the individual holdings goes with a relatively

large agrarian population and, at the same time, very low yields per acre:

| | AGRARIAN POPULATION PER 100 ACRES OF FARMLAND | YIELD PER ACRE (1933-37), IN CWTs | | |
|--------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|------|----------|
| | | Wheat | Rye | Potatoes |
| Poland | 31 | 9.6 | 8.9 | 94 |
| Czechoslovakia | 24 | 14.8 | 12.9 | 103.3 |
| Hungary | 24 | 10.9 | 8.9 | 56.2 |
| Roumania | 30 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 63.7 |
| Yugoslavia | 42 | 8.9 | 6.6 | 48.9 |
| Bulgaria | 33 | 10.7 | 8.5 | 53.0 |
| Greece | 48 | 7.7 | 6.4 | 43.9 |
| Germany | 17 | 17.7 | 13.6 | 117.9 |

The smaller the individual holdings and the more severe the overcrowding of the land, the lower appears to be the return per acre. The economy of peasant agriculture is not one which makes the most of the individual worker by equipping him with adequate tools. Instead, it gets as much as is possible from the land at an excessive cost in human labour. If the agrarian population were halved there would be no corresponding drop in agricultural productivity. If we add that the standard of nutrition is exceptionally low over most of Eastern Europe, the childhood mortality-rate more than double that in Great Britain or Germany before 1939, and housing, sanitation, and clothing of a very primitive order, the broad outlines of the peasant problem become complete. After the First World War the peasants became more articulate. Peasant parties were formed under the leadership of such men as Witos, of Poland, Radic, of Croatia, Maniu, of Roumania, and Stamboliski, of Bulgaria. Large estates were broken up, and the land distributed to the peasants. This movement made least progress in Poland and Hungary; most in Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia; in all of which countries the size of 'dwarf' holdings was considerably increased. Only slow progress was made in this direction in Poland; in Hungary the early promises of the Government were negated, and this remained the country of small holdings *par excellence*. But the break up of large estates increased the internal political differences. In Czechoslovakia

German-owned estates were divided among Czechs; in Roumania and Yugoslavia Magyar-owned among Roumanians or Serbs. The distribution of land was not always made with strict impartiality, and a bias was often shown against one or other minority group.

The break-up of the large estates was a palliative, not a solution, of a problem which was essentially that of the over-population and under-capitalization of the land. The position of the peasants may even be said to have deteriorated as a result of the division. Grain production increased, and the price dropped. At the same time most of the peasant countries developed certain industries, in which the former owners of the large estates were interested. The price of industrial goods remained steady or even rose, particularly with the tariffs that were introduced to protect the new industries; that of agricultural goods fell. This was the essence of the 'price scissors,' the fall in value of agricultural goods in relation to industrial, which prevented the peasant from purchasing with his agricultural surplus the tools and equipment he required.

The requirements of peasant Europe can be enumerated, and, particularly with the example of Russia, the problems of planning should not be insuperable. Briefly, then, an improvement of conditions in Eastern Europe is dependent on:

(i) A break with traditional methods of agriculture, consolidation of holdings, and some modification of customs and practices which are costly and of no economic value and frequently involve high rural indebtedness.

(ii) A diversification of agriculture, with an increased emphasis on dairying and the growing of vegetables and fodder and industrial crops.

(iii) An improvement in roads and railways, which would allow agricultural surpluses to be marketed, together with a reduction or total abolition of market dues and other hindrances to trade.

(iv) A drastic reduction in the number working on the land and an increase in the number and size of industries, particularly of those associated with agriculture; manufacture of farming machinery and manures and the breeding of better seed and farm-stock.

It cannot be denied that reforms of this nature would meet

with serious opposition, not merely from the vested interests of the richer peasants, like the *kulaks* of Russia, but also from the innate conservatism of agricultural folk the world over. Real progress also presupposes a higher degree of political stability than has existed in recent years. The perpetuation of feuds and of "old and sterile imperialisms" stands in the way, and it might almost be said that some degree of federation among Balkan countries is necessary. Stamboliski realized this, and the reward of too great a friendship with Serbs was his own murder by chauvinistic fellow-countrymen. The two overlapping "Ententes" have, in fact, achieved a degree of unity in South-eastern Europe, and there is no reason why, now that Germany and her allies in Europe have been defeated, this degree of union should not be deepened. It even seemed, on the eve of the Second World War, that Bulgaria might be admitted to the councils of the Balkan Entente. The problem of Hungary, especially of her relations with Roumania, is more difficult. Ideally the countries of South-eastern Europe might become autonomous units in a federal republic. Their similarities in language, culture, and economy outweigh their differences.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

SOVIET RUSSIA

IN November 1917 centuries of misrule, a generation of propaganda, and three years of war against the greatest military Power of its day, combined to overthrow the Tsar of All the Russias and to usher in the rule of the Bolshevik Party. Its programme and ideals were derived very largely from the writings of Karl Marx, adapted to suit the mentality and social institutions of the Russian people. Its leaders were idealists, political climbers, doctrinaires, and visionaries, led by Lenin, one of the ablest political thinkers and administrators of his generation. It is beyond the scope of this work to follow the events of the Russian Revolution. Certain of its aspects, however, derive from the configuration of Russia, and from its vastness and its great and undeveloped resources.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The revolution of 1917 had been provoked by the German advance into the wheat-lands of the Ukraine and the inability of the Russian soldiers, ill-equipped and often poorly led, to do more than check their progress. The war against Germany went on until March 1918, and by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, with which it terminated, Germany annexed, under one guise or another, the greater part of the Ukraine, as well as all Poland and the territories that have subsequently come to be known as the Baltic states. The Germans succeeded in harvesting much of the crops of the summer of 1918, which were needed by their people at home, and if they could have acquired earlier the resources of Western Russia it is highly probable that Germany could have resisted, perhaps successfully, the attacks of the Western Powers.

A second aspect of importance not only to the course of the Revolution but in Russia's subsequent relations with her neighbours was the "Intervention" in Russian affairs of various interested Powers. Russia can be invaded only at

relatively few points. Along most of her Arctic coastline she is insulated by the ice-covered polar ocean. Only in the west is this coast free of ice for a sufficient period to make possible trade or invasion. Similarly, along most of her southern border, high mountains either prohibit entirely or render improbable any form of armed intervention. In the west Russia is vulnerable only in the region of Murmansk and Archangel, along her Baltic coast and the frontiers against Poland and Roumania, and on her Black Sea coast. The Plateau of Iran can be used to give access to the passes of the Elburz Range and the Caspian depression. In the east only the Manchurian border and the stretch of coast, ice-bound in winter, northward from Vladivostock can possibly be used as bases for the invasion of Russia. It was from all of these points that Russia was attacked in the years following 1918. The 'intervention' policy was supported in only a half-hearted fashion by the Western and Allied Powers. Small forces, supporting "White" Russian generals, operated from Archangel and Petrograd. The Polish invasion of the Ukraine led to the capture, followed by the evacuation of Kiev, and the recoil of the Polish forces to the line of the Vistula. The subsequent victory of the Poles gave them rather generous territorial concessions and a frontier which they held until 1939. "White" Russian forces, operating from the Black Sea coast, were supported in a rather perfunctory manner by the Ukrainian autonomist movement. More serious was the invasion of Siberia by Japanese and American forces, supporting the "White" Russians. Intervention eventually failed, and the last of the White invaders was driven from Russian soil. This struggle had been one between a number of sea Powers and a continental Power of immense size. The continental Power had triumphed, an augury—in spite of the divisions between the interventionist Powers, their war-weariness, and lack of real interest in the struggle—of the future strength of Russia.

In the course of the 'intervention' period new frontiers were delimited in the West. The Finns revolted successfully, and with German help established an independent republic. Finland, supported by immense reserves of timber, generous resources of hydro-electric power, and an able and industrious




FIG. 118. THE WESTERN FRONTIER OF RUSSIA, 1914 AND 1921

people, succeeded in building up a stable Parliamentary democracy, similar to those of other Scandinavian countries. For much of the nineteenth century Finland had been a partially autonomous unit in Tsarist Russia. Its frontier, crossing the Karelian isthmus and the lakes to the north, approached close to the town and port of Petrograd. It then passed through sparsely populated, forested country. Here Finland has cherished claims to the Russian part of Karelia, an area famous in Finnish history and legend.

Similar risings in the territories south of the Gulf of Finland led to the establishment of the republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The two first had had no previous political existence. The last had been absorbed into medieval Poland. The new states were small in population and resources. Their eastern frontier was an arbitrary line, which cut across the routes from Russia to Riga and Talinn. Reference has already been made to the frontier with Poland. It included in the latter country the towns of Vilna and Lwow and the intervening Pripet region. To the south the disputed territory of Bessarabia was left in Roumanian hands.

Effective Russian penetration of the Caucasus was delayed until the nineteenth century, and it was not until the last quarter of that century that Batum was finally occupied. The politics of the area south of the Caucasus were complicated by the rivalries of Russia, Turkey, and Persia, and by the feuds and mutual antipathies of the Trans-Caucasian peoples themselves, the Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaidzhanians. Parts of this valuable area were occupied by Germany and Turkey at the end of the First World War, and a Georgian republic was set up to be conquered three years later by Soviet Russia.

The formation of a barrier of small states along Russia's western frontier has been ascribed to the deliberate policy of the Western Powers. Clemenceau once referred to it as a "*cordon sanitaire*," which would serve as a bulwark against the westward spread of Communism. It should be remembered that the four Baltic states came into being by their own spontaneous revolt, assisted by Germans rather than the Western Powers, and that France's anxiety to establish a strong Poland was prompted by her anticipations of a revival




FIG. 119. FRONTIERS AS LAID DOWN IN THE TREATIES OF BUCHAREST
AND BREST LITOVSK, 1917-18

After J. W. Wheeler-Bennett

of German militarism. Russia's western frontiers were, perhaps, not those which in justice might have been allowed her. The lack of natural obstacles and of a frontier consecrated by history, together with the transitional nature of Russia's western borderland, permit both sides to make out specious claims to an accession of territory. An equitable solution of these boundary problems has defied statesmen and is perhaps unattainable. In the last resort the relative strengths of Russia and the Central European Powers must determine the alignment of boundaries.

Security. The sordid politics of the 'intervention' period and the establishment, with the obvious goodwill of the Western Powers, of the barrier states along Russia's border served only to strengthen the mixture of suspicion and jealousy with which Soviet Russia regarded the capitalist Powers. The floods of propaganda which issued from the organization of the Third International were inspired in part by genuine Russian idealism; but also in part by the knowledge that the security of Soviet Russia was at stake. Her leaders were convinced, with a certainty that brooked no argument, that Russia, alone in a capitalist world, would become the object of attack by her neighbours to west and east. Their defence was to spread the Communist doctrine, to sap the strength of the capitalist states, and to weaken them by an attack from within. This policy, whose chief exponent was Trotsky, held the field in Russia until the middle twenties. But it was increasingly difficult for its supporters to justify it. Their successes were scanty. Communist revolutions had been carried through only in Hungary and in a part of peasant China, and, in the former, counter-revolution had overwhelmed the Communist regime. Realists in Russia looked for an alternative policy, and foremost among them was Stalin.

On Lenin's death in January 1924 power devolved upon a triumvirate, consisting of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Stalin. Personal jealousies were sharpened by differences of policy. The struggle between the two factions lasted almost three years, and ended in the defeat and expulsion of Trotsky. Stalin was now in a position to carry through his programme of internal development, which would give Russia prestige and security in virtue of her own resources.

TSARIST RUSSIA

Russia before the Revolution of 1917 covered an area of over eight and a half million square miles. After the loss of over 400,000 square miles to the border states in the West, Russia still remained the largest political unit in the world. It was divided into east-west belts, consisting of the cold tundra in the North, the great belt of forests, mainly of softwoods; steppe-lands, which reached from the borders of Poland into Manchuria, and mountains and hot deserts in the South. The first of these belts was undeveloped and almost uninhabited. The population of the forest belt was very small, except in the clearings in the West. Timber and pelts were the chief resources, but their utilization was handicapped by the inadequate means of transport. The rivers flowed to an ice-bound sea, and communications to ports in the East and West were too long. The greater part of Russia's population lived in the southern margin of the forests and on the great grasslands beyond. This belt had been slowly colonized from the West by the land-hungry Russian peasantry. In the semi-desert and desert lands east of the Volga, settlement was confined to oases and the riverine lands. Rainfall was less than twenty inches, and less than ten over large areas. With diminishing volume went increasing unreliability. Here was the "famine belt."

Four-fifths of the Russian people were peasants. Personal serfdom had ceased to exist in 1861, but the economic status of the Russian people had scarcely improved. They cultivated holdings often in many scattered fragments, by primitive methods and with crude tools, with poor stock and bad seed, without any of the aids of modern science and at the mercy of drought, storm, and pests. The rich black earth lands of the Ukraine produced an excess of wheat, much of which was exported from Odessa. A line from Northern Roumania to the Southern Urals separated an area where there was sufficient or an excess of wheat, from a north-western area where grain of all kinds was deficient. The communications of Tsarist Russia were not so well developed that the grain supply would be evened out. As in peasant countries throughout the world, Russian agriculture was characterized by an excessive rural population in relation to the cultivated area, by an uneconomic

use of labour, and low standards of living. Such a state of affairs could be remedied, but only by a government endowed with absolute power and an organizing capacity above the average, and possessed of a complete ruthlessness in carrying out its plans.

Factory industry was immature, confined to the western parts of European Russia and restricted to the simpler kinds of




FIG. 120. THE UKRAINIAN AREA OF SOUTHERN RUSSIA AND POLAND
Frontiers of 1938.

manufactured goods. The Moscow region, including the towns of Tula, Vologda, Vladimir, and Kaluga, was the most important. Cloth and the more rudimentary metal goods were produced. Petrograd added to these the building of ships. In the Ukraine the coal of the Donetz basin and the iron of Krivoi Rog had given rise to a metallurgical industry which was large only by Russian standards. In Russian Poland were the industrial towns of Lodz and Warsaw, the former one of the largest textile manufacturing towns on the Continent. The capital and initiative in these developments had come largely from without, at first German, later French, as France began to see in Russia a possible ally against Germany. But the

achievement of Russian industry was small indeed, as the cruel testing of the war of 1914 was to show.

In 1914 the whole of Russia, both in Europe and Asia, was governed autocratically by the Tsar. Only "Congress" Poland and Finland had ever possessed local rights, and these had been suppressed. Some 70 per cent. of the inhabitants of Russia spoke one of the related Russian languages. Of these the Little Russians inhabited Ukraine and South-eastern Poland, and the White Russians, the Russo-Polish and Russo-Lithuanian borderland. The Great Russians were associated primarily with the drainage basin of the Volga. Outside European Russia was a large number of tribes, some of them, such as those of the mountain basins of Turkestan, the heirs of an ancient civilization, but many others were wandering steppe nomads or fishermen and hunters of the forests and tundra. It was probably no exaggeration to say of Tsarist Russia that half its population was "low-grade stock, alien to Russian life and speech." The stages by which the Russia of the Tsars has changed to the grimly efficient, machine-like state of Stalin are summarized in the two following sections; first the economic revolution, and secondly the revolution in the political structure of Russia.

THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

The conditions of modern war demand a developed factory industry, primarily for the production of munitions, but also for uniforms and material comforts, for transport facilities and processed foodstuffs. At the end of the civil war and intervention Russia not only lacked such an industry but had further the devastation, destruction, and loss of life of some seven years of war to make good. The plan envisaged by the Soviet Government in 1927 was to reduce the excessive rural population, to mechanize and nationalize agriculture, and to develop and extend manufacturing industries. The efficiency of the individual would be improved and the national income increased, and the greater resources could be used both to improve the standards of living of the Russian people and to strengthen Russia against aggression.

The conversion of a large section of the population from

agricultural to industrial occupation, which was the kernel of the plan, raised a formidable problem. The equipment of the rural worker represented a very small capital investment: tools, a few head of cattle, seeds. But the capital value of factory equipment in relation to the number of employees was very much greater. It included buildings, furnaces, steel works, machine tools, spinning and weaving machinery, not to mention the complex mechanism of the transport services. This had to be accumulated before labour could become more productive. It could not be produced at home, at least within a measurable time, and external capital was not available to purchase it. The services of foreign technicians and the tools to achieve this great reorganization were purchased abroad, and paid for by the exports of her raw materials, chiefly timber and petroleum, which were sold at rather less than world prices in order to assure for Russia the necessary foreign exchange.

The process of industrialization is a costly one, and unless foreign loans are available, the people have themselves to bear the added burden in the shape of longer hours of work and less satisfactory working conditions. Labour conditions deteriorated, and the reasons were not fully appreciated either inside or outside Russia. The planned developments of the first five years were completed, and a second and subsequently a third plan begun. The last was interrupted by the German invasion of the summer of 1941. The achievement of Russia in twelve years of planned development may be summarized under the headings, (i) the development and redistribution of industry, (ii) the revolution in agriculture.

(i) *Industry under the Five-year Plans.* Some progress had already been made before the inauguration of the first Five-year Plan in 1928 in the development of factory industry. It was Lenin who hoped to bring electric power to every peasant's cottage. But the achievement was small compared with what was done after that date. Between 1926 and 1939 the urban population increased from some 26 to about 56 millions. Much of this increase was taken up by the new industrial towns east of the Urals. No great developments took place in the older industrial centres, such as Moscow and its neighbouring towns, Leningrad, Nizhni-Novgorod, renamed Gorki. The resources of the Ukraine in coal and iron were too great to permit their

development to be neglected. The Dnieper dam at Dnieperstroï was made to increase the power resources of this region. The non-ferrous metal and metallurgical industries generally were strongly developed, and the manufacture of agricultural machinery, as one might expect in a region of such high fertility, became particularly important. One of the motives of this development was the military preparedness of Russia, and it seemed unwise to rely too much on the output of the Ukraine, a region in which Germany was known to cherish ambitions. Large reserves of coal, iron-ore, and other minerals existed farther east, and new industrial regions were developed, first in the Urals, then farther east in the Kuzbas, in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and the Far East.

The Ural industrial area is based on large reserves of iron-ore, though local coal has to be supplemented by that brought from the Kuzbas. There are deposits of mineral oil and of non-ferrous metals. A number of large industrial towns—the largest, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Ufa, Nizhni Tagil, and Magnitogorsk—have sprung up within the last fifteen years or have grown from small urban centres of Tsarist times.

The Kuzbas of Western Siberia contains a coalfield of large size and good quality, as well as some iron-ore. The intention has apparently been to establish here an industrial region of great size, far removed from the threat of air attack. The region would clearly be linked closely with the Urals, each supplying the other's requirements in coal and iron. To the south, in Kazakhstan, a number of isolated industrial units have been established, particularly at Karaganda, Balkhash, and Alma Ata. In Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan cotton cultivation in irrigated fields at the foot of the Pamirs has led to the growth of a spinning and weaving industry in Tashkent, Samarkand, Bokhara, Fergana, Askhabad, and other towns.

The possibility of having to fight the Japanese has encouraged the Russians to build up manufacturing industries in the Khabarovsk region. There are local reserves of coal and iron, but neither appears to be of a good quality, and it would seem that industrialization in this region is not economic, but justified by the exigences of defence.

It is very difficult to assess fairly the expansion of Russian industry between 1928 and 1941. Figures have been published

of the output of coal, iron-ore, mineral oil, and certain non-ferrous metals.

| — | COAL IN THOUSAND TONS | IRON-ORE IN THOUSAND TONS | MINERAL OIL IN THOUSAND TONS |
|----------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1928 . . | 35,500 | 6,133 | 11,749 |
| 1933 . . | 76,200 | 14,555 | 22,458 |
| 1937 . . | 127,100 | 27,743 | 30,600 |

It is significant that in 1938 nearly half the total imports of Russia consisted of machine tools and non-ferrous metals, chiefly the alloys required in certain steels. It is said that, in spite of the great emphasis laid on the production and utilization of electric power, half the electrical equipment required was imported on the eve of the war. It seems that, although Russia has been able to produce sufficient of the more rudimentary types of factory goods, Western Europe and North America may still have a considerable lead in the manufacture of the more specialized types of mechanical equipment. It would be strange if this were otherwise. The slow development in the West over two centuries and the inherited skill of its industrial workers still count for something. It must be remembered, however, that Russian industry is yearly becoming more versatile, and that its capacity to produce the higher ranges of manufactured goods is increasing. There had been, for example, in the years immediately preceding the war a marked drop in the import of turbines and alloy-steels. Russia, too, is exploiting virgin resources. She can draw on the accumulated knowledge and experience of the Western Powers. Her mines are shallow; they operate on the richest beds and veins, and are planned with the greatest efficiency.

(ii) *Agriculture under the Five-year Plans.* Reference has already been made to the backwardness of agriculture and the poor distribution of agricultural produce. In the course of the Five-year Plans the total area under crops was increased by about 50 per cent., the greatest increases being in the cultivation of vegetables, potatoes, and fodder crops. The northern part of European Russia, hitherto an importer of foodstuffs, has been made self-sufficing, and food production has increased in Siberia. The efficiency of agriculture has been greatly

increased. The small scattered holdings of the old peasantry have been replaced, not without opposition from the Kulaks, or richer peasants, by collective farms, cultivated by the co-operative effort of the village community. Tractors and harvesters are used; and all the resources of agricultural science are applied to the task of obtaining higher yields from the land.

POLITICAL DIVISIONS

The vast Russian empire had been ruled by the Tsars as a single political unit, embracing people whose culture ranged from that of the Great Russians of the industrial towns to the hunting nomadism of the Chukchis. It is claimed that 150 different languages are spoken, though a great many of these are no more than dialects, and there are over forty national groups, each numbering at least 50,000 persons. These nationalities were not recognized; many were treated as backward peoples, to be impressed for unskilled labour. They were always liable to find themselves at a disadvantage through their ignorance of the Russian language. In 1917 the Soviet Government declared the equality of all the national groups of Russia. For administrative purposes the country was divided into forty-seven divisions, varying much in area, population, and resources, but all of them embracing one of the major national groupings of Russia. Boundaries have been stretched to some extent to make the political unit as far as possible an economic one.

In all, sixteen Soviet Socialist Republics make up the Union. Each contains a population of considerable size and distinct cultural traditions. The largest of these, the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, covers 78 per cent. of the area of the whole country, and is inhabited mainly by people of Russian speech. It includes not only most of European Russia, but also a belt across Siberia where the Great Russian people have settled from the sixteenth century. The remaining S.S.R.'s are marginal, Finno-Karelia, White Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan. To these have been added the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Moldavian. According to the constitution, each may secede from the Union.

Included within these Union Republics are twenty-two Autonomous Republics and nine Autonomous Provinces. Owing to their position, secession is impossible. They are smaller than the Union Republics and constitute national groups less distinct than those of the larger units. There are, lastly, eight National Regions, areas of sparse population and low state of development. Most of these lesser units occur in the Ural region, in the forest and tundra of Siberia or the central Asiatic mountains.

The rule of Russia is vested, according to the constitution of 1936, in two elected houses, which together comprise the Supreme Soviet. The Soviet of the Union is elected by universal suffrage, one member for each 300,000 of the population; the Soviet of Nationalities consists of twenty-five deputies from each Union Republic; eleven from each Autonomous Republic, five from each Autonomous Province, and one from each National Region. Each of the republics, provinces, and regions has its own Soviet. The Russian Government has done a great deal to improve the standards in the more backward of the administrative districts. Literacy has increased; the language and traditions of the individual nationalities have been safeguarded. There is every reason to believe that the federal system which the Soviet Union has evolved has been successful, and it is capable of indefinite extension.

RUSSIA'S FRONTIERS IN THE WEST

The frontiers established in the years immediately following the Russian Revolution have been greatly modified during the Second World War. The outbreak of the war was preceded, by a few days, by the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, in which Germany purchased the neutrality of Russia during the coming struggle in the West. Russia was to receive eastern Poland, up to a line corresponding very roughly with the Curzon Line. The Balts, or German-speaking inhabitants of the Baltic states, many of whose families had lived here since the Middle Ages, were called back to the Reich, and Germany evidently acquiesced in Russia's demand for air and naval bases in the Baltic states. Eastern Poland was occupied in the second half




FIG. 121. FINLAND, WITH THE TERRITORIES LOST DURING THE
'WINTER WAR'

of September and was apparently very soon afterwards put into a state of military preparedness. As a gesture to the Lithuanian republic, Russia returned to it its ancient capital, Vilna. This frontier was crossed by the Germans in their attack on Russia in June 1941, but reoccupied by the Russians in 1944. It seems probable that it will constitute the future boundary between Russia and Poland, and, though rejected by a large number of Poles, appears to be justified on purely ethnographic grounds. Polish opposition is based less, perhaps, on reluctance to part with this eastern territory than on a genuine fear that their political independence is at stake. The Berlin Conference further recognized that the eastern part of East Prussia, with the town of Königsberg, should pass to the Soviet Union.

The establishment of the new frontier in Poland in 1939 was quickly followed by demands made to the three Baltic states for the cession of naval and air bases. This was followed within nine months by the incorporation of the three republics in the U.S.S.R.

The demands made on the Baltic states were quickly followed by similar demands made against Finland. The Finnish republic had come into existence in 1918 after a successful revolt, in which it was aided by German forces. In the next twenty years Finland made steady progress in the development of her hydro-electric and timber resources. Finland's eastern frontier stretched from the Murmansk coast to Lake Ladoga and crossed the Karelian Isthmus to the Gulf of Finland. It approached within twenty miles of the Russian Leningrad, to which it was thought to constitute a direct threat. North of Lake Ladoga the frontier passed through the almost uninhabited northern forests. Here Finland claimed considerable areas of Russian Karelia. Russia's demands for the cession of certain territories, relatively small in area but important strategically, were presented in October 1939. The Winter War followed in November 1939, and ended with a Russian victory in March of the following year. By the terms of the Treaty of Moscow Russia gained the following territory in Finland:

1. The Karelian Isthmus, with the town of Viipuri (Viborg), but excluding the important hydro-electric power-station of Imatra. The frontier was thus pushed back to nearly ninety

miles from Leningrad, an important matter in the war which followed.

2. A strip of land in the 'waist' of Finland, near the Leningrad-Murmansk railway, and the Rybachi peninsula, which dominate the approaches to the ice-free port of Petsamo.

3. The island of Hogland in the Gulf of Finland and the lease of the peninsula of Hango (Hanko) on the south-western coast of Finland. These completed the series of bases which Russia had set up in the Baltic states.

The importance of these acquisitions in slowing down the German advance in the summer of 1941 cannot be denied. They are all territories to which Russia could show a reasonable claim, based on strategic and economic requirements, if not altogether upon ethnic. The arbitrary way in which they were obtained was justified only by the imminence of a German attack.

The position in Bessarabia has already been described. The restitution of this territory, together with northern Bukovina, was demanded in June 1940, and at once taken over by Russia and constituted as the Moldavian S.S.R.

THE BLACK SEA

It has long been part of Russian policy to secure, not only command of the Black Sea, but also control of the outlets from it into the Mediterranean. This was possible only by the subservience of Turkey or the subjugation of that country by Russia. In 1833 the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi closed the Straits to all vessels hostile to Russia. Seven years later an international convention, in which Great Britain and France participated, formally closed the Straits to Russian warships, and neutralized the Black Sea. This was confirmed by the Peace of Paris (1856), which terminated the Crimean War. France was the power chiefly interested at this time in holding Russia back from the Mediterranean, and her humiliation in 1870 allowed Russia to denounce the treaties which restricted her, and she once again established a fleet in the Black Sea. Russia's attempts to remove the restriction on the passage of her warships through the Straits failed, and when the First World War began she found herself cut off from her allies by

the fortifications of the Turks, which the Gallipoli campaign failed to breach.

After the Turkish collapse in 1918 the Allied navies gained complete control of the Straits, and were able to use their power to bring help to the 'intervention' forces in the Ukraine. By the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), between the Allied Powers and Turkey, the Straits were demilitarized, and vessels, naval and merchant, of all nations were now free to enter the Black Sea. Russia preferred the Straits garrisoned and held by Turkey to this state of affairs, and could not help feeling that the opening of the Straits was intended to make attack on the Soviet Union easier. Twelve years later the balance of power in Europe had changed radically. Fascist Italy was striving to control the Aegean, and there was a case for allowing Turkey to fortify the Straits and thus protect herself and Russia. By the Montreux Convention (1936) Turkey regained her old rights in this matter. Warships of non-Black Sea Powers were prevented from entering the Straits under any conditions, while those of Russia might pass out if Russia was not herself at war. If Turkey was at war she could act as she chose in the matter. This was the most favourable settlement that Russia had yet obtained, but use of the Straits by Russia during the Second World War was prevented, not by the hostility of Turkey, but by the German occupation of the islands of the Aegean.

Russo-Turkish relations, traditionally bad, have greatly improved during the last twenty years, with the avowed abandonment of imperialist designs on the part of both Powers. Turkey, however, still nourishes suspicions, carefully cultivated in the past by German propaganda, that Russia intends to occupy the zone of the Straits and be her own porter at her own front door.

THE HEART OF ASIA

The Russian penetration of the Caucasus has been already described. Iran has been a sphere of Russian interests, and the treaty of 1907 with Great Britain defined their respective zones. The Russian sphere was renounced at the Revolution, and Russian interests in the country were not revived until

1941. The trans-Iranian routes were seen to be ways by which supplies could be sent to Russia, and the intrigues of the Shah with the Axis were cut short by a joint Allied occupation of the country. The trans-Iranian railway from the head of the Persian Gulf to Bander Shah, on the Caspian, was rebuilt and doubled, and was much used in the following years. Very soon after the end of hostilities in Europe the Iranian Government intimated to the Powers concerned that the reasons for their occupation no longer existed.

Central Asia is occupied by a series of mountain ranges of great height, separating upland basins. Communications across the ranges are few and difficult, and the whole region is arid, with a climate of extremes and a very sparse population, consisting mainly of nomadic Mongol pastoralists. The Kun Lun range, and the Tien Shan, continued in the Altai, diverge from the Pamirs in the extreme north of India, and present the most serious barrier to movement. Between the Kun Lun and the Tien Shan is the Tarim basin, drained by a river of that name to the salt marshes of Lob Nor. To the east access can be gained to the north-west of China proper; to the west caravan-routes lead through Yarkand and Kashgar to the basin of Turkestan. North of the Tien Shan, and between it and the Altai Mountains, is the Dzungarian Gap, a routeway which gives perhaps rather easier access to the Russian Kazakh Republic than to China. North-east of the Altai are Inner and Outer Mongolia, provinces of Greater China. Outer Mongolia is a vast area of mountains and poor grassland, cut off from China proper by the Gobi Desert, but linking more easily with Manchuria. After the fall of the Manchu dynasty Chinese control of these outer territories weakened. The frontier territory of Tannu-Tuva was 'liberated' by the Red Army about 1921, and the National Tuva Republic was set up, with a Soviet form of Government. This thin disguise hardly conceals the fact that Tannu-Tuva is for all practical purposes part of the Soviet Union. Events in Outer Mongolia have been extremely difficult to follow, but it appears that Russian infiltration was followed by the proclamation of a Soviet Government about 1920. This Government then signed a treaty of friendship with Russia, of which it in effect forms part. Sinkiang is economically of greater importance than the two

provinces already mentioned; its contacts with republican China are closer, and it contains both the Dzungarian and Kashgar routes across the ranges of Central Asia. Soviet interest in the region can be explained by fear of Japanese intentions in China. The Turksib (Turkestan-Siberian) Railway passes through Alma Ata, close to the western border of Sinkiang, and this has tended to tap the resources of the province, which has been described as "economically . . . a province of the U.S.S.R." Russian troops have been called in to suppress Moslem risings, but there is no evidence that Sinkiang has yet been Sovietized.

The suspicion has not entirely disappeared that Russia intends to advance its borders towards India. These fears were rife at the end of the last century, when Russia had completed her occupation of Turkestan. Her seizure of the village of Penjdeh, on the Afghan frontier (1885), was regarded as a first step in this direction, and had serious international repercussions. It seems, however, that, although Russian propaganda may since have had some effect among the tribesmen of Afghanistan and the North-west Frontier, there was never any real likelihood of a Russian invasion of India.

THE SOVIET FAR EAST

The foundation of the port of Vladivostock, which is ice-bound for part of the year, was followed by a search for a 'warm-water port.' Port Arthur was occupied in 1895 and linked with the Trans-Siberian railway. The Chinese Eastern Railway was built across Manchuria to avoid the great bend which the Trans-Siberian made, following the Amur river, to avoid Manchurian territory. Russian penetration of Manchuria was halted by the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), and the loss of Port Arthur. Manchuria was conquered in 1931-32 by the Japanese, who until August 1945 faced the Russians along the Amur river.

Russian industrial developments in Eastern Siberia have already been mentioned. Their primary object has been to make this region as nearly self-sufficing as possible. A considerable population has been attracted here, and a Jewish community has been set up in Birobidzhan, where more than

100,000 have settled. Off the coast of Eastern Siberia the mineral resources of Sakhalin and the relatively valuable sea fisheries have been in dispute between Russia and Japan. The island of Sakhalin was acquired by Russia in 1875, but the southern half was lost to Japan in 1905. The Russian portion of the island contains useful petroleum deposits and some coal. The fisheries of the Khabarovsk Province and the sea of Okhotsk have been much developed in recent years and are of considerable importance to both countries.

The abrupt termination of the Pacific war and Russia's participation in its closing stages have made possible a restoration of certain Asiatic territories. Port Arthur has been recovered, though it is not clear yet whether this is in full sovereignty. In addition, Russia acquires the remainder of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Vladivostock is no longer cut off from the Pacific by an unbroken barrier of Japanese-controlled islands.

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PART IV
EXTRA-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
NINETEENTH-CENTURY IMPERIALISM

THE development of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires in the sixteenth century has already been described, at least in broad outline. These remained, until the end of the sixteenth century, practically the only colonial empires. The English had made no progress with the settlement of Newfoundland, discovered by them over a century earlier, and their voyages in search of a North-west and a North-east Passage to the Far East had led only to the development of a small trade with arctic Russia. Settlements on the eastern shores of North America had proved abortive. The French achievement was scarcely greater. Since Cartier had discovered the estuary of the St Lawrence river in 1536, and had sailed up it as far as Montreal, some French settlements had been made; but it was not until after 1608 that French colonists began to people the shores of the estuary and to settle among the peninsulas and islands of what were later to become the Maritime States. During the sixteenth century, the English and French were prisoners within the Atlantic, whose outlets were closed either by ice or by their political enemies and rivals.

The most remarkable event of the seventeenth century was the decline in military strength and political importance of Spain and Portugal. From 1580 until 1640 Portugal formed part of the Spanish Empire, to which its interests were sacrificed. An opening was thus created from the Atlantic into the Indian Ocean, which the English and Dutch, and later the French, were quick to use. But in the New World the Spanish grip was beginning slowly to relax. Spain could no longer prevent the establishment of English and other settlements in North America and the West Indies or the development of a clandestine trade between her own colonies and other countries. The period of Spain's decline saw also the final achievement of French

unity, the establishment of the independent Netherlands, and the growth in England of an aggressive nationalism, hand in hand with a Reformed religion and a developing trade.

It is impossible in this short space to do more than indicate broadly the lines of development in the seventeenth century. The motives for these enterprises are obvious enough. Overseas possessions were intended to supplement the resources and increase the wealth of the colonial power. According to the prevailing mercantilist doctrine the nation state strove to make itself as self-sufficient, particularly in those resources pertaining to war, as was possible. England, the Netherlands, and France, for example, each wanted an adequate and secure supply of naval stores, timber, spars, and hemp; of sugar, silk, and cotton, spices, gem-stones, and specie. Each strove to increase its own wealth, but wealth was conceived of as existing only in the form of bullion, and an increase in the wealth of one country was thought to be possible only at the expense of another. Colonies were located with these ends in view; they were to supply the raw materials which the home countries lacked and to become markets for the products of the home industries. It was thus inevitable that England should prize more highly her possessions on the shores of the Chesapeake and in the West Indies than those in New England and Canada, and that she should discourage the import of calico cloth from India, which competed with the products of her own woollen weavers. Colonies, on the other hand, were not thought of as outlets for surplus population,¹ because countries could ill spare men who might serve to strengthen their armies or intensify their industry. The establishment of colonies in New England was regarded by some as a net loss to the country; of those in Jamaica, as a net gain. There was, however, a partial exception. Toleration had developed sufficiently for a Government to permit the settlement in its overseas or distant possessions of those whose ideas and practices conflicted with its social and political ideals. In this way French Huguenots migrated to both North and South America; English Puritans of many shades went to the New England colonies; German Lutherans, French Calvinists, and

¹ The Elizabethans, however, hoped to use the colonies to settle the large numbers of landless labourers.

dour Scots Presbyterians did much to develop the new lands. Fundamentally similar in its nature was the settlement of parts of Siberia by Russian convicts and of Australia by English. These had previously been sent to the North American states; and Georgia was originally conceived as a settlement for the inhabitants of debtors' prisons.

During the seventeenth century the English settled the greater part of the North American seaboard and penetrated inland as far as the Appalachian mountains. Small groups of Dutch, Swedes, and Finns formed enclaves in the area of English settlement. The Maritime States were mainly settled by English, with some French, and the St Lawrence Valley became a predominantly French-speaking area. The French possessions in the New World, closely controlled by the Government at home, exported timber and tar, hemp and flax, and fish. French population was small in North America. They numbered only about 20,000 in 1713, when there were 158,000 in the New England States and 218,750 in the other British colonies in North America. In spite of the small numbers the French pushed up the St Lawrence to the Great Lakes, and, led by their missionary-explorers, crossed from Lake Michigan to the headwaters of the Mississippi and so reached the Gulf of Mexico. At the same time the French occupied islands in the West Indies, of which Martinique and Guadeloupe were most significant, on account of their sugar-production.

In the New England States English-speaking peoples developed a society similar in many respects to that which they had left and rivalling it in products and exports. Southward of the Delaware river the warmer climate permitted the cultivation of sugar and tobacco, cotton and rice. Conditions which made this possible prohibited white labour in the fields. Slaves were introduced, and possession of a farm in the South indicated a considerable private fortune. From these contrasted geographical conditions there grew the differing social and political outlooks of the aristocratic South and democratic North; the one closely linked with England by trade ties, the other competing with England in its products.

Like the French, the English Government collected island possessions in the West Indies, which it valued for their plantation produce. Central and South America, divided

between Spain and Portugal, resembled the unchanging orient in their apparent lack of material progress. The volume of trade was small, and restricted to the ships and markets which the home country could supply. Africa was the least-known and least-settled continent, except Australia. The colonial powers established stations on its coast for watering and supplying ships and for the capture and export of slaves. Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and English had no more than precarious footholds. The scarp which the high plateau of the southern half of Africa presents to the sea, the rapids which impede the navigation of its rivers, the mangrove swamps, forests, and disease, and the hostility of man and nature made the penetration of Africa more costly than the prospect of gain would warrant. It was passed by in the search for the riches, more easily exploited, of the Far East. Australia, lying off the shipping-routes and presenting only barren cliffs and deserts on its most accessible coasts, also awaited exploration and settlement until the second half of the eighteenth century.

It was in the Indian Ocean and the Far East that colonial rivalries were most intense. India and the Indies had a dense, hard-working, and intelligent population; they could produce with comparative ease those sub-tropical goods which European peoples chiefly needed at that time. The Indies were the magnet, drawing all sixteenth-century traders and explorers. The Portuguese established a net of trading-posts and sea-routes, from Goa to China. The Dutch, developing their commercial activities at the end of the sixteenth century, founded an East India Company which occupied island bases in the East Indies and very severely limited the activities of the weakened Portuguese Empire. Gradually a vague hegemony over the islands of the East Indies was built up. The English East India Company, entering the field early in the seventeenth century, was forced by the pressure of the Dutch to turn to India, where it established trading-stations round the coast.

The destinies of the sixteenth-century empires of Spain and Portugal were controlled and guided by the Governments at home. The seventeenth was pre-eminently the century of the company. French enterprises in Canada and the West Indies were guided by public profit-making companies. Trading-companies planned the settlement and development of many

of the English settlements in North America, and the Hudson Bay Company was virtually the ruler of vast areas of northern Canada. English and Dutch enterprise in the East was carried on through the medium of companies.

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Imperial developments in the eighteenth century continued the trends of the seventeenth. Colonial areas increased in every continent; a beginning was made of the settlement of Australia and South Africa. The motives of empire were the same, primarily commercial; the volume of imperial trade increased, and, in a world of competing imperialisms, strategic bases and stations for provisioning and watering ships were acquired—Cape Town, Delagoa Bay, Gibraltar, Minorca, Louisberg. The outstanding imperial powers were France and England; the former was the largest Power in Europe, in terms of population, and the richest; the latter, with no land-frontier to defend, developed an unrivalled position as a sea-power. The preservation of an empire required a navy, and France, preoccupied for much of the time with events on the continent of Europe, was defeated by the sea-power of England. Her empires in Canada and India were isolated and conquered, and many of her island possessions were lost.

The defeat of France in the war of 1756-63 prepared the way for the most significant event of the century in the field of imperial affairs—the revolt of the American colonies and the creation of the United States of America. British sea-power had hitherto given them a degree of protection from the French policy to encircle them by linking Canada with Louisiana and the Upper Mississippi. This threat was now eliminated. It is impossible to describe here the political motives which led to the revolt. Its successful outcome raised the question of the future of colonial possessions. Would they, as Turgot prophesied, drop off with worldly ingratitude, like ripe fruit, or could the bonds between empire and imperial power be strengthened to their mutual advantage. The last 150 years have shown that there is no simple answer. The American colonies were unique in being the only overseas possession of a European power able to rival the mother

country in climate, resources, and products, and, at the same time, inhabited by a people able to mobilize them. Other colonial possessions, with the exception of French Canada, were tropical or sub-tropical, inhabited by an indigenous people with relatively low standards and politically immature. White people were a minority, dependent on the labour of the coloured and the protection of the home power. No such problems could yet arise in these areas.

The eighteenth century, lastly, saw the virtual completion of the Dutch Empire and the beginning of the decline of those of the sated powers of Portugal and Spain. Their final dissolution, however, was accomplished in the nineteenth century, and, in the event, the object-lesson of the formation of the United States was not forgotten.

THE SOUTH AMERICAN COLONIES

In some ways the colonization of South America resembled that of North. There were large areas suitable for white settlement, where Spain had not scrupled, in the sixteenth century, to send her best sons. They had formed with the native Indian peoples a mixed, mestizo race, whose links with Spain became more and more attenuated, as Spanish rule became more and more capricious and oppressive. The revolt of the provinces of South America began in 1809, prompted in large measure by the French occupation of Spain. And it was completed within some thirty years by the expulsion of Spanish rule from the continent. At about the same time Brazil was declared an independent empire, and the republics of Central and South America were launched on their rather stormy passage towards political security and economic well-being. The success of the South American revolts had been facilitated by England's sympathy with them and by her command of the sea. At the same time the declaration of the American President that the New World was no longer to be considered a field for European colonization (1823) had a certain influence on the immediate issue, and later acquired an enlarged meaning and an almost religious significance in North America. A whole continent of states had broken free of their mother country. Historically they form a link between

the revolt of the North American colonies and the creation of the self-governing dominions.

MOTIVES OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY IMPERIALISM

The later years of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth saw the intensification of manufacturing processes, known as the Industrial Revolution. It had two important results in the field of imperial affairs. The demand for raw materials, many of them of tropical origin, was intensified. At the same time the rapidly increasing urban population in the countries of Western Europe required the import of foodstuffs. The seventeenth century demand for trading opportunities was sharpened in the nineteenth century. Africa was partitioned; conquests were made by European powers in South-eastern Asia; 'treaty' ports were established in China. The intensified colonial rivalry reflected the strained political relations which existed at least in the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe. When war was never far distant the defence of a colonial empire and of the trade-routes linking it with the home country became of paramount importance. Thus a second type of colonial possession developed, with a strategic rather than economic function, and competition for strategic bases disguised the underlying economic rivalries. Suez, Cyprus, Morocco, Tangier, Gibraltar, the Baghdad Railway were all stepping-stones to an economic hegemony of a large part of the world.

The Industrial Revolution was accompanied by an increase in population, due to a drop in the death-rate rather than to any marked rise in the number of births. Not all were absorbed into industry, and there was a considerable migration to overseas possessions, chiefly those of Great Britain, but also to South America, North Africa, and other areas where white men can live at standards not inferior to those which they had left. It was inevitable that these people should demand some voice in the control of their own political destinies, and the revolt of the North American and Spanish American colonies showed how it might be obtained. This problem first asserted itself in Canada, where a considerable population, of European origin, was hostile to British rule. First the law, religion, and

customs of the French Canadians were assured (1774), but the colony continued to be governed by a nominated Council. English settlers came in increasing numbers to Upper Canada, or Quebec, and the fear that the French Canadians would be submerged by the English was remedied by the division of Canada into two separate political units, Quebec and Ontario, each with a limited measure of self-government. Racial bitterness continued in Lower Canada, while in Upper Canada a movement for self-government gained ground. In 1840 the two parts of Canada were reunited, and in 1867 the federal principle was accepted for Canada and the Dominion was established. Canada thus demonstrated that a colony can attain self-government without revolution, and without loosing the ties which bind it to the mother country. At the same time it was shown that the federal principle can be used to overcome racial and other antagonism within a political unit.

The attainment of dominion status in Canada prepared the way for similar developments in Australia and New Zealand. In the former the period of convict settlement and military rule was followed by an increase in the number of free settlers. From the ports of Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Brisbane, and Perth these moved into the interior, engaging in agriculture and sheep-farming, and establishing district colonies. Modest degrees of self-government were permitted, followed in 1854 by the establishment of responsible government. It was not until 1900 that the separate states were united in the federal constitution of the Commonwealth, and in the meanwhile each state had gone its own way, planned its development, and laid out its railways and chosen their gauges without reference to its neighbours. The Commonwealth has since had to overcome the effects of this narrow provincialism.

The first settlements in New Zealand were made in the early years of the nineteenth century. The islands were among the most suitable for white settlement, in spite of the opposition of the Maoris, one of the ablest of all coloured peoples. Responsible government was permitted in 1852, and political independence and Dominion status were conferred in 1907.

Developments in the other British Dominion, the Union of South Africa, were a great deal less peaceful. Physical obstacles hindered white settlement. Owing to the lack of

navigable rivers the country is difficult to enter. The climate prohibits white men from working in the fields in certain parts, and everywhere coloured labour is an advantage. The result was the growth of a society resembling, in its relations with the coloured people, that of the Southern States of North America. White settlement was relatively small, and, surrounded by a far more numerous native population, tended to form a self-conscious aristocracy. The original white settlers were Dutch, a hard-fisted, slave-owning people, jealous of its rights and of its cultural traditions and resentful of all other immigrants. British rule replaced that of the Netherlands during the Napoleonic Wars, and after 1817 the settlement was organized of groups of English-speaking people. Differences on social questions, primarily that of slavery and the native population, embittered the relations, never good, between the English and the Dutch, or Boers, and the latter moved away in 1836—the Great Trek—on to the grasslands of the High Veld. The events of the next seventy years are particularly involved, but it may be said that, broadly speaking, the Dutch desire for independence was conditioned by their fear, particularly in the Transvaal, of the Kaffir tribes, against whom they required British help. When this menace was greatest the Transvaal Dutch accepted annexation by Britain, but after the defeat of the Zulus they broke away and re-established their independence.

The colonies of Cape of Good Hope and Natal, where English settlement had chiefly taken place, had been granted a considerable degree of self-government, at least for the white population. The Boer Republics were conquered between 1899 and 1902, and in 1910 joined Cape Colony and Natal in the formation of the federal Union of South Africa (see Chapter XXIV).

Parallel with the development of the self-governing dominions, very largely inhabited, except the Union of South Africa, by white people, there went on a scramble for the possession of tropical and sub-tropical areas, whose products were increasingly demanded in the factories of the more developed countries. There were no areas in either the New World or Australia yet unclaimed. Only the dark continent of Africa and the thickly populated lands of South-eastern Asia

were potential fields of European imperialism. The colonial powers of Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands may be described as satisfied. France built up in the nineteenth century a new empire to replace that which she had lost in the eighteenth. Germany and Italy, new and aggressive political units, entered the colonial field towards the end of the century, and Belgium, or rather its King, acquired a rich empire in Central Africa. The colonial empires of the nineteenth century are described in this order: French, British, German, Italian, and Belgian. The conquests of Japan and the colonial possessions of the U.S.A. are considered in the next chapter.

THE FRENCH EMPIRE

In 1830 the French landed on the coast of Algeria, hitherto a resort of pirates and a menace to Mediterranean trade. Only the coastal strip and the valleys of the mountains have an economic value, but in order to secure their possession of these the French extended their rule to the desert on the south—not, however, without prolonged resistance from the Berber tribesmen. Strategic considerations apart, Algeria was of value to France because it is capable of producing in considerable quantities some of the requirements of French industries, including tobacco, olive oil, wine, certain cereals, esparto grass, cotton, as well as phosphates and iron ore. France naturally attempted to round off her possessions in North Africa by the occupation of the territories to east and west. A protectorate was established over Tunis in 1881, in spite of a considerable settlement of Italians here and the undisguised ambitions of Italy in this direction. French penetration of Morocco had been foreshadowed by frontier incidents before the end of the nineteenth century, but when it occurred was complicated by the imperial designs of Germany (see Chapter XXIV).

It was a French engineer, with French capital, who planned the Suez Canal, which was opened in 1869. From this time France shared Great Britain's interest in Egypt, the gateway to India and the East. An Egyptian nationalist rising compelled them to abandon their foothold in Alexandria. Great Britain subsequently reconquered Egypt (1882) without French assistance, and France's jealousy of Britain's position in the

Middle East embittered their relations during the rest of the century.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and Denmark possessed only trading-posts on the African coast. Progress southward from the Mediterranean was checked by the barrier of the Sahara, and movement inland from other parts of the coastline was at first very slow. But in the second half of the century faster progress was made. The Niger was reached from Senegal, and the West African settlements were linked up behind the intervening British, until the French Empire spread across the great savannah belt from Cape Verde to the Sudan. East of the Niger possession of the Cameroons and Equatorial Africa completed the French Empire in Africa. Madagascar was conquered and a French protectorate established in 1889.

France's empire in Asia is limited to a few survivals from her earlier empire, such as Pondicherry and Réunion, and the group of territories known as Indo-China. The latter had long been a field of French missionary enterprise. French political intervention began in 1862 with the acquisition of certain ports. The annexation of Tongking, Annam, Cambodia, Cochin China, and Laos followed. These territories had varying statuses and were held together in the federation of Indo-China. France, finally, acquired a number of islands and island groups in the Pacific, of which New Caledonia, the Society, and Marquesas groups and the Low Archipelago are the most important.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

It is possible to summarize the expansion of the British Empire in the nineteenth century in only the briefest terms. Many of her colonial possessions date from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Four others during this period ripened into self-governing dominions. Extensions of territory were made in Africa and Asia. The conquest of Egypt was followed by that of the Sudan. The West African enclaves—Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, and Nigeria—were filled out, and native states, such as that of Ashanti, overthrown. The occupation of Kenya and Uganda came somewhat later, and

the way was prepared by the peaceful penetration of the British East Africa Company. The uplands of Rhodesia were similarly occupied first by a commercial company, Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company (1889). The colonies of Northern and Southern Rhodesia were established and settled by small groups of comparatively well-to-do white people. Responsible government has been granted, and the two Rhodesias have together made considerable progress towards dominion status.

The British possessions in India were governed by a commercial company until after the Mutiny of 1857. They had been acquired piecemeal and were intermixed with native states, which each conducted its own policy and maintained its own relations with the East India Company. In 1858 the administration of British India was transferred to the crown. No further extensions of British power were made, except in Burma, whose conquest was completed in 1886. The basis of British rule in India has gradually been widened, and progress has been made towards the realization of dominion status (see Chapter XXIV).

Early in the century bases for commercial enterprise were acquired among the islands of South-eastern Asia. Singapore and Penang were the chief of these, controlling the sea-route to China through the Malacca Strait. British protection was gradually extended to the small states of the Malayan peninsula and to parts of Borneo. Hong Kong, off the coast of south-eastern China, was annexed, and commercial privileges were obtained in the parts of China.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE

For several years after the unification of Germany Bismarck steadfastly set his face against the acquisition of overseas possessions, which would in his view squander the resources of the mother country. The 'seventies, however, were a period of intense colonial activity, especially in Africa, and the German people were not so averse to imperialism as their Chancellor. Societies were formed of business-men, anxious for the closed market which they thought an empire would bring, to further this end. Bismarck wavered, and after 1881

a cautious colonial policy was pursued. It had been left late; the plums of the colonial field had already been gathered. But in less than three years, 1884 to 1886, the Germans gathered an empire of no small extent and, in parts, of considerable potentialities. South-west Africa, mainly poor scrubland with the possibilities of mineral wealth, was annexed. In the next year Togoland and Kamerun were also gained, after treaties had been signed between Dr Nachtigal and the local chieftains. At the same time Karl Peters secured treaties with East African chiefs which assured to Germany the rule of Tanganyika. The north-western quadrant of New Guinea was occupied, and in the Pacific the Germans proceeded to net all islands not yet claimed—the Marshall Islands, in 1885–86, Nauru in 1888, and the Caroline, Pelew, and Marianne groups from Spain in 1899. The Chinese port of Kíaochow was seized in 1898. The Kaiser's ambitions in Morocco were disappointed, but they gained for him, by way of compensation, a strip of French Equatorial Africa, which was attached to the Kamerun territory.

The German colonial empire was liquidated during the European War of 1914–18, and it is convenient to consider here, rather than in the next chapter, the broad lines of German colonial policy. Germany valued her colonies chiefly as potential sources of raw materials for her industries, and there is little doubt that, had she won the First World War, she would have extended her empire and maintained an exclusive control over it. There is no doubt that her colonial administration was efficient, nor that plantations were organized, wherever possible, with primary regard to the interests of German industry. Tanganyika is suitable for white settlement, though its German population remained until the end very small. Its sisal was important, and there were possibilities, not realized under German rule, of growing rubber and coffee and of raising cattle in the fly-free zone. South-west Africa held out few prospects; alluvial diamonds were the chief of a very short list of exports. Togoland and Kamerun share in the fullest degree the disadvantages of the coasts of the Gulf of Guinea, and the latter has one of the heaviest rain falls in Africa. Potentially those areas are of high value, but their development is proving costly. Germany certainly found there

no rich storehouse of vegetable oil, rubber, and the other tropical products she wanted.

Germany claimed later that in losing her empire she lost control of sources of raw materials, weakening her industrial position as against the more favourably placed allied countries. It is, of course, impossible to say how much Germany would have developed her colonies had she been allowed to keep them; but in 1913 trade between the empire and the German homeland amounted to less than 1 per cent. of the latter's total foreign trade. It is inconceivable that the colonies could have provided more than a very small fraction of Germany's imports of food and raw materials.

THE ITALIAN EMPIRE

Italy entered the colonial field rather earlier than Germany. Her East African empire was founded in 1869, when trading-stations were established on the coasts of Eritrea and Somaliland. The attempt to link these two territories by the conquest of Abyssinia failed disastrously, and the Italians suffered a severe military set-back at Adowa in 1896. Here the Italian empire rested until Italy was emboldened in 1911 to attack Turkey and seize Tripoli and the group of islands off the coast of Asia Minor known as the Dodecanese. The latter, which should have been returned to Turkey, were still in Italian hands when the First World War broke out, and were then kept until taken over by the Germans in the Second World War. Italian schemes of development and settlement in Tripoli and Cyrenaica were delayed by the War of 1914 and then by the resistance of the Berber tribesmen. They are considered in a later chapter.

THE BELGIAN EMPIRE

This is limited to the vast and little-known area of the Belgian Congo. Leopold II of Belgium displayed an interest in Central Africa and financed the expeditions of Henry Stanley, which were aimed at persuading the native chiefs to make treaties with him and to form a Congo state. The International Association of the Congo, in which Leopold's

was the moving voice, was recognized as the governing power in this area, but other European powers, at a conference at Berlin, laid down certain rules which were to govern its development. Slavery was to be suppressed; complete freedom of trade throughout the territory was insisted upon, with freedom of navigation on the Congo river. The Berlin Act of 1885 introduced the principle of freedom of access of all nations to the produce of colonial territories, but King Leopold's rule of the territory was marked by greed, corruption, and cruelty to the native peoples. In 1885 he became King of the Congo Free State, which was in 1908 annexed to the Belgian State.

The next two chapters are devoted to the problems of the colonial empires in the twentieth century—the first to considerations of imperial policy and the rule of colonies in the economy of strategy of the imperial power, and the second to the racial, territorial, and economic problems of the individual colonies. It is difficult to group the material in a way that is justified both historically and geographically. Two colonial empires have a more limited territorial distribution than most, and are therefore considered in the chapters relating to the oceans in which they lie, the Japanese empire in the Pacific and the American empire, which, reflecting the double interest of the United States, faces, Janus-like, both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

*A bibliography for this chapter is included at the end
of Chapter XXIV.*

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

TWENTIETH-CENTURY IMPERIALISM

DURING the nineteenth century the creation of a colonial empire had seemed the natural aspiration of any strong and virile nation. It caused little self-questioning, and if wrongs were sometimes committed to subject peoples any pangs of conscience were quickly salved by a consideration of the measureless good that would result from contact with western civilization. The century was obsessed with the idea of progress, and imperialism was a sign of progress. Nevertheless, the motives which had served to justify colonization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were no longer regarded as sufficient. Trade, strategy, and the settlement of surplus population could not alone be taken to justify conquest and annexation. A high moral purpose began to appear. An example of the contrast with earlier centuries was the occupation in the nineteenth century of West African bases from which to suppress slavery on the very coast along which Hawkins, only two and a half centuries earlier, had carried on this lucrative pursuit. It would be too much to expect of human nature to suppose that colonial ventures were now wholly philanthropic. Much of Africa was opened up by trading companies, whose motive was private gain, but they paid at least lip-service to a higher ideal. The Berlin Act of 1885, which defined the government of the Congo basin, specified the purpose of that rule as the extension of the benefits of civilization to the natives. The Congo native, however, derived little benefit from those aspects of European civilization with which he came into contact at this time. Seven years later the Brussels Act amplified and extended, at least on paper, this newer conception of imperialism. In Nigeria Sir George Goldie enunciated his policy of making the native chiefs the instruments of his administration. In India, over half a century earlier, a British spokesman had proclaimed that British rule would be withdrawn when the Indians "became sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it." The

idea of trusteeship slowly gained ground from that time (1831) when an American judge ruled—vainly, as it proved—that the American nation was trustee for the lands of the Cherokee Indians. This conception was popularized under the name of the ‘white man’s burden’ and came, in one form or another and in greater or lesser degree, to inspire the policies of all colonial powers.

The policies and objects of imperial powers have recently been classified as:¹

(i) Exploitation, in which the economic ends of the imperial power are predominant. This does not necessarily exclude the provision of services for the native people, though, when exploitation has been dominant, abuses have been severe. The public opinion of the civilized world demands that the well-being of the native population should in no sense be sacrificed. In 1923 the British Government declared, with particular reference in this instance to Kenya, though the principle is a general one, that “the interests of the African native must be paramount, and that when those interests and the interests of the immigrant races conflict, the former should prevail.”

(ii) The policy known as the ‘Dual Mandate,’ which has been fully worked out both in theory and practice by Lord Lugard. This implies a double responsibility on the part of the colonizing power, as trustee, first, to develop natural resources for the good of mankind, and, secondly, for the welfare of the native races. This has not been an easy policy; too often the two ‘mandates’ have been found to be, to some degree, contradictory. Land and labour questions in East and South Africa are cases in point.

(iii) The ultimate termination of the colonial system by the education of the native people in the methods of self-government. This is the declared policy of Great Britain towards most of her colonial empire, an earnest of which has been the establishment of the self-governing dominions and the progress in this direction of India, Rhodesia, and Burma. This and the policy of the Dual Mandate are not exclusive, though the latter cannot be said to presuppose the termination of the colonial system within a measurable time.

¹ *Colonial Problem* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1937).




FIG. 122. THE COLONIAL EMPIRES

The self-governing dominions, together with India, are stippled. Non-self-governing colonial territories are shown in black. Antarctica, which is claimed by certain Powers, cannot fairly be regarded as a colony, and is omitted.

(iv) The termination of the colonial system by the absorption of the colony as an integral part of the mother country. The conspicuous example of this has been French policy towards Algeria and her 'old' colonies. It presupposes, almost inevitably, the absence of a 'colour-bar' and the economic equality of the peoples of colony and home country. It would appear a possible line of development in the overseas empire of the U.S.A.

No country has ever established colonies without looking for some material gain. A small group of colonies has been established partly or wholly for strategic reasons. Gibraltar and Malta are obvious examples. Cyprus was acquired by Great Britain in large measure to offset Russian progress towards the Mediterranean. St Helena, Ascension, the Falkland Islands, Aden, and islands in the Indian and Pacific Oceans belong also to this group. The changed balance of forces in the Pacific in recent years has given a similar significance to Hawaii, Guam, Midway, and other islets. While not precisely colonies, the British garrisons in Egypt and Iraq and the American tenure of the Panama Canal Zone and of bases in the West Indies, Newfoundland, and Guiana have a similar purpose—to safeguard communications. Not all such bases have retained their old importance; the Falkland Islands and the Portuguese Alagoa and Delagoa Bays are no longer significant. Air-power has brought about a further revaluation of strategic centres. Dakar, Kuwait, and Bahrain acquire a new significance. Aircraft are not tied to the shipping-lanes. The use of great circle routes brings them across Iceland and Greenland, the Aleutian Islands and Kamchatka. Furthermore, the need for the fullest weather information gives a real value to such islands as the Faroes and adds to the importance of Iceland and Greenland.

In general, however, an economic advantage has been expected, and there has been some ratio between the amount of money put into colonial development and the expected commercial advantage to be derived from it. The early empires were exclusive. The trade of the colony was for the enjoyment of the mother country alone. Smuggling was encouraged, though small exceptions were occasionally made, such as the 'Asiento' with Spain, usually under duress.

However much this exclusiveness may have been modified, both colony and mother country have retained in most empires a privileged position in their mutual trade. The beginnings of a broader policy are to be found in the Berlin Act (1885), which regulated the affairs of the Congo. The policy of the 'open door' was prescribed, and no discriminatory tariffs were to be applied within the conventional Congo basin, actually all Central Africa. This was modified in 1890 and 1919, so that the open door was left only just ajar. At the same time Great Britain adopted, with certain reservations, a free-trade policy within the Empire, and the mandated territories were, by the terms of the mandate, open to the unrestricted trade of the world. Most imperial powers, however, attempted to canalize the trade of their colonies. Japan has openly diverted to the home market all that it required. The Belgian, French, Italian, and late German empires also established a relatively large internal trade. In 1932 Great Britain and its empire also abandoned their free-trade policy and, in the Ottawa Agreements, established imperial trade preferences. This policy has been criticized, especially in the U.S.A., and it is argued that the Empire is not sufficiently self-contained for such a policy to be practicable.

THE VALUE OF COLONIES

If there were no preferences the imperial power could gain no considerable commercial advantage from the possession of an empire. It may be asked, then, what is the importance of the trade of the colonial empires—to what extent are they of economic value to their mother countries? The answer will depend, of course, on the way in which the colonies have been developed. Germany, Italy, and Japan have exploited their colonies in their own war interests and have forced them to produce commodities, often at high cost, for this particular purpose. We can, however, only examine the volume of colonial trade under the conditions which have existed until recently.

The colonial empires are, with very few exceptions, located in areas near to or within the tropics. They embrace a relatively large proportion of the climatic-vegetational regions

known as the equatorial forests, savana lands, and deserts, and their products are the crops normal to these regions, together with certain minerals, whose distribution is unrelated to climate and vegetation. The following table shows the position assumed by colonial empires *as a whole* in the world production of the chief commodities. Figures are given as percentages.¹

| <i>Foodstuffs</i> | | <i>Raw Materials</i> | |
|-------------------|------|----------------------|------|
| Cocoa | 74 | Palm oil | 98.8 |
| Tea | 48 | Rubber | 96.1 |
| Cane sugar | 35.9 | Copra | 64.4 |
| Bananas | 30.2 | Ground nuts | 28.5 |
| Maize | 24.1 | Soya bean | 11.7 |
| Rice | 22.4 | | |
| | | <i>Minerals</i> | |
| Tin | 56.9 | Tungsten | 16.3 |
| Phosphates | 52 | Manganese | 13.7 |
| Graphite | 46 | Bauxite | 13.1 |
| Copper | 21.3 | Chrome | 12.3 |

The chief imports of the industrial Powers—wheat and other grains, meat, wool, cotton—do not figure in the list. These are the products, not of colonies, but of the dominions and independent countries, and in these respects no colonial empire is self-sufficient. If we turn to the volume of trade carried on between each mother country and its respective colonies we again find that it is comparatively small. Only in the cases of France and Japan has the colonial trade been really important.

PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL TRADE

| <i>Imports from their Colonies</i> | | <i>Exports to their Colonies</i> | |
|------------------------------------|------|----------------------------------|------|
| France | 25.5 | France | 29.9 |
| Japan | 23.1 | Japan | 22 |
| United States | 18.8 | Portugal | 11.2 |
| Portugal | 10.9 | United Kingdom | 10.4 |
| United Kingdom | 7.5 | United States | 9.6 |
| Netherlands | 5.6 | Italy | 7.2 |
| Belgium | 5.4 | Spain | 4.4 |
| Spain | 1.9 | Netherlands | 4.3 |
| Italy | 1.6 | Belgium | 1.1 |
| Germany (1913) | 0.5 | Germany (1913) | 0.5 |

¹ This and the following table are from *The Colonial Problem* (R.I.I.A.), 290, 287.

If, however, we include the self-governing dominions and India in the figures for the United Kingdom, we find that in 1930, before the Ottawa Agreements, 29.1 per cent. of its imports were from the Commonwealth and 43.8 per cent. of its exports went to the Commonwealth. By 1936 these figures had risen to 39.2 per cent. and 49.2 per cent. respectively. The increase of inter-imperial trade after 1932 has been achieved at a price which some would consider too high, the risk to the greater volume of trade carried on with countries outside the empire.

COLOUR AND LABOUR

The colonial territories are, in general, areas where white settlement is at least difficult and where there is a native population, varying in size with natural resources, with standards considerably below those of the Europeans. Two different but related problems result—that of colour and that of the supply of labour. The reactions of white men to association with coloured is quite irrational, but, however misguided colour-consciousness may be, it would be a mistake to underestimate its geographical significance. It is, however, closely bound up with the question of standards of living. It is difficult to say whether the colour-bar is enforced because coloured people are not white or, more logically, because theirs are lower material standards, and the white man fears the competition of a cheaper labour force. Colour policies within the imperial territories may be grouped as:

(i) No discrimination, the coloured enjoying equal opportunities with the white.

(ii) Discriminating between those who are relatively educated and those who are not. In the French Empire there is no colour-bar, but the distinction between citizen and non-citizen cuts across colour.

(iii) Restriction of coloured people to certain occupations.

(iv) Complete enforcement of racial segregation and the restriction of coloured people to unskilled occupations.

The working out of these policies will be touched on in the following pages.

The absence of a colour-bar does not, however, mean that all communities are merged into a single society. In the

Netherlands East Indies, parts of the West Indies, and elsewhere, where condition (i) obtains, the white community is socially distinct. The same is true of different coloured communities, Chinese and Malays, Indians and Bantu, Indonesian and Chinese. These form a 'plural society.' It is evidently desirable to break down the rigidity which is creeping over these groups before they get too set both in their economic pursuits and in their antipathies to one another.

The development of colonial resources, for which the colonial powers are 'trustees to civilization,' requires labour which white men cannot, in general, supply. Natives are recruited for this purpose. The question which the imperial powers face is whether, in the long run, the native peoples benefit from the industrial, mining, and other developments going on in their midst. In parts of Central and South Africa, for instance, where labour is urgently needed in the gold or copper mines, the natives are becoming 'detribalized.' Absence from home and the atmosphere of the mining compound, not to mention alcohol and drugs, sap their sense of loyalty to tribal institutions. They lose their inherited standards of conduct without at the same time acquiring those of the white peoples, and just drift—a serious problem to all concerned with native welfare. They may even become so demoralized as to lose the will to live, as certain of the South Sea Islanders have done. To quote another example of this clash of interests, native agriculture is fairly extensive; it does not make the most, or even much, of the land, and white farmers with different techniques could get far heavier crops. Should the native be dispossessed? This has happened in many areas, and the native peoples have been crowded into reserves which, with their low standards of cultivation, are inadequate. No attempt is made to pass judgment on these extremely complex problems, but in the following chapter their existence is indicated.

Related to this labour question is the problem of the 'poor white.' This arises from the difference in certain territories in the economic standards of coloured and white. Certain of the latter cannot live up to the level of their own people and fall to that of the coloured. In South Africa and the U.S.A. the problem is serious, and it is potentially so in every country where the standards of white and coloured have not been

assimilated to each other. In such a society the half-caste population, which inevitably develops, tends to be assimilated neither to the white nor to the coloured communities. The Cape Coloured in South Africa and the Eurasians are examples. Only in countries such as those of Latin America do these questions not arise, and here one frequently finds that the whole population is mulatto or mestizo.

MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIP

One of the territorial problems calling for settlement at the end of the First World War was that of the German Empire and the non-Turkish parts of the Ottoman. To them was applied the principle of trusteeship. Article 22 of the League Covenant, embodied in the Versailles Treaty, prescribed that to those territories "which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization. . . . The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League." It was not always easy at the Peace Conference to distinguish between the interests of native peoples and the ambitions of imperial powers. On the issue the mandated territories were classified as:

A. Territories which might reasonably be expected to secure their independence within a few years. Those placed in this category have actually achieved independence, with the exception of Palestine.

B. Those which "are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory." Conditions were imposed, and reports on progress submitted periodically to the Mandates Commission of the League. The Mandatory was prevented from using these territories for selfish or national ends, and they were to be open freely to the trade of all League members.

C. Those "which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory."

On these principles, then, the territories of Germany and Turkey were apportioned among the Allied Powers:

'A' Mandates

| | |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| Iraq | Great Britain |
| Palestine and Transjordan | Great Britain |
| Syria and the Lebanon | France |

'B' Mandates

| | |
|---------------|--------------------------|
| Togoland | Great Britain and France |
| Cameroons | Great Britain and France |
| Ruanda-Urundi | Belgium |
| Tanganyika | Great Britain and France |

'C' Mandates

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| South-West Africa | Union of South Africa |
| New Guinea | Australia |
| Western Samoa | New Zealand |
| Nauru | British Empire |
| North Pacific Islands | Japan |

Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, and Transjordan are now sovereign states; and a similar development in Palestine has been hindered only by the political difficulties in that country. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the Mandatory not to reap some economic reward, but the conditions of the Mandate have been fairly observed by all except Japan. 98 per cent. of the trade of her mandated territories came to be with Japan,¹ and military establishments were set up on the islands in question. The mandate system can clearly be broadened, and suggestions have been made for its extension to colonies and protectorates of the British Empire. This, it is said, would reduce the feelings of envy and jealousy with which this apparently closed preserve has been viewed by non-imperial powers. It was pointed out above, however, that the economic importance of the colonial empires is easily exaggerated.

¹ It was far from clear whether the 'open door' policy applied to 'C' Mandates. It came to be assumed that it did not.

By 1939 the League of Nations had become, for practical purposes, extinct, but since then the principle of trusteeship has been reaffirmed in many declarations of allied statesmen. The discussions of the San Francisco Conference widened its scope, extending it not merely to colonies but to all territories not wholly self-governing. The principle was adopted in the resulting Charter that "the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount," and the United Nations "accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost . . . the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories." The framework of a Trusteeship Council was established with a view to taking over not only existing mandates, but also such areas of the Italian and Japanese empires as might be submitted to it.

COLONIAL POLICIES OF THE IMPERIAL POWERS

Imperial powers at the present day are limited to Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and the United States. Germany ceased to be an imperial power in 1918, and Italy and Japan were deprived of their empires at the end of the Second World War.

Great Britain. It has long been the declared policy of this country to develop representative institutions in the territories of its colonial empire and gradually to hand over to the native peoples the business of governing themselves. This policy has not, however, been followed in any doctrinaire manner, and it is difficult to find any two colonies in which the constitutional developments have been closely similar. The Empire contains five territories in which this evolutionary process has been completed. These dominions are "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

They make war and peace and enter into treaties and trading agreements as their policies dictate. One has, rather ambiguously, declared itself a Republic; none were compromised by Great Britain's declaration of war in 1939, and,

with the exception of Ireland, they are individually members of the United Nations.

This status has been abrogated temporarily in the case of Newfoundland, which found itself in 1930 in considerable financial difficulties. From 1933 the constitution has been suspended, and the country has been ruled by a nominated commission. This, it is realized, is only a temporary expedient, and Newfoundland will eventually revive its dominion status. These dominions have been settled by white and, in Australia, New Zealand, and Newfoundland, predominantly English speaking peoples. These carried with them rudimentary institutions and the political traditions of self-government, which ripened in an atmosphere more tolerant perhaps than in England into responsible government. India and the colonies are in a different category, because in all of them white settlers are a small—in some cases microscopic—minority. The period of tutelage of the colonial peoples is long, but all have legislatures, at least partially elective. India is furthest advanced towards the ultimate goal. In Southern Rhodesia, Ceylon, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Burma the same objective is more distant, but nevertheless in view.

In certain parts of the empire a contrary but nevertheless progressive policy has been invoked—that of 'indirect rule.' This has become "a philosophy of native administration." Its object is to discipline and 'refine' native institutions, rather than introduce European and alien political devices, and to find the political organization of the native people deep in its own past. It aims at creating good African citizens, for example, rather than bad Europeans. Indirect rule may evolve towards representative institutions, but it is at present necessarily based on the authority of the chiefs and the unity of the tribe or clan.

The small groups of Protectorates, such as Sarawak, the Malay States, both Federated and Unfederated, North Borneo, and Tonga, have kept more or less intact their internal administration, while allowing their external affairs to be controlled by the protecting power. The Indian Native States are analogous to Protectorates.

The implication of Great Britain's professed policy has been warped and hindered in many ways, some of which are

touched on in the next chapter. The equality of black, white, yellow, and brown is implied, and yet a colour-bar has crept in. The principle of the dual mandate raises difficult and even insoluble problems, in which legality and equity may not always coincide. At the same time the work of the colonial Governments and of private individuals to improve the health and well-being of the native peoples have been unceasing and by no means always ineffective and misguided.

France. French colonial policy is in strong contrast with British. Colonies have not been conceived, at least in recent years, as potentially self-governing but rather as extensions of France itself, *la France d'outremer*. French citizenship has been extended to all, irrespective of colour, who show themselves assimilable. Thus it has come about that Algeria is an integral part of France, and the West Indian, Indian, and Indian Ocean possessions, and also Cochin China, are represented in the French Chamber. The inhabitants of the more recently acquired African territories have been less assimilable, but the same centralizing policy is extended to them, and they are to be 'associated' with the gallicized *élite*. The French have never appealed to moral obligations; colonies have been expected to justify their existence in the economy and strategy of the mother country, and those which have failed to do so have received little largesse from France. France enters very largely into the trade of her colonies; she uses them as a field of recruitment for her armies, but, completely unconscious of colour, she embraces all who will acquire French culture and become good citizens of France.

Netherlands. During the present century the Dutch Government has initiated a policy of economic and political development in the Netherlands Indies, which can be compared with the best in the British Empire. The Kingdom of the Netherlands now embraces the whole empire, divided into the Netherlands proper, Guiana (Surinam), Curaçoa, and the Indies. Thus far it is like France, but the administration is really decentralized. Each unit develops along its own lines, and the Dutch Queen has indicated the establishment of a federal commonwealth, "with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance."

Belgium. The Belgian empire is limited to the vast basin of the Congo. Independence is at present inconceivable, and does not appear to be contemplated as a long-term objective. There is no legislature. The Belgian Government has encouraged investments in the plantations and mines, but white settlement has been very slight, and very few Belgians indeed visualize the Congo as a permanent home, though many may be attracted by its mineral resources.

Spain. The Spanish empire is small, and its territories the scene of neither economic nor political progress. They now include the Spanish Zone of Morocco, Rio de Oro, Rio Muni, and the island of Fernando Po.

Portugal. The Portuguese empire still embraces two extensive areas in Africa, and territories of smaller size and lesser importance in Asia. The Colonial Charter of 1933 leaves the empire centralized and in large measure controlled from Lisbon, but partly elective advisory councils are to be set up in the colonies.

The empire of Germany, renounced by treaty in 1919, has been mentioned above, and its dismembered territories were the scene of the mandate experiment. Those of Italy and Japan, lost in the course of the War of 1939-45, are about to be used in a similar experiment in 'trusteeship.'

*A bibliography for this chapter is included at the end of
Chapter XXIV.*

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR
TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS OF THE
IMPERIAL POWERS

THE extent of the colonial empires of the twentieth century and the policies and problems of the colonial powers have been broadly considered in the previous chapter. This is devoted to the more local territorial and economic problems of the dependencies. Although continents and countries are to be examined in turn, it may be well to classify the sorts of problems that arise. They are, in general, essentially local. They may be grouped into:

(1) *Frontier Problems.* These are relatively insignificant, as outstanding questions have in general been cleared up within the last forty years. Typical of those which remain is the question of the Siam-Indo-China frontier.

(2) *Plural Societies.* This term has been used by the Dutch to describe the co-existence of non-co-operating peoples, such as Malays and Chinese in Malaya. Standards of living, moral, religious, and legal codes, and domestic economies differ in greater or lesser degree between the different groups. Their points of contact are few, and their relations frequently potentially hostile. Most colonial territories are more or less 'plural,' but in some 'plurality' becomes a matter of serious importance in the internal stability of the State.

(3) *'Poor Whites.'* The 'poor white' is a special case of the results of a plural society, in this case composed of whites, with relatively high standards of living, and a coloured people, with lower standards, content to receive a very much smaller wage. Almost inevitably there are sections of the white community, lacking in either the stamina or the ability necessary for the more exacting forms of work, who are forced to compete with the more lowly paid coloured labour. Their wage drops, and in time they constitute a society white only in colour. The 'poor white' exists in the United States and the Union of South Africa, but is not a serious problem in South America and the French Empire. In Australia the growth of such a society has been precluded by the formulation of the 'White

Australia Policy.' The problem does not arise where there is no social and economic distinction between white and coloured, and this is so in the French colonies, in at least the northern parts of South America, and in the U.S.S.R.

(4) *Over-population.* Problems arising from over-population, from the failure of staple agricultural products or of established markets, form a wide group upon which generalization is difficult. It may, however, be repeated that over-population is a relative matter. Jamaica, for example, may be over-populated as an agricultural unit, relying on sugar and bananas, but with a more diversified agriculture, better methods, equipment, seed, and stock, and a measure of industrialization, might even be under-populated. The standards of living of colonial peoples are in general low, and attempts to raise them are fundamentally dependent upon increasing the value and productivity of labour by furnishing it with more and better tools; in other words, upon capitalization. The output of colonial peoples would be increased and diversified, and so also would their consuming-power. They would become better markets for the goods of other countries.

The Union of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, though in no sense colonies, are considered in this chapter because they share to some extent the problems of the colonial territories. The same is true of India, which approximates to the Dominions in its status.

AFRICA

Africa differs from the other continents in that only 11 per cent. of its area is controlled by the self-governing states—Egypt, Liberia, Abyssinia, and the Union of South Africa. The remainder is partitioned between the colonial empires of:

| | | | |
|--|------------------------|---|---|
| France (incl. Madagascar) | 4,583,300 square miles | | |
| Great Britain (incl. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) | 2,678,500 | „ | „ |
| Italy | 1,094,000 | „ | „ |
| Belgium | 910,000 | „ | „ |
| Portugal | 802,000 | „ | „ |
| Spain | 121,000 | „ | „ |
| Mandated territories | 564,400 | „ | „ |

As has been explained in an earlier chapter, the opening up of Africa was delayed, chiefly by geographical factors, much longer than that of the comparable continent of South America. Its rivers, unlike those of South America, are not navigable for more than comparatively short distances; much of its coastline is fringed by mangrove swamp and jungle, while inland the ravages of disease have slowed down exploration and hindered settlement.

The relief of Africa is comparatively simple; the south and east, as far north as the Abyssinian Highlands, consists of a plateau, which ranges in height from 2000 to 6000 feet. This has the effect of moderating the temperature and assisting drainage, so that these areas are, in general, suited to white settlement. The heavy rainfall and great heat of the Congo basin and at least the coastal strips of East and West Africa have led to the development of forest and jungle, which are unfavourable to settlement. The forests thin to the north and south, as the rainfall becomes increasingly seasonal, and here population is more dense and agriculture more progressive. Beyond these are large, sparsely populated regions consisting, in the north, of desert; in the south, of semi-desert and poor grassland. At the northern and southern extremes are small areas of winter rainfall and greater productivity and population.

Over very large areas within the tropics the climatic conditions make economic development difficult. The population is sparse and backward, disease is rife, and transport difficult.

Malaria is the most widespread of tropical diseases; sleeping sickness and various forms of fever, such as cholera and typhus, have a rather more local distribution. To some extent the native peoples are immune to the more serious forms assumed by these diseases, though Africans living in mosquito-free areas are said gradually to lose their immunity. Sleeping sickness is carried by the tsetse fly, whose distribution is more localized than that of the anopheles mosquito. Control of the disease-carrying mosquito has been difficult; the tsetse fly has been more amenable to control, and certain areas, particularly the north-western shores of Lake Victoria, have been freed of the pest. Other diseases, responsible for ravages among the native peoples, are tuberculosis, to which the Africans have shown lower powers of resistance than the whites; silicosis, confined

to the mining population; leprosy; and venereal diseases. Hookworm, which is widespread, has a debilitating effect, and lowers the powers of resistance to other diseases. Many of these diseases are preventable by higher standards of feeding, housing, and cleanliness.

The development of communications has been slow, and has reacted, in turn, on the economic development of the continent.



FIG. 123. TSETSE-FLY-INFESTED AREAS OF AFRICA

Relief, forests, and swamps have presented serious difficulties to the railway engineer, and, on the other hand, the great area and sparse population have made it improbable that, over much of the continent, earnings would ever be sufficient to justify the construction of a railway. It has, in fact, been said that "minerals were the magnet which drew most of the existing lines across the continent."¹ The rail network is close only in French North Africa and in the Union. Road construction is relatively easy in certain areas, where there is an abundance of cheap labour. The French make labour on

¹ S. H. Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa* (Oxford, 1938).

the roads a form of taxation of the native peoples. But the torrential rains and frequent lack of suitable materials often make road-transport difficult. Water-transport is relatively




FIG. 124. RAILWAYS OF AFRICA
After Lord Hailey

important, although the rivers are interrupted by rapids. On the Congo these are circumvented by short railways, and in several areas railways are tributary to rivers.

The racial and linguistic groupings of the African peoples bear no relation to political divisions and little to physical features. Racially they are extremely mixed, ranging from the

primitive Bushmen and Pygmy peoples to the relatively advanced Hamites of North Africa and Abyssinia. They can be divided, not wholly on ethnic criteria, into:

- (1) Bushmen, Hottentot, and other Negrillo peoples.
- (2) Bantu, who inhabit most of Africa south of about 5° N. They include such advanced peoples as the Baganda and Kikuyu, as well as those of South Africa, collectively termed Kaffirs.
- (3) Sudanese Negroes of West Africa and the western Sudan.
- (4) Hamites, a non-negroid people of North Africa. The Nilotes are a Hamite-Negro cross.
- (5) Semites, or Arabs, not always easy to distinguish from Hamites, to whom they may be assimilated.
- (6) Immigrant peoples of whom the most important are the whites and the Indian settlers of the east coast.

More important than racial origins are the economic standards. Primitive hunting and collecting exist in forested and semi-desert areas. This ranges upward through the shifting agriculture of the forest belts to varying combinations of pastoralism and agriculture. Well-known groups, such as the Hamitic Fulani and the Bantu Masai, are predominantly pastoral, though the degrees to which nomadism is practised vary.

North Africa has been considered in the chapter on the Mediterranean. The political geography of the remainder of the continent is examined below.

Egypt and the Sudan. The outstanding international problems of Egypt derive from its position at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, where a short canal links this with the Red Sea, and, secondly, from its dependence on the flood-waters of the Nile. The former indirectly occasioned the British occupation of 1882 and still determines the British occupation of naval and military bases in spite of the independence of Egypt.

Egypt is only a narrow strip of fertile, irrigated land, bounded by deserts. Its dense population of fellahin is dependent upon the late summer Nile floods for the cultivation of subsistence crops and the cotton which is their chief export. The population of Egypt is 15,900,000, concentrated in no




FIG. 125. ABYSSINIA AND THE EX-ITALIAN COLONIES OF EAST AFRICA

more than 4 per cent. of the total area, where the density of agricultural population rises to over 700 per square mile. The flood-waters of Egypt derive from the summer monsoon in the Abyssinian Highlands, and are brought to the plains chiefly by the Blue Nile. These waters might be tapped in Abyssinia and also in the Sudan, and the residue which reaches Egypt might be insufficient for the needs of Egyptian agriculture. The development of irrigated cotton-fields in the Gezira district of the Sudan has increased the pressure on the limited water-supplies, and the need becomes urgent for a large reservoir on the Blue Nile valley. This has proved impossible, and at most the Italian Government undertook (1937) not to interfere with the discharge from Lake Tana. The restored Abyssinian state may be more amenable. "There is no region in Africa where geography suggests more clearly than in the Nile Basin the need for economic and political co-operation between states."¹

Anglo-Egyptian forces reconquered the Sudan in 1898, and a condominium has since been maintained. Egypt's interests in the very much more sparsely populated Sudan are likely to increase rather than diminish, but its attempts to gain a larger measure of political control have hitherto been resisted by the British Government.

Abyssinia and Somaliland. The Abyssinian Highlands are bounded on the east by arid lowlands, whose sparse population is still partly nomadic. The highlands, however, are better watered, and, though rugged, support a much denser population, which has carried on a small trade in such articles as gum, beeswax, and ivory. The potentialities of the highland region are considerable. In the latter years of the nineteenth century the relatively poor coast plain was partitioned between Italy, France, and Great Britain. Italy's attempt to unite the two portions of her East African empire was defeated by the Abyssinians, but the desire remained. In 1906 the three powers reached an agreement on spheres of interest in Abyssinia, and after the accession to power of Mussolini Italy renewed her forward policy. In 1929 the French-owned railway from Jibuti, in French Somaliland, to Addis Ababa was completed. Already Italy had extended her frontiers in

¹ W. Fitzgerald, *Africa*.

the eastern Ogaden region and had acquired from Britain Kenyan Jubaland. Her plans to build a railway from Eritrea to Italian Somaliland across Abyssinia did not mature. Instead plans were developed for the conquest of Abyssinia itself. The




FIG. 126. AREAS OF WHITE SETTLEMENT AND NATIVE RESERVES OF KENYA
After W. Fitzgerald

Hoare-Laval project for the partition of the country (December, 1935) fell through, and by the following summer the greater part of the country had been conquered. Plans were at once put into operation for the settlement of Italians, particularly at first in the eastern provinces of Amhara and Harar. Abyssinia is said to be not inferior, as a field of white settlement, to

Kenya, and by 1939 the European settlers were greatly in excess of those in Kenya.

In the course of the War which followed the whole of Italian East Africa was conquered by allied forces, and the Abyssinian emperor restored. He accepts, however, the tutelage of Great Britain and recently mineral concessions have been granted to Americans. France has regained control of the Jibuti railway, which is the chief link between Abyssinia and the outer world.

British East Africa consists of the colony of Kenya, the protectorates of Kenya and Uganda, the mandated territory of Tanganyika, and the Sultanate of Zanzibar. Together they make up an area of high plateau, sinking to a hot coastal plain in the east and to the Nile and Congo on the west. The native population consists mostly of Bantu tribes, with differing languages, cultures, and economy. In varying degrees they have been disorganized and depend for employment on white settlers. The outstanding political problems are those created by the settlement of Indians and Europeans and by the projected union of the East African territories.

The East African Highlands are one of the very few inter-tropical areas where white settlement is possible, and this has taken place on a not inconsiderable scale in the Kenya Highlands. The population (census 1938) of the three territories is:

| <i>Territory</i> | <i>African</i> | <i>European</i> | <i>Asiatic</i> |
|----------------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| Uganda | 3,725,798 | 2,282 | 19,141 |
| Kenya | 3,280,774 | 20,894 | 62,446 |
| Tanganyika | 5,214,800 | 9,345 | 33,784 |

These highlands reach 10,000 feet, and were covered with forest or rolling grassland. The soils are generally volcanic, and are fertile. 6,768,000 acres have been alienated for white settlement, chiefly along the Mombasa-Uganda railway, where this runs through the Highlands. Native population was sparse, but this arose in part from tribal wars in these areas, but also from the native economy which is by nature extensive. The Kenya administration has been accused, apparently with

justice, of favouring the white settler, and the British position has been described as "that of an umpire mediating between the desires of the settlers and rights of the Natives."¹ White settlement has broken up the Masai land, with serious consequences to the integrity of the tribe and thus on the moral sanctions of the people themselves. Pressure on the land in the Kavirondo reserves has become very acute, and can be relieved only by the restoration of part of the alienated land or by an intensification of native agriculture. The problem has been intensified by the discovery of gold in the North Kavirondo Reserve. It must be remembered that N.-E. Kenya is too dry for large-scale agriculture. The problem is less acute in Tanganyika, where the German policy towards the natives and their land became relatively enlightened, and in Uganda more than any other East African territory, which "has maintained its status as a Black Man's country."²

The Sultan of Zanzibar maintains his authority over the coastal region of Kenya, but Zanzibar feels the consequences of too great a dependence on a single crop—cloves—and economic considerations may force it into a closer union with the mainland dependencies. A wider union of all the East African dependencies has been considered. Geographically it would appear an obvious step, but the terms of the Tanganyika mandate and the differing political conditions are serious obstacles.

The European settlers include some 3000 Germans in Tanganyika, and there is also a considerable Greek colony. But the largest non-European community is Indian. Many of these were brought in as labourers on the railways; many more have immigrated since. Over half are engaged in commerce, and relatively few in agriculture, though some have developed plantations. There is no discrimination against Indians in Tanganyika, and very little in Uganda. In Kenya they are prevented from acquiring land in the Highlands, and some attempt has been made to segregate them in the towns.

The Congo Basin consists of a depression in the ancient African platform. Its surface is not level, and rivers are

¹ J. A. Noon, *Labor Problems of Africa* (African Handbooks, No. 6, University of Pennsylvania).

² W. Fitzgerald, *Africa*, p. 251.

interrupted by rapids, the Congo itself being navigable for less than 100 miles from its mouth. Much of the area is forested, though broken by many open or lightly wooded areas. On the margins the basin rises to grassy uplands which are not unhealthy. The region is sparsely populated but of considerable potential wealth. Development has depended largely on the




FIG. 127. THE CONGO BASIN,
SHOWING RAILWAYS AND NAVIGABLE SECTIONS OF THE RIVERS

provision of transport and the supply of labour. The former has been chiefly by river, but this, owing to the impediments to navigation, has necessitated frequent and costly transhipment. The recently opened railways to Lobito Bay, in Angola, and Beira, in Mozambique, have eased this problem and made possible the mineral development of the Katanga. The mining industry, located chiefly in the latter region and at Kilo-Moto, in the north-east, have been handicapped by the

labour shortage, and the Belgian Government have taken strong measures to secure it, recruiting natives even in the mandated Ruanda-Urundi to work in Katanga.

The economic centre of Africa is at present the Katanga district, where are large and unusually rich deposits of copper and related minerals. The Lobito railway, not completed




FIG. 128. WEST AFRICA: POLITICAL

until 1931, has given the chief mining concession, *Union Minière du Haut Katanga*, a convenient outlet to the sea, and has also led to a more vigorous settlement and development of the open Bihé plateau of Angola.

French Sudan and Equatorial Africa. The French dependencies of *Afrique Occidentale Française* (A.O.F.) and *Afrique Equatoriale Française* (A.E.F.) were each organized on a federal basis. A.O.F. consists of seven colonies (originally eight), together with the District of Dakar. Senegal is politically and economically the most important. It contains the town of Dakar, which

has become, with the opening of the railway to Kayes, the outlet of the Upper Niger basin. Of the others the population is relatively dense only in Dahomey and French Sudan. Ivory Coast and Guinea have areas of the marshy, forested coastal lowlands, and the rest, Mauritania and Niger, are mainly desert. The degree of economic development is everywhere slight, handicapped by lack of capital and shortage of labour. It is easy to criticize the shortcomings of French colonial administration. It may be enough to say that the administration of French colonies has not attracted men of the calibre of those who have served the British and Dutch. Military conscription is enforced, but most of the native troops serve outside West Africa. The town of Dakar has become, with the establishment of air-routes, of outstanding importance. It lies at the point from which the South Atlantic crossing can be made.

A.E.F. was also formerly a federal unit, consisting of Gabun, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, and Chad. A centralized Government has recently been established in which these are administrative units. To these should be added the Cameroons, a mandated territory but assimilated as far as possible to A.E.F. Yaunde, in the Cameroons, has become the centre of a road-system which penetrates to the remotest parts of French territory.

British West Africa consists, in order of size and also from east to west, of Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia, to which should be added the mandated territories of western Togoland and the British strip of the Cameroons. Nigeria was formed in 1914 by the union of the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. It has become, under the enlightened administration of Lord Lugard, a model dependency, in which the doctrine of 'indirect rule' is fully developed. It has been said, however, that the Fulani chieftains of northern Nigeria have provided an admirable medium for this policy. In Nigeria and also the Gold Coast there is a lack of adjustment between plantation and the native subsistence agriculture. The former tends to be developed at the expense of the latter, and over-dependence of a very few cash crops is a source of weakness. The Gold Coast focuses a very rudimentary plan for a West African union, which is yet rather more educational and cultural than political.

Rhodesia and Nyasaland. These territories, three independent and partly self-governing units, resemble East Africa in their physical features and in the problems they present. They are plateaus, covered with grassland and scattered trees,




FIG. 129. NATIVE RESERVES AND AREAS OF WHITE SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA

After W. Fitzgerald

dissected by valleys in which vegetation is thicker, approximating, in wetter areas, to forest. Northern and Southern Rhodesia have a very considerable mineral wealth, the most intensively worked area being southern Katanga. White settlement has been most active in Southern Rhodesia, but an overflow has continued into Northern Rhodesia.

In Southern Rhodesia the policy has been adopted of segregating the white and coloured agricultural populations.

| <i>Territory</i> | <i>African</i> | <i>European</i> | <i>Asiatic</i> |
|---------------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| S. Rhodesia | 1,372,900 | 68,954 | 6,521 |
| N. Rhodesia | 1,366,641 | 13,000 | 537 |
| Nyasaland | 1,682,456 | 1,738 | 1,851 |

Roughly half the area has been alienated to Europeans, and forms a belt along the High Veld on each side of the Bulawayo-Salisbury railway. A good deal of fly-infested area remains unassigned, but the Rhodesian Government appears to have made adequate provision for the needs of the native people. Relatively little land in Northern Rhodesia has been alienated, and about a third of the territory, including almost the whole of Barotseland, is reserved for the natives. Native population, however, is most dense in the eastern areas, where reserves are least. Less than one-sixth of Nyasaland has been alienated to white ownership, but this small territory is the most densely peopled in East Africa, and normally exports labour to neighbouring countries. The industrial and agricultural developments of Southern Rhodesia make greater demands than can be satisfied from local labour. In recent years considerably over half the labour force has been recruited outside the territory, mainly from Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, and Mozambique.

Various proposals have been made for the political union of these territories. Southern Rhodesia is in most respects self-governing. It has resisted union with South Africa, with which, however, it has close economic and cultural ties. One reason has been the desire of the whites of Southern Rhodesia, 96½ per cent. of British origin, to maintain the Anglo-Saxon character of white settlement. More recently union with Northern Rhodesia and perhaps Nyasaland has had growing support. The project has not been excluded by the British Government, and is likely to be consummated in the not far distant future. The chief problem would be the administration of native lands, particularly Barotseland, within a greater Rhodesia.

Portuguese Africa consists of the large and sparsely populated

territories of Mozambique and Angola. White settlement has been small, only some 72,000 altogether, and many of these are half-caste. Portuguese colonization in Mozambique has been ineffective. The plateau of the interior of Angola is better suited to white settlement, which in recent years has increased along the Katanga railway. The relatively undeveloped state of the Portuguese empire has attracted the attention of land-hungry powers in Europe and Asia, and suggestions have been made that these might be satisfied at Portugal's expense.

The Union of South Africa, formed in 1910, is a federation of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange Free State, and Transvaal. Closely associated with it are the mandated territory of South-west Africa and the native protectorates, or High Commission Territories, of which Bechuanaland is the largest. The whole makes up a compact area of fairly simple relief. A plateau, highest on the east and south, drops to a narrow coastal plain. On the west and south the latter is dry, relieved in the Cape Province only by the winter rains; but where, at Port Elizabeth, the coast bends towards the north-east, rainfall increases and the vegetation becomes more luxuriant. The central plateau consists of grassland, shading eastward into scrub desert and northward into savana, or bush veld. The political divisions accord to some extent with the relief. The better watered grasslands make up the Orange Free State and Transvaal; Natal lies below the eastern scarp. Cape Province contains the east-west ranges of the south, but extends northward into the semi-desert, and the latter is continued in Bechuanaland.

The demographic problems of the Union are more serious than those of any other part of Africa. The population is made up of:

- (i) Primitive negrito peoples, few in number and inhabiting the western semi-desert areas.
- (ii) Bantu peoples, recent immigrants as far as South Africa is concerned. They number over 7 millions, but are distributed unevenly, there being relatively few in the Cape Province, except the east.
- (iii) 'Cape Coloured,' half-castes, distributed chiefly in the western parts of Cape Province.

- (iv) Boers, rather over a million and slightly outnumbering the English. They predominate in the Orange Free State and Transvaal, to which their ancestors withdrew in the Great Trek.
- (v) English settlers, chiefly in Natal and Cape Province. With this group may be associated the French settlers of the Cape.
- (vi) Asiatics, numbering some 240,000, are almost confined to the hot coastlands of Natal.

Problems raised by the juxtaposition of these groups are particularly complex, and it is possible to do little more than indicate their existence. The English-Boer problem is now almost a century old. The Boers are rural dwellers; they moved on to the Veld in order to be free to practice the way of life they had chosen. They have been followed by miners and other settlers, and after a war their territory was absorbed into the British Empire. Although virtual independence was restored with the establishment of the Union, many of the Boers have never become reconciled to this position. A nationalist party developed, aiming at the ultimate establishment of a republic. The differences between the two groups of white peoples are closely linked with the native question. Very broadly, the Boers take a stronger line on the colour question. The native peoples are permitted to engage in only a limited range of mainly unskilled occupations and are prevented from acquiring land. Basutoland, Swaziland, and Bechuanaland, the first two mountainous and the latter semi-desert, are protectorates outside the Union, and the scope of white activity is severely limited. There are, furthermore, considerable areas of native reserve, chiefly in Cape Province and Natal, where the land is secured to the black people. Population pressure in the reserves and protectorates is great, and natives are forced to leave them to work for the whites, particularly on the land, where mining and industrial developments are having a strong detribalizing influence. Reserved land is very small in Transvaal and Orange Free State.

The question of native franchise is really beyond the scope of a geographical work. Briefly, the facts are that a progressive policy in the mainly English Cape Province was opposed by the Boer population and replaced, under Hertzog's Nationalist

Government in 1936, by a system under which the natives vote on a separate register and are represented in the Senate




FIG. 130. THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES, AND NATIVE RESERVES

by four whites. In addition they have a partially elected Representative Council.

In Cape Province the 'Cape Coloured' are very numerous and tend to approach the social and economic status of the

native. The 'poor whites' are said to number rather under quarter of a million. Though capable only of unskilled work, arrangements are made to pay them more highly on account of their white status. Asiatics also number almost 250,000. They are mostly descendants of indentured Indian labour and are settled chiefly in Durban and the coastal belt of Natal. They suffer under the same racial disabilities as the African, but are receiving the support of the Indian Government. They engage chiefly in industry and commerce; foremost among their grievances are the restrictions on land-purchases.

South Africa was at first wholly agricultural in its economy. Mining developed on a large scale in the later years of the nineteenth century, and agriculture was relatively neglected. Rural population tended to drift to the towns, contributing to the growth of the 'poor whites.' It has been said that in 1930 approximately a half of the population of the Union was supported by the Rand mines, and that a similar proportion of the Government's finances were derived, directly or indirectly, from it. At present, then, the well-being of the mining industry is fundamental to the prosperity of the country. It was estimated at that time that workable ores would last for only a relatively small number of years. Some respite has been given by the departure of the sterling bloc from the gold standard and by the higher value of gold, but the situation remains critical unless agriculture is replanned and new industries established to replace that which threatens to be extinguished. South Africa is handicapped by the relatively small extent of good agricultural land, though her resources in coal and base metals appear to be adequate for a considerable measure of industrialization.

ASIA

Most of Asia is occupied by the U.S.S.R., China, and India. Discussion of the first two does not fall within the limits of this chapter, and there remains to be considered India, the imperial possessions of the Middle East, and those of South-eastern Asia.

Middle East. South of the Armenian mountains, where the head of the Persian Gulf approaches the Mediterranean, are

the small territories of Syria, Palestine, and Iraq. Problems of the two former have already been considered. Iraq, like them, was formed from the Turkish Empire, and conferred as a




FIG. 131. POLITICAL DIVISIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

mandated territory on Great Britain. To the south, the Arabian peninsula is divided politically into:

(i) *The Kingdom of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies.* This was created in 1932 and embraces the whole interior of Arabia and also its Red Sea coast. Most of the kingdom is desert, and its population small and partially nomadic. Saudi Arabia conquered the Hejaz in 1925, and derives a degree of political importance from its possession of Mecca and Medina, sacred cities of the Moslem faith.

(ii) *The Yemen*, a small independent Arab state, ruled by the Imam of Sana.

(iii) *Aden*, a British colony, and the *Aden Protectorate*, with the Hadramaut. Aden is a territory of only 75 square miles, with a population, mainly Arab, of some 47,000. Its importance is strategic, controlling, with the islands of Perim and Kamaran, the entrance to the Red Sea. It is under the control of the Indian Government, thus emphasizing its importance as a station on the route to India. Aden Protectorate and the Hadramaut consist of a number of sultanates and sheikdoms each in treaty relationship with Great Britain. Their country is mainly desert and sparsely populated.

(iv) *Sheikdoms and Sultanates of Eastern Arabia*. These are politically independent, though Great Britain, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia have considerable influence in certain of them. The largest is the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The Trucial Sheikdoms, seven in number, lie between the Strait of Hormuz and Qatar; they are in treaty relationship with Great Britain. The Sheikdoms of Qatar and Bahrain are more closely linked with Great Britain. Kuwait, at the head of the Gulf, is a British protectorate. Kuwait and the small island of Bahrain have considerable economic and strategic importance, and, probably for that reason are claimed by neighbouring states—Kuwait by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain by Persia. Bahrain now serves as an outlet for much of the small trade of Arabia; it has pearl-fisheries and oil-wells and also an excellent aerodrome, used by Imperial Airways on its route to India. Kuwait has a good harbour, and oil-reserves were discovered here also in 1938.

Iraq is economically and politically the most important of this group of Middle Eastern countries. Its dependence is conditioned only by its treaty obligations to Great Britain. Faisal, son of Hussein of the Hejaz, became King of Iraq in 1921, and the control of the mandatory power was progressively relaxed until 1932, when Iraq entered the League of Nations as an independent state, subject to the British occupation of air-bases near Basra and elsewhere, and a defensive alliance with Great Britain. Frontier problems with Turkey were settled and outstanding difficulties with Persia, chiefly over the control of the Shatt-ul-Arab, by which the Tigris and Euphrates

discharge into the Persian Gulf, have been cleared up. Treaties of friendship with her neighbours culminated in 1937 in the signature of the Pact of Saadabad with Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, in which the integrity of their mutual frontiers was guaranteed.

Iraq somewhat resembles Egypt. Its rainfall is small, and agriculture is usually impossible away from the rivers. Large-scale irrigation works have been built at Kut, Habbaniya, and elsewhere, and, if developed, the country could support a much larger population than it does at present. The chief source of wealth is, however, the mineral oil deposits. These supply rather under 4 per cent. of the world's output, but their importance is relatively great owing to their proximity to Europe. The chief fields are in the north, in the region of Kirkuk, and south-eastward along the foothills of the mountains. The oilfield thus continues into Iran. Iraq oil is chiefly exported by pipe-line to Tripoli (Syria) or Haifa (Palestine). Abadan, on the Shatt-ul-Arab, is the chief outlet for the Iranian oil of the Karun valley.

The considerable British and French interests in the Middle East can be explained primarily by the very great strategic importance of this area, and the necessity of safeguarding their communications with the Far East. The part played by this region in the German scheme of 1941 underlines its international importance. Their interests derive, secondly, from the oil-fields, so important to the navies of both countries.

The Middle Eastern countries are overwhelmingly Arab. This term bears only a cultural significance; the Arabs speak the Arabic language and are of the faith of Islam. Until 1918 almost all were embraced within the Turkish Empire, itself Moslem. With the defeat of the latter, the Arab world was not only divided politically, but parts of it were subjected to non-Moslem powers. Contact with the West stirred into existence a dimly felt Arab nationalism; Arabs became conscious of their common spiritual, historical, and literary traditions, and resented the western powers' assumption of moral superiority. This is a factor of importance in British relations with Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq and in those of France with Syria. It might almost be said that Great Britain and France have created Arab nationalism. The unity of

Arab people is, however, broken by internal feuds of a doctrinal nature. The chief groups are the more tolerant Sunnis and the less tolerant Shi'ites. There are, further, sectarian divisions of the latter; of whom the Druses of Syria have presented the gravest political problems. There are other extremist, militant sects, such as that which the Mahdi called into being in the Sudan seventy years ago. The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia are a reformed Sunni group. These doctrinal differences are not without importance in a nationalism based so much on creed. Another source of division arises from the peoples who, though converted to Islam, have never wholly abandoned their ancient cultures. Such are the Berbers and the Kurds. In spite, however, of its internal differences, Arab nationalism is a force of importance. In 1941 the British Foreign Minister declared it "both natural and right that cultural and economic ties between Arab countries, yes, and political ties too, should be strengthened."¹ It was evident that Great Britain intended to ally itself with Arab nationalism, rather than face its hostility. The evidence is that the unity of the Arab world will be shown rather by political and economic collaboration than by steps, at least in the near future, towards political union.

Persia and Afghanistan. These two countries, though never part of any colonial empire, have been the scene of certain imperialist ventures, so that their problems may be legitimately mentioned here. Persia consists of a high, mountain-girt plateau, dry in the west and very dry in the east. Population is very sparse over most of the area, and the few towns lie among the better watered ranges of the west. In the south-west Persia reaches the Shatt-ul-Arab and embraces a tract of the Tigris plain. Here are most of Persia's oil-reserves.

Before 1914 Persia had been the scene of economic penetration by the Great Powers, and in 1907 it was divided by Great Britain and Russia into spheres of influence. After the Revolution Russia renounced all her assets in the country. In 1925 Riza Khan established himself as Shah, and a revolution was carried through, similar in its scope and purpose to that of Kemal in Turkey. The independence of the tribes was crushed, and steps were taken towards the modernization and industrialization of the country. Light industries have been established,

¹ The Right Hon. Anthony Eden, at the Mansion House, May 29, 1941.

and a railway was built across the country from Bandar Shahpur, on the Persian Gulf, to Bandar Shah, on the Caspian Sea. In token of the changed conditions the name of the state was changed in 1935 from Persia to Iran, an older name with a wider connotation. Suspicions of Great Britain and Russia inclined Persia towards alliance with Germany. German




FIG. 132. PERSIA: RAILWAYS AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, AS LAID DOWN IN 1907

propaganda and economic penetration gained such success that the country was invaded by Anglo-Russian forces in August, 1941, and the Riza Pahlevi regime overthrown. The Trans-Iranian Railway was improved and at once became one of the most important links between Russia and the outside world.

Afghanistan, like Persia, has been a buffer between the interests of Great Britain and Russia, without, however,

offering the economic assets which Persia possesses. The country contains the ranges that radiate from the Pamirs, and sinks in the west to the desert depressions of Herat and Seistan. The sparse population consists of Pathan tribesmen, Moslem by faith, with a sprinkling of Turki-speaking peoples, who have entered from the north, and Indian traders from the south-east. The function of Afghanistan, with its southward continuation in Baluchistan, has been as a barrier, first between Persia and India, and later between Russia and India. The Russian conquest of Turkestan in the middle of the last century raised fears for the safety of India, and this was a reason for the attempts of the Indian Government to dominate the country. In 1907 Russia renounced all claim to Afghan territory. In 1920 the independence of Afghanistan was recognized by the Government of India. The following development of Afghanistan was similar, but less intensive, to that in Persia. German influence became powerful and remained so until 1941.

The Indian Empire raises more problems of political geography than can possibly be touched on here. They may be summarized as:

- (i) Frontier problems.
- (ii) Problems of internal organization and political development.
- (iii) Problems of over-population and economic development.

Discussion of these is necessarily summary in the extreme. India is a 'continent' little smaller than Western Europe, with a population approaching 400,000,000, 222 vernacular languages, and climates ranging from tropical jungle to desert.

(i) *Frontiers*. India is well defined by mountains and sea. The mountain frontier, however, is no hard and fast line, predestined by nature to set bounds to India. The plain merges into hills and these into the higher ranges, which lie one behind the other. In the east the frontier follows a belt of tangled mountain country, which was thought impassable until the Burma Campaign of 1944-45. At very few points does the northern frontier follow the watershed of the Himalaya. The southern slopes of the range are occupied in part by the independent state of Nepal and the state of Bhutan,




FIG. 133. THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE OF INDIA
After D. H. Cole and the Simon Report

whose relations with the Government of India are rather more intimate. On the north the state of Kashmir lies across the Himalaya and Karakorum ranges, and extends into the drainage basin of the Sinkiang. The North-west Frontier has




FIG. 134. BRITISH INDIA AND THE NATIVE STATES

been the most disturbed of any. Here is the chief land-route, the Khyber Pass, into India, and most of India's invaders have come from this direction. The possibility of attack from Russia or Persia, combined with the actual threat from the Pathan tribesmen, has focused attention on this quarter. The British inherited from the Sikhs an almost indefensible frontier in the Indus plain. This is roughly the frontier of British India, but

a 'forward policy' was initiated of extending British influence over "that part of the Border where anarchy, murder and robbery up to the present time have reigned supreme."¹ The result was the creation of the Durand Line (1895), further advanced into Pathan territory, as a purely military frontier. The territory, some 25,000 square miles, between the Durand Line and the political frontier of India, comprises the North-west Frontier Province, contains some 3 million Pathans, and is subject to a degree of control by Political Agents of the Government of India. Many advocate a stronger policy and the institution of complete control over the tribal areas, while others would limit British interference to a minimum. Baluchistan to the south, a large semi-desert and mountainous tract, is wholly occupied by British and Indian forces. Both the North-west Frontier and Baluchistan are areas of tribal unrest, which constitutes a threat to Indian security and a heavy burden on the Indian Government.

(ii) *Political Organization.* India is divided politically, by the accident of history, into British India, under the direct rule of the Government of India, and the Native States, which are in varying degrees autonomous in their internal affairs. Their relative areas are:

| — | Area (sq. m.) | Population (1941) |
|-------------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| British India. | 865,446 | 295,808,722 |
| Native States | 715,964 | 93,189,233 |

The Native States are thus seen to be much less densely peopled than British India. They include, in Rajputana, the desert area of Thar and also sparsely peopled areas of the Deccan. Most of the larger towns and industrial centres lie in British India, together with the greater part of the politically conscious section of the people.

Over a century ago the ultimate independence of India was envisaged as a long-term object of policy. In 1919 Indians were associated with English in the government of the country, and a system of government, known as 'dyarchy' came into

¹ Lord Roberts, in 1898.

being, whereby certain functions of government passed into the hands of elected members of the provincial Legislative Councils. In 1930 the Simon Commission recommended an extension of responsible government in the provinces. The Government of India Act of 1935 was preceded by a series of




FIG. 135. DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIMS IN NORTH-WESTERN INDIA

After O. H. K. Spate

Round Table Conferences, chiefly notable for the failure of the Indian groups to agree among themselves. By this Act the provinces were reshaped in detail and given a fuller measure of autonomy.

The final stages in the attainment of complete self-government within the Empire have been more difficult. The problems have been those which might be expected from an attempt to rule so varied a continent as a unit. Over and

above the Indian Nationalists, with whose aims, if not always methods, people in this country may sympathize, is the political division between Indians themselves. This tends to follow




FIG. 136. DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIMS IN BENGAL

After O. H. K. Spate

religious lines. The Muslim League represents the interests of Indian Muslims. The Congress Party, while claiming to represent the nationalist aspirations of the country as a whole, is very largely a Hindu organization. Nor are the Hindus a

simple group. They are divided into Castes, with differing social and religious status and economic function. At the bottom of the Hindu scale and constituting 30 per cent. of their community, is the large body of the Depressed or Scheduled Classes. Within the Hindu community these are under serious disabilities; these are at the bottom of the social and economic scale, generally quite uneducated, and are even segregated into certain quarters in some of the towns. The chief religious communities are:

| | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| Hindus | 254,930,506 | (66 per cent. of total) |
| Muslims | 92,058,096 | (23 per cent. of total) |
| Christians | 6,316,549 | |
| Sikhs | 1,449,286 | |
| Parsees | 114,890 | |
| Tribes, animists, etc. | 25,441,489 | |

The politics of Indian nationalism cannot be discussed here, and reference can only be made to its geographical basis. Granted that dominion status will be accorded to India, the problem at present is to secure the rights of the non-Hindu groups which make up the Indian people. Foremost among these are the Muslims. These have been afraid of the political and religious consequences to themselves of the triumph of the Hindu majority, and put forward the scheme, known as Pakistan, which envisages the creation of a separate Muslim state. This would consist essentially of those north-western states where there is a Muslim majority: Baluchistan, Sind, North-west Frontier Province, and part of Punjab. The claim for the inclusion of Bengal and Assam is pressed less seriously. The economic consequences of such a partition would be serious. The area of Pakistan is not among the richer and more prosperous parts of India; it has few industries, but is a producer of wheat and cotton. Large areas are desert, and it is doubtful if the area as a whole would be financially self-supporting. Pakistan, secondly, would have considerable Sikh and Hindu minorities, which would object as strongly to Pakistan as the Muslims do to a united India. If Pakistan is unattainable the Muslims demand equality with Hindus in the government of India; only so, they say, would their minority rights be safeguarded.

The policy of federation was recommended at the first

Round Table Conference. It is one which at first recommends itself. It appears to receive the support of the Native States, though not of all the nationalists, who conceive of India as a united country, controlled from the centre by themselves.

The objections of the Muslims to a Hindu-dominated India are shared in greater or lesser degree by the Scheduled Classes and the other religious groups.

(iii) *Problems of Development and Rehabilitation* in India are essentially similar to those of China and of parts of Africa—namely, the acute over-population of the country in relation to its present standard of production. A majority of the Indian people live either close to or below the subsistence level. Their holdings are small and fragmented; they are at the mercy of flood and draught, and, in consequence, often enough of that of the money-lender as well. Rural progress is slow and “in spite of the progress that undoubtedly has been made and of the great increase in the gross wealth of the country, the ordinary cultivator on his tiny plot is still a man of few resources, with small means for meeting his limited needs . . . with an outlook confined by tradition and environment, and needing above all things that those who consider his future as a citizen should understand something of his life as a man.”¹ Amelioration of rural conditions is bound up with the question of rural indebtedness and the improvement of the efficiency of agriculture. The extension of irrigation by means of large structural works is bringing large areas under cultivation for the first time, but this work tends to be negated by the increase of population, made possible by medical and famine relief and the improvement in sanitation and public health.

As in most peasant countries, a first step in rehabilitation is the absorption into industry of surplus agricultural labour, the amount depending on the extent to which other aids are brought to the help of the cultivator. India is not unsuited for industrial development. Her coal output more than suffices for present demands; her potential hydro-electric resources are immense. She has large reserves of iron, and most other minerals can bear the cost of importation. Labour is cheap, but its efficiency varies; in general it is well below that of Western Europe. Factory industries are said to have absorbed

¹ Simon Report (1930), I, 19.

1 $\frac{3}{4}$ millions, less than 0.5 per cent. of the total population. Most of this has only lately been recruited from the countryside, and "the immigrant to the city preserves his village standards of life; conditions which may pass muster in rural areas cannot be observed in a crowded town without creating a slum."¹ The chief industrial developments have been in the textile—cotton and jute—industries and in iron and steel. Developments of the latter at Jamshedpur have very largely been due to the initiative of J. N. Tata. The cotton industry is largely concentrated in Bombay, the jute in Bengal. The War brought rapid developments in Indian industry, particularly in the production of higher quality steel, and India found herself at the end of it no longer a debtor, but a creditor nation, able to pay for the capital goods required for her agricultural and industrial development.

South-eastern Asia contains important elements of the British colonial empire in Burma, Malaya, and the dependencies in Borneo, of the French in Indo-China, and, in the Netherlands East Indies, of the greater part of the Dutch Empire. These are considered in turn.

Burma consists of the Irrawaddy-Sittang valley and its surrounding ranges. It is insulated from India, with which it has very slight cultural or historical association, though linked politically with it until 1937. The population is mainly Burman, closely related to the Chinese. In the south are Karens, and to the east of the Sittang are Shans, who really belong to the Thai people of Siam. The total population is about 168,000,000—comparatively small for so large a country. Density is light, even in the rice-growing area of the delta. There has been a seasonal influx of cheap labour from India for the rice-harvest, and numbers of Indians, particularly the Chettyars, or money-lenders, have settled in the country. The imported Indian labour has tended to lower the standards of living among the Burmans, and has contributed to the Burmese nationalist movement. Japanese propaganda met with some success, but appears, on the evidence of the recent campaigns, to have had little permanent influence. Burma tends rather to establish closer relations with China. For the period from its completion in 1938 until July 1940 the Burma Road, from the

¹ *Ibid.*, I, 21.




FIG. 137. FRENCH INDO-CHINA
Shaded areas are those taken by Siam, 1940.

railhead at Lashio to Chung-king, afforded China her chief opening to the outer world. With the development in Szechwan and Yunnan the port of Rangoon is likely to become increasingly important for China.

Siam and Indo-China. The link between Burma and Indo-China is Siam, consisting of the Menam basin and the western part of that of the Mekong. Siam resisted imperialist ventures, and has learned just enough from the West to develop a nationalist movement and to put forward claims to the territory of her neighbours, the Shan States in the west and parts of Indo-China in the East. Her change of name (*vide* Persia, Manchuria, Formosa, and others) was meant to symbolize her change of heart. Like Burma, Siam is relatively sparsely populated and is potentially an area of settlement for part of the surplus in India, China, or Japan.

The population of Indo-China is more complex. The Annamites, related to the Chinese, are most numerous; in the west are Thais; the Cambodians, or Khmers, of the south are akin to Hindus; and scattered over the whole country are Chinese merchants and artisans. The French have developed a federal government, embracing the colony of Cochin China and the five protectorates, which may be divided into:

1. Tonkin and Annam, with the colony of Cochin China. These lie to the east and are inhabited by Annamites. Population is not dense except in the north, where the Red River valley is a continuation of the densely populated riverine lands of China. Nationalist feeling is confined to these provinces, but, though vocal, is uncertain of its aims, owing in some measure to the divisions between the Annamite people before the coming of the French. In Tonkin the nationalist movement is a pale reflection of the Kuomintang.

2. Cambodia and Laos lie to the west of the mountain backbone of Annam. The peoples are varied but distinct from—and, in general, hostile to—the Annamites. They have long been a buffer between Siam and Annam, and accepted French protection with the greater willingness because it put an end to the attacks of both. Siam has recently claimed certain areas west of the Mekong, and gained possession of them after a short war with the French in 1941. The basis of their claim is the Thai affinities of some of the peoples.




FIG. 138. BRITISH MALAYA

Chinese have immigrated on an increasing scale in recent years. As in other parts of S.-E. Asia, they form a trading and commercial class and are important in plantation agriculture, and, as elsewhere, their greater industry and ability gives them an advantage over the slower-moving native peoples, by whom they are admired, but not loved. In fact, "for the French, Sino-Annamite hostility is the greatest guarantee against either group's becoming a political menace."¹

Malaya is a term used to embrace a number of political units, in varying relationships with the British Crown. They occupy the Malay peninsula south of the Siamese border, together with near-by islands. They are:

(1) Straits Settlements, territorially the least, consisting of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, with which are associated administratively Labuan, off Borneo, and Christmas and the Cocos Islands.

(2) Federated Malay States, consisting of Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan, itself a federation of smaller units. Each has a native administration, but there is a federal Government at Kuala Lumpur.

(3) Unfederated States, Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu, together with Brunei, in Borneo. These are British protectorates.

The economic development of the peninsula began in the seventeenth century with the exploitation of its tin resources. This has continued, and the average annual output from 1934 to 1938 was 52,000 tons, or about a third of the world production. In the past the small alluvial workings were owned and operated by Chinese, but now an increasing proportion of the tin is coming from deep mines, with a larger capital investment and generally British owned. The other great industry is rubber-planting, a more recent development, which in 1939 yielded 383,000 tons, or over 41 per cent. of the world output. There is a smaller but nevertheless important export of copra and palm oil, but subsistence agriculture is relatively undeveloped and there is normally a large import of rice. Malayan prosperity is precariously based, as the course of the great depression showed.

¹ V. Thompson, *French Indo-China*.




FIG. 139. POPULATION DENSITY IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

After Atlas van Tropisch Nederland

The population (1931) is made up of:

| | | | | | |
|-----------|---|---|---|-----------|------------------|
| Malays | . | . | . | 2,169,000 | (42.4 per cent.) |
| Chinese | . | . | . | 2,114,000 | (41.3 per cent.) |
| Indians | . | . | . | 755,000 | (14.8 per cent.) |
| Eurasians | . | . | . | 18,000 | (0.4 per cent.) |
| Others | . | . | . | 56,000 | (1.1 per cent.) |

Chinese immigrants have been attracted by the mines and plantations, and without them these could not have been developed to their present extent. "Had the British Government stopped the entry of those Chinese and Indians, it would have killed the tin and rubber industries and given up to the Malay what nature meant for mankind"¹—an interesting problem in the application of the dual mandate. But the result has been the creation of a 'Palestinian problem.' The steadily increasing Chinese population threatens to overwhelm the native Malays, who in any democratic system would be in a perpetual minority.

The political union of Malaya appears to be dictated by the homogeneity of this small region. An obstacle would certainly be the rights and privileges of the sultans, but more important are the probable consequences to the Malaysians. The present system has at least the merit that it safeguards their interests by perpetuating the authority of the Malayan Sultans. The internal stability of Malaya is of importance to others besides the Malaysians because, off the southern end of the peninsula, is Singapore, entrepôt and naval base. One cannot say yet to what extent disloyalty in the peninsula contributed to the Japanese conquest in 1942, but that event and its consequences to India, the Netherlands Indies, and Australia cannot be ignored. Singapore is the outermost bastion in the defence of all these territories.

Netherlands East Indies embrace all the islands between Asia and Australia, with the exception of those British possessions just mentioned, Sarawak, North Borneo, and the eastern halves of Timor and New Guinea. The islands lie astride the equator; climate is hot and wet and vegetation luxurious. Many areas in the interiors of Borneo, Celebes and New Guinea must still be counted as unexplored. The non-European population is, as in Malay, very mixed. Negritos live in remote parts. East

¹ Sir Richard Winstedt, *Britain and Malaya*, p. 76.

of the Wallace line the population is Melanesian, but in most of the islands the chief element in the population is the Malayan or Indonesian. White settlement, almost wholly Dutch, became considerable only in the nineteenth century. Most were attracted to Java, an island small enough to be effectively occupied, yet sufficiently large to provide varied resources. It is hilly enough to make possible a large scale white immigration and the soil of unusual fertility formed from lava and tuff, could support a dense agricultural population.

The Dutch exploitation of its East Indian empire was at first utterly ruthless. The practice, known as the 'culture system,' of exacting from the natives contributions in kind of agricultural produce was abandoned during the nineteenth century; the administration became progressively more liberal and the native people now share in the government and are represented in a partially elected Volksraad. This progress has resembled that in India, without, however, the complications there introduced by the religious communities. The natural wealth of the East Indies attracted other immigrants besides Europeans. Chinese and Japanese have settled in considerable numbers. In 1930 their numbers were:


| — | <i>Java and Madura</i> | <i>Elsewhere</i> |
|---------------------------|------------------------|------------------|
| Natives | 40,891,093 | 18,246,974 |
| Europeans | 192,571 | 47,846 |
| Chinese | 582,431 | 650,783 |
| Other Orientals | 52,269 | 63,266 |

The Chinese have increased in number most rapidly, and this upward tendency was continuing when the war in the east broke out. They are strongly entrenched in banking, industry, and commerce, and form a closely knit group, one element in this plural society. They tend to form a middleman group between the Europeans and the natives, and are a solid block to the progress of the latter. At the same time Japanese immigration increased and reduced still further native prospects in trade and commerce. The number of Europeans has increased less sharply. Many of these are 'Indian-born'—white men who have made the tropics their home—but the proportion of European-born white men is increasing, and

these have fewer contacts with the natives; “. . . the new colonial lives more in Europe and carries his European culture with him to a much greater extent than his predecessor of a bygone generation.” The native Indonesian population is increasing less rapidly than any of the immigrant groups, but is not in the precarious position, politically and economically, of the Malays.

Until the present century Dutch settlement and development had been very largely confined to Java. Here a series of favourable conditions, natural and human, have produced the very dense population of 41,718,364, or 817.5 per square mile (census, 1930). The majority of these are agricultural. Recently the agricultural production of the outer territories has begun to exceed that of Java. Sumatra is the scene of the most vigorous development, but the potentialities of Borneo and Celebes are also great. The Netherlands Indies were in 1938 the second producer of raw rubber, 33.3 per cent. of the total, and an only slightly smaller proportion of the total copra and palm oil. Sugar and tea were also export crops. Tin-production amounted to 16.9 per cent. of the total, and petroleum to 2.7.

The Pacific. The Pacific Ocean is dotted with island groups, either coral atolls or high, rocky, and volcanic. It is customary to divide these islands, on the basis of the racial groups which inhabit them, into Polynesia, Micronesia, and Melanesia. The last is racially the least distinctive, consisting of very varied strains. Most of the islands lie on submarine ridges and form lines or arcs. Many of the Pacific peoples have travelled over vast stretches of ocean, moving from island to island in large, oar-driven canoes. Since the advent of the white traders in the early nineteenth century the native population has declined. The ruthless exploitation of the ‘blackbirders’ who collected labour for the plantations, and the sandalwood gatherers, the diseases which they introduced, and the drugs and alcohol which they sold have so demoralized and dispirited the native peoples that in certain islands they are losing the will to live. Space permits only such generalizations; there are many exceptions, such as Fiji, where the British have instituted a kind of indirect rule, and Tonga, where a native queen rules under British protection.



The Pacific islands were not of great economic importance, in spite of the phosphates of Nauru and Ocean Island, and the chrome and nickel of New Caledonia, until their importance on the trans-oceanic air-routes was discovered. The political divisions in the Pacific are:

BRITISH

| | <i>Area in sq. m.</i> | <i>Population in 1000's</i> |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Fiji | 7,083 | 202 |
| Gilbert and Ellice | 180 | 34 |
| Solomon Islands | 11,458 | 94 |
| Tonga | 250 | 33 |

AUSTRALIAN

| | | |
|--------------------------|--------|-----|
| Norfolk Island | 15 | 1 |
| Papua | 90,540 | 300 |

NEW ZEALAND

| | | |
|-------------------------|-----|----|
| Union Islands | — | 1 |
| Cook Islands | 109 | 12 |

FRENCH

| | | |
|---|-------|----|
| New Caledonia | 7,334 | 60 |
| Loyalty, Society, etc., Islands | 1,544 | 40 |

U.S.A.

| | | |
|----------------------|-------|------|
| Guam | 206 | 18.5 |
| Hawaii | 6,407 | 368 |
| Samoa (E.) | 76 | 10 |

MANDATED TERRITORIES (EX. GERMAN)

| | | |
|--|--------|-----|
| Nauru (Brit.) | 8 | 2.6 |
| New Guinea (Aust.) | 93,000 | 484 |
| Samoa (E.) | 1,133 | 54 |
| Caroline, Marianne, Marshall Islands | 811 | 70 |

In addition to the above islands, there are two groups ruled jointly by:

(i) Great Britain and France: the New Hebrides group, has been ruled jointly by the two countries since 1906.

(ii) Great Britain and U.S.A.: Canton and Enderby Islands, while remaining part of the British Phoenix Group, are to be used in common by Great Britain and the U.S.A. for aviation and communications.

NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA

West Indies. These islands consist of a great arc reaching from Yucatan to Venezuela. Jamaica lies on a submarine ridge to the south, and the Bahamas, a large coral group, are to the north. The greater part of the chain is made up of the large islands of Cuba, Haiti-Santo Domingo, and Porto Rico. The remainder, mostly colonies of either Great Britain or France, are conventionally divided into the northern, Leeward Islands and the southern, Windward Islands. The West Indies were the scene of the earliest phases of European colonization. No islands are now Spanish owned, but two are relics of the old French Empire. American influence in the more northerly of the West Indies islands developed with the extinction of the Spanish Empire.

Cuba. American financial interest in Cuba was considerable before the island, with American help, achieved independence from Spain (1898). The nominal independence of Cuba has been conditioned by the proximity of the U.S.A. It is now "essentially an economic dependence of the United States."¹ Cuba is the world's largest sugar producer, over 15 per cent. of the whole, and sugar makes up 75 per cent. of the total exports, tobacco coming second. The market is very largely in the States.

Haiti and Santo Domingo. Haiti is the western third of the island of Hispaniola, which is more mountainous and less productive than Cuba. 95 per cent. of the population of Haiti is negro, and the remaining 5 per cent., who dominate the island politically and socially, is mulatto. The atmosphere and pattern of life are essentially African, with a faint veneer of French culture. Santo Domingo, by contrast, is mainly mulatto in population, but is dominated by a small, Spanish and almost feudal aristocracy, which owns most of the land. Haiti is densely populated; Santo Domingo, sparsely.

¹ Preston James, *South America*, p. 756.

Land-hungry Haitians have filtered across the frontier, and the Dominicans have even resorted to terrorist methods to exclude them. An atmosphere of tension characterizes the relations of these two neighbouring states.

United States Possessions. Puerto Rico passed into American possession after the Spanish War. It lies within the customs union of the United States, which absorbs most of its sugar, coffee, and tobacco. The island is very densely populated, and its negro inhabitants are poor and backward. It is not an area which has derived great benefits from American rule. The Virgin Islands, to the east of Puerto Rico, were purchased from Denmark in 1917. Their population consists largely of negro cultivators.

British West Indian Islands are made up of:

- (1) Bahamas, an archipelago of coral islands.
- (2) Leeward Islands, a group consisting of the British Virgin Islands, Antigua, St Kitts-Nevis, Montserrat.
- (3) Windward Islands, made up of Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent, and Grenada.
- (4) Barbados, lying to the east of the arc of the Lesser Antilles.
- (5) Trinidad and Tobago.
- (6) Jamaica.
- (7) British Honduras, on the mainland of Central America may be associated with the islands, as may
- (8) Bermuda, which is strictly not in the West Indies.

Administration follows this eightfold division.

These islands are inhabited mainly by negroes, who engage in a sort of peasant cultivation. In the past, however, subsistence farming has not been important, and the emphasis has been on cash crops, particularly sugar and bananas, and food, including Burmese rice, has been imported. Only in Trinidad was prosperity more widely based on petroleum and mineral produce. The decline of the market for cane sugar, particularly in Europe, has brought about a serious situation among the West Indian growers. The expansion of the banana-trade has not been enough to restore prosperity. There were strikes, riots, and labour difficulties; the West Indies were, in effect, a depressed area. The Stockdale Report (1943) on the economic and social conditions in the British

West Indies has emphasized the weakness of dependence on a single crop, and pointed out the necessity of maintaining essential food-supplies by a return to subsistence farming. Mixed and dairy farming are to be encouraged, and secondary manufacturing industries for local consumption established. The problem is essentially the world-wide one of capitalizing the native agriculture and industry.

The establishment of American naval bases on certain islands has created a local demand for labour and supplies. The strategic importance of the islands, covering the approaches to the Panama Canal, is such that none of the canal users can be blind to their welfare.

French West Indies consist of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and a few near-by islets. The chief pursuit has been sugar-growing, and their economic plight is similar to that of the British-owned islands.

Dutch West Indies consist of some very small islands in the Leeward chain and Curaçao and neighbouring islets off the Venezuelan coast. Curaçao and Aruba are important for the refineries, which handle a large proportion of Venezuelan oil.

The Guianas. Guiana, divided rather unevenly between Great Britain, Holland, and France, is, apart from the Falkland Islands, the only colonial possession in South America. The coastal belt consists of dense tropical forest; the highlands of the interior are more open. The population is small, and the white population infinitesimal. A number of Indonesians and Chinese have settled, attracted by the shortage of labour in the plantations and mines. Guiana has recently acquired considerable international importance owing to its possession of bauxite deposits, which now supply over 90 per cent. of the demand of the U.S.A.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

THE ATLANTIC

It has been customary to consider the territorial problems of the world continent by continent. The individual land-mass has been a convenient unit only as long as the barrier nature of the surrounding sea has been predominant. From the fifth century B.C. we have frequently met with sea-states, grouped generally round a relatively small expanse of water—the Ægean, the Baltic, or one of the basins of the Mediterranean. They have arisen because, in the prevailing stage of human development, the sea was less an obstacle to human movement than a mountainous or forested land. The Atlantic formerly set a limit to Europe. Beyond the western horizon were, perhaps, the Hesperides or St Brendan's blessed isle, but whoever sailed to the west did so at his own peril. The crossing of the Atlantic by Columbus and his successors was the first step in the breaking down of the idea of the Atlantic as an obstacle and the beginning of the conception that the lands bordering the Atlantic make up a single unity. The strength of the links between the eastern and the western shores of the ocean was suggested by the speed at which communications could be maintained between them. With the coming of the steamship the time was gradually lessened from five to six weeks to as many days, and aircraft have brought the two continents within a few hours of each other.

Until recently the Americas had been able to adopt towards Europe the pose which Shakespeare adopted towards the Continent:

This precious gem set in a silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands.

This inspired the 'Monroe Doctrine,' or rather the interpretations put upon it; the idea of the New World as a refuge from the cares and troubles of Europe. It has encouraged isolationism in Canada and the U.S.A. Did not many of the immigrants to the New World go there because they wished to put the

width of the Atlantic between themselves and the threat of war? And are not many in this year of grace 1946 thinking of doing the same, and for the same reason? Even before the atomic bomb isolation was becoming almost as impracticable, in these days of long-range bombers, submarines, and in-




FIG. 141. AIR-ROUTES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

The dotted line is the great circle route from Central Europe to Central North America.

geniously contrived flying missiles, for the U.S.A. as for Great Britain.

The Atlantic Ocean narrows at two points. In the north, where its shores appear stretched wide apart on Mercator's projection, the great circle distance from Scotland to Newfoundland is little over 2000 miles. On this route lie Iceland and Greenland, stepping-stones, as the Norse voyagers found them, from Europe to America. The regular use of this

northern crossing is made impossible by sea-ice, which in winter encloses Iceland and Greenland in its grip, and until late summer imperils ships with drifting bergs from the Greenland coast. Continuous air-service is not yet a practical proposition owing to the quickly changing weather conditions and the difficulties inherent in navigating near the pole. But these are not insuperable, and one may look forward to a time when increasing scientific knowledge allows regular communication in these latitudes.

The New World also approaches the Old in the South Atlantic, where only 1900 miles of sea separate West Africa from Brazil. The Lufthansa air-route used this short crossing, and during this century its strategic importance has not passed unnoticed. In 1904 and the following years the Kaiser intrigued to obtain some footing in North-west Africa. He failed, partly because of the intervention of the American President, Theodore Roosevelt, at the Algeciras Conference. One must not read too much into this event, but it is significant that the first important intervention of the U.S.A. in the affairs of Europe was to prevent the German control of the approaches to the Cape Verde region. Only twelve years later the United States entered the War against Germany primarily because the latter had attempted to close the passage of the Atlantic to American and other neutral shipping. The freedom of the seas meant freedom for American ships to trade freely with Europe. In the War that has just ended the importance of the South Atlantic crossing has been greater, with Germany's greater power to use it. The German occupation of Dakar, the French port near Cape Verde, was considered, as it was probably meant, a threat to Brazil, and the American President's references to the 'Straits of Dakar' showed how truly he had appreciated these events.

Of scarcely less value has been the air-link between bases in the Iberian Peninsula and the United States by way of the Azores and Bermuda. It is longer than those already considered, some 4000 miles; but weather conditions are very much better than those experienced on the northern route. Of possible importance, also, is the fact that its use depends on the goodwill of three powers—U.S.A., Great Britain, and Portugal. Near the beginning of the War the American




FIG. 142. COMMERCIAL PORTS AND NAVAL BASES OF THE
BRITISH ISLES

The Irish bases were retroceded in 1936.

Transatlantic Clippers flew direct from the States to the Azores in order to avoid the British censorship in Bermuda, but it may not always be possible to omit one of the refuelling bases on this long flight.

SPECIAL INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN

The predominant British interest in the North Atlantic is undoubtedly the security of its shipping-routes to the Mediterranean, the Cape, Panama, and the ports of the eastern seaboard of the Americas, through which pass Britain's supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials. Owing to the peculiarities of the geography of North-western Europe these shipping lanes must pass perilously near a possibly hostile coast. The chief port and distributing centre, London, can be reached only after a voyage through either the English Channel or the North Sea, and the routes to the western ports, from Glasgow to Bristol, pass close to Ireland. In the past the hostility of France has been balanced by a close grip on Ireland and a control of the seaway between Scotland and Norway. In the First World War, although Ireland was disturbed by civil war, naval bases on its coast were held, and the French coast was in allied control. Nevertheless, the menace of submarine attack in the western approaches to these islands became very serious indeed. In the Second World War the position became even more serious. The French and Norwegian coasts were in German control. The greater part of Ireland was neutral, and use of its bases denied, and the only comparatively secure approach to British ports was that from the north-west, between Ulster and Scotland. How serious this matter became has been explained by Winston Churchill, when he said that, in order to secure bases on the southern and western coasts of Ireland, from which to protect convoys, his Government seriously considered the invasion of Ireland.

Ireland is further removed from England than England is from the continent of Europe, and, although the best-developed areas and the ports of Ireland are in the east, intercourse has never been sufficiently intensive to break down the barriers of distance, language, and culture. In the Dark Ages there had

been close contact between northern Ireland and Scotland; this was perpetuated in the seventeenth century by the Plantation of Ulster (1607) and the settlement there of a Protestant, Anglo-Scots community. The rest of Ireland was conquered with difficulty and held by Great Britain in opposition to the great majority of the Irish people. The independence movement gained ground in the nineteenth century, and in 1916




FIG. 143. NORTHERN IRELAND AND ULSTER

broke out in the Easter Rising. An Irish Republic was proclaimed, independent of England, and embracing the whole of the island. Civil war followed, until the signature by Great Britain and Irish representatives of the Treaty of 1921, by which dominion status was accorded to Ireland. The slight bonds which continued to hold Ireland to England have since been cut away, one by one, until now Ireland is a republic masquerading as a constitutional monarchy. After 1921 Great Britain continued to hold the three naval harbours of Cobh (Queenstown), Berehaven, and Lough Swilly, necessary for the protection of the western shipping-lanes. These were

returned to Ireland in May 1938, in a moment of misguided generosity, when the deterioration of the political situation in Central Europe made a European war almost inevitable. Mr Churchill deplored the sacrifice of these ports at the time, and this country has since seen how well his prognostications have been justified by the event.

Irish policy has been guided by two primary considerations: (i) political, the desire to remove the last traces of British rule and to terminate the partition of Ireland, and (ii) economic, the knowledge that the prosperity of agricultural Ireland is bound up with the preservation of the English market. The two are contradictory, and the Irish have shown themselves quite prepared to cut off their economic nose to spite their political face.

Northern Ireland embraces six of the nine counties of Ulster. The boundary was drawn in 1921 and confirmed later, to exclude predominantly Catholic counties. Tyrone and Fermanagh, which were included, are lukewarm supporters of the integrity of Northern Ireland, but the remaining four have Protestant majorities, which is tantamount to pro-British feeling. It is difficult in Northern Ireland to prevent political differences from relapsing into a religious feud. In Éire the opposition to 'Partition' appears to result partly from an ingrained hostility of England and partly from the idea that the physical territorial unit should be also a political unit. In Northern Ireland rigorous Scottish and English settlers have built up textile and ship-building industries and have established higher economic standards than those of peasant Ireland. Advances in social and economic well-being have been fully shared in Northern Ireland, and a majority of its people see no reason for sacrificing the real standards they have attained for the illusory benefits of restoring ancient Ireland.

The prosperity of the Irish farmer is dependent on the export of his cattle and dairy produce, and the nearest and largest consumer of these commodities is Great Britain. In 1925 the latter took 97.5 per cent. by value of Ireland's exports and provided 81.2 per cent. of her imports. A nationalist policy reduced both these figures. De Valera tried to reverse the policy "which made us the kitchen garden for supplying

the British with cheap food." But there is little freedom of choice in the matter of economic development in a country as devoid of fuel and minerals as Ireland. The fact is that Ireland wants the English market more than the English consumer wants Ireland. Imports of manufactured goods from foreign countries was increased, but in 1938, 92.6 per cent. of Eire's exports still came to Great Britain.

Of less direct importance are British possessions and bases in the Atlantic. It is clearly important to control parts of the coast of West Africa and to have a naval base at Simonstown, near the Cape of Good Hope, especially in view of the possible closing of the Mediterranean to merchant shipping. Gibraltar, between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, is in a position to overlook the trade-routes off North-west Africa and the Iberian peninsula. On the western side of the Atlantic the security of British routes has been, in some measure, guaranteed by Canada, Newfoundland, and the British islands in the West Indies and by the fact that war is not possible with the U.S.A. in the foreseeable future. In the South Atlantic the islands of St Helena and Ascension and the Falkland group have served as coaling-stations in the past and could probably serve as bases from which air-patrols could be maintained.

SPECIAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

It might almost be said that until after the First World War the U.S.A. had no special interests in the Atlantic, whose barrier nature was thought to be predominant. The military threat from Germany forced a reconsideration of the geographical values of the islands of the Atlantic, which might be capable of taking the first shock of an attack. The protection of the Panama Canal and its approaches has formed, since 1914, the main preoccupation of American military policy. The need for a sea-connexion between the Atlantic and the Pacific, more convenient than the difficult passage of Cape Horn, was felt as soon as the United States was extended to the Pacific coast in 1848. An isthmus route was used to Panama City, and in 1878 de Lesseps began the construction of a canal. His project failed, to be revived again in 1904, after the Spanish-American War of 1898 had demonstrated its importance. A belt of land,

twenty miles wide, was leased from the republic of Panama and, aided by the resources of medical and mechanical science, the canal was completed in 1914. Its importance to the United States is twofold; in the first place it has encouraged the growth of an immense traffic in bulky goods—timber, coal, grain, ores—between the eastern and western shores of North America, and, in the second, it permitted the rapid movement of naval forces from one ocean to the other, though setting a limit to the size of naval craft.

The opening of the Panama Canal was followed in 1916 by the purchase from Denmark of the Virgin Islands and by repeated American intervention in the affairs of the West Indian and Central American republics. Puerto Rico was acquired from Spain in 1898 and strongly fortified. Intervention in Cuba ceased in 1934, but the naval station of Guantánamo was retained. The construction of an alternative canal through Nicaragua was discussed, and American marines were stationed in the country, under one pretext or another, from 1912 to 1925. If the unruliness of the Central American republics caused the American Government some anxiety events in Europe caused more. The German conquest of Europe left only Great Britain and the British Navy between Germany and the New World, and the Americans looked to their own moat. At Havana, in July 1940, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American republics accepted a resolution to prevent the transfer of any area in the New World from the possession of one non-American Power to that of another. This was clearly aimed against the German acquisition of French and Dutch colonies in the Caribbean. Only a few weeks later the lease by the United States was announced of a number of British bases in the Western Hemisphere, some of which were given in exchange for American destroyers. The bases in question were in Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, St Lucia, Antigua, Trinidad, British Guiana, and the Bahamas.

The Americans could reasonably consider the Atlantic approaches to Panama safe, but they had still reason to fear that the North Atlantic crossing might be used. The Faroe Islands and Greenland are parts of the Kingdom of Denmark. Iceland, though an independent state, was ruled by the King of Denmark, and it maintained very close relations with that



FIG. 144. BRITISH AND U.S.A. NAVAL BASES IN NORTH AMERICA

Those underlined have been leased by Great Britain to the U.S.A.

country. German infiltration into Iceland had preceded the War, and in 1940 there was a bigger German colony in the island than the local police could probably handle. If the Germans could have got possession of the island and used it as a base for aircraft and submarines the damage to allied shipping might have been incalculable. British forces occupied the Faroe Islands in 1940, and soon afterwards Iceland. Greenland fell under American protection, but was not occupied until 1941, when Germans had attempted to land and had sent reconnaissance aircraft over the island. It was made clear that the occupation of these islands was only temporary, and that they would revert to Denmark at the end of the war. Iceland has, however, decided to sever this connexion and to become a republic. Neither Great Britain nor the United States can in future be disinterested in the political affairs of these islands.

THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND

Canada covers an area a little larger than that of the United States, but over three-quarters of this consists of tundra and northern forest, where agriculture is impossible and mining, lumbering, and fur-trapping give employment to a very sparse population. The well-populated areas of Canada are three lobes projecting northward from the United States frontier. The most westerly of these includes Vancouver and Vancouver Island, and resembles neighbouring Washington and Oregon. A belt of mixed and wheat farming country continues from the Red river valley into Manitoba and Saskatchewan, cut off on east and west by the sparsely populated Canadian 'Shield' and the Rocky Mountains. The well-populated Lakes Peninsula and St Lawrence valley form part of a large urbanized region which lies between the Shield and the Atlantic coast of the United States. The political interests of Canada demand a developed east-west system of communications, and trans-continental railways have been developed to an uneconomic degree (see Fig. 145). Coal requirements of Eastern Canada can be supplied most economically from Pennsylvania by way of the Great Lakes and St




FIG. 145. NEWFOUNDLAND, LABRADOR, AND THE ST LAWRENCE MOUTH

Lawrence, and the largest iron ore reserves are to the west of the Great Lakes, on the United States side of the frontier. The great St Lawrence waterway, of the highest importance to both countries, has not been controlled and developed as it might partly because of the joint control of its banks.

There is no question of any form of political or even economic union between Canada and the United States, but the closeness of the geographical ties between them tends to sharpen the suspicion with which Canada regards the States. The development of Canada's northern territories may tend to become a makeweight against too great a dependence on the United States. Agricultural development is limited by the harsh climate and poor soil, but progress is being made, with specially produced seeds, in the Peace river district of Alberta and in the 'Clay Belt' of Ontario and Quebec. The mineral wealth of Northern Canada is undoubtedly great, and large reserves of copper, lead, zinc, and nickel are being worked. They may tend to check the tendency for Canadian industries to becoming increasingly dependent upon United States resources. The intensification and diversification of Canadian industries have proceeded steadily, but they have to face the competition of those of the United States, which, with a consuming public at home some ten times as large, can produce proportionately more efficiently.

In the field of foreign affairs Canada has tended, in the past, to share the prevailing American 'isolationist' policy. While participating in international peace and security discussions, Canada has always been conscious that the broad mantle of the Monroe Doctrine spreads over her as well as over the South American republics. Canada would not be called upon to fight, except in a war of her own choosing, without the support of her more powerful neighbour. In the League of Nations period Canada tended to oppose a general obligation on League members to impose sanctions against an aggressor. The proposal that no state should be called upon to apply military sanctions outside its own continent was hers, and her representative described Canada as living "in a fireproof house far from inflammable materials" (1924).

Canadian policy has, however, been weakened by the division of the Canadian people into two exclusive groups—the

English-speaking, Protestant people and the French-speaking Catholic (see above, p. 137). The latter compose 30 per cent. of the total population. Over three-quarters of them live in the province of Quebec, and 79 per cent. of the population of this province is French Canada. The city of Quebec is virtually a French town, and Montreal has a large French majority. The problem is not that there are outstanding territorial disputes between the two peoples, but rather the existence of differing outlooks on life and society. French Canada belongs to the eighteenth or even the seventeenth century; "in the land of Quebec nothing must die, nothing must change."¹ French Canada feels little attachment to modern France; it is isolationist, resisting Canadian participation in the War of 1939 and opposing conscription, the plight of France having as little influence on its opinion as that of Great Britain. French Canada is a land truly stamped with the image of a people; the villages and market towns, the small, well-tilled fields, and the peasants with their deep love of the land belong to France rather than the New World. With this goes their intense Catholicism, their conservatism, and their opposition to the more progressive and 'American' ideals of Ontario. The French-speaking population is increasing rapidly; its present total of over 3 millions has sprung from the 20,000 of the eighteenth century, and with the land-hunger of the peasant they are welling over into the Clay Belt of Quebec and into Ontario and Manitoba. The English Canadians are acutely afraid that they will eventually be reduced to a minority. The problem of the French Canadian has certain close parallels with that of the Boers in South Africa.

Newfoundland has naturally been closely associated with Canada but has always been politically distinct, and for almost a century had enjoyed a considerable measure of independence. Commercially Newfoundland is closely bound to Great Britain and Western Europe, where is the chief market for her timber and fish. She tends to be cut off from Canada by the physical barrier of the 'Shield' and, in winter to spring, by the frozen St Lawrence. Newfoundland has claimed the coast of Labrador since the seventeenth century, on account of its fisheries; after some dispute with the Province of Quebec the

¹ *Maria Chapdelaine*, the novel of French Canadian life by Louis Hémon.

present boundary was established in 1926, thus giving Newfoundland control also over large areas of virgin forest and large potential reserves of hydro-electric power. Labrador has no overland communications with Quebec. Since the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) French fishermen have had the right to fish off the coast and to land on western and part of the northern shore for the purpose of drying their catch. The two small islands of Miquelon and St Pierre, which France has retained from her former empire, have a similar importance.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

We have examined briefly in an earlier chapter the geography of English settlement in North America, and the broad economic and social differences which separated the northern from the southern states. For long the dangers of Indian attack and difficulties of transport kept the settlers near the tideway. In the eighteenth century settlement advanced to the Piedmont, which slopes up to the Appalachian mountains. These were the effective limit of large-scale settlement, though small bodies of men pushed through the passes into the Ohio valley, where, at the junction of the Monongahela and the Allegheny, Pittsburg was founded on the site of the French Fort Duquesne. At the time of their formation the United States consisted of thirteen states, all lying to the east of the mountains. But the removal of the French threat led to a rapid advance into the Middle West. The routes chiefly used were those which followed the Potomac and Susquehanna rivers. There was an important convergence at Pittsburg, from which town and from Wheeling, farther downstream, the trail struck westward through Zanesville, Columbus, Springfield, and Indianapolis. The Genesee Road followed the Hudson river and the Mohawk river gap to Lake Ontario. Kentucky and Tennessee were reached by way of the Shenandoah valley and the Cumberland Gap.

The war of 1756-63 had terminated French rule of Canada, but France still controlled, nominally at least, the Mississippi. In 1803 this vast area, all of it known as Louisiana was purchased by the United States, and the path was open for the westward advance of the United States. The constitution

provided for the addition of fresh states to the Union as soon as their population and development warranted it. Soon after 1800 all the states east of the Mississippi had been established, and in that year the United States Government purchased from France the vast middle-western territory known as




FIG. 146. THE NORTH AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Louisiana (see map). Traders, prospectors, missionaries, and farmers pressed westward, establishing log towns at the crossings of the greater rivers and at the meeting-places of their trails. They crossed the Mexican border, and reared their cattle, which they sent back along the Abilene Trail into Kansas. The Colt revolver allowed them to defeat the Indians; barbed wire to pen their cattle. They revolted against the Mexican Government and set up the Texan republic, which




FIG. 147. THE TERRITORIAL GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES

entered the Union in 1845. Numerous Americans had moved into parts of Mexico fronting the Pacific, and the Mexican War gave this territory also to the United States in 1848. In 1849 gold was discovered in California; the population grew rapidly, and in 1850 the State of California was recognized. The intervening Rocky Mountain states were populated later, chiefly by miners.

Florida was purchased from Spain in 1819. The extreme north-west was reached by the American explorers Lewis and Clark, who followed the Missouri river, and hunted by the trappers of the Canadian Hudson Bay Company. Feeling ran strongly on the question of which was to rule the Oregon

Territory, until, in 1846, the British Government acknowledged American control in the area.

The population of the United States has increased from some 2½ millions at the time of their formation to 131½ millions in 1940. There was, in practice, no restriction on immigration during the nineteenth century; the continent was empty and crying out for settlers. After 1918 a limitation was imposed on the number of immigrants, prompted partly by the fear




FIG. 148. THE 'NORTH' AND 'SOUTH' IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

that hordes of southern and south-eastern Europeans would depress the labour-market and form unassimilable national groups. Americans feared that the English-speaking character of the country would be lost. Immigration quotas, based first on the census returns of 1910, later on those of 1890, were instituted, when the inflow of people was almost wholly from north-western Europe.

The population of the United States may be grouped as follows:

- (1) The American-born, English-speaking majority, who

may be regarded as thoroughly assimilated to American ways of life.

(2) Unassimilated groups, mainly of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. Some of these tend to form the hyphenated groups—German-Americans, Irish-Americans—who resist assimilation and maintain their own language and culture. The Americans have the object-lesson of the French Canadians before their eyes.

(3) The Negroes, most of whose ancestors were brought to America in the eighteenth century or even earlier amount to less than 10 per cent. of the population. Negroes compose the largest section of the population in the southern states from Virginia to Louisiana and Arkansas. They are few in the north and the west, and are almost non-existent in the Rocky Mountain and New England States. Their distribution (see map) accords closely with that of cotton-growing. In the southern states, which alone discriminate by law against the negroes, very many of the negroes are share-croppers, growing cotton on small holdings, with a very narrow margin of security. Here they form a 'depressed' class. The evidence from South Africa, Australia, and elsewhere shows only too convincingly that the co-existence of white and coloured communities, with differing standards of living, only produces a class of 'poor whites,' whose way of living approximates that of the lower group. This has happened in the south, and racial discrimination is the American's answer to the problem. Feeling against the negro is much less in the north and west, but here negro standards are but little below those of whites, and coloured labour has not the depressive influence which it has in the south, though the negro population is steadily increasing.

There is a relatively small Chinese and Japanese population in the Pacific, where, owing to their lower standards, they create a problem similar to that in the south.

It must be remembered that the advance of settlement has only recently filled out the continent between the Mexican frontier and the forty-ninth parallel of latitude. There had always been land without the jurisdiction of the courts and beyond the purview of police and magistrates. The frontier of settlement itself, in the mining-camps of Nevada and Colorado

or the ranches of Texas, was often a lawless place, where lynch-law replaced more orthodox methods of justice. At the same time the pioneer fringe put a premium on individual courage, initiative, and resource. It bred the best as well as the worst of the types that have gone to make American civilization. The lawlessness of the great cities, whatever its immediate course, is a survival of the conditions of the frontier, and may be expected to diminish as the State gets the measure of its duties.

The North American continent appears to be uncommonly well endowed, not merely with good land, but with minerals, particularly coal, mineral oil, and iron ore. This, however, is only partly the cause of the exceptional productivity and efficiency of American industry. The resources were developed late, and American apprenticeship to industry was less costly than that in Europe had been. Mineral resources were untouched and development cheaper than in the long-worked mines of contemporary Europe. Mining equipment and technique were newer and more efficient. America, also, had a steadily increasing population. The domestic market was expanding, and industrial equipment, constantly being added to, was kept up to date.

American industry has been located chiefly in the north-western quadrant of the country, east of the Mississippi and north of about the thirty-eighth parallel. Here were the earliest settlements; the advantages of water-power and nearness to the tideway were reinforced by the immense reserves of coal in Pennsylvania, the iron of Lake Superior, and the traffic of the Great Lakes. During the present century, and particularly in the last twenty-five years, industry has tended to move westward and southward. This dispersion has been encouraged by the distribution of markets and resources, cheaper site-values for factories, and, in some cases, cheaper labour. This has been the case particularly with the redistribution of the cotton textile industry, which is becoming increasingly important in the cotton states of the South. More recent still has been the development of the industries of the Pacific coast.

The volume of American foreign trade is relatively small in relation to the size of her population. So large a country

can reasonably be expected to be self-sufficing in many minerals and foodstuffs. Broadly speaking it may be said that the imports of the United States consist of:

(1) Vegetable products of tropical origin, particularly natural rubber, vegetable oils, coffee, hardwoods, silk.

(2) Highly specialized manufactured goods and luxury articles, relatively small in volume, chiefly from Europe.

(3) Softwood timber.

(4) Certain minerals, of which tin is the most important.

The volume of American foreign trade has steadily increased during the present century. The completion of the broad settlement pattern of the continent left energies free for overseas enterprise, and accumulating capital looked for fields of investment. The period of American imperialism began at the turn of the century, with Mahan as its prevailing prophet and Theodore Roosevelt as its leader. A short war with Spain was followed by the annexation of the ex-Spanish colonies of Hawaii, the Philippine Islands, and Puerto Rico, and American protection was extended to Cuba. Much American capital had been invested in Cuba, chiefly in its sugar-plantations. Aided by a preferential import duty and an assured market in the United States, the Cuban sugar-industry has expanded spectacularly. But outside Cuba the Government of the United States has been more interested in the political stability of the islands and states of the Caribbean than in their economic and commercial development. Its first consideration has always been the safety of the Panama Canal.

Before 1914 American investments in the Latin American republics had already become considerable. In the course of the War of 1914-18 large loans were made to Great Britain and France, and it was widely believed in the States after the War that America entered the struggle to safeguard these investments. At the end of the War the United States became a net creditor, and with the implication of the Dawes Plan (1924) she made very large loans for reconstruction and development in European countries. The provision of American goods and services served to maintain high prosperity in the States; loans permitted Germany to make reparation payments to the allied powers, which the latter repaid to the United States as War debts. This giddy roundabout was

maintained until increasing fears regarding the advisability of making further loans to European countries led to a lack of confidence in the financial position and to the crash of the end of 1929.

The crisis spread to Austria, then to Germany, Great Britain, and other countries. It was this which provided the excuse, if not the cause, of the establishment of Nazi power in Germany, and intensive rearmament was Germany's way of solving the ensuing unemployment problem. The unity of the Atlantic could not have been demonstrated more clearly than in the financial transactions of the twenty years between the Wars.

Large investments were made by American citizens in Central and South America and China. The term 'dollar diplomacy' was particularly associated with the deliberate policy of the State Department of assisting the flow of American money into these countries. The policy was renounced by President Wilson (1913), but it was very long before America's neighbours recognized that her policy was anything but crudely imperialist. The improvement of American relations with Latin America is described below.

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America consists of seventeen republics, seven of them in Central America. They differ greatly in size and resources, in political stability and economic development, but all have been formed from the empires of Spain and Portugal. Spanish is the language of all except Brazil, though native Indian languages are spoken, particularly in the more remote parts. The population is very mixed. The Spanish and Portuguese settlers found in South America native tribes at differing stages of cultural development, and they introduced West African negroes for plantation work in the Caribbean. The white settlers have shown no reluctance to intermix with the coloured, and there has never been a 'colour-bar.' There is instead every gradation of racial mixture—white *creoles*, half-Indian *mestizos*, and half-negro *mulattos*. Only in Argentina and Uruguay, most European of the republics, is much satisfaction derived from the possession of a white skin.

Argentina and Uruguay have been populated in the nineteenth century, chiefly by Europeans, but by no means all of Spanish origin. The grasslands of the Pampa encouraged the formation of large estates, and the development of an export trade in livestock and grain. Here and elsewhere in South America there is a wide gulf between the land-owning aristocracy and the share-cropper, or landless labourer. Coloured groups are least here, and colour-consciousness most developed. Brazil has a considerable white population, in parts strongly tenacious of its superior position. In the coastal regions of northern Brazil are considerable numbers of negroes, and, in the forests of the Amazon, little known and very primitive Indian tribes. Portuguese is the official language of Brazil. Chile, like Argentina, is predominantly white. The republics of the northern part of South America and Central America are predominantly mestizo in their racial composition, though the white element is locally numerous, as in parts of Mexico.

One of the outstanding characteristics of the Latin American republics has been, in our eyes, their political instability. The continent has bristled with frontier problems, and the short life and revolutionary violence of successive Governments have become a byword. The republics are fundamentally the *audiencias* of the Spanish Empire. Their frontiers were not always clearly defined, especially when there seemed no obvious reason for defining them. Now that the provinces have become autonomous states this lack of definition has led to serious international problems. The chief matters in dispute are the following.

(1) The Tacna-Arica areas on the Chile-Peru boundary. These areas, containing considerable nitrate and copper resources, were conquered by Chile from Peru and Bolivia in 1879. A plebiscite was promised in Tacna, but never held. The Peruvian population, which was probably in a majority, was severely victimized by the Chileans, and the Peruvians expressed the view that the plebiscite would not fairly reflect the feeling of the inhabitants. Eventually, after American arbitration, the territory in dispute was partitioned between Chile and Peru. No concession was made to Bolivia, which demanded an outlet to the sea.

(2) The Chaco dispute concerns the possession of a large

area of savanna grassland on the order of Paraguay and Bolivia, between the Pilcomayo and Paraguay rivers. The dispute was an old one, but mattered little as long as the Chaco Boreal remained of slight value. Bolivia claimed it as part of the *audiencia* of Charcas, with which it identified itself, but administrative changes at the end of the eighteenth century had greatly complicated the issue. Various agreements




FIG. 149. BOLIVIA'S OUTLETS TO THE SEA AND TERRITORIES IN DISPUTE WITH HER NEIGHBOURS

had been made, but never ratified, in the nineteenth century, and the existing frontier had been established in 1894. The problem came to a head in 1927; Argentinian mediation failed and in 1928 the Paraguayans attacked Bolivia. Peace was restored by the intervention of the Pan-American Conference (see *infra*, p. 483), but fighting again broke out, and developed to a new pitch of intensity and ferocity. An embargo was imposed on the import of arms into the two countries, subsequently lifted for Bolivia. In 1935 the Paraguayans were driven from Bolivian territory, and the war terminated, with no territorial changes, shortly after.

(3) Peru and Colombia agreed on the delimitation of their

mutual frontier in 1922, and Colombia acquired a corridor reaching from the south-eastern angle of her own territory to the Amazon river. In 1932 the Colombian village of Leticia, at the extremity of this strip, was seized by Peruvian troops, who were subsequently supported by their own Government. The dispute was terminated in 1934 with the restoration of the *status quo ante*. It is an interesting comment on the justice of



FIG. 150. TERRITORIES IN DISPUTE BETWEEN PERU AND ECUADOR

Colombia's claim to this territory that difficulty of communications compelled Colombian forces, sent to protect this territory, to travel through Brazil, up the river Amazon from the sea.

(4) The problem of the frontier between Ecuador and Peru is one of the most intractable in South America, and, on purely legalistic grounds, virtually insoluble. Ecuador claims, as the successor of the *audiencia* of Quito, to include the disputed territories of Tumbes, Jaen, and Oriente, as far south as the Marañon river. Peru, on the other hand, claims that, owing

to last-moment changes in the administrative districts of the Empire, Ecuador's claim is not valid, and, furthermore, that she possessed these territories before Ecuador came into existence with the break-up of Great Colombia. The dispute was revived in the 1930's, and a solution has not yet been reached. The regions in dispute are sparsely populated, and their value is entirely potential. Tumbes is desert, with some irrigable areas, and rivers which continually change their beds and with them the frontier. Jaen is mountainous and very wet; the Oriente is part of the forest of the Amazon basin. The last can be reached more easily from Peru than from Ecuador, but its loss would rob Ecuador of an outlet to the Amazon valley.

The disturbed internal politics of the Latin American countries are not unconnected with their frontier disputes. The elements which make up each of them are so diverse and discordant that, though they have mixed, they have not blended to make a nation. The minority groups of South America are not so much racial as in Europe, as social and economic—the landowners, the peasant proprietors, a liberal intelligentsia, groups interested in the exploitation of mineral and other forms of natural wealth. The social structure is still quasi-feudal, in the sense that society is dominated by the large landowners, who more or less control the landless labourers. Government is the prerogative of this oligarchy, and the frequent revolutions are the attempts of groups within it to secure power.

Rival groups may take their origin from separate centres of population. South America as a whole is sparsely populated, with some 90,000,000 people scattered unevenly over the continent. Population is most dense along the eastern coast between the Amazon mouth and Bahia Blanca. Here it is well based on the natural resources of the country. Most of the interior is almost uninhabited, but in and near the western cordillera are scattered nests of population whenever minerals or a favourable soil and climate have attracted them. Their loyalties are generally intensely local. Many of the revolutions that have afflicted Ecuador have turned upon the rivalry of Quito and Guayaquil. Deep social cleavages reflect the varying geographical *milieux* in all the Andean republics,

and their political unity is hardly more than nominal. It is difficult to see how any deeper unity can be achieved until the semi-feudalism of South America has disappeared and the standards of living of the mass of the people raised.

These generalizations must be qualified in particular areas. The republic of Mexico is an exception. The revolution of 1910 was followed by seven years of civil war; a new constitution was formulated, and in 1920 the real work of reconstruction was begun. The mineral resources were nationalized, the size of the large estates was reduced. Under President Cardenas (1934-40) the standard of education throughout the country was raised, new farming communities were set up, cultivating their land by up-to-date methods with entirely successful results. The Mexican people have "demonstrated a capacity to work persistently and to govern themselves without resort to knives and bullets." The expropriation of the oil-fields, which produced in 1938 11 per cent. of the world's output of mineral oil, antagonized the United States, which owned the bulk of the capital, and also Great Britain, but these differences appear to have been settled in Mexico's favour. A not dissimilar end appears to be the object of President Vargas's rule in Brazil, though his methods are totalitarian. Chile, too, is attempting to follow a political revolution with a social one and agrarian reform. But in all South American countries progress is very slow, and it is easier to describe their aspirations than their achievements.

Industrialization is adding yet another element to the diverse groups which make up the population of South America. The Latin States remain primarily producers of raw materials and foodstuffs, which are exported to North America and Europe, but industrial development has made progress in Brazil and Argentina and, to a less extent, in Mexico and other republics. This is, in part, an expression of the newly found nationalism of these countries, but it also has deeper causes. Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile have been large-scale exporters of a comparatively small range of raw materials. But world markets have been unsteady, liable to be reduced during trade depressions, cut off in time of war, or lost to rival producers. This has happened in turn to Brazilian coffee, the meat and grain of the Pampas, and Chilean nitrate. The answer of the

South American republics has been the diversification of their own products and a modest move in the direction of national self-sufficiency. The United States have encouraged these tendencies, seeing in a more independent economy in South America less opportunity for German penetration than if those countries were dependent on a European market.

Most spectacular are the metallurgical developments of Brazil, a country particularly well endowed with minerals. Textile, paper, and other industries are also being set up, but the most highly industrialized of the Latin American countries is Argentina, where, however, the range of development is restricted by lack of mineral resources. Tentative proposals made for some sort of economic union of the River Plate countries—Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Argentina—have borne little fruit, but geographically such an agreement would appear eminently desirable.

PAN-AMERICA

There is no *a priori* reason why the two American continents should aim at any form of political or moral union. The tenuous link of the Panama isthmus hardly constitutes them a geographical unit, and most of South America is scarcely farther away in sailing-time from Europe than from North America. Both are, however, continents of pioneer activity, each trying to keep free from entanglements with the politics of the Old World. American intervention in the Caribbean states had wounded the susceptibilities of the Latin Americans generally, and, although Woodrow Wilson openly abandoned 'dollar diplomacy,' he found it difficult to persuade his neighbours that the conversion was genuine. American forces were gradually withdrawn from Nicaragua, Haiti, and other territories they had occupied. President Roosevelt turned his back on the old ways, and at the Montevideo Pan-American Conference in 1933 enunciated his 'good neighbour' policy: "no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another." Five years later the conference at Lima pledged all the republics of America to adopt common action if exposed to the attack of a non-American power. In 1940 a conference at Havana declared in no uncertain terms the

unity of the New World. It would resist collectively an attack against any one of its members, and prepared to take over the American colonies of any European power if there was any possibility of their falling into German hands.

In all these negotiations Argentina was either lukewarm or actively hostile to the majority opinion, which was expressed by the United States. This can be accounted for to some extent by two considerations, which arise from the location and resources of the country. Argentina is farthest from the United States of all the Latin American republics. She has tended to resent the growing American influence, however well intentioned, in the continent, to consider herself a leader of Latin American opinion, and to assert her individuality by a show of independent political action. Argentina, secondly, is bound economically to Europe rather than to North America, as the following figures show:

SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS: PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS

| REPUBLIC | CONTINENTAL EUROPE | UNITED KINGDOM | UNITED STATES AND CANADA |
|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------|-----------------------------|
| Argentina . . . | 39 | 31·8 | 8·6 |
| Brazil . . . | 41 | 8·8 | 34·6 |
| Chile . . . | 32 | 21·8 | 16 |
| Colombia . . . | 22 | 0·4 | 60 |
| Guatemala . . . | 23 | 0·3 | 70 |
| Nicaragua . . . | 23 | 2·3 | 68 |

Three of the northern republics are also listed for purposes of comparison. It should be noticed that Chile's relatively small dependence on North American markets is reflected in a more spirited foreign policy. Argentina could not dispose of her agricultural surplus within the Americas, and, in fact, has had heavy surpluses of wheat, maize, and linseed during the war years. The conservative, land-owning minority have hitherto retained power in Argentina. With the development of industry a more radical feeling is being displayed in the towns, which, it may be anticipated, will express itself in political action. With the gradual weakening of economic dependence on Europe, as a result of industrialization, Argentina may be expected to show a greater degree of solidarity with her American neighbours.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

THE PACIFIC

It was in 1513 that Nuñez de Balboa, after crossing the pathless jungle of Panama, reached one of the sierras of the isthmus and

Star'd at the Pacific—and all his men
Look'd at each other with a wild surmise—
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.

Slowly the Spaniards extended their knowledge, travelling northward and southward along the western shores of Central America. In 1531 Pizarro set out to conquer Peru; ten years later Valdivia advanced into Chile. Magellan, sailing from Spain in 1519, passed through the straits which bear his name into the Pacific. Here, according to Pigafetta's narrative, "we remained three months and twenty days without taking in provisions or other refreshments, and we only ate old biscuit reduced to powder, and full of grubs, and stinking from the dirt which the rats had made on it when eating the good biscuit, and we drank water that was yellow and stinking." The great barrier of distance held the eastern and western shores of the Pacific apart. Several crossings were made in a westerly direction. The Spaniard Mendaña discovered the Solomon Islands; Drake and Cavendish circumnavigated the world in this direction, but the prevailing westerly direction of the the inter-tropical winds made a return voyage extremely difficult. This was done eventually, as in the Atlantic, by sailing far to the north. In 1565 the Spaniards began to colonize the Philippine Islands, which, as Magellan's voyage had demonstrated, lay on their side of the Pope's line of demarcation.

Meanwhile the Portuguese had approached the Pacific from the west and established trading-stations in Java, the Moluccas, on other islands of the East Indies, and in southern China. The absorption of the Portuguese Empire into that of Spain facilitated the approach to the Philippines. There was a short period of Spanish activity in the Pacific, when Mendaña, Quiros, and Torres added considerably to contemporary knowledge of the ocean. Then the Dutch entered the field,

chased the Portuguese from most of their island bases, and established that empire of the East Indies which lasted until 1942. The Dutch did more than the Portuguese to open up trade with China, and made contact with Japan. At the same time the Dutch sailors, crossing the Indian Ocean from the




FIG. 151. SPANISH, BRITISH, DUTCH, RUSSIAN, AND AMERICAN EXPANSION TO THE PACIFIC

Cape of Good Hope in the zone of the Westerlies, reached the western shores of Australia. The bare, desert coast gave them little encouragement. Tasman, sent out to explore this great southern land more fully, examined the northern and western shores, and in a later voyage reached Tasmania and New Zealand. It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that Cook reached the more congenial shores of eastern and south-eastern Australia.

For over two hundred years the Pacific was the real barrier separating east and west. Spanish colonies in America were reached by way of the Atlantic; European colonies in the Far East, by the Cape route and the Indian Ocean. There were few crossings of the ocean itself. It was not until after the time of Cook that there was any great increase in knowledge of the Pacific. Not until the settlement of Australia, the opening up of New Zealand, and the development of an interest on the part of the United States in the Pacific and in China, did that ocean become gradually a highway, and cease to be a barrier between the New World and the Old.

AUSTRALIA

The Dutch made no serious attempt to settle Australia, and it remained a vast unclaimed and sparsely peopled continent when Cook sailed along its eastern coast in his first voyage, in 1770. Even so, the first white settlements were not made until 1788. They were by English convicts who would previously have been sent to the states of North America. The first settlement at Botany Bay was exchanged for Sydney, a few miles to the north. The settlement of Australia developed slowly, and in the first forty years only a semicircle round Sydney, between the coast and the Blue Mountains, was thinly populated by white men. Free settlers came slowly; the Great Dividing Range presented a barrier to movement into the interior, and tended to trap the settlers in the narrow coastal plain in the east. Settlements on Port Philip Bay and later at Melbourne, Hobart, Perth, Adelaide, and Brisbane followed, and from these points progress was made slowly into the interior (see Fig. 152). Sheep had been introduced before the end of the eighteenth century. Merino sheep of Spanish origin followed, and an export of tallow and wool grew slowly. The grasslands of the Murray-Darling region were opened up, and squatters spread westward towards the semi-arid land of the centre. In 1851 gold was discovered at Bathurst, and soon afterwards at Ballarat and Bendigo. Miners flocked to the goldfields. Wild conditions prevailed for a time, but with the exhaustion of the easily worked alluvial deposits many of the miners turned to agriculture. The demand for wool

was increasing in Europe, and the export increased. Convicts were sent to Australia in smaller numbers; the last convict ship arrived in 1868. Thereafter Australia was predominantly a free country.

The development of Australia was both assisted and hindered by the absence of a numerous, intelligent native people. The




FIG. 152. THE EXPLORATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONTINENT

After Griffith Taylor

Aborigines were too few and too weak to resist white settlement, but, for the same reason, they could not provide labour on plantations. The Australians have been torn between the ambition, encouraged by the approaching extinction of the native people, to make theirs a white man's continent, and the economic necessity, if the tropical produce of northern Australia is to compete in the world market, of using coloured labour. Chinese immigrants took part in the early gold-rushes, and, with their lower standards, were able to work reefs which white men would not touch. They went into agriculture to some

extent, but tended chiefly to settle in the towns, where racial feeling was excited against them. For a time state legislation forbade their immigration. This was permitted again later, though subject to restrictions, and, finally, in 1901 a literacy test was imposed, which very few orientals could hope to pass.

For a time South Sea Islanders, or Kanakas, were brought to Queensland to work in the sugar and cotton plantations.




FIG. 153. THE AGRICULTURAL POTENTIALITIES OF AUSTRALIA

After Griffith Taylor

Their importation was, however, prohibited about 1890, though not before the Kanaka labourers of the north had raised a problem not dissimilar to that presented by the negro slaves in the Southern States.

The 'White Australia Policy' has been much criticized. The number of white settlers has risen slowly. Although large areas are suited to them, there are tropical and sub-tropical areas in the north, which can be developed economically only by coloured labour, and there are areas elsewhere developable

by oriental people, though not by Australians with their higher standards. Australia as a whole is very much underdeveloped. The problem has been to decide whether to develop it at the expense of introducing coloured labour on a very considerable scale. The Australians have decided not to do so, and in this there has been a remarkable unanimity between the States. It is said that fear of Japanese expansion was one of the motives which tended most strongly in the direction of federation. Australia pays a high price for her racial exclusiveness. Her national income is much lower than it might otherwise be, but Australia has not hitherto experienced the severe competition with white men of able, industrious, and lowly paid orientals.

The white population of Australia has increased slowly. In 1800 it was about 6000; by 1820 it had risen to some 30,000. The rise became sharper in the '40's, and with the gold-rush very steep indeed. By 1860 it had exceeded a million, and in 1870 it reached about 1,600,000. Since then the increase has been more steady. In 1921 the population was $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and in 1943 was estimated at $7\frac{1}{4}$ millions. This is small for a continent of the size and potentialities of Australia. Most live near the eastern and south-eastern coasts, with a small population in the area of 'Mediterranean' climate in the south-west. The centre and north are either unpopulated or only very sparsely inhabited by pastoralists. The towns shown on the map in these regions are no more than small clusters of houses; the urban population is negligible. Defence has presented a serious problem, especially in view of the growth within the last seventy years in the north Pacific of a powerful and aggressive state in Japan. The exposed coastline is the least populous, and in many parts was probably less well known to the Australians than to the Japanese, who fish these waters for pearls. At the same time the manufacturing industries, which a defence programme makes necessary, have developed late and have been handicapped by the relatively small home market. Australia has, however, the largest coal reserves in the southern hemisphere, with adequate reserves of iron and of some other minerals. The Second World War has given an impetus to the development of heavy industries in Australia.

New Zealand was discovered and settled later than Australia.

For a long time development was slow, owing to the remoteness of New Zealand, the opposition of the Maoris, and the competition of Australia, to which New Zealand was at first politically subject. The population was not raised artificially by either convict settlements or the rush to mine the precious metals. The population is still little more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and the problems arising from under-population, which were conspicuous in Australia, are even more important in New Zealand. New Zealand has built up a highly specialized farming industry, the chief feature of which is the export of dairy produce and mutton, but she depends on imports for the greater part of her factory-made goods. Her coal reserves are small, but she is in a position to import comparatively easily from Australia, and she has considerable developed hydro-electric power resources and reserves of power are great.

CHINA AND JAPAN

Reference has already been made to the early contacts between Western Europe and China. The Portuguese had established their station at Macao in 1557, and for a time Spain controlled Amoy, and the Dutch, some years later, the Pescadores and Formosa. The English East India Company did not engage in the China trade until the end of the seventeenth century, and then succeeded in establishing its headquarters at Canton, where the Government had contemptuously allowed them to use a mud-flat, known as the Shameen. European traders worked under very great difficulties: They were continuously watched with suspicion and treated with contempt by the Chinese Government. Attempts made in the eighteenth century to secure some higher status and better treatment for Europeans were unsuccessful. China had been a poor market for the manufactured goods of the west, and Europeans had been forced to purchase her silk and tea by export of bullion. This was criticized as contrary to the prevailing mercantilist conception of trade, and eventually a market was developed in China for opium, which was produced in India. The import of opium was forbidden by Chinese law, but it was smuggled on a very considerable scale and to the profit of the Company. The

hostilities which broke out in 1838 were provoked by the unsatisfactory position of European traders rather than the Chinese seizure of English-owned opium. Their object was




FIG. 154. TREATY PORTS OF CHINA

After list given by E. M. Gull

“to secure recognition by China of the equality of the Family of Nations.” By the Treaty of Nanking (1842) five Treaty Ports were established—Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai—in which rights of trade were permitted. Their number was increased during the nineteenth century (see map). Most were established on the south-eastern coast and along

that great highway of trade the Yang-tse-kiang. Later a group were established in the plain of north China and in southern Manchuria, but always the tea and silk of the more southerly ports were the chief exports of China. Tea-clippers raced to Europe from Pagoda Anchorage or Shanghai with their cargoes of 'Bohea.' At the same time the island of Hong Kong was acquired by the British Government, and a few years later the territory of Kowloon, on the mainland opposite. These together served as a dockyard for naval and merchant craft and as an entrepôt for trade.

Throughout the nineteenth century Great Britain insisted upon the 'open door' principle in trade with China. This meant, in practice, that the powers demanded entry into China for purposes of trade, but also that none of them claimed any exclusive privileges. The Treaty Ports were open to the unrestricted trade of all nations, and a considerable share was taken also by the French, Americans, and Germans. In the course of the scramble for imperial possessions in the last years of the nineteenth century Great Britain strengthened her position in the Yang-tse valley, which became virtually her sphere of influence. France claimed southern China, adjacent to her possessions in Indo-China. Germany claimed the plain of the Hwang-ho and Shantung, where she established her colony of Kiaochow; Russia penetrated Manchuria; and Japan took Korea and, later, the Liaotung peninsula and Formosa.

At the end of the century the dismemberment of China seemed imminent. In 1898 Russia seized Port Arthur (see below, p. 498) and at the same time Japan gained possession of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, while Korea became independent of China—the first step towards its incorporation by Japan. In 1897 Germany extorted Tsingtao (Kiao-chao), a port on the southern shore of the Shantung peninsula, and in the next year Russia occupied Port Arthur and Dairen, whose possession the Powers had denied to Japan only three years earlier.

In 1911 a Chinese nationalist movement, deriving its power from Canton and the south of China, overthrew the last of the Manchu dynasty. A period of almost twenty years of anarchy followed, in the course of which Japan further extended her

political influence in China. In 1915 the Japanese presented their "Twenty-one Demands," which, if they had been accepted in their entirety, would have given Japan a supreme position in China. They aroused the hostility of the United States, jealous of the 'open door' principle in China. What Japan failed to get by negotiation in 1915 she began to fight for in 1931. China, hitherto "carved up like a melon" between the imperialist, western Powers, now appeared to be coming a prey to Japanese imperialism, and the western Powers re-entered the field to protect China from her eastern neighbour.

Japan's relations with Russia, Manchuria, and the U.S.A. are summarized below. It is possible here to give only the briefest outline of political events in China after her revolution of 1911. Nine years of great disunity followed. Sun Yat-sen was the acknowledged leader of Chinese nationalism, but the powers of the central Government had completely broken down, and the provinces ruled themselves or were ruled by self-styled Marshals and War-lords. The support of Russia had been obtained, and it seemed not impossible that Russia and Japan might come to grips in China. But Russia's military strength was weak and her support for the Chinese Government insufficient. In 1924 Chiang Kai-shek came to power in China. Gradually the alliance with Russia was abandoned. Chiang Kai-shek, breaking with the Communists, and relying more on the western Powers, set out to unite China under the Nationalists. Much of China as far north as the Yang-tse was controlled by Chiang Kai-shek before the break with the Communists became complete, and he advanced to Peking without their assistance. In reality a three-cornered struggle was being fought between the Chinese Nationalists, anxious to unite their country and to free it from dependence on all outside Powers, Russia, and Japan. The last two were in direct contact in the north; elsewhere they were playing for position. Although Russia had lost a dominant position in the counsels of the Chinese Government, the possibility that China might become united under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek induced Japan to act. It was easier to fight a politically dis-united country than one united behind its Nationalist leaders. The result was the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in the autumn of 1931. The importance of Manchuria is considered

below. It is sufficient to note that Manchuria afforded no field for Japanese settlement, but that its mineral wealth was much needed by Japanese industry and that its agricultural products could make up certain deficiencies in Japan. Manchuria was, furthermore, a convenient base for further operations against China. From it the Japanese infiltrated westward into Chahar and Jehol, provinces of Inner Mongolia—a movement clearly calculated to prevent the Russians from giving assistance to the Chinese against Japan.

The fears of Japan were well founded. After the mysterious incident of the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek at Sian-fu (1936), the Chinese Nationalists and Communists came together to oppose the threatened Japanese aggression. The second war between Japan and China in this century began in 1937, with the Japanese invasion of Inner Mongolia and capture of Kalgan. The Japanese had already prepared the way by helping to establish an almost independent regime in the province of Hopei. Here the great plain of China narrows between the mountains of Manchuria and Mongolia on the one side and the Gulf of Pe-chi-li on the other, affording a corridor, some 50 miles wide. The Japanese used this route, fanning out across the plains of the lower Hwang-ho. At the same time Japanese forces landed at Shanghai, occupied the lower Yang-tse valley, and linked up with those advancing from Hopei. A blockade of the Chinese coast was followed by landings at Amoy, Bias Bay, and Canton. In this way the Japanese overran most of the flatter and richer areas of China, in which their mechanized forces could operate. Chinese resistance continued in the hills, so that although the Japanese were spread widely over the country they actually controlled only a relatively small proportion of it. This included, however, the fertile, easily irrigated areas which produced the greater part of China's rice and contained the bulk of the population. Not only were the armies of Free China thus cut off from a large part of their natural source of food, but also from the factories which might supply them with munitions. The Red Basin, China's 'back-country,' cut off from the Great Plain by the ranges of the middle Yang-tse valley, was developed as an arsenal of the new China. Seaborne commerce was cut off by the Japanese control of the ports. A new route, the




FIG. 155. THE LASHIO-CHUNGKING (BURMA) ROAD
Land over 6000 feet # shaded.

Burma Road, was opened up across the ranges of Yunnan and the deep gorges of the Salween and the Mekong, to the Burmese railhead at Lashio.

For some six years the area under Japanese control did not greatly alter. The Japanese failed to advance farther up the Yang-tse than Ichang, and in north China were limited by the margin of the Great Plain. In the south their foothold was even more restricted. Japanese campaigns have aimed at controlling the small, fertile plains, the 'rice-bowls,' of the mountain areas.

RUSSIA AND JAPAN IN MANCHURIA

Some account has already been given (*supra*, p. 375) of Russia's advance to the Pacific. In 1860 Russia acquired from China the territory, now known as the Primorsk province, between the Ussuri river and the sea, and a year later founded the port of Vladivostok. The island of Sakhalin was annexed, but the Japanese claim to the Kurile Islands admitted. The vast, sparsely populated expanse of Eastern Siberia already formed part of the Russian Empire, which had also included the Aleutian islands and Alaska. These latter territories had been sold to the United States in 1867. But Russia did not really become a Pacific Power until after 1885, when the construction was begun of the Trans-Siberian Railway. This line followed the great northward bend of the Amur river from a point east of Chita, and then followed the Ussuri river to Vladivostok. In 1896 the Chinese Eastern Railway was built very largely with Russian capital. This had the effect (see map) of reducing the distance from Central Siberia to Vladivostok by nearly 600 miles. Two years later the Russians acquired the lease of the Liaotung peninsula, including Port Arthur and Dairen (Dalny). Vladivostok is ice-bound in winter, and thus Russia acquired a warm-water port in the Pacific, while she linked with the Siberian railway system by means of the South Manchurian Railway. There was little doubt, at the end of the last century, that Russia had ambitions of creating a Far Eastern Empire whose nucleus would have been Manchuria, which was considered almost lost to China. Russia thus not merely challenged the imperialist ambitions of

Japan, but, by her threat to Korea and North China, jeopardized her very existence. The Japanese regarded the war of 1904-5 as one to safeguard their right to live. By the Treaty of Portsmouth Russia gave up the Liaotung peninsula and the southern part of the South Manchurian Railway, her interests in Korea, and the southern half of Sakhalin. Northern Manchuria remained under Russian economic domination, while in southern Manchuria Japan pursued a policy of railway imperialism.




FIG. 156. MANCHURIA AND INNER AND OUTER MONGOLIA

Manchuria at this time was one of the few great untouched areas of grassland left in the world. Railway building was followed by a flood of Chinese immigrants, chiefly from the overpopulated plains of Hopei and Honan. A 'pioneer fringe' advanced northward between the Kalgan mountains in the west and the ranges along the Korean border. If the Japanese had ever entertained ideas of settling here themselves they were forestalled by the land-hungry Chinese peasantry, with whose standards of frugality and industry not even they could compete.

In 1918 the Japanese, together with the Americans, 'intervened' in Eastern Siberia. Although they did not withdraw until 1922, the Japanese failed to increase materially their

interests on the mainland. In particular, they failed to get control of the Russian-owned railways in northern Manchuria. In 1931, as we have seen, Russia began the military conquest of Manchuria, which she completed the following year. Russia sold her interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway, no longer of any value to her in view of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, and concentrated upon improving her defensive position in the Far East. Manchuria was erected by the Japanese into a monarchy, under the name of Manchukuo, ruled by a puppet of their own choosing, and continued to supply them with coal and iron from its very considerable reserves, as well as with soya and other vegetable products.

From 1932 Japan and Russia faced each other along the Amur river and Ussuri river frontier, altogether some 3000 miles. Incidents were frequent, some amounting to campaigns of considerable proportions. If neither side allowed these to develop into a general war, it can only be because each was too deeply committed elsewhere. It remains to be seen whether Russia still nourishes political designs in Manchuria. She is always liable to be tempted by its ports and mineral resources.

JAPAN IN THE MODERN WORLD

Before 1638 Japan's contact with the western world had been slight. In that year further contact was forbidden; Japan withdrew within herself, and was unknown to the outer world, except through the medium of the Dutch ships which were allowed to visit her infrequently. This lasted until 1853, when an American squadron entered Yedo Bay, with a request for facilities to trade and take on coal and supplies. The Japanese would probably have resisted if they had been able. Instead they opened their doors to the scientific and technical ideas and absorbed much that was worst in western civilization. It is beyond the scope of this book to describe the social revolution that was achieved in Japan; only the geographical features of Japan's economic development and territorial expansion can be summarized.

At the time of the Meiji Revolution (1868) Japan was an almost exclusively agricultural country; manufacturing




FIG. 157. THE EXPANSION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1876-1940

industries were limited to handicrafts, and there was practically no foreign trade. Her population in 1880 was about 36 millions. This rose steadily and reached 45 millions twenty years later. Manufacturing industries were developed, particularly textile and light engineering, and those connected with national defence were generously subsidized by the Japanese Government. The greater proportion of Japanese industry was controlled by a small group of firms, of which the Mitsui and Mitsubishi were the most important; these were closely associated with the higher command of the Army, with which they have pursued an expansionist policy. It has been said that the Japanese have a highly developed imitative faculty, that their industrial achievement is copied from that of the west, and that they are incapable of independent discovery and development. Whatever may have been the case forty years ago this is true no longer. The Japanese have learned all that the west can teach them, and have developed techniques and processes along lines peculiar to themselves. The population of the Japanese homeland has risen to 97,000,000, of which something over 38 per cent. are engaged in industry and commerce and some 48 per cent. in agriculture. The area of Japan, 261,000 square miles, is only a little larger than that of Great Britain, but not more than about 15 per cent. of its area may be considered cultivable. This figure might be increased at a cost which would not be economic. Japan has been able to produce most of her foodstuffs, but with a steadily rising population an increased import is probable. The mineral resources of the Japanese homeland are not large, and Japan is self-sufficing only in copper. Her coalfields, which are inadequate to supply her present industrial development, are in the extremities of Japan proper, in Kyushu and Hokkaido. Her iron ore reserves are small, and it is estimated that a quarter of her steel output is dependent on imported iron scrap and a further three-eighths on imported ore. Much of the raw materials of her textile and other industries is imported. Raw cotton amounts to over 30 per cent. of her total import trade and raw wool over 7 per cent. Fertilizers, rubber, mineral oil, and non-ferrous metals are also important.

The natural increase of population, recently nearly a million a year, was absorbed into the manufacturing industries. The

import of raw materials rose, and with it the need to market the manufactured goods became more pressing. Low labour costs assisted the export trade, and Japan became a serious competitor of Great Britain in all Far Eastern markets. Japanese standards of living, though low when compared with those of the United States or Great Britain, are very much higher than her own fifty years ago, and higher also than those of her Far Eastern neighbours. The effect of this is to permit an even cheaper production of factory goods in these countries. Japan very largely lost her market in India for cotton textiles to the Indian manufacturers, and she had no desire to lose the China market also. The policies open to Japan were thus seen to be (1) to continue to increase her export trade, (2) migration to other areas suited for Japanese enterprise, (3) an increased dependence on domestic resources, with the consequent lowering of standards. The last course will not willingly be taken, though it is a probable consequence of the military defeat at the hands of the United States and Great Britain. The Japanese have never evinced any great desire to migrate. They are excluded from countries, such as Australia and the United States, with standards higher than their own, and they do not readily go to countries with lower. The migration of Japanese agriculturists to Manchuria and other parts of the Japanese Empire was very small for this reason. Hokkaido, which is relatively sparsely populated, is too severe for the warmth-loving Japanese. In 1936 less than a million Japanese were living outside their homeland, Korea, and adjacent islands.

It remained, then, for Japan to develop further her export trade. This is the economic basis of Japan's "Co-prosperity Sphere." This has been variously defined; it certainly includes China, South-eastern Asia, and the Netherlands Indies. Within this area Japan's primary purpose would be to check any development of manufacturing industries; secondly, to secure the free and unrestricted entry of her own manufactures; and, thirdly, to secure as much of her raw materials as possible from within this Sphere. It is unlikely, however, that Japan would ever make her Sphere self-sufficing without including at least Australia. The bulk of her cotton and wool and a fair proportion of her mineral requirements have been imported either from the Americas or from west of Singapore.

• Japan went far towards the achievement of this dream of a Far Eastern empire. Early stages in the conquest of the Japanese Empire have already been mentioned, and are summarized in the map (Fig. 157). In 1927 the so-called Tanaka Memorial propounded a scheme of world conquest. Its authenticity has been doubted, but it reflected the thoughts




FIG. 158. JAPANESE EXPANSION, DECEMBER 1941 ONWARD

of at least a section of Japanese opinion. In 1934 the League of Nations proposed technical assistance to China was met by the Amau Statement, which enunciated in more diplomatic language a sort of Monroe Doctrine for eastern Asia.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate the events of the past five years, in the course of which the Japanese overran south-eastern Asia, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, and many of the island groups of Melanesia and Micronesia.

The problem which faced them was to find frontiers which could be easily defended. To some extent they appear to have relied upon the barrier nature of the Pacific Ocean, together with a number of island fortresses, of which Midway, Wake, and the Marshalls and Gilbert and Ellice islands were the most important. The eastern Pacific (see map, Fig. 158) has relatively few islands, and it is possible that if the Japanese could have held all the islands of the western half, including Hawaii and the groups southward to the Society and Cook groups, she could have resisted almost indefinitely an attack from America. In the event, the use of a fleet of aircraft carriers has altered geographical values, and allowed the Americans to bring their air-bases within the line of Japanese held islands. To the geographer the significance of recent campaigns is the clear demonstration that, under modern conditions, the widest ocean forms no natural frontier, and that, while it is too early to speak of the unity of the Pacific, it is impossible to regard any form of isolationism as a possible policy for either side. On the south Japanese conquests could hardly be regarded as complete until they embraced Australia and New Zealand. They were checked in Papua and the Solomons, and from the land-base in Australia the Japanese were slowly driven back the way they had advanced. On the west, the Indian Ocean and the mountains of China and Burma set a limit to Japanese conquests, but these proved insufficient to protect their conquests.

THE UNITED STATES IN THE PACIFIC

European peoples have entered the Pacific slowly—first the Portuguese, then the Spanish, the Dutch, and the English. In spite of its possession of much of South and Central America and of the Philippines, Spain never became a great Pacific Power. The size of the ocean, the difficulties of navigation, and the almost complete absence of islands in its eastern half checked any movement westward from the American seaboard. Fig. 151 shows diagrammatically the movement of imperial Powers into the Pacific. The United States entered the field late. It was not until after the defeat of Mexico, a century ago, that she acquired a Pacific seaboard. In 1867 Seward

purchased Alaska from Russia, whose explorers had at one time advanced southward almost to the site of San Francisco, and had meddled in the affairs of Hawaii. The north Pacific had escaped becoming a Russian lake, but America was slow to realize that it was itself the legatee of Russia in the Pacific. Commodore Perry, who in 1854 had opened Japan to foreign trade and intercourse, urged upon the Government the desirability of establishing some foothold in the Far East. Seward inaugurated a definite Pacific policy. American trading interests were growing in Hawaii; Seward suggested its annexation, but the American Government undertook only to protect Hawaii from a third party (1875) and in 1884 occupied Pearl Harbour. Hawaii became an important source of America's sugar, and commercial relations were very close, but Hawaii was not annexed until 1898. The acquisition of the Philippine Islands in the same year, and also the expansionist policy of Japan, had made clear to the United States the necessity of a base in the mid-Pacific. American occupation of Samoa, with its harbour of Pago Pago, had begun in 1872, but it was several years before the Government at home was prepared to accept responsibility for it.

Guam and the island group of the Philippines, which comprises the remainder of America's Pacific empire, was acquired at the end of the Spanish War of 1898. The Government was reluctant to increase its commitments by the incorporation of these islands, and from the first announced its intention of restoring complete independence as soon as possible. The indecision which has marked American policy in the Philippines reflects American uncertainty of its future as a Pacific power. On the one hand, the rising power of Japan encouraged many Americans to adopt an imperialist policy as a measure of defence, while, on the other, the old isolationism asserted itself. The defence of the Philippines, cut off from America by the whole width of the Pacific, would be too great a burden; the nearness of the islands to Japan and China—Luzon is less than 250 miles from Formosa—might embroil America in Far Eastern affairs. Furthermore, the Philippines were not economically necessary to the States, and the grant of independence in 1934 was due to some extent to the pressure organized by American sugar-growers, who were jealous of

Philippines competition. This act provided for the grant of commonwealth status in 1935 and of complete independence in 1946.

The population consists of Malaysians, with an admixture of Spanish and Chinese blood. Primitive negrito tribes live in




FIG. 159. THE 'ALCAN' HIGHWAY

the interior. The Filipino people have been anxious for complete independence, but as the time for the American withdrawal approached they seemed more and more reluctant to face Japanese competition and possibly invasion unassisted. In the event Filipino troops, under American leadership, fought well in the defence of their islands and later in their recovery. The Pacific war has necessarily caused some modification of American Pacific policy. The attack on Pearl

Harbour in December 1941 and the subsequent development of long-range weapons have shown that even the coast of the United States is not free from fear of attack. In the interests of their own safety Americans cannot afford to be disinterested in the events on the opposite side of the Pacific. It seems improbable that they will abandon the Philippines completely, and they may continue to hold the naval base of Manila.

The islands of Midway, Wake, and Guam lie like stepping-stones between Hawaii and the Philippines. All are small and of no economic importance, and Guam is ringed by the formerly Japanese-controlled Marianne and Caroline Islands. Its fortification was agreed on in 1941, but too little progress had been made to prevent either it or Wake Island from falling into the hands of the Japanese. The naval action off Midway prevented the Japanese from advancing farther to the east.

The American possessions in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands were threatened in 1942 by a Japanese movement along the northern boundary of the Pacific, and the islands of Kiska and Attu were actually lost. The problem was rendered more difficult by the dangers and difficulties of the sea-voyage from American ports to Alaska. The question of supplies was, however, solved in part by the construction of a road, the Alaskan (Alcan) Highway, from the railhead at Edmonton, in Alberta, to Fairbanks, on the Yukon river, from which a railway runs to Anchorage and Seward. The chief American naval and air base in this region is Dutch Harbour, and there are further establishments at Silka, Kodiak, and Kiska.

It was the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902 which allowed Japan to attack Russia two years later without the fear that Russia would find help in the Pacific. This treaty remained operative until the end of the War of 1914-18, when it was replaced by a complex bunch of treaties drawn up at Washington in 1921-22. These dealt with the changed state of affairs. Russia was no longer a Pacific Power of consequence. China, on the other hand, appeared to be crumbling to pieces, and it seemed desirable to guarantee her territorial integrity in the Nine-Power Pact, of which one of the signatories was Japan. Japan had emerged from the previous War as a first-class naval power, whose strength had been increased by the

acquisition of a large proportion of the ex-German colonial possessions in the Pacific. At the same time the Four-Power Treaty between Great Britain, France, the United States, and Japan provided for the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Pacific. It was further provided that none of the signatories should increase its "existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and . . . no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions . . ." of these Powers. This in effect prevented the Americans from elaborating the defences of the Philippines and from fortifying Guam. It also prevented the British from making a naval base at Hong Kong, and forced them to rely on Singapore, which was too remote to serve as a base of operations in Japanese waters. Judged by its results the Washington Conference was a victory for Japan.

BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC

It is customary to divide the islands of the Pacific into three groups, (i) Melanesia, the island arc southward from the Solomons towards New Zealand, (ii) Micronesia, to the north, including the Caroline, Marianna, and Marshall islands, and (iii) Polynesia, the far-flung island groups, eastward to Easter Island and northward to Midway. Most are small, and are either low, flat coral reefs or high volcanic cones. Vegetation is profuse on most, though their economic importance is in general not great. Some have considerable mineral wealth, particularly Ocean Island and Nauru (phosphates) and New Caledonia (nickel, chrome, and a wide range of non-ferrous metals). The population is small, and, though it is able and virile on certain groups, such as the Fiji Islands, is in general declining. Large numbers have been taken as impressed or indentured labour to the sugar-fields, plantations, and mines of adjacent territories, and "drugs, alcohol, demoralization, and disease" have further thinned their ranks. At the same time it is doubtful if the various Christian missionary societies have done better work anywhere than in the South Seas to improve the lot of a coloured people. •

After the voyages of Captain Cook, which literally put many of these island groups on the map, Great Britain established a

claim to the majority, including Fiji, the Solomons, and the Gilbert and Ellice groups. France acquired New Caledonia and several of the Polynesian groups, including the Society, Tuamotu, and Marquesas Islands. The Cook, Niue, and certain other islands are dependencies of New Zealand. Most of the other groups in the Pacific were acquired in the nineteenth century by Germany, and after her defeat were assigned as mandates to Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Thus Australia acquired the Bismarck Archipelago and, jointly with Great Britain and New Zealand, the island of Nauru, centre of the phosphate mining industry. Japan gained the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianna groups, strategically the most important, protecting, as they do, the southern approaches to Japan and lying between Hawaii and the Philippines.

Pearl Harbour is the base of the American Pacific Fleet, and a small Asiatic Fleet is based on Manila. Australia and New Zealand have small fleets, but, up to 1941, had no capital ships. A British battle-fleet was maintained in Far Eastern waters, based on Singapore, but, as has been pointed out above, the Washington agreements, freezing the situation existing in 1922, prevented the establishment of a base in the China Sea. A Dutch fleet was based on Sourabaya.

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CONCLUSION

IN the preceding chapters emphasis has been laid on the evolution of the political rather than of the economic and cultural pattern. In the course of some three thousand years states of varying size and importance have grown, expanded, and decayed, and have been replaced or absorbed by other political units. Their development has been influenced—one cannot say controlled—by climate, topography, and the relationship of land- and sea-masses. In certain respects the physical environment is seen to have had a less and less restrictive influence through the ages. This is especially true of land utilization and urban and industrial development. Electric power, particularly hydro-electric, allows countries without coal resources to develop factory industries, and it is possible that in the not too distant future further developments of industrial power may remove what restrictive influences in this direction nature still imposes. While climate can be varied only in the slightest degree, the advances of science can, under favourable economic circumstances, increase the viability of man and crops in areas of harsh or extreme climate. Water can be brought to desert settlements by pipe-line. Central heating and air-conditioning, prepared foods and medical services, can increase the habitability of such regions, while an advancing mining technique and crops whose special characters have been obtained by selective breeding give them an economic value which they did not possess a few years ago. Thus, at the same time as a revolution in transport is giving a new importance to the waste lands of the Canadian and Russian Arctic, these advances are adding to their potential value.

But it cannot be claimed that political organization is emancipating itself to the same degree from the influence of the sizes, shapes, and interrelationships of land-masses. Through the kaleidoscopic pattern of changing political units, from the time when the institution of the state evolved from tribal society, there runs a unifying thread, giving a sense of logical development to the whole. It may be rather arbitrary

to divide states into 'land' and 'sea,' continental and oceanic; many partake of both qualities, but such a division is useful and not wholly at variance with the facts of historical geography. In Europe are two land-locked seas of considerable size, the Baltic and the Mediterranean. Opening from the latter are lesser seas, the Aegean, Black, and Adriatic. Off north-western Europe are the English Channel, North Sea, and the partially enclosed and island-studded waters between Denmark and Sweden. Each has been the nucleus of a state system. In contrast are inland foci of states systems—the Paris Basin, the Meseta, Bohemia, Serbia. These are the contrasted sea and land states. Viewed in its broadest sense, the fundamental problem in Europe has been whether the continent should consist of a powerful, central, continental state, dominating a group of smaller peripheral units, or whether the latter should increase in political power and economic importance, reducing the interior of Europe to a congeries of small dependencies. This problem has been solved at different times and for varying portions of the European sub-continent. The thalassic Roman Empire gave way to the continental empire of Charlemagne. To the latter succeeded the Holy Roman Empire, but as it grew weaker, disintegrating within and threatened from without by Slavs and invaders from the steppes, a fringe of sea states, not all of them contemporary, inherited its western, marginal areas—the Danish state, England-Normandy-Anjou, the Muslim sea state of the Mediterranean, replaced gradually by the commercial empires of Venice, Genoa, and Aragon. The land state of France asserted itself from the twelfth century, expelling its invaders and extinguishing the Angevin sea empire. To France succeeded Germany in the late nineteenth century, a strong land power effectually dominating at least part of its periphery of lesser states. With the shift of the centre of political gravity from France to Germany, France became more a maritime, less a continental Power. France has developed overseas interests and has absorbed part of North Africa into her own political system. Her policy has been to keep Central Europe weak and divided. Germany, however, has failed in the course of two wars and twenty intervening years of intrigue and aggression to consolidate her position by completing the subjugation of the maritime

Powers. •Fear of German ambition has kept France watchful now for almost a century, and France has played a strong part in foiling Germany's purpose during these years.

In some measure the German failure in 1914-18 is to be attributed to the intervention of the United States in 1917, so effectively strengthening the Western Powers that Great Britain and France were able to hold and eventually break the German attack. It cannot, however, be said that an Atlantic unity came into existence, if only because of the isolationist policy of the United States and its renunciation of European obligations. If the American Senate had honoured its President's guarantee of the Rhine frontier it is difficult to resist the opinion that a North Atlantic unity, similar to that of the Mediterranean at the time of the Roman Empire, would have been established.

GEOPOLITICS

Ten years before the First World War Sir Halford Mackinder had published in England a paper entitled "The Geographical Pivot of History."¹ He not only saw in its broad perspective this alternation of land and sea-power, but supplied a reason. He interpreted the history of Europe as fundamentally one of conflict between the peoples of the west and invaders from the Steppes of the east. To these latter he attributed that instability and insecurity which for long impeded political development in Central Europe. Progress, political and economic, was possible only in the marginal regions, and the peripheral sea states resulted. Mackinder thus saw in the rise of Venice from the mud flats of the Adriatic, after the destruction of Aquileia by the "cloud of ruthless and idealess horsemen," sweeping out from Asia, a symbol of these civilizations and states of maritime Europe. As the menace from the East diminished Germany became a more closely integrated political unit, stretching its tentacles eastward towards Russia and into the Balkans. A continental state, it challenged the maritime states of the Atlantic seaboard. But Mackinder looked farther afield than Central Europe. He demonstrated the essential "oneness" of the "World Island," the compactly spaced continents of Asia,

¹ *Geographical Journal*, 1904, XXIII, 421-437.

Europe, and Africa, pointing out that the island groups off its Pacific balanced those off its Atlantic coast. No less distinct than the "World Island" is its "Heartland," that portion of it "to which, under modern conditions, sea-power can be refused access." This consists of the drainage basins of the




FIG. 160. THE "HEARTLAND"

After H. Mackinder

ivers which flow to the ice-bound Arctic, together with the interior basins which have no outlet at all to the sea. Outside it are a "marginal crescent" and an "outer or insular crescent." Sea-power has belonged to the latter, which has disputed with the Heartland possession of the marginal areas. The Heartland may expand into Manchuria, Mongolia, and China, on the one hand; into Eastern Europe, to the Baltic, or to the Dardanelles, thus denying access to the Black Sea to the Powers of maritime Europe. The maritime peoples circumnavigated Africa or reached the Indian Ocean by the Suez route, estab-

lished an empire in India and the Indies, and penetrated China by its great river avenues. The Russians, moving on what strategists call interior lines of communication, sought an outlet to the marginal crescent in turn at the Black Sea, Persia, Afghanistan, Manchuria, and Mongolia, and Vladivostok and the Primorsk province. They succeeded only on the coast of the North Pacific.

Mackinder's paper was a dispassionate study. After 1919 it formed part of the background of the studies of the German




FIG. 161. THE 'HEARTLAND' AND THE INNER AND OUTER CRESCENTS OF SEA-POWER

After H. Mackinder

geopoliticians. Geopolitics has been described as "political geography charged with emotion."¹ It seeks, by analysis of the geographical factors in history, to formulate laws or principles which govern the rise, expansion, conflict, and decay of states. It is impossible to examine here the genesis of this German pseudo-science, and the debt it owes to three very different personalities—Mackinder, the Swede Rudolf Kjellén, and the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel. It may be said that none of these three would gladly acknowledge even the foster parenthood of this school of historical and geographical thought. Mackinder's hypothesis of the World Island and

¹ E. G. R. Taylor, *The Geography of an Air Age* (R.I.I.A., 1945), p. 37.

the Heartland was taken, not for what it was, a study of the past interrelations of geography and history, but as a prognosis for the future. The Heartland has immense area and great resources, little known and almost undeveloped when Mackinder first wrote, but the dense populations of India and China are at its gates; Eastern Europe is in reach, and it is invulnerable. If this area were disciplined and developed it could outstrip in military power all the marginal and maritime states; it could control the World Island and dominate the whole world. Mackinder bade some "airy cherub" whisper these words of advice to the statesmen gathered to make the peace of 1919:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:

Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island:

Who rules the World Island commands the World.

Mackinder's sybilline book was not accepted, but its significance to-day is too apparent to require emphasis. The Germans understood it. The dream of the geopoliticians was the control of the Heartland and the domination of the world. Conquest of Russia, or control of a friendly Russia; either would serve Germany's ends.

The Heartland has for several years now been in process of development. It is becoming rich and populous. Military defeat and revolution compelled Russia in 1917 to abandon part of the marginal areas to the west just as, twelve years earlier, Port Arthur had been abandoned to the Japanese. In the Second World War Russia regained part of these territories, and a group of states was established on her western border—Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria—sympathetic towards Russia and her politico-economic system. In the east Russia has made advances, the extent of which is by no means clear, in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and perhaps Manchuria. It has been urged in Western Europe that a Russia-dominated bloc in Eastern Europe is developing. It is claimed in Russia, on the contrary, that a Western bloc is forming hostile to the economic and political aspirations of Russia. De Gaulle's speeches give colour to the Russian grievance and can only intensify the feelings of suspicion with which she views the West, and lead to a firmer Russian grip on Eastern Europe. It need not be argued here that the formation

in Europe of two exclusive, suspicious, and perhaps hostile blocs would be disastrous for the future peace of the world. Looking at the problem broadly brings us back to Mackinder's hypothesis, the message of the airy cherub, that the day of the peripheral states is over as soon as civilization dawns over the rich wastes of Siberia.

GEOGRAPHICAL DETERMINISM

Has environment, one may ask, so compelling an influence over the fortunes of states that conflict becomes inevitable and the triumph of the Heartland certain? Mackinder's German followers considered that it had, and it was for this reason that they planned to control Russia. Mackinder himself held no such view. In Shakespeare's words, which he quotes:

The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.

Ratzel was a determinist; he even evaluated in mathematical terms the relative importance of environment and human initiative. His American disciple, E. C. Semple, followed yet further Ratzel's deterministic line of reasoning. In France, however, a revulsion of feeling produced the 'possibilist' view of environmental influence. "There are no necessities, but everywhere possibilities; and man, as master of the possibilities, is judge of their use,"¹ and again, "Nature prepares the site, and man organizes it in such fashion that it meets his desires and wants."² Reference has been made earlier in this chapter to the processes by which man is attaining an increasing degree of control over his environment. Foremost of these is the development of air-travel. Aircraft are independent of surface features except at the termini of their routes, and climate can at most hinder their use. This bears on Mackinder's hypothesis. He wrote before air-power had become even a major factor in war, and he was careful to emphasize that the Heartland was invulnerable to sea-power. But air-power opens up a new perspective. We have been, as Professor Taylor has emphasized,³ the victims of Mercator's projection for too long a period.

¹ L. Febvre, *A Geographical Introduction to History*.

² Vidal de la Blache, *Personality of France*.

³ E. G. R. Taylor, *The Geography of an Air Age*.

Quite apart from the exaggeration of all poleward land-masses, Mercator's projection separates what are close together. Russia's northward frontier appears as an immensity of ice-bound sea; it looked invulnerable quite apart from the factor of ice. But a new view of high latitudes shows the Arctic Ocean as a small sea, its greatest dimension no more than 60 degrees of arc, and its least 35. The ice is seen to be no longer a protection or a barrier when the operations of war can be accomplished by aircraft. Soviet Asia is nearer Canada than it is Western Europe. The Atlantic and the Pacific may divide the World Island from the Americas, but




FIG. 162. THE GREAT CIRCLE ROUTE FROM VANCOUVER TO SHANGHAI

the Arctic unites. May we not even see in the Arctic Ocean a new Mediterranean?

A rigid determinism cannot stand. There are many possibilities, and as man advances in material things, so their number increases. Mackinder's conception is only one, and if society succumbs to it, it will be because its moral development has not kept pace with its material; because, in short, "we are underlings."

CONCEPTION OF THE STATE

Fundamentally, the organic conception of the state is opposed to the rigid determinism of Ratzel and the German school. The rise and decline of states in the past 3000 years of recorded history induces an idea that the state is necessarily subject to the natural processes of growth, maturity, and decay; that it

is an organism over and above the individuals that compose it, and to be served and protected from all the ills that afflict the body politic. This 'idealist' or 'absolutist' theory of the state derives in part from the Greek philosophers, but it ran counter to the ecumenical pretensions of the medieval church, and was not given further expression until modern times. Its supreme exponent there was the German Hegel, whose ideas, extended and developed by Treitschke and others, have provided the philosophical basis of the Fascist state. It is, however, in the organic aspect of the state that the geographer is primarily interested. Most geographers tend, as is perhaps to be expected, to over-emphasize the influence of environment on social development. They must ask themselves whether there is anything inevitable in the rise and decline of states, and, if so, how far, if at all, this compulsion derives from geographical factors. This organic concept has been strongly influenced by biological thought. The development, decline, and ultimate extinction of natural species, revealed by the geological studies of the last century, has suggested a similar process in the supreme human society, the State. But the natural species have not developed and decayed over a period of thousands or millions of years because of something internal to themselves. Such a process is not inevitable in the species; it arises from a changing environment, such as increasing heat or cold, or from the competition of other species, whose growth and multiplication have been encouraged by new conditions. The species that can adapt itself to new conditions can survive, and the one which has, more than any other, displayed this capacity is *homo sapiens*. Strict analogy with natural species should not make the rise and fall of states dependent on some law internal to themselves. It should be made to arise from the competition between states for limited resources.

Many writers have forecast the rise and decline of states. They differ only in the mechanism whereby these mutations have been brought about, but, in general, they appeal to the biological conception of conflict and the survival of the fittest. Nature, "red in tooth and claw," is reflected in states, always in a condition of incipient hostility. A state of war is a natural one; diplomacy and war, as Clausewitz said, differ only in degree. The state, always in conflict with every other state,

'survives only by expanding and conquering fresh territory. Wide 'space concepts' is a mark of a vigorous and rising state, while *Folk ohne Raum*, the title of a highly tendentious German novel, can have no future. It is easy to see where this argument leads. Pressed to its conclusion, it has inspired the policy of Nazi Germany. It is based, however, on false premises. While,




FIG. 163. THE POLAR OCEAN, ON A ZENITHAL EQUIDISTANT PROJECTION

doubtless, applicable to primitive man, who lived on the produce of the chase, this competition between social groups in order to live should not exist in human societies. Man differs from the rest of animate nature in being able to develop his material environment and, by means of techniques of increasing degrees of refinement, to extract the means of livelihood on an increasing scale from an ever-widening area of the earth. Certain countries, we have seen, are over-populated; but the earth, as a whole, is not. The Malthusian bogey, the pressure

of population on the means of subsistence has no validity except locally, and the over-populated countries are not, in general, those which have made the greatest outcry for living-space.

The phenomenon of the rise and decline of states and empires cannot be explained by reference to essentially biological principles. The facts of history do not lend themselves to the formulation of laws, which would, in any case, be incapable of the testing which alone could guarantee their validity, and it is thus impossible to prophesy the future of a state from the evidence of its geography. The problem which the historical geographer sets himself, however, is, if the fortunes of states are not governed by their own internal laws, the extent to which geographical factors control or guide their development. This book contains some of the material upon which judgment can be based. States prosper or decline only partly because they possess or lack space, population, and resources. Russia, for example, is now the strongest Power in Europe, not because its population and resources are greatly different from those of Tsarist times, but because "wherever 'man' and 'natural products' are concerned, the 'idea' intervenes." As Febvre has expressed it, "natural regions are simply regions of possibilities for human groups." This puts man in the forefront. In studying historical and political geography it is less the hard facts of the environment that count than what man thinks of them. Humanity is faced, as it always has been, with the alternatives of planned development, the orderly exploitation of resources for the benefit of mankind, and international chaos, the law of the jungle.

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The changed geographical values that have resulted from the development of air-transport have not yet been exhaustively studied, perhaps because they are still in flux. E. G. R. Taylor, *The Geography of an Air Age* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1945) is a stimulating introduction.

INDEX

- ABADAN**, 429
Abd-el-Krim, 221, 246
Aborigines of Australia, 489
Abraham, age of, 28
Abydos, 31
Abyssinia, 28, 29, 30, 257, 319, 408,
 414-416
Achaëa, 62
Acre, 103
Acropolis, 46
Addis Ababa, 414
Adelaide, 385
Aden, 396, 428
Aden Protectorates, 428
Adige, 16
Adowa, battle of, 391
Adriatic Sea, 15, 61
Ædvi, 55
Ægalcos range, 47
Ægean Sea, 15, 16, 17, 28, 35, 37, 39,
 42, 48
Ægospotami, battle of, 48
Æolis, 45
Afghanistan, 52, 376, 430-432
Africa, imperial Powers in, 381, 408-
 426; peoples of, 412; Indians in,
 417
Agade, 33
Agri Decumates, 60 (map), 61
Agriculture, origin of, 25, 26
Aix (Provence), 57
Akkad, 32
Alamanni, 66, 69, 70, 71
Alans, 68, 69
Alaska, 506, 508
Albania, 17, 140, 141, 255, 316,
 334-336, 342; Italian occupation of,
 335-336
Albert Canal, 237, 238 (map)
Albigensian heresy, 96
Alboran basin, 244
Albuquerque, Afonso de, 135
"Alcan" Highway, 507 (map), 508
Aleutian Islands, 305
Alexander Nevsky, 169
Alexander the Great, 51
Alexandretta, Gulf of, 63
Alexandretta, Sandjak of, 263
Alexandria, 63, 387; naval base at,
 248-249
Alfonso XIII, King of Spain, 221
Alfred, King of Wessex, 86
Algeciras Conference, 245
Algeria, 244-245, 387; in French
 economy, 245
Algoa Bay, 396
Allenstein, 304
Alma Ata, 367, 376
Alpine passes, 16
Alpines, 147-150
Alps, the, 15, 16, 28, 53
Alsace, 122, 178, 180, 183, 189
Alsace-Lorraine, 232 (map), 233;
 German reoccupation of, 183
Altmark, the, 116
Amalfi, 104
Amanus Mountains, 28, 34, 39
Amau Statement, 504
Amazon, river, 478
Amber Route, the, 61
Ambrosius, 81
Amhara, 415
Amsterdam, 238
Amur Province, 174, 175
Anatolia, 18, 28, 35, 36, 37, 39
Anau, 35
Ancona, 101
Andalusia, 16
Andorra, 15
Angevin Empire, 95
Angles, 81
Anglo-Saxon settlement, 81
Angola, 418, 423
Annam, 388, 442
Annamites, 442
Ansariyeh Mountains, 39
Anschluss, 280, 320
Antioch, 18, 103
Antonine, Wall of, 59
Antwerp, 106, 183, 235
Anual, battle of, 246
An-yang, 36
Apennine Mountains, 15, 53, 55
Appalachian Mountains, 470
Apulia, 50, 53, 73, 335
Aquileia, 61
Aquitaine, duchy of, 95
Aquitania, 59 (map), 64, 93
Arabs, 17, 19, 74, 102; in Palestine,
 267-268; nationalism of, 429-430

- Aragon, 96, 97, 217
 Archæans, 44-45, 49
 Archangel, 169, 171
 Archbishoprics, Rhenish, 113
 Ardennes, the, 13
 Argentina, 477, 478, 482, 483, 484
 Argolis, 42, 45
 Armenia, 18, 27, 28, 34, 42, 56, 58, 269, 369
 Armorica, 13
 Arno, river, 53, 100
 Arpad, dynasty of, 126
 Arthur, King, 81
 Artois, 177
 Arvad, 39, 41
 Aryans, 37
 Ascension, 396, 463
 Ashanti, 388
 Ashkenazim Jews, 159
 Asia Minor, 28, 34, 42, 45, 49, 51, 53, 56, 63
 Asiento, 396
 Ashkhabad, 367
 Aspromonte, 55
 Assur, 34
 Assyria, 34
 Astropalia, 260
 Asturias, 220, 222, 225
 Aswan, 29
 Athens, 46, 47, 48, 58, 62, 350
 Atlas Mountains, 15, 56
 Attica, 42, 46 (map), 46-48
 Augsburg, 120, 138
 Augusta Rauricorum (Augst), 60-61
 Augusta Treverorum (Trier), 60
 Augustus, Emperor, 57
Augleich, 318
 Australia, 379, 385, 407-408, 488-491
 Austria, 190, 279-280, 318-320; medieval, 114-115; trade of, 192
 Avars, 111, 114, 117, 156, 164
 Axios (Vardar), 62
 Azerbaidzhan, 369
 Azov, 172
 BABYLON, 33, 34
 Babylonia, 31, 34
 Bačka, 327, 341
 Bactria, 53
 Baden, 193
 Baffin, William, 137
 Baganda, 412
 Baghdad, 31
 Bahamas, the, 452
 Bahrain, 396, 428
 Balboa, Vasco Nuñez de, 135, 486
 Balearic Islands, 42, 77, 97, 251
 Balkan Entente, 326, 345, 347
 Balkan Mountains, 15, 127
 Balkan Wars, 318, 334-335, 346
 Balkhash, 367
 Baltic Sea, 21, 193-196
 Balts, 283, 284, 370
 Baluchistan, 432, 438
 Banat, 322, 325, 330, 341; Germans in, 281
 Bandar Shah, 431
 Bandar Shahpur, 431
 Bantu, 423
 Baranja, 327, 341
 Barbados, 452
 Barbarian invasions, 65-70
 Barbary Coast, 143, 144
 Barcelona, County of, 96, 97
 Barcelonnette, 180
 Barents, Willem, 137
 Barley, 19
 Barotseland, 422
 Basle, 120
 Basque territory, 16, 219, 220, 222, 224-225, 224 (map); language, 157
 Basra, 428
 Bastidas, Rodrigo de, 135
 Basutoland, 423
 Batavian Republic, 181, 235
 Bavaria, 193
 Bavarians, 76
 Beaker folk, 152
 Bechuanaland, 423-425
 Beira, 418
 Belfort Gap, 16
 Belgian Empire, 391-392, 406
 Belgica, 59 (map), 64
 Belgium, 234-237; railways of, 201 (map), 202; industrial development in, 204; industries of, 236-237; as a colonial power, 387, 391-392
 Belgrade, 141
 Berber people, 64, 74, 148, 430
 Berehaven, 461
 Berlin, 112; growth of, 192, 214
 Berlin Act, 392, 393, 397
 Bermuda, 452
 Berne, canton, 123
 Bessarabia, 17, 172, 315, 329, 373
 Bethlen Gabor, 126
 Betic Cordillera, 16
 Bhutan, 432
 Bielorussia, 295

- Bihé plateau, 419
 Bihor Mountains, 62
 Birnbaumer Pass, 104
 Birobidzhan, 376
 Birth-rate in Europe, 212
 Bismarck, Otto, Prince von, 198, 273, 298, 391
 Bithynia, 63
 Bizerta, 245, 251
 Black Forest, 13
 Black Sea, 17, 35, 45, 48, 50, 58;
 Russian advance to, 172-173; Russia
 in, 373-374
 Boeotia, 47, 50
 Boers, 386, 424
 Boetia, 64
 Boghaz Keui, 34
 Bohemia, 13, 17, 35, 61, 62, 125, 190
 Bolivia, 478, 479, 483
 Bordeaux, 186; wine trade of, 95
 Borneo, 389, 446, 448; North, 404
 Bornholm, 66
 Bosnia, 67, 339; and Herzegovina, 274, 316, 317, 318
 Bosphorus, 17
 Boulogne, 65
 Brabant, 106
 Brandenburg, 117; electorate of, 190;
 growth of, 190-192
 Brandenburg-Prussia, 196-198; rise of, 190-192
 Brasov, 331
 Bratislava, 15, 17, 61
 Brazil, 478, 482, 483, 484
 Brenner Pass, 16, 101, 104
 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 275, 276, 357, 361 (map)
 Brick-earth, 14, 26
 Brisbane, 385
 British East Africa Company, 389
 British Empire, 388-389, 403-405
 British Honduras, 452
 British West Indies, 352
 Brittany, 13, 95, 96
 Bronze Age, 79; spread of, 25 (map)
 Bruges, 106
 Brundisium (Brindisi), 58
 Brunei, 444
 Brunswick, 193
 Brussels, 106
 Brussels Act, 393
 Bucharest, Treaty of, 275, 361 (map)
 Budapest, 15, 17, 61, 143, 321
 Bukovina, 315, 329-330, 373
 Bulgaria, 141, 316, 334, 342, 345-348;
 medieval, 128-129; economy of, 347-348
 Bulgars, 128-129, 164
 Burgenland, 320, 325
 Burgundians, 66, 69, 70
 Burgundy, 120-124, 121 (map), 122, 177; Lower, 234
 Burma, 389, 394, 404, 440-442
 Burma Campaign, 432
 Burma Road, 440-442, 497 (map), 498
 Bushmen, of Africa, 412
 Byblus, 32, 39
 Byelozero, 169
 Byzantine Empire, 72, 104, 140
 Byzantium (Constantinople), 62, 66, 67, 68
 CABOT, JOHN, 87, 137
 Cabral, Pedro, 135
 Caesar, Julius, 57
 Calabria, 50, 73
 Calais, 95
 California, 472
 Cambodia, 388, 442
 Cambrai, 177
 Cameroons, the, 388, 402, 420
 Campine, 237
 Canada, Dominion of, 385, 466-469
 Cañadas, 98
 Canal-building in Europe, 200-202
 Canal des deux Mers, 186
 Canals, French, 187; German, 287 (map)
 Canton, 492
 Canton Island, 451
 Cape Coloured, the, 401, 423, 425-426
 Cape of Good Hope, 386, 423-426
 Cape Province, 423
 Capet, Hugh, 92
 Capetian dynasty, 92; estates, 92, 93 (map)
 Cappadocia, 63
 Carbonnière Forest, 70, 109
 Carcassonne gap, 16
 Carchemish, 34
 Carinthia, duchy of, 77
 Carlist Wars, 220
 Carpuntum, 61
 Carol, King, of Roumania, 329
 Caroline Islands, 390, 508
 Carolingian Empire, 75-77, 90, 110, 181, 182
 Carpathian Mountains, 17, 62
 Carpathos, 42

- * Carпини, John of Plano, 132
- Carthage, 42, 55, 56
- Carthaginians, 50, 55
- Cartier, Jacques, 137, 378
- Caspian Sea, 58
- Castes in India, 438
- Castile, 96
- Catalonia, 97, 98, 217, 219, 222-224
- Cathay, 136
- Caucasus Mountains, 27, 28, 36, 58
- Celebes, 446, 448
- Celtic languages, 153-154
- Celtic saints, 79
- Central European Highlands, 12
- Central Massif, 13
- Cephalic indices, 146-147, 147 (map)
- Cerata range, 47
- Ceuta, 246, 249, 250
- Ceylon, 404
- Chaco, 478-479
- Chad territory, 420
- Chalcidice, 49, 51
- Chalcis (Euboea), 50
- Chamberlain, H. S., racial theories of, 151
- Champagne, 96
- Chancellor, Richard, 137
- Charlemagne (Charles the Great), Emperor, 75, 96, 110, 113, 115
- Charles IV, Emperor, 113
- Charles the Bold, 120
- Charleville, 177
- Chatti, 70
- Chelyabinsk, 367
- Cherokee Indians, 394
- Chettyars, 440
- Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 495
- Chile, 478, 482, 484
- China, 36
- Chinese Eastern Railway, 376, 498, 500
- Chinese Nationalists, 494-495, 496
- Chios, 45
- Cilicia, 34, 63, 269-270
- Cimbri, 57
- Cipangu, 136
- Cisalpine Gaul, 55, 100
- Cisalpine Republic, 181
- Cistercian order, 119
- Citharon range, 47
- City-state, 45-49
- Claudius, Emperor, 58
- Clay Belt of Canada, 468
- Cleves, 190
- Climate of Europe, 18-22; of Greece, 43
- Cloth trade, 105
- Cobh (Queenstown), 461
- Cochin China, 388, 405
- Coimbra, 98
- Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 187
- Cologne, 70, 120
- Colombia, 479
- Colonia Agrippina (Köln), 60
- Colonial empires, trade of, 398-399
- Colonial policy in eighteenth century, 382-383
- Colonies, their value in seventeenth century, 379; as primary producers, 398-399
- Colonization, Central European, 118-119
- Colour-bar, 396, 399-400
- Columbus, Christopher, 135-137
- Condominium, 414, 450
- Confederation of the Rhine, 181
- Confluentes (Coblenz), 60, 61
- Congo basin, 397, 406, 409, 417-420
- Congo, Belgian, 391-392, 393
- Congo Free State, 392
- Congo, International Association of the, 391
- Congo, river, 392, 411, 418-419
- Congress Party (India), 437-438
- "Congress Poland," 170, 196
- Constance, Lake, 58, 61
- Constantine the Great, Emperor, 67
- Constantinople, 17, 74, 88; fall of, 141
- Continental System, 182
- Cook, Captain James, 487, 488
- Corcyra, 55
- Cordon sanitaire*, 360
- Corfu, 255, 260-261
- Corinth, 62, 128; Gulf of, 45
- Cornish language, 154
- Cornwall, 27, 35
- Coronado, Francisco Vasquez de, 136
- Corsica, 77, 251, 255-256
- Cossaks, 172, 173
- Côte d'or, 14
- Cotentin, 13
- Craiova Agreement, 347
- Creoles*, 477
- Crete, 26, 35, 39, 44, 261
- Crimea, 15, 171, 172
- Crimean War, 352
- Crisana, 330
- Croatia, 339
- Croats, 126, 127, 324, 337-339
- Crop Reliability (map), 20
- Crusades, 101-103

- Cuba, 476, 451
 Curaçoa, 405, 453
 Curzon Line, 171, 304, 370
 Cycladean massif, 15
 Cyclades, 35, 43, 45, 141
 Cyprus, 39, 41, 42, 103, 248, 261, 396
 Cyrenaica, 64, 391
 Cythera, 42
 Czechoslovakia, 280, 307-313
 Czechs, 126
- DA GAMA, VASCO, 134
 Dacia, 58, 62, 65, 66, 153
 Dacians, 328
 Dahomey, 420
 Dakar, 396, 419, 458
 Dalmatia, 50
 Dalmatian coast, 253-254
 Damascus, 42
 Dandolo, Henry, 104
 Danelaw, 86-87
 Danes, 75, 85-87
 Danish language, 154
 Danish towns, 107
 D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 253, 344
 Danube, river, 15, 16, 17, 35, 50, 57, 58, 61, 62; navigation of, 193
 Danzig, 116, 125, 280, 301-303
 Dardanelles, 17, 45, 243, 270, 351-353, 374
 Dauphiné, 96, 122
 Davis, John, 137
 de Gobineau, Arthur, racial theories of, 151
 de Lesseps, Ferdinand, 243, 463
 de Soto, Hernando, 136
 de Vaca, C., 136
 De Valera, Eamon, 462
 Deccan, 96
 Dede Agach, 346
 del Cano, S., 136
 Delagoa Bay, 396
 Denmark, 81; as a Baltic Power, 193-194; agriculture in, 211; as an Imperial Power, 388
 Dhilos, 48
 Diaz, Bartholomew, 134
 Dieppe, 186
 Diets of the Empire, 113
 Dinaric Mountains, 15, 17, 127
 Diocletian, Emperor, 66, 67, 72
 Disarmament after the First World War, 277
 Diseases in Africa, 409-416
 Dnieperstroï, 367
 Dobrudja, 17, 62, 295, 318, 329, 330-331, 346, 347
 Dodecanese Islands, 244, 258-261, 259 (map), 271, 349, 391
 Dominion status, 385-386
 Donetz basin, 175, 364
 Dorestadt, 105
 Dorians, 44, 45, 49
 Dortmund-Ems Canal, 201
 Drin valley, 17, 342
 Druses, 430
 Dual Mandate, 394
 Dual Monarchy, 318
 Dubrovnik, 255, 344
 Dunkirk, 186
 Durand Line, 435
 Dutch language, 154; in North America, 380; in South Africa, 386
 Dyarchy, 435-436
 Dynasties, Egyptian, 31, 32
 Dyrrachium (Durazzo), 62
- EAST AFRICA, 416-417
 East India Company (British), 381, 389
 East India Company (Dutch), 138, 381
 East Indies, Chinese in, 447
 East Prussia, 115 (map), 190, 294
 Eastern Rumelia, 316, 334
 Ecuador, 480, 481
 Edessa, 162
 Edgar, King, 86
 Edict of Nantes, 187
 Edward the Elder, King, 107
 Egypt, 15, 18, 30-32; 35, 39, 51, 56, 57, 63, 74, 261, 396, 408, 412-414; British in, 248-249, 387, 412-414
 Elamites, 33
 Elbe, river, 59
 Elburz, 28
 Eleusis, plain of, 47, 48
 Eleutherus, 39
 Elis, 62
 Emona, 61
 Enderby Island, 451
 English Channel, 26
 Epirus, 51, 56, 140
 Equatorial Africa, French, 388, 419-420
 Eric the Red, 87
 Eridu, 31, 32
 Eritrea, 391
 Erse, 154
 Estonia, 283, 360, 369
 Estonians, 157
 Etruscans, 53, 55
 Euboea, 42

- Eupen, 236, 237 (map), 277
 Euphrates, 30, 33
 Eurasians, 401
 Exchange of population, Greek, 350
 Extremadura, 219
 Ezekiel, 41
- FAIRS, in France, 105, 186
 Faisal, King of Iraq, 428
 Falkland Islands, 396, 463
 Faroe Islands, 396, 464
 Faubourg, 107-108
 Federated Malay States, 444
 Fergana, 367
 Fermanagh, 462
 Fernando Po, 406
 Fertile Crescent, 28-29, 34, 52, 58, 102
 Fiji Islands, 509, 510
 Filipinos, 507
 Finland, 360; Swedes in, 195
 Finnish people, 157, 358; in North America, 380
 Finno-Karelia, 369
 Finno-Ugrian people, 168
 Fiume, 16, 253, 303, 321, 344
 'Five Boroughs,' 85-86
 Five-year Plan, Polish, 306
 Five-year Plans, Russian, 306, 365-369
 Flanders, 105, 120, 234; frontiers in, 180
 Flemings, 235
 Flemish language, 233
 Florida, 472
 Four-year Plan, German, 284
 Fourteen Points, 301, 324
 France, 70-72, 227-234; frontiers of, 177-183; eastward expansion of, 179 (map); agriculture of, 183-185, 208-210, 229-230; before the Revolution, 184-187; population of, 185, 227-228; ports of, 186; industries of, 187-188, 207-208, 230; railways of, 203; coal-mining in, 204; foreign workers in, 228-229; birth-rate in, 229; peasantry of, 229-230; and political security, 230-234; treaties of, with eastern European countries, 231-232; and Rhine Frontier, 231, 232-233
 Franche Comté, 122, 180
 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, 129
 Franco y Bahamonde, General Francisco, 221-222
 Franconia, 113
 Frankfort, 113, 120
- Franks, 66, 70-72, 76, 101
 French Empire, 387-388, 398, 399, 405, 408
 French Equatorial Africa, 419-420
 French in Canada, 380, 385, 469
 French language, 109
 French Sudan, 419-420
 Frioul, language, 153
 Friouli, duchy of, 77
 Frisians, 105
 Frobisher, Sir Martin, 137
 Frontiers: of the Roman Empire, 58-62, 65; nature of, 177-178; of France, 177-180; problems of, 407
 Fulani, 412
 Fulda valley, 61
- GABUN, 420
 Gaelic, 154
 Galatia, 63
 Galicia, 64, 217, 222, 225
 Gallia Lugdunensis, 59 (map), 64
 Gallia Narbonensis, 56, 59 (map), 64, 93, 94
 Gambia, 388, 420
 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 101
 Gascony, 16
 Gaul (Transalpine), 56, 57, 58, 64
 Gauls, 57
 Gdynia, 303
 Genoa, 48, 104
 Genoese trade, 104-105
 Geopolitics, 513-517
 Georgia, 369
 Gepids, 66
 German Empire, 198, 278, 289, 389-391, 397
 German language, boundaries of, 116, 153; in South Tyrol, 253
 Germans outside the Reich, 279-284, 282 (map), 295
 Germany, 35-61, 189-193, 272-296; trade in, 192; industries of, 196, 205, 207-208, 285-287; in the nineteenth century, 196-198; unification of, 198; railways of, 202; coal-mining in, 204; agriculture in, 210-211, 285; population in towns of, 213-214; strategy of (1914), 275; supply of raw materials to, 284-286; self-sufficiency of, 284-290; strategy of (1939-44), 291-292; foreign labour in, 296
 Gesoriacum (Boulogne), 65
 Gex, 180

- Gezira, 414.
 Ghent, 106.
 Gibraltar, 216, 243, 249-250, 396
 Gilbert and Ellice Islands, 450, 505,
 510
 Gniezno, 124, 297
 Gold Coast, 388, 402
 Golden Bull of Charles IV, 113
 Golden Horde, 131, 166, 172
 Goldie, Sir George, 393
 Gorizia, 253
 Gorki, 366
 Gothland, 66
 Goths, 66, 68, 72, 73
 Grape, 43
 Great Britain, 58; population of, 212.
See also British Empire
 Great Elector, the, Frederick William I,
 190, 192
 Great Khan, the, 131
 Great Russia, 166
 Great Trek, 386, 424
 'Greater' Sweden, 88
 Greece, 35, 42-53, 56, 261, 318, 333,
 334, 342, 348-351; modern, con-
 trasted with classical, 348; growth
 of, 348-349; trade of, 350
 Greek colonies, 49
 Greenland, 135, 396, 457, 458, 464,
 466
 Gregory of Tours, St, 75
 Grisons, 124
 Guadeloupe, 380, 453
 Guam, 396
 Guiana, 453; Dutch, 404
 HABBANIA, 429
 Habsburg Empire, 215-216, 216 (map)
 Habsburg, House of, 113, 189, 318
 Hadramaut, 428
 Hadrian's Wall, 59
 Hagenau Forest, 109
 Haifa, 268, 429
 Haiti, 451
 Hallstatt people, 37
 Hamites, 412
 Hango (Hanko), 373
 Hanno, the Carthaginian, 42
 Hanover, 193
 Hanseatic League, 106, 120, 125, 193
 Harappa, 36
 Harran, 34
 Harrar, 415
 Hatay, 262-264, 269-270
 Havana, 464; Conference at, 483-484
 Hawaii, 396, 476, 506, 508
 Hawkins, Sir John, 393
 'Heartland,' 514
 Hebrus (Maritza), 62
 Hejaz, 427
 Hellenism, 52
 Helvetic Republic, 182
 Henry, Prince, of Portugal ("the
 Navigator"), 134
 Heptarchy, kingdoms of, 81
 Herat, 432
 Hernici, 55
 Hertzog, James Barry Munnik, 424
 Highland Zone, 65, 79
 Hindu Kush, 28
 Hindus, 437-438
 Hiram, King of Tyre, 41
 Hissarlik, 35
 Hittites, 33, 34, 39
 Hlinka, Andrej, 312
 Hoare-Laval plan, 415
 Hogland, 373
 Hohenzollern, House of, 190
 Hokkaido, 502
 Holy Roman Empire, 111
Homo sapiens, 23
 Honan, 499
 Hong Kong, 389, 509
 Hopei, 499
 Horatius, 53
Hospodars, 329
 Hottentots, 412
 Hudson, Henry, 137
 Huguenot refugees, 192
 Hungary, 16, 61, 69, 314-315, 321-
 327; kingdom of, 143; population
 of, 211; peoples of, 321-322;
 dismemberment of, 324-325; foreign
 policy of, 325-327
 Huns, 68, 69, 73, 101, 115, 156, 164
 Hyksos, 32
 Hymettus range, 47
 IBAR VALLEY, 17, 342
 Iberian peninsula, 58, 64
 Ice Age, 13, 23
 Iceland, 396, 457, 458, 464, 466
 Icknield Way, 81
 Illyrieum, 59 (map), 67, 68
 Imperial Airways, 428
 Imperial Cities, 113
 Imperialism in the eighteenth century,
 382-383; in the nineteenth century,
 378-392; in the twentieth century,
 393-406; problems of, 407-455

- * India, 28, 36, 37, 389, 394, 404;
 - native states in, 404, 435; frontiers of, 432-434; industries of, 439-440
- Indian Empire, 432-440
- Indian Mutiny, 389
- Indian Ocean, 63
- Indians in Africa, 412, 417, 424
- Indirect Rule, 404-405
- Indo-Aryan languages, 152
- Indo-China, 442-444
- Indo-European languages, 37
- Indonesians, 447-448
- Indus, river, 36, 52
- Inn valley, 16
- Ionia, 48
- Ionian Islands, 255, 260-261, 348
- Ionians, 44-45, 49
- Iran, 27, 28, 37, 52; Russians in, 374-375
- Iraq, 249, 396, 402, 429-430
- Ireland, 27, 460-463
- Iron Age, 36-37
- Iron Gates (Dapube), 61, 62
- Iron industry, 205
- Iron ore, occurrence of, 205
- Islam, 73-75, 133-134
- Istrandja, 17
- Istria, 253
- Italian Empire, 246-248, 391, 397, 403
- Italians in Tunis, 245
- Italy, 16, 251-257; Northern, 56;
 - unification of, 252; agricultural development of, 255-256; industrial development of, 256; over-population in, 256; foreign trade of, 257
- Ivory Coast, 420
- JAEN, 480, 481
- Jagello, 124
- Jamaica, 379, 404, 408, 451
- Jamshedpur, 440
- Janissaries, 144
- Japan, 496, 500-505
- Japanese Empire, 397, 398, 402-403
- Jason of Pheræ, 50
- Java, 447-448
- Jebel Druz, 263
- Jerusalem, 56; capture of, by Turks, 102; in the Crusades, 102-103
- Jewish National Home, 265
- Jewish Pale, 160
- Jews, 157, 159-161, 295, 329; settlement of, in Palestine, 266 (map), 267-268
- Jibuti, 414; railway, 416
- Johore, 444
- Jubaland, 415
- Judæa, 18
- Juliana Canal, 237, 238 (map)
- Junkers, 210
- Jura Mountains, 15
- Justinian I, Emperor, 72, 73, 100, 101
- Jutes, 81
- KAFFA, 133
- Kaffirs, 412
- Kaiserslautern Gap, 109
- Kamaram, 428
- Kamchatka, 396
- Kamenets Podolsk (Kaminiecz), 297
- Kamerun (Cameroons), 390
- Kamieniez, 144
- Kanakas, 490
- Karabuk, 271
- Karaganda, 367
- Karageorgievic dynasty, 274
- Karelia, 169, 170, 360, 372
- Karens, 440
- Kars, 269
- Karst plateau, 16, 68, 127
- Karun valley, 429
- Kashmir, 434
- Katanga, 418-419, 421, 423
- Kavalla, 337, 346
- Kavirondo, 417
- Kayes, 420
- Kazakhstan, 367, 369
- Kazan Khanate, 172
- Kedah, 444
- Kelantan, 444
- Kenya, 388, 394, 416-417
- Khabarovsk Province, 367, 377
- Khairuddin Barbarossa, 143
- Kharkov, 176
- Khazars, 164, 165
- Khmers, 442
- Khyber Pass, 434
- Kiaochow, 390, 494
- Kiel Canal, 201
- Kiev, 88, 170, 173, 297
- Kiev, kingdom of, 164-166
- Kikuyu, 412
- Kilo-Moto, 418
- Kirghizstan, 369
- Kirkuk, 429
- Kish, 33
- Kiska, 508
- Kiuprili family, 144
- Klagenfurt, plebiscite of, 320, 340

- Knights of the Sword, the, 116 (map), 117
 Knossos, 44
 Knut, King, 87
 Kodiak, 508
 Königsberg, 116, 125, 192, 372
 Korea, 494, 499, 503
 Kossovo, battle of, 129, 141, 337
 Kotor, 67
 Krakow, 124
 Krivoi Rog, 176, 364
 Kuala Lumpur, 444
Kulaks, 356
 Kurdistan, 269
 Kurds, 430
 Kurile Islands, 377, 498
 Kut, 429
 Kuwait, 396, 428
 Kuzbas, 367
 Kyushu, 502
- LA MANCHA, 219
 La Rochelle, 186
 Labrador, 469
 Ladin, 153
 Lahn, river, 60
 Landrecies, 177
 Langres Plateau, 16
 Languages in Europe, 151-157, 152 (table)
 Langue d'oc, 96, 153
 Laos, 388, 442
 Lapps, 149, 157
 Larissa, 46
 Latakia, 262, 263
Latifundia, 56; in Spain, 219
 Latin America, 477-483
 Latin language, 109
 Latin people, 53
 Latium, 53
 Latvia, 283, 360, 369
 Lauraguais, Gap of, 14
 Laurium, 48
 Lausanne, Treaty of, 349-350, 374
 Le Havre, 186
 Lea, river, 86
 League of Nations, 231, 401-403, 428, 468
 Lebanon, 18, 28, 32, 41, 261, 262-265, 402
Lebensraum, 288-290
 Leeward Islands, 452, 453
 Leif, son of Eric the Red, 87
 Leipzig, 120; fair of, 192
 Lenin, Nikolai, 357, 362
- Leningrad, 366, 373
 Leon, 96
 Leopold II, King of Belgium, 391-392
 Lepanto, battle of, 143
 Leros, 257, 258, 259 (map), 260
 Lettish, 157
 Liaotung peninsula, 494
 Liberia, 408
 Libya, 15, 247-248, 247 (map)
 Lichtenstein, 15
 Liguria, 53; republic of, 181
 Lille, 106
 Limburg, 235, 240
 Limon, 14
 Lithuania, 124, 169, 280, 283, 360, 369, 372; Grand Duchy of, 170
 Lithuanian language, 155, 157
 Little Entente, 232, 325-326, 345
 Livonia, 117
 Ljubljana, 344
 Lob Nor, 375
 Lobito, 418, 419
 Locarno treaties, 232, 236, 239
 Łódź, 176, 364
 Loess, 14
 Lombards, 73, 100, 101
 Lombardy, kingdom of, 77
 Lombardy, plain of, 22, 101
 Londinium (London), 65
 London, Treaty of (1915), 335, 342
 Lorient, 186
 Lorraine, 122, 178, 180, 183; kingdom of, 92
 Lothaire, kingdom of, 95
 Lothar, 90
 Lotharingia, 111
 Louis XIV, King of France, 178
 Louisiana, 470
 Louvain, 106
 Low Archipelago, 388
 Lowland Zone, 79
 Lübeck, 116
 Lublin, Union of, 124, 170
 Lugard, Lord, 394, 420
 Lugdunum (Lyons), 65
 Lusitania, 64
 Luxembourg, Duchy of, 235
 Luxemburg, House of, 125
 Luzern, canton, 123
 Lwow, 170, 305
 Lycia, 63
 Lyonnais, 95, 96, 122
 Lyons, 70

- MAASTRICHT, 106, 235
 Macao, 492
 Macedonia, 50, 51, 53, 56, 62, 68, 336-337, 339, 346-347, 350
 Macedonian language, 155
 Macedonian Revolutionary Movement, 346-347
 Mackinder, Sir Halford, 513
 Madagascar, 388
 Magdeburg, 120
 Magellan, Ferdinand, 136
 Maginot Line, 233
 Magna Græcia, 55, 100
 Magnitogorsk, 367
 Magyar language, 157
 Magyars, 126, 156
 Mahan, Alfred T., 476
 Mahdi, 430
 Main valley, 61
 Maine (France), 13, 95
 Mainz, 90, 113
 Malacca, 389, 444
 Malaria, 65, 66
 Malay States, 404
 Malaya, 407, 443 (map), 444-446; peoples of, 446
 Malca, Cape, 42
 Malmédy, 236, 237 (map), 277
 Malta, 257, 258, 396
 Maltese language, 258
 Manchukuo, 500
 Manchuria, 175, 375, 376, 494, 495, 499, 500
 Mandates, 262, 401-403
 Mandates Commission, 401
 Maniu, Julius, 354
 Maoris, 492
 Maramures, 330
 Marañon, river, 480
 Marathon, plain of, 47
 March, river, 61
 Marcus Aurelius, 65
 Mariann Islands, 390, 508
 Maricnwerder, 304
 Marignano, battle of, 124
 Mark, 190
 Marmora, Sea of, 34, 42
 Marquesas Islands, 388
 Marsilles, 75
 Marshall Islands, 390, 505
 Martinique, 380, 453
 Marx, Karl, 357
 Masai, 412, 417
 Massilia (Marsilles), 50
 Mauretania, 64
 Mecca, 427
 Medcs, 34
 Medina, 427
 Mediterranean, the, 15, 17-18, 29, 39; people of, 147-150; climate of, 242; geological structure of, 242-243; French in, 244-246; colonization of, 244-249
 Megalithic people, 27
 Megara, 47
 Meiji Revolution, 500
Mein Kampf, 146
 Meissen, porcelain of, 192
 Mekong, river, 442
 Melbourne, 385
 Memel-land, 280
 Mercia, 83
 Merovingian dynasty, 71
 Mers el Kebir, 251
 Merv, 133
 Meseta, 22, 98, 217
 Mesogæa, plain of, 47
 Mesopotamia, 18, 30, 33, 34, 63, 73
 Messenia, 48
Mesta, 98
Mestizos, 477
Métayage, 229
 Methuen Treaty, 95, 226
 Metz, bishopric of, 177, 178
 Mexican War, 472
 Mexico, 482, 505
 Middle East, 426-432
 Middle Kingdom, 90
 Midway, 396, 505
 Milan, 68, 101
 Mining: Roman, 65; in Germany, 192; in Africa, 410, 426
 Minoan civilization, 44
 Minorca, 216
 Mitrovitsa basin, 317
 Mitsubishi, 502
 Mitsui, 502
 Mittelmark, 190
 Moesia, 61, 62, 66, 68
 Mogontiacum (Mainz), 60, 61
 Mohacs, battle of, 143
 Mohenjo-daro, 36
 Moldavia, 17, 314, 328, 330
 Moldavian Republic, 369, 373
 Mombasa, 416
 Mongolia, Outer, 175, 375; Inner, 496
 Monroc Doctrine, 456, 468
 Mont Cenis Pass, 104
 Mont Genève Pass, 104
 Montenegro, 317, 334, 337, 339

- Montevideo Conference, 483
 Montreal, 348
 Montreux Convention, 270, 352, 374
 Moors, 21, 98
 Morava, 17, 35, 336
 Moravia, 190
 Moravian Gap, 15, 17, 61, 312
 Morea (Peloponnesus), 142
 Morocco, 244-245, 387, 390; Spanish, 246, 250-251, 406
 Moscow, 364, 966; growth of, 166; Treaty of, 372-373
 Moslem travellers, 131
 Mosul, 34, 102, 269
 Mozambique, 418, 422, 423
Mulattos, 477
 Mulberry-tree, 185
 Munich, 112
 Murmansk, 21, 358
 Muscat, 428
 Muscovy Company, 169
 Muslim League, 437-438
 Mussolini, Benito, 414
 Mustapha Kemal, 269-270, 349
 Mycenæ, 45
- NACHTIGAL, DR GUSTAV, 390
 Nanjing, Treaty of, 493
 Nantes, 186
 Naples, 50, 73
 Napoleon Bonaparte, 180-182
 Natal, 386, 423-426
 Nauru, 390, 402, 450, 509
 Naval bases, American, 464
 Navarre, 16, 96, 97
 Nazi Party, 112, 279
 Nebuchadnezzar, King, 41
 Neckar, river, 61
 Negri Sembilan, 444
 Negrillo peoples, 412
 Negroes, 412; in North America, 474
 Nejd, 427
 Neolithic age, 24, 28, 31
 Neolithic civilization, spread of, (map), 24
 Nepal, 432
 Netherlands, 234, 237-240; Austrian, 181
 Netherlands East Indies, 446-448
 Netherlands Empire, 387, 405-406
 Neuilly, Treaty of, 346
 Neumark, 190
 Neva, river, 169
 New Caledonia, 388, 450
 New Castile, 96
- New England, 379; settlement of, 138
 New Guinea, 402, 446-447
 New Hebrides, 450
 New Zealand, 385, 404, 487, 491-492
 Newfoundland, 396, 404, 469-470
 Nicaragua, 464, 483
 Nice, 181, 183, 233, 234
 Niger, river, 388
 Nigeria, 388, 420
 Nikopoli, 141
 Nile, river, 29, 30, 31, 32, 63, 412, 414; battle of, 182
 Nilotes, 412
 Nimrud, 34
 Nineveh, 34
 Nippur, 33
 Niš, 141, 145
 Nisibin, 34
 Nizhni Novgorod, 166, 366
 Nizhni Tagil, 367
 Nordic people, 147-150
 Norfolk Island, 450
 Noricum, 58, 61
 Normandy, 95
 Normans, in Italy, 101
 Norsemen, 87
 North Africa, 42, 56, 58; products of, 387; French in, 387-388
 North America, settlement of, 139
 North Cape, 21
 North German Confederation, 198
 North Sea, 26
 North Sea Canal, 238
 North-east Passage, 137, 378
 North-west Frontier Province, 433 (map), 438
 North-west Passage, 137, 378
 Norway, united with Sweden, 196
 Norwegian language, 154
 Novgorod, 164, 171
 Novibazar, Sandjak of, 317
 Novogrodek, 305
 Numidia, 56
 Nuremberg, 112, 120, 138
 Nyasaland, 421-422
- OCCUPATION, Allied, of Germany, 278
 Ocean Island, 450, 509
 Odessa, 363
 Offa's Dyke, 84 (map), 85
 Ogaden, 415
 Oil, synthetic, 285
 Old Stone Age, 23
 Olives, 19, 32, 43, 50
 Oman, 428

- Ontario, 385
- 'Open door' policy, 397
- Oporto, 98
- Orange Free State, 423-426
- Orava, 304
- Oregon Territory, 472-473
- Oriente, 480 (and map), 481
- Orleans, 72
- Ormuz, 133
- Orontes, 39
- Osterreich, 115
- Ostia, 58
- Ostmark, the, 115, 117
- Ostrogoths, 68, 69, 70, 101
- Ottawa Agreements, 399
- Otto I, Emperor, 101, 115
- Ottoman Empire, 314-315, 333-334
- Ottoman Turks, 127, 131, 140
- Oxus, river, 52
- PACIFIC OCEAN, 486-488
- Pahang, 444
- Pakistan, 436-437 (maps), 438
- Palatinate, 193
- Palestine, 29, 34, 63, 249, 261, 265-268, 402; economic development of, 268
- Palmyra, 63
- Pan-America, 483-484
- Panama Canal, 453, 463-464, 476
- Panama Canal Zone, 396
- Pannonia, 62
- Panslavism, 316
- Pantelleria, 258
- Papacy, 101
- Papua, 450
- Paraguay, 479, 483
- Paris, 72, 186-187; basin, 16, 70-71; Peace of (1856), 373
- Parnes range, 47
- Parthia, 53, 59
- Partition of Mersen, 91 (map), 92
- Partition of Verdun, 90, 91 (map)
- Partition of Worms, 90, 92
- Pastoralism in Europe, 24-25
- Pathans, 435
- Patræ, 62
- Peace, river, 468
- Peasant parties, 354
- Peasantry of Eastern Europe, 353-356
- Pechora basin, 169
- Peel Report, 267
- Pelagonian Massif, 15
- Pelew Islands, 390
- Peloponnesian War, 48
- Peloponnesus, 42, 68
- Pelusium, 63
- Penang, 389, 444
- Peninsular War, 216-217
- Penjdeh incident, 376
- Pentelicus range, 47
- Perak, 444
- Pereslav, 164, 166
- Pericles, 50
- Perim, 428
- Perlis, 444
- Persepolis, 52
- Persia, 53, 430-432
- Persian Empire, 52
- Persian Gulf, 17, 29, 58
- Persians, 34
- Perth, 385
- Peru, 478, 479, 480
- Peters, Karl, 390
- Petra, 63
- Petsamo, 21, 373
- Philippine Islands, 476, 506-507, 508
- Phœnicians, 39, 41, 42
- Phylloxera, 210
- Piedmont (American), 470
- Pigmentation, 149, 150 (map)
- Pilsudski, Marshal Josef, 299
- Pinerolo, 234
- Pinzon, Vicente Yañez, 135
- Pipe-lines in Middle East, 264-265; in Roumania, 331
- Piræus, 46
- 'Plural societies,' 400, 407
- Podolia, 305
- Poetovio, 61
- Poitou, 13
- Poland, state of, 124-125, 170, 297-307; partitions of, 171, 297; frontiers of, 293 (map), 294, 299-304; languages of, 298 (map); economic development of, 305-307; mineral resources of, 306
- Polish 'Corridor,' 118, 280, 301-304; languages in, 302-303
- Polo, Marco, 133
- Pomerania, 116, 189
- Pompey (Gneius Pompeius Magnus), 56
- Pondicherry, 388
- Pontebba Pass, 5
- Ponthieu, 95
- Pontic Mountains, 28, 42, 58
- Pontus, 63
- Poor Whites, 407, 426

- Population of Europe, 211-214
 Port Arthur, 377, 494, 498
 Port Elizabeth, 423
 Portugal, 226-227; origin of, 98;
 voyagers of, 134-135; as a colonial
 power, 387
 Portuguese Empire, 138, 378, 406,
 422-423
 Potsdam Declaration, 294
 Pottery, 26, 27
 Poznan, 124
 Prague, 125
 Premyslid dynasty, 125
 Prester John, 132
 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 221
 Primorsk, 498
 Pripet Marshes, 305
 Pristina, 129
 Prizren, 129
 Propontis, 50, 51, 63
 Provence, 96, 122
 Pskov, 164
 Ptolemaic kingdom, 52
 Puerto Rico, 452, 476
 Punic Wars, 55
 Punjab, 438
 Pyrenees, the, 15, 16, 71, 216-217
 Pyretus (Pruth), 62
 Pyrrhus, 55

 QATAR, 428
 Quebec, 385

 RACIAL characteristics, 146-151
 Radič, Stefan, 354
 Railway-building in Europe, 200-203
 Rajputana, 435
 Rakoczy, Franz II, 126
 Rand, 426
 Rangoon, 442
 Ravenna, 68
 Ravensburg, 190
 Red Sea, 17, 32, 63
 Reformation, the, 114, 189
 Regensburg, 120
 Regina (Regensburg), 61
 Reims, 72
 Reparations, 277
 Réunion, 388
 Reuss gorge, 120
 Rhine, river, 15, 16, 58, 59, 60, 61; as
 frontier, 180-183
 Rhodes, 42, 103, 141, 257, 260
 Rhodes, Cecil, 389
 Rhodesia, 389, 394, 404, 421-422

 Rhodope, 15
 Rhoetia, 61
 Rhône, river, 15, 16
 Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement, 305,
 370
 Richelieu, Cardinal, policy of, 178
 Rif War, 221, 246
 Riga, 125, 303; Treaty of, 304-305
 Rio de Oro, 406
 Rio Muni, 406
 Riza Khan, 430-431
 Roads, Roman, 70; in France, 187
 Roman settlement, 19
 Roman towns, 107
 Romance speech, 152, 153
 Romansch, 152, 153
 Rome, 53-57; 73, 101
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 458
 Rostock, 116
 Rostov, 166
 Rotterdam, 237, 238
 Rouen, 186
 Roumania, 275-276, 315-317, 318,
 324, 327-331
 Roumanian language, 327
 Roumanians, 126, 323; origin of, 62
 Round Table Conferences, 436
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 182
 Roussillon, 71
 Ruanda-Urundi, 402
 Rudolf of Habsburg, 115
 Ruhr, 206, 286; development of, 207
 Rural population in Eastern Europe, 353
 Russia, 19, 36; vegetation of, 162-164;
 rivers of, 164, 165 (map), 167;
 expansion of, 168-175; languages
 of, 170; economic development of,
 175-176; Swedes in, 195; popula-
 tion of, 212; in 1914, 274-275;
 frontiers of, 359 (map), 370-377;
 industry in, 366-368; agriculture in,
 368; coal and iron production in,
 368; political divisions of, 369-370
 Russian Revolution, 357-358
 Russmen, 164
 Russo-Finnish War, 372
 Russo-Japanese War, 376
 Ruthenes, 310-312, 323, 330
 Ruthenia, 321, 326
 Ruthenia (Sub-Carpathian Russia), 312
 Rybach peninsula, 373
 Rye, 19

 SAALE, river, 61
 Saar basin, 233

- *Sabana*, 55
- Sahara desert, 19, 56
- St Bernard Pass, 101, 104
- St Briec, 79
- St David, 79
- St Germain, Treaty of, 279, 320
- St Gotthard Pass, 104, 120
- St Helena, 396, 463
- Saint Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement, 269
- St Lawrence, river, 468, 469
- St Malo, 186
- St Omer, 106
- St Petersburg (Leningrad), 170, 171; trade of, 175
- St Petroc, 79
- Sakhalin, 174, 377, 498, 499
- Salerno, 104
- Salonika, 303, 336
- Saluzzo, 180, 234
- Samarkand, 133, 367
- Samnites, 55
- Samos, 45
- San Domingo, 451
- San Francisco Conference, 403
- San Stefano, Treaty of, 317, 346 (map)
- Sancho the Great, 96
- Sandjaks, 144
- Saracens, 101
- Sarawak, 404
- Sardinia, 26, 42, 55
- Sargon, 32
- Sarmizegethusa, 62
- Saudi Arabia, 261, 268, 428-430
- Savaria, 61
- Save, 16
- Savoy, 122, 181, 183, 233
- Saxons, 66, 81-85
- Saxony, 113, 119
- Scandinavia, 20, 36
- Scandinavian Shield, 11
- Scarbantia, 61
- Schaffhausen, canton, 124
- Scheduled Classes, 439
- Scheldt, control of, 235, 240
- Schleswig, 81, 277, 278 (map)
- Schlieffen, Alfred, Count von, 274, 275, 291
- Schwyz, canton, 123
- Scotland, 36, 37
- Seistan, 432
- Selangor, 444
- Seleucia, 63
- Seleucids, 52
- Seljuk Turks, 102
- Semites, 412
- Senegal, 388, 419-420
- Senegalese troops, 228
- Senussi, 247, 248
- Separatism in Spain, 222-225
- Sephardim Jews, 159
- Septimania, 71, 94
- Septimer Pass, 101, 104
- Serbia, 67, 274, 315, 317, 318, 333-341, 346
- Serbs, 129, 324, 337-339
- Sèvres, Treaty of, 269, 349, 352
- Seward, William Henry, 505-506
- Shan dynasty, 36
- Shanghai, 494
- Shans, 440
- Shepherd Kings, 32
- Shi'ites, 430
- Siam, 442-444
- Sibenik, 344
- Siberia, 174, 379, 499
- Sicily, 26, 42, 50, 55, 56
- Sidon, 39
- Sierra Leone, 388, 420
- Sierra Morena, 64
- Sikhs, 434, 438
- Sila massif, 55
- Silesia, 116, 191, 299, 300 (map), 301
- Silk manufacture, 207-208
- Silka, 508
- Simon Commission, 436-437
- Simonstown, 463
- Sinai, 27, 31, 32
- Sind, 438
- Singapore, 389, 444, 509
- Sinkiang, 375-376
- Sirmium, 66
- Skanderbeg, 141
- Slavonia, 341
- Slavonic languages, 155-156
- Slavs, 76, 117
- Slovakia, 321, 326; economic development of, 311-312
- Slovaks, 126, 310-312, 323, 330
- Slovenes, 127, 337-339, 324, 344
- Smolensk, 164, 170
- Smyrna, 270, 348, 349
- Sobieski, John, 144
- Society Islands, 388
- Soissons, 70, 72
- Solomon, 41
- Solomon Islands, 450, 510
- Solovetsky, 169
- Solway Firth, 58

- Somaliland, 391, 414-416
 Sopron (Odenburg), 320
 South Africa, Union of, 385-386, 407, 423-426
 South American republics, 383-384
 South Manchurian Railway, 498, 499 (map)
 South-west Africa, 390, 402
 Spahis, 228
 Spain, 42, 55, 56, 64, 74-75, 215-225; agriculture of, 217-218; size of holdings in, 217-220; pastoral industries of, 219; mining in, 219, 220; languages of, 223-225; as a colonial power, 387
 Spalato, 255
 Spanish Civil War, 221-222, 227
 Spanish Empire, 138, 215-216, 378, 406; in the Mediterranean, 246
 Spanish March, 77, 96
 Spanish Netherlands, 234
 Spanish Republic, 221
 Spanish-American War (1898), 463, 476
 Sparta, 48, 62
 Speyer, 90, 113
 Split, 344
 Sporades, 42
 Spreewald, 13
 Stalin, Marshal Joseph, 362
 Stamboliski, Alexander, 354, 356
 Stanley, Henry, 391
 State-building, 90-108
 Stature, 148 (map)
 Steel industry in France and Germany, 206
 Steppes, 17, 20, 21, 35
 Stettin, 116
 Stockdale Report, 452
 Straits (Dardanelles), 351-353; strategic importance of, 353; and Russia, 374
 Straits Settlements, 444
 Stralsund, 116
 Strecknitz Canal, 116
 Strumitza, 342
 Stuttgart, 120
 Sudan, 414; French, 420
 Sudeten Germans, 294, 307-310, 309 (map)
 Sudetenland, 125, 280, 289, 310
 Sueves, 68, 69
 Suez Canal, 186, 243, 248, 249, 387
 Suez, Gulf of, 32
 Sugar-beet, 185, 209, 211
 Sumatra, 448
 Sumeria, 32, 45
 Sundgau, 178, 180
 Sunium, Cape, 47
 Sunnis, 430
 Sušak, 344
 Suvalki region, 305
 Suza, 180
 Suzdal, 166, 171
 Svein, king of Denmark, 87
 Sverdlovsk, 367
 Svyatoslav, 164
 Swabia, 113
 Swabians, 110
 Swaziland, 423
 Sweden, expansion of, 84, 189, 194 (map), 195; in the sixteenth century, 194; mining in, 195
 Swedes, in the Baltic States, 169; in Russia, 171; in North America, 380
 Swedish language, 154
 Swilly, Lough, 461
 Switzerland: languages of, 109; origin of, 120-124
 Syagrius, kingdom of, 70
 Sybaris, 49
 Sydney (N.S.W.), 385
 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 262
 Syria, 18, 34, 39, 42, 51, 58, 63, 73, 249, 262-265, 402
 Syrtes, 64
 Szczchwan, 442, 496
 Szekeli, 322, 323, 327, 330
 TACNA-ARICA area, 478
 Tadzhikistan, 367, 369
 Tamerlane, 141, 166
 Tana, Lake, 414
 Tanais (Don), river, 50
 Tanganyika, 390, 402, 416-417
 Tangier, 246, 250-251
 Tangier Statute, 251
 Tannenberg, battle of (1410), 117
 Tannu-Tuva, 375
 Taranto, 258
 Tarnopol, 305
 Tarraconensis, 64
 Tarshish, 42
 Tartars, 131, 132, 166, 171
 Tashkent, 367
 Tasmán, Abel, 137
 Tasmania, 487
 Tata, J. N., 440
 Tatra Mountains, 61
 Taurus Mountains, 28, 34, 58, 73
 Tchernigov, 164

- Teheran Conference, 320
 Tel Aviv, 268
 Teschen, 304, 310
 Teutoberg, battle of, 59
 Teutones, 57
 Teutonic Knights, 116 (map), 117, 119, 190
 Texas, 472
 Textile industry, 207
 Thais, 442
 Thebes (Egypt), 32
 Thebes (Greece), 46, 47, 50, 51, 128
 Theseus, 46
 Thessalonica (Salonika), 62
 Thessaly, 35, 50, 51, 68
 Thirty Years War, 125, 178, 189, 195, 210
 Thrace, 51, 56, 62, 68, 72, 347, 350
 Thuringia, 119
 Thuringians, 66
 Tiber, river, 53, 100
 Ticino, 124
 Tigris, river, 28, 30, 36, 39
 Tigris-Euphrates valley, 18, 28, 30, 32-34, 36, 51, 58, 73
 Tiryns, 45
 Tisza, 17, 61
 Tobruk, 257
 Togoland, 390, 402
 Toledo, 96
 Tomi (Constantia), 62
 Tonga, 404, 450
 Tongking, 388
 Tonkin, 442
 Torun, 125
 Toul, bishopric of, 178
 Touraine, 95
 Tours, 74
 Trafalgar, battle of, 182
 Trajan, Emperor, 62
 Trans-Caucasia, 360
 Trans-Iranian Railway, 431
 Trans-Siberian Railway, 174, 376, 498
 Transjordan, 268, 402
 Transvaal, 423-426
 Transylvania, 314, 315, 321, 322, 323, 327, 328, 330
 Transylvanian Alps, 15, 61, 62
 Transylvanian Germans, 281
 Treaty Ports, 384, 493, 494
 Treaty revision, 256
 Trebizond, 132
 Trengganu, 444
 Trieste, 16, 68, 344
 Trinidad, 404, 452
 Triple Alliance, 272 (and map)
 Triple Entente, 272 (and map)
 Tripoli (Libya), 257, 391
 Tripoli (Syria), 39, 103
 Tristan and Iseult, legend of, 79
 Trnovo, 141
 Trotsky, Leon, 362
 Troy, 35, 45
 Troyes, 69
 Trusteeship, 401-403
 Tumbes, 480, 481
 Tunis, 245, 387
 Turkestan, 35, 174, 376
 Turkey, 269-271, 276, 346, 428, 429
 Turki-Mongol languages, 156
 Turkish Empire, 140-145, 261, 269, 314
 Turkmenistan, 369
 Turks, 117
 Turksib railway, 376
 Tuscany, 101
 "Twenty-one Demands," 495
 Two Sicilies, Kingdom of, 101
 Tyne, river, 58
 Tyre, 39, 41, 51
 Tyrol, 252-253, 283, 284, 320
 Tyronc, 462
 UBANGI-SHARI, 420
 Ufa, 367
 Uganda, 388, 416-417
 Ukraine, 17, 69, 170, 172-173, 295, 363-364, 369; language of, 173; industries of, 175
 Ulster, 460, 461 (and map), 462
 Uniate church, 170-171
 Union of Kalmar, 196
 United States of America, 407, 470-477
 U.S.S.R., 408. *See also* Russia
 Unkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of, 373
 Unterwalden, canton, 123
 Uppsala, 88
 Ur, 32
 Ural Mountains, 174
 Ural-Altaic languages, 157
 Ural-Caspian plain, 69
 Urban Revolution, 27
 Uri, canton, 123
 Urströmaler, 116
 Uruguay, 477, 478, 482, 483
 Utrecht, 105; Treaty of, 470
 Uzbekistan, 367, 369
 VAL D'AOSTA, 234
 Val di Susa, 234

- Valais, 124
 Valdai Hills, 162
 Valdivia, Pedro de, 136
 Valenciennes, 106
 Valona, 335
 Vandals, 17, 66, 69, 73
 Varangians, 162, 164
 Vardar, 17, 35, 68, 336, 342
 Vargas, President Getulio, 482
 Vasa, house of, 88, 195
 Vegas, 98
 Vegetation belts of Russia, 162, 163
 (map), 165 (map)
 Vei, 55
 Venetian trade, 104-105
 Venezia, 252
 Venezia Giulia, 320, 342, 343 (map), 344
 Venice, 48, 101, 104; Empire of, 103 (map); trade of, 141
 Verde, Cape, 458
 Verdun: Partition of, 111, 177; bishopric of, 177, 178
 Vermandois, 96
 Versailles, Treaty of, 232, 256, 277-279, 401
 Vespucci, Amerigo, 135
 Via Egnatia, 62
 Vienna, 17, 61, 319; sieges of, 143, 314; Award of, 326, 330
 Viipuri, 372
 Vikings, 35, 95
 Villach, 340
Villes drapantes, 106
 Vilna, 170, 305, 372
 Vindobona (Vienna), 61
 Virgin Islands, 452, 464
 Virginia, settlement of, 138
 Visby, 88
 Visigothic Kingdom, 94, 96
 Visigoths, 68, 69, 70, 101
 Vlachs, 153, 336
 Vladimir, 166
 Vladivostok, 174, 358, 376, 377, 498, 499 (map)
 Voivodina, 322, 324, 339
 Volga famine, 363
 Volga Germans, 281
 Volhynia, 305
Völkerwanderung, 73
 Volkov, river, 169
 Volksraad, 447
 Vologda, 169
 Volsci, 55
 Vosges Mountains, 13, 109
 WAHABIS, 430
 Wake, 505
 Waldscemüller, Martin, 136
 Waldshut, 123
 Wales, 27
 Wallace line (East Indies), 447
 Wallachia, 314, 315, 328
 Walloons, 235
 War-lords of China, 495
 Warsaw, 124; Grand Duchy of, 297
 Watling Street, 84 (map), 86
 Weimar Republic, 278
 Welsh language, 154
 Wends, 117
 Wessex, 81, 83
 West Indies, 396
 West Prussia, 118
 Westphalia, Treaty of, 189
 Wheat, 19
 White Australia Policy, 490-491
 White Russia, 369
 'White' Russians, 358
 White Sea, 21, 169
 William of Rubruck, 132
 William of Wied, 335
 Willoughby, Sir Hugh, 137
 Wilson, President Woodrow, 477
 Windward Islands, 452
 Wine-trade of France, 210
 Wismar, 116
 Witos, Wincenty, 354
 World War: First, 274-277; Second, 290-292
 Worms, 90, 113
 Württemberg, 193
 XENOPHON, 51
 YALTA, 15
 Yang-tze valley, 36
 Yaundé, 420
 Yemen, 428
 Yiddish, 159
 Ypres, 106
 Yugoslavia, 16, 337-345; peoples of, 339; frontiers of, 339-345; provinces of, 340-341; trade of, 345
 Yunnan, 442, 498
 ZAGREB, 344
 Zagros Mountains, 28, 30, 31, 34
 Zamora, 96
 Zanzibar, 416-417
 Zara, 255, 344

Zavolochie, 168

Zinoviev, Grigori, 302

Zionism, 160

Ziska, Jan, 125

Zog (Ahmed Zogu), King, of Albania,
335

Zollverein, 196-198

Zonguldak coalfield, 279, 1

Zug, canton, 123

Zulus, 386

Zurich, canton, 123

Zwin, river, 106

